Thursday, February 23, 2012

EIGHT FORMER SECRETARIES OF AGRICULTURE SPEAKING AT USDA'S 2012 AGRICULTURE OUTLOOK FORUM INDUCTED INTO USA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME

EIGHT FORMER SECRETARIES OF AGRICULTURE SPEAKING AT USDA'S 2012 AGRICULTURE OUTLOOK FORUM INDUCTED INTO USA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME

BELOW, are the ones responsible for MAD COW DISEASE in North America. so let’s applaud them all for their great work of exposing us all to the BSE TSE prion agent. THANK YOU VERY MUCH !!! how many of our loved ones are they responsible for killing? all Mike Johanns and Ann Veneman wanted was TRADE, at all cost, including human and animal health. SO LET’S HAVE A PARTY, shall we $$$ pat each other on the back and say what a good job we all did again.

what a joke they all are.





THE USDA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME

Eight Former Secretaries of Agriculture Speaking at USDA’s 2012 Agricultural Outlook Forum

Early Registration $375 until January 23, 2012 * $425 after January 23 Updated: 02/06/2012

Keynote Speaker Tom Vilsack Secretary of Agriculture Welcome Kathleen Merrigan Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Agricultural Economic Outlook Joseph Glauber Chief Economist

Agriculture: Visions of the Future Moderated by Secretary Tom Vilsack Panelists: Former Secretaries of Agriculture

Ed Schafer 2008-2009

Mike Johanns 2005-2008

Ann M. Veneman 2001-2005

Daniel Glickman 1995-2001

Mike Espy 1993-1994

Clayton Yeutter 1989-1991

John Block 1981-1986

Robert Bergland 1977-1981 Dinner Speaker Jim Miller Senior Policy Adviser Senate Budget Committee



http://www.usda.gov/oce/forum/





http://www.usda.gov/oce/forum/POG.htm







A MAD COW REVIEW OF WHAT THESE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR IN NORTH AMERICA, THANKS TO THE USDA, CFIA, AND THE OIE $$$



DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN





''nobody has ever ask''




''they dont want our comment''





''they don't want to know, the don't care''




''i have tried repeatedly''





''level of absolute ignorance''





''Entire policy was driven...heard from mr. laycraft, so now, after time has passed, it's ok for Canada, cattle under 30 month, to the USA, THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERED!





PRUSINER ASKED : IF FROM YOUR TESTIMONY, A DEMONSTRATED THREAT TO PUBLIC HEATH ?





''yes, i think prions are bad to eat, and you can die from them''





http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html







meanwhile, back at the ranch with larry, curly, and mo at USDA ET AL ON BSE ALABAMA STYLE



Epidemiology Update March 23, 2006



http://www.prwatch.org/node/4624






Thursday, October 18, 2007



BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA, A REVIEW OF SORTS



HOW can they find anymore mad cows when the june 2004 enhanced bse cover-up was just that, the testing and protocol for testing was totally flawed, and proven to be so. they floundered every step of the way. and then when the atypicals started showing up, they just shut the testing down. the two suspect cows that samples sat on the shelf for 7+ months that was later confirmed, and the other suspect that sat on the shelf for 4 months, but later thought to be negative UNDER VERY QUESTIONABLE CONDITIONS, but could not have all the proper testing done on it, due to the sample being set in paraffin, which is a no no. they knew that, and that was the end around johanns and dehaven did after fong did the same to them on the 7 month delayed sample. all this done, while GW et al at the USDA were shoving down everyone throats the BSE MRR policy, the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally. ...tss



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html







Friday, March 4, 2011



Alberta dairy cow found with mad cow disease





http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/03/alberta-dairy-cow-found-with-mad-cow.html








Thursday, February 10, 2011





TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY REPORT UPDATE CANADA FEBRUARY 2011 and how to hide mad cow disease in Canada Current as of: 2011-01-31





http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2011/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html









Friday, February 18, 2011





UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS ''PLEADS GUILTY"





http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/02/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html









Wednesday, December 22, 2010





Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow disease ?





http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/12/manitoba-veterinarian-has-been-fined.html






Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half



http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf







-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681









CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENTS MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM





PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDAs Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law. Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the USDA Agreement) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the Targeted Cattle Population). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.



Evidence uncovered during the governments investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDAs ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;



(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDAs testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #



http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/







WHAT ABOUT YOUR CHILDREN EATING ALL THOSE MAD COW HAMBURGERS VIA THE NSLP ???

WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 50 YEARS ???

YOU can thank these folks for the exposure to out children all across the Nation, via the National School Lunch Program NSLP, where for 4 years or more, dead stock downer cattle were fed to our children via the NSLP. dead stock downer cows are the most high risk for mad cow type disease. have your children been exposed ??? are you and them one of the ones that will have a lifetime of what and see, if you get creutzfeldt jakob disease ??? see here ;



SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE



http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/who-will-watch-children.html





http://downercattle.blogspot.com/





DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???



you can check and see here ;



http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/safety/pdf/Hallmark-Westland_byState.pdf







-------- Original Message --------

Subject: DOWNER COW COUNT USA (number as high as 1.5% of all cattle, or nearly 1.8 million cows per year)

Date: Tue, 18 May 2004 12:11:23 –0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder@wt.net

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Greetings List members,

with the ongoing debate of downer cattle going to the human/animal food chain, I thought it might be interesting to look at some past and present data...TSS

March 2002 Livestock Mortalities: Methods of Disposal and Their Potential Costs

snip...

The estimates of livestock mortalities used throughout this report are believed to not include most “downer livestock”, many of which are currently processed into human food at specialized slaughter facilities. The number of downer livestock in the US is unknown, but estimates put the number as high as 1.5% of all cattle, or nearly 1.8 million cows per year (National Market Cow and Bull Audit).

snip...

http://www.renderers.org/economic_impact/MortalitiesFinal.pdf






ALSO, again, I must emphasize the importance of banning ALL DOWNERS for human/animal consumption. WHEN an animal has a CNS disorder, they are apt to fall and brake a leg etc. when symptoms first appear. We must not let political science hinder true science. The agent will just continue to spread. ...TSS





Subject: JOHANNS PONDERING LETTING THOSE MAD COW DOWNERS BACK ON YOUR DINNER PLATE

Date: July 25, 2006 at 12:44 pm PST

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################



US Ban On Downer Cattle Protects Humans From BSE

-Study

WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--The U.S. ban on slaughtering downer cattle – cattle that are too sick or injured to walk - has some effect on keeping consumers safe, but does very little to combat the spread of mad-cow disease in herds, according to an updated Harvard University study.




==============================================================



"The measure does reduce predicted potential human exposure" to mad-cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, by about 3%, the study said, but noted that the downer ban has "little effect" on the average number of animals that could become infected.



==============================================================



The U.S. Department of Agriculture banned downer cattle meat from the human food supply in response to the first infected cow found in the U.S. in December 2003. That rule, though, was only an "interim" measure and has not been replaced yet with a final rule.

The USDA has taken the results of the Harvard Center For Risk Analysis study - updated in October 2005, but not released publicly until now - as it writes final rules to replace temporary BSE safety measures it put in place about three years ago. Draft copies of the USDA final rules have been circulating around USDA for months, but none have been made public.

The USDA has announced finding two more cases of BSE since the first one was discovered in December 2003.

USDA Secretary Mike Johanns, when asked recently whether the department would continue its ban on downer cattle on a permanent basis, said no decision had been reached yet.

Johanns said July 20 that there have been "a number of meetings on that over the past few months."

The existing, yet temporary, downer prohibition can be unfair to ranchers, Johanns has said in the past. In a March 2005 interview, he noted that many downer cattle suffer some sort of injury such as a broken leg and present no disease risk.

U.S. cattle and beef industry groups generally opposed the restriction on downer cattle because they are worth far more when slaughtered for human food.

Ranchers sold about 150,000 head of downer cattle a year to slaughterhouses before the prohibition was enacted, according to data compiled by the National Cattlemen's Beef Association.

Source: Bill Tomson; Dow Jones Newswires; 202-646-0088; bill.tomson@dowjones.com


http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=54885





Johanns states ;

USDA Secretary Mike Johanns, when asked recently whether the department would continue its ban on downer cattle on a permanent basis, said no decision had been reached yet.

Johanns said July 20 that there have been "a number of meetings on that over the past few months."

The existing, yet temporary, downer prohibition can be unfair to ranchers, Johanns has said in the past. In a March 2005 interview, he noted that many downer cattle suffer some sort of injury such as a broken leg and present no disease risk. ......end



Greetings,



I can see the writing on the wall, those mad cow downers are going back to the market regardless, it's just a matter of a little more time, and a lot more spin, hey, but those triple BSE firewalls been in place since 8/4/97, and no problem in the USA, just Canada ;-) and nobody knows about Mexico, but all Three are classified as BSE GBR III, but then GW et al change rules to BSE MRR, which we all know what this means, the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally, and that's just what is happeing. ...TSS



BSE Regulation Has Not Been Fully Implemented by the Feed Industry To determine how firms were implementing the June 1997 BSE regulation, FDA, with the assistance of state officials, inspected over 9,100 firms from January 1998 through January 2000. Table 1 shows the types and number of firms inspected.

Table 1: Types of Firms Inspected a Includes haulers and distributors of feed, and firms or persons who receive prohibited materials directly from manufacturers. Source: FDA. The BSE inspection results revealed that 1,688 of the 9,184 firms were not aware of the new BSE feed regulation. Furthermore, inspection results of the 2,481 firms that were identified as handling “prohibited” material— Type of firm Number of firms inspected Licensed feed mill 1,029 Nonlicensed feed mill 4,901 Ruminant feeder 1,400 Dairy farm 495 Renderer 211 Protein blender 121 Othera 1,027 Total 9,184 B-285212 Page 12 GAO/RCED-00-255 Safety of Animal Feed material that is not allowed to be fed to ruminants—revealed some serious deficiencies. For example:

• Required cautionary statement not on product label. Of the firms inspected, 699, or 28 percent, did not label their products with the required cautionary statement that the feed should not be fed to cattle or other ruminants.

• Required records not properly maintained. One-hundred and thirtyseven firms, or about 6 percent, did not properly maintain the name and address of the consignee of their products, which would make it difficult to trace sales of contaminated feed.

In addition, of the 1,771 firms that manufacture both prohibited and nonprohibited material, 361, or 20 percent, did not have a system in place to prevent commingling and cross-contamination, as required by the regulation.

Because renderers and FDA-licensed feed mills are at the greatest risk of introducing BSE to a wide segment of the animal feed market, the inspection results for these firms were particularly disturbing. For example,

• Twenty-three of the 211 renderers inspected, about 11 percent, were not aware of the BSE regulation.

• Twenty-seven of the 163 renderers that handle prohibited material, about 17 percent, did not label their products with the required cautionary statement.

• Ten of the 63 renderers that manufacture both prohibited and nonprohibited material, about 16 percent, did not have a system in place to prevent commingling.

The results for the FDA-licensed feed mills were similar. For example,

• Sixty-three of the 1,023 mills, about 6 percent, were not aware of the regulation.

• Eighty-five of the 409 mills that handle prohibited material, about 21 percent, did not label their products with the required cautionary statement.

• Thirty-seven of the 300 mills that manufacture both prohibited and nonprohibited material, about 12 percent, did not have a system in place to prevent commingling.

B-285212

Page 13 GAO/RCED-00-255 Safety of Animal Feed

FDA told us that as a result of the BSE inspections, two warning letters have been issued and five firms have voluntarily recalled products. As of July 2000, however, FDA had not completed its analysis of the inspection results and had not updated its enforcement strategy for achieving industry compliance with the BSE regulation. FDA also told us that the next rounds of BSE inspections will include only those firms that handle prohibited material. In addition, FDA told us it will direct its efforts towards those firms or segments of the industry that are not in compliance with the regulation. ........

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00255.pdf










NOT MUCH HAS CHANGED, EVEN IN 2006. ...TSS







----- Original Message -----



From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To:

Sent: Sunday, July 16, 2006 9:26 AM

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE - USDA/FDA TRIPLE BSE FIREWALL CONTINUES TO FAIL





##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

#####################





TSS

MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE

Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22

71.248.128.67





RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,

Recall # V-079-6;

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),

Recall # V-080-6;

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL

FEED, Recall # V-081-6;

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6

CODE

a) Bulk

b) None

c) Bulk

d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and

by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.



REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone

meal.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

10,878.06 tons



DISTRIBUTION

Nationwide





END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html







JOHANNS ET AL STATE ON JULY 13, 2006 REGARDING CANADA'S SEVENTH CASE OF BSE,

FROM ULAN BATOR, MONGOLIA ;

''I am dispatching a USDA expert to participate in the investigation of this

case, particularly as it relates to how this animal may have been exposed to

BSE infected material.''

http://www.usda.gov/







MY GOD, that's like the blind leading the blind, what a hoot. WHAT Johanns

et al need to do first is figure out why the USDA's supposedly BSE triple

firewalls have failed so terribly here in the USA, why not only the feed ban

has failed, but also the infamous rigged June 2004 Enhanced BSE surveillance

program where everything from the BSE testing protocols, the BSE

surveillance, and the BSE feed bans have all failed time and time again

since the August 4, 1997 _partial_ and _voluntary_ mad cow feed ban was put

in place. IT'S a failed policy PERIOD, and the testing results meaningless

considering all of the above, and this is not only my opinion, this is fact,

and I will be glad to reference any and all for those that just don't get

it. IT's all been referenced here time and time again over the years. ...





still disgusted in Sunny, Hot, Bacliff, Texas





TSS





#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html

####################





#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################



SO, FOR THE FOLLOWING, SCIENTIFICALLY PROVEN SOUND REASONS i.e. (failed, flawed, corrupt, BSE, CWD, Scrapie typical and atypical surveillance, and eradication efforts of the USDA, APHIS, FSIS, FDA, NIH, CDC, et al, I HAVE NOMINATED ALL OF THE ABOVE, INTO THE;



USDA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME.

FIRST, LET’S start with that mad cow feed ban, you know the one, the August 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban, that was nothing but ink on paper. looked good too. one thing wrong though, it was NEVER ENFORCE MUCH. with 10,000,000 MILLION POUNDS OF BLOOD LACED MEAT AND BONE MEAL GOING INTO COMMERCE TO BE FED OUT AS LATE AS ONE DECADE (10 YEARS) POST PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY INK ON PAPER MAD COW FEED BAN, THIS IN 2007. They called the mad cow feed ban a part of that famous TRIPLE MAD COW BSE FIREWALL. a supposedly failsafe to mad cow disease in the USA. well, that failed too.

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm





see much more tonnage of recalled prohibited banned suspect BSE contaminated feed here ;

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU

Berne, 2010 TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html







Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR>

Prion disease update 2010 (11) PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=20101206.4364







2012



2012, where still feeding cows to cows, but the have made the reports so complicated by it’s system, you really can’t say how much mad cow protein is in commerce now ;

Sunday, February 5, 2012

February 2012 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/february-2012-update-on-feed.html







NEXT, what about that mad cow suveillance program that was so terribly flawed, one of the top Prion scientist at CDC, Paul Brown, that he trusted NOTHING they did following the blunder of the 2ND TEXAS MAD COW, where Texas was finally caught in the act of covering up a mad cow, after they successfully covered up one before. THIS time, the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG MAD JOHANNS TEST THAT SUSPECT MAD COW AGAIN, this time in Weybridge UK, and low and behold, the cow WAS FINALLY CONFIRMED HAVING MAD COW DISEASE, some 7+ MONTHS AFTER THE FACT, all the while the USDA pushed through the BSE Minimal Risk Region, a legal tool they could now use to trade TSE PRION disease globally. THAT COW HAD A 48 HOUR TURN AROUND by BSE regulations. but BSE regulations means nothing in the USA. see for yourself ;




Friday, February 18, 2011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS ''PLEADS GUILTY"

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/02/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html







Wednesday, November 17, 2010

MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2010/11/mad-cow-testing-faked-in-usa-by.html





Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf





THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;



CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve Mitchell writes:

Analysis: What that mad cow means

By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent

WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.

Despite this, Brown said the U.S. prevalence of mad cow, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, did not significantly threaten human or cattle health.

"Overall, my view is BSE is highly unlikely to pose any important risk either in cattle feed or human feed," he said.

However, Jean Halloran of Consumers Union in Yonkers, N.Y., said consumers should be troubled by the USDA's secrecy and its apparent plan to dramatically cut back the number of mad cow tests it conducts.

"Consumers should be very concerned about how little we know about the USDA's surveillance program and the failure of the USDA to reveal really important details," Halloran told UPI. "Consumers have to be really concerned if they're going to cut back the program," she added.

Last year the USDA tested more than 300,000 animals for the disease, but it has proposed, even in light of a third case, scaling back the program to 40,000 tests annually.

"They seem to be, in terms of actions and policies, taking a lot more seriously the concerns of the cattle industry than the concerns of consumers," Halloran said. "It's really hard to know what it takes to get this administration to take action to protect the public."

The USDA has insisted that the safeguards of a ban on incorporating cow tissue into cattle feed (which is thought to spread the disease) and removal of the most infectious parts of cows, such as the brain and spinal cord, protect consumers. But the agency glosses over the fact that both of these systems have been revealed to be inadequately implemented.

The feed ban, which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration, has been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in two reports, the most recent coming just last year. The GAO said the FDA's enforcement of the ban continues to have weaknesses that "undermine the nation's firewall against BSE."

USDA documents released last year showed more than 1,000 violations of the regulations requiring the removal of brains and spinal cords in at least 35 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with some plants being cited repeatedly for infractions. In addition, a violation of similar regulations that apply to beef exported to Japan is the reason why Japan closed its borders to U.S. beef in January six weeks after reopening them.

Other experts also question the adequacy of the USDA's surveillance system. The USDA insists the prevalence of mad cow disease is low, but the agency has provided few details of its surveillance program, making it difficult for outside experts to know if the agency's monitoring plan is sufficient.

"It's impossible to judge the adequacy of the surveillance system without having a breakdown of the tested population by age and risk status," Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments, told UPI.

"Everybody would be happier and more confident and in a sense it might be able to go away a little bit for (the USDA) if they would just publish a breakdown on the tests," Mumford added.

UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days. This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized that it cannot locate it.

Mumford said the prevalence of the disease in U.S. herds is probably quite low, but there have probably been other cases that have so far gone undetected. "They're only finding a very small fraction of that low prevalence," she said.

Mumford expressed surprise at the lack of concern about the deadly disease from American consumers. "I would expect the U.S. public to be more concerned," she said.

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics, a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or more easily transmitted from person to person.

"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures" and even through the blood supply, Moser said.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved




http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r





http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2003/12/30/Mad-Cow-Linked-to-thousands-of-CJD-cases/UPI-47861072816318/







CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ...

Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ...

Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm





PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html





OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program ­ Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf





Tuesday, January 1, 2008

BSE OIE USDA

Subject: OIE BSE RECOMMENDATION FOR USA, bought and paid for by your local cattle dealers i.e. USDA

Date: May 14, 2007 at 9:00 am PST

OIE BSE RECOMMENDATION FOR USA, bought and paid for by your local cattle dealers i.e. USDA

STATEMENT BY DR. RON DEHAVEN REGARDING OIE RISK RECOMMENDATION

March 9, 2007

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html





they did not want to find BSE, and never intended to. ...tss





Tuesday, November 02, 2010

IN CONFIDENCE

The information contained herein should not be disseminated further except on the basis of "NEED TO KNOW".

BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html





2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html





U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Greetings List Members,

I was lucky enough to sit in on this BSE conference call today and even managed to ask a question. that is when the trouble started.

I submitted a version of my notes to Sandra Blakeslee of the New York Times, whom seemed very upset, and rightly so.

"They tell me it is a closed meeting and they will release whatever information they deem fit. Rather infuriating."

and i would have been doing just fine, until i asked my question. i was surprised my time to ask a question so quick.

(understand, these are taken from my notes for now. the spelling of names and such could be off.)

[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD Watch.

[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]

[host Richard] could you repeat the question?

[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?

[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.

[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary

[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?

[not sure whom speaking] NO

from this point, i was still connected, got to listen and tape the whole conference. at one point someone came on, a woman, and ask again;

[unknown woman] what group are you with?

[TSS] CJD Watch and my Mom died from hvCJD we are trying to tract down CJD and other human TSE's world wide. i was invited to sit in on this from someone inside the USDA/APHIS and that is why i am here. do you intend on banning me from this conference now?

at this point the conference was turned back up, and i got to finish listening. They never answered or even addressed my one question, or even addressed the issue. BUT, i will try and give you a run-down for now, of the conference.

IF i were another Country, I would take heed to my notes, BUT PLEASE do not depend on them. ask for transcript from;

RBARNS@ORA.FDA.GOV 301-827-6906

he would be glad to give you one ;-)

Rockville Maryland, Richard Barns Host

BSE issues in the U.S., How they were labelling ruminant feed? Revising issues.

The conference opened up with the explaining of the U.K. BSE epidemic winding down with about 30 cases a week.

although new cases in other countries were now appearing.

Look at Germany whom said NO BSE and now have BSE.

BSE increasing across Europe.

Because of Temporary Ban on certain rendered product, heightened interest in U.S.

A recent statement in Washington Post, said the New Administration (old GW) has a list of issues. BSE is one of the issues.

BSE Risk is still low, minimal in U.S. with a greater interest in MBM not to enter U.S.

HOWEVER, if BSE were to enter the U.S. it would be economically disastrous to the render, feed, cattle, industries, and for human health.

(human health-they just threw that in cause i was listening. I will now jot down some figures in which they told you, 'no need to write them down'. just hope i have them correct. hmmm, maybe i hope i don't ???)

80% inspection of rendering

*Problem-Complete coverage of rendering HAS NOT occurred.

sizeable number of 1st time FAILED INITIAL INSPECTION, have not been reinspected (70% to 80%).

Compliance critical, Compliance poor in U.K. and other European Firms.

Gloria Dunason Major Assignment 1998 goal TOTAL compliance. This _did not_ occur. Mixed level of compliance, depending on firm.

Rendering FDA license and NON FDA license

system in place for home rendering & feed 76% in compliance 79% cross contamination 21% DID NOT have system 92% record keeping less than 60% total compliance

279 inspectors 185 handling prohibited materials

Renderer at top of pyramid, significant part of compliance. 84% compliance

failed to have caution statement render 72% compliance & cross contamination caution statement on feed, 'DO NOT FEED TO CATTLE'

56 FIRMS NEVER INSPECTED

1240 FDA license feed mills 846 inspected

"close to 400 feed mills have not been inspected"

80% compliance for feed.

10% don't have system.

NON-FDA licensed mills There is NO inventory on non licensed mills. approximately 6000 to 8000 Firms ??? 4,344 ever inspected. "FDA does not have a lot of experience with"

40% do NOT have caution statement 'DO NOT FEED'.

74% Commingling compliance

"This industry needs a lot of work and only half gotten to"

"700 Firms that were falitive, and need to be re-inspected, in addition to the 8,000 Firms."

Quote to do BSE inspection in 19 states by end of January or 30 days, and other states 60 days. to change feed status??? Contract check and ask questions and pass info.

At this time, we will take questions.

[I was about the third or fourth to ask question. then all B.S.eee broke loose, and i lost my train of thought for a few minutes. picked back up here]

someone asking about nutritional supplements and sourcing, did not get name. something about inspectors not knowing of BSE risk??? the conference person assuring that Steve Follum? and the TSE advisory Committee were handling that.

Some other Dr. Vet, whom were asking questions that did not know what to do???

[Dennis Wilson] California Food Agr. Imports, are they looking at imports?

[Conference person] they are looking at imports, FDA issued imports Bulletin.

[Linda Singeltary ??? this was a another phone in question, not related i don't think] Why do we have non-licensed facilities?

(conference person) other feed mills do not handle as potent drugs???

Dennis Blank, Ken Jackson licensed 400 non FDA 4400 inspected of a total of 6000 to 8000, (they really don't know how many non licensed Firms in U.S. they guess 6000 to 8000??? TSS)

Linda Detwiler asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number, unless last resort. (i thought of calling them today, and reporting the whole damn U.S. cattle herd ;-) 'not'

Warren-Maryland Dept. Agr. Prudent to re-inspect after 3 years. concerned of Firms that have changed owners.

THE END

TSS

############ http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############



snip...see full text and more here on tissue donor herds and the TSE Prion disease ;



U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

http://tseac.blogspot.com/2011/02/usa-50-state-bse-mad-cow-conference.html





Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in

Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website:

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Risk_Assessments/index.asp).





Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS.

Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary.

This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf





Owens, Julie

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM

To: FSIS RegulationsComments

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

Page 1 of 98

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf





FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf





-------- Original Message --------

Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease

Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: affairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us

Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............

snip...

There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...

Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx

Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST In Reply to: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:



=====================================


Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected. just pondering... TSS


=====================================




MAD COW IN TEXAS NOVEMBER 2004. ...TSS

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW fromTEXAS ???

Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: Carla EverettReferences: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us>

Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;

Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?

I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...

can you confirm??? terry

==================================================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]>

The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas.

Carla

At 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:

Greetings Carla,

i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from

TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?

thank you,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>

======================================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us><[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]us> <[log in to unmask]>

our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something.

At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,

you wrote:

why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:

November 22: Press Release title here

star image More BSE information

terry

Carla Everett wrote:

no confirmation on the U.S.'inconclusive test...

no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>

ABOUT 8 MONTHS LATER, AFTER A GLOBAL OUTCRY BY SCIENTIST AND AN ACT OF CONGRESS, THIS COW WAS FINALLY CONFIRMED. ...tss

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA



Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

####

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html





http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/







Wednesday, May 25, 2011

O.I.E. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission and prion (TSE) disease reporting 2011

----- Original Message -----

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

To: BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG

Cc: trade@oie.int ; oie@oie.int ; f.diaz@oie.int ; scientific.dept@oie.int ; cjdvoice@yahoogroups.com ; BLOODCJD@YAHOOGROUPS.COM



Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 2:24 PM

Subject: O.I.E. Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission and prion (TSE) disease reporting 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/05/oie-terrestrial-animal-health-standards.html







Friday, January 6, 2012

OIE 2012 Training Manual on Wildlife Diseases and Surveillance and TSE Prion disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/oie-2012-training-manual-on-wildlife.html





Cjd texas 38 year old female worked slaughtering cattle exposed to brain and spinal

CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER

Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas

Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas.She left 6 Kids and a Husband.The Purpose of this web is to give information in Spanish to the Hispanic community, and to all the community who want's information about this terrible disease.-

Physician Discharge Summary, Parkland Hospital, Dallas Texas

Admit Date: 12/29/2009 Discharge Date: 1/20/2010 Attending Provider: Greenberg, Benjamin Morris; General Neurology Team: General Neurology Team

snip...

The husband says that they have lived in Nebraska for the past 21 years. They had seen a doctor there during the summer time who prescribed her Seroquel and Lexapro, Thinking these were sx of a mood disorder. However, the medications did not help and she continued to deteriorate clinically. Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. The husband says that he does not know any fellow workers with a similar illness. He also says that she did not have any preceeding illness or travel.

http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8





>>> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<



please see full text ;

CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER

http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html





To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.



http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2





14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

18.173 page 189

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.

http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/



http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf



http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml





14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf





Thursday, January 26, 2012

Facilitated Cross-Species Transmission of Prions in Extraneural Tissue

Science 27 January 2012: Vol. 335 no. 6067 pp. 472-475 DOI: 10.1126/science.1215659

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/facilitated-cross-species-transmission.html





Thursday, January 26, 2012

The Risk of Prion Zoonoses

Science 27 January 2012: Vol. 335 no. 6067 pp. 411-413 DOI: 10.1126/science.1218167


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/risk-of-prion-zoonoses.html





http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/






Tuesday, February 14, 2012

White House budget proposes cuts to ag programs including TSE PRION disease aka mad cow type disease

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/white-house-budget-proposes-cuts-to-ag.html





Thursday, February 16, 2012

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE

31 USA SENATORS ASK PRESIDENT OBAMA TO HELP SPREAD MAD COW DISEASE 2012

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-bse-31.html





Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html





Sunday, June 26, 2011

Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-analysis-of-low-dose-prion.html





Friday, December 23, 2011

Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model

Volume 18, Number 1—January 2012 Dispatch

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/12/oral-transmission-of-l-type-bovine.html







Increased Atypical Scrapie Detections

Press reports indicate that increased surveillance is catching what otherwise would have been unreported findings of atypical scrapie in sheep. In 2009, five new cases have been reported in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. With the exception of Quebec, all cases have been diagnosed as being the atypical form found in older animals. Canada encourages producers to join its voluntary surveillance program in order to gain scrapie-free status. The World Animal Health will not classify Canada as scrapie-free until no new cases are reported for seven years. The Canadian Sheep Federation is calling on the government to fund a wider surveillance program in order to establish the level of prevalence prior to setting an eradication date. Besides long-term testing, industry is calling for a compensation program for farmers who report unusual deaths in their flocks.

http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/This%20Week%20in%20Canadian%20Agriculture%20%20%20%20%20Issue%2028_Ottawa_Canada_11-6-2009.pdf





J Vet Diagn Invest 21:454-463 (2009)

Nor98 scrapie identified in the United States

Christie M. Loiacono,' Bruce V. Thomsen, S. Mark Hall, Matti Kiupe!, Diane Sutton, Katherine O'Rourke, Bradd Barr, Lucy Anthenill, Deiwyn Keane

Abstract.

A distinct strain of scrapic identified in sheep of Norway in 1998 has since been identified in numerous countries throughout Europe. The disease is known as Nor98 or Not-98-like scrapic. among other names. Distinctions between classic scrapie and Nor98 scrapie are made based on histopathologv and immunodiagnostic results. There are also differences in the epidemiology, typical signalment, and likelihood of clinical signs being observed. In addition, sheep that have genotypes associated with resistance to classic scrapie are not spared from Nor98 disease. The various differences between classic and Nor98 scrapie have been consistently reported in the vast majority of cases described across Europe. The current study describes in detail the patholo gic changes and diagnostic results of the first 6 cases of' Nor98 scrapic disease diagnosed in sheep of the United States.

Key words: Hisiopathology: Nor98: PrP imniunolabeling; scrapie: sheep.

snip...

Results

Case I

The first case identified as consistent with Nor98 scrapie had nonclassic PrP distribution in brain tissue, no PrPSC in lymph tissue, and nonclassic migration of protein bands on a Western blot test. The animal was an aged, mottled-faced ewe that was traced back to a commercial flock in Wyoming. ...

Case 2

The second case was a clinically normal 8-year-old Suffolk ewe that had been in a quarantined flock for 5 years at a USDA facility in Iowa.

Case 3

A 16-year-old, white-faced, cross-bred wether was born to a black-faced ewe. He lived his entire life as a pet on a farm in California.

Case 4

The fourth case of Nor98 scrapie was identified in an approximately 8-year-old Dorset ewe that was born into a flock of approximately 20 ewes in Indiana.

Case 5

The fifth case was a clinically normal, approximately 3-year-old, white-faced, cross-bred ewe from an approximately 400 head commercial flock in Minnesota.

Case 6

The sixth case of Nor98 scrapie was identified in a 4-year-old, white-faced ewe that was purchased and added to a commercial flock in Pennsylvania

snip...

see full text ;





http://ddr.nal.usda.gov/bitstream/10113/33943/1/IND44241920.pdf





Sunday, October 3, 2010

Scrapie, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, and BSE in sheep and goats North America, who's looking ?



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/10/scrapie-nor-98-atypical-scrapie-and-bse.html





http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/





CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD MAD DEER AND ELK DISEASE

2012

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD WISCONSIN Almond Deer (Buckhorn Flats) Farm Update DECEMBER 2011

> > > The CWD infection rate was nearly 80%, the highest ever in a North American captive herd.

Despite the five year premise plan and site decontamination, The WI DNR has concerns over the bioavailability of infectious prions at this site to wild white-tail deer should these fences be removed. Current research indicates that prions can persist in soil for a minimum of 3 years.

However, Georgsson et al. (2006) concluded that prions that produced scrapie disease in sheep remained bioavailable and infectious for at least 16 years in natural Icelandic environments, most likely in contaminated soil.

Additionally, the authors reported that from 1978-2004, scrapie recurred on 33 sheep farms, of which 9 recurrences occurred 14-21 years after initial culling and subsequent restocking efforts; these findings further emphasize the effect of environmental contamination on sustaining TSE infectivity and that long-term persistence of prions in soils may be substantially greater than previously thought. < < <



http://dnr.wi.gov/org/nrboard/2011/december/12-11-2b2.pdf





SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2011/12/chronic-wasting-disease-cwd-wisconsin.html





Thursday, February 09, 2012

50 GAME FARMS IN USA INFECTED WITH CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/02/50-game-farms-to-date-in-usa-infected.html





QUESTION ???



now that we have ultra-sensitive tests for exceedingly low levels of infections prions, how about testing some of the cwd-exposed fish and game guys as well as hunters known to have eaten cwd positive meat prior to learning test results???

waiting for epidemiology results to trickle in over decades is not the way for CDC to go.





Our findings demonstrate that cervid PrPSc, upon strain adaptation by serial passages in vitro or in cervid transgenic mice, is capable of converting human PrPC to produce PrPSc with unique biochemical properties, likely representing a new human prion strain. The newly generated CWD-huPrPSc material has been inoculated into transgenic mice expressing human PrP to study infectivity and disease phenotype and this data will be published elsewhere. ...end

http://www.jbc.org/content/early/2011/01/04/jbc.M110.198465.long







then you had this old data ;

CJD9/10022

October 1994

Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ

Dear Mr Elmhirst,

CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT

Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.

The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.

The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.

The statistical results reqarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.

I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.

http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf





don't forget too ;



5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

snip...

R. BRADLEY

http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102222950/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/23001001.pdf





From: TSS (216-119-163-189.ipset45.wt.net)

Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???

Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST

From: "Belay, Ermias"

To:

Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"

Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM

Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS

Dear Sir/Madam, In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD.

That assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article and call me if you have questions or need more clarification (phone: 404-639-3091). Also, we do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with prion disease from eating venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in any other forum is limited to the patients we investigated.

Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

-----Original Message-----

From:

Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM

To: [log in to unmask]">[log in to unmask]; [log in to unmask]">[log in to unmask]; [log in to unmask]">[log in to unmask]

Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS

Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM ......snip........end..............TSS

snip...

full text ;

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2009/02/exotic-meats-usa-announces-urgent.html



http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2009/03/noahs-ark-holding-llc-dawson-mn-recall.html





Thursday, April 03, 2008

A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease

2008 1: Vet Res. 2008 Apr 3;39(4):41

A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease

Sigurdson CJ.

snip...

*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,

snip...

full text ;

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html





Wednesday, November 16, 2011





Wisconsin Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, CWD, TSE, PRION REPORTING 2011



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/wisconsin-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cwd.html





Sunday, November 13, 2011





COLORADO CWD CJD TSE PRION REPORTING 2011





http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/colorado-cwd-cjd-tse-prion-reporting.html





Monday, November 14, 2011





WYOMING Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, CWD, TSE, PRION REPORTING 2011





http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/wyoming-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cwd.html







Saturday, February 18, 2012

Occurrence, Transmission, and Zoonotic Potential of Chronic Wasting Disease

CDC Volume 18, Number 3—March 2012

*** CDC REPORT MARCH 2012 ***

Indirect Environmental Transmission

Environmental transmission of the CWD agent was reported in studies demonstrating that an infected deer carcass left in a pasture for 2 years could transmit the agent to immunologically naive deer (17). Exposure of naive deer to pasture previously inhabited by an infected deer also led to CWD transmission, as did cohabitation of naive and infected deer (17). Naive deer exposed to water, feed buckets, and bedding used by CWD-infected deer contracted the disease (18).

Epidemiologic modeling suggests that indirect environmental routes of CWD transmission also play a major role in transmission (8). Environmental transmission of scrapie is well documented, and scrapie prions may remain infectious after years in the environment (19,20; S.E. Saunders, unpub. data). Nevertheless, environmental transmission of scrapie may be less efficient than transmission by direct contact (19). Conversely, the relative efficiency of CWD transmission by direct contact versus indirect, environmental routes remains unclear, but evidence suggests environmental transmission may be a major mechanism (8). The proportion of transmission by direct versus indirect routes may vary not only between captive and free-ranging cervid populations, but also among cervid species and free-ranging habitats and ecosystems. Transmission dynamics may also vary over time as CWD prevalence and ecosystem residence times continue to increase (8).

If the environment serves as a reservoir of CWD infectivity, hot spots of concentrated prion infectivity could be formed at areas of communal activity where shedding occurs (Figure 3) (12). Animal mortality sites, where highly infectious CNS matter would enter the environment, could also be hot spots (21). In a study of deer carcass decomposition in Wisconsin, carcasses persisted for 18–101 days depending on the season, and were visited by deer (22). In addition, cervid carcasses are visited by numerous scavenger species, such as raccoons, opossums, coyotes, vultures, and crows, which could consume and transport CWD-infected tissue and increase CWD spread (21,22). Thus, there is the potential for CWD to spread from sites of animal deaths. Predators may also contribute to spread of the CWD agent and transmission (5), as could transport by surface water (23) or insect vectors. Natural migration and dispersion of cervids is also a likely mechanism of geographic spread of CWD (24).

Given that cervids habitually ingest considerable amounts of soil, soil has been hypothesized to play a key role in CWD transmission (Figure 3) (11,20; S.E. Saunders et al., unpub. data). Inhalation of dust-bound CWD prions may also represent a route of transmission. It is known that CWD prions can bind to a range of soils and soil minerals (25,26) and retain the ability to replicate (27). In addition, rodent prions retain or gain infectivity when bound to soil and soil minerals (20,27; S.E. Saunders et al., unpub. data). Prion fate and transmission in soil has been recently reviewed (20). Although the potential for CWD transmission by soil and soil reservoirs is considerable, this transmission remains to be directly evaluated with cervids.

CWD Zoonotic Potential, Species Barriers, and Strains

Current Understanding of the CWD Species Barrier

Strong evidence of zoonotic transmission of BSE to humans has led to concerns about zoonotic transmission of CWD (2,3). As noted above, CWD prions are present nearly ubiquitously throughout diseased hosts, including in muscle, fat, various glands and organs, antler velvet, and peripheral and CNS tissue (2,14,15). Thus, the potential for human exposure to CWD by handling and consumption of infectious cervid material is substantial and increases with increased disease prevalence.

Interspecies transmission of prion diseases often yields a species-barrier effect, in which transmission is less efficient compared with intraspecies transmission, as shown by lower attack rates and extended incubation periods (3,28). The species barrier effect is associated with minor differences in PrPc sequence and structure between the host and target species (3). Prion strain (discussed below) and route of inoculation also affect the species barrier (3,28). For instance, interspecies transmission by intracerebral inoculation is often possible but oral challenge is completely ineffective (29).

Most epidemiologic studies and experimental work have suggested that the potential for CWD transmission to humans is low, and such transmission has not been documented through ongoing surveillance (2,3). In vitro prion replication assays report a relatively low efficiency of CWD PrPSc-directed conversion of human PrPc to PrPSc (30), and transgenic mice overexpressing human PrPc are resistant to CWD infection (31); these findings indicate low zoonotic potential. However, squirrel monkeys are susceptible to CWD by intracerebral and oral inoculation (32). Cynomolgus macaques, which are evolutionarily closer to humans than squirrel monkeys, are resistant to CWD infection (32). Regardless, the finding that a primate is orally susceptible to CWD is of concern.

Interspecies transmission of CWD to noncervids has not been observed under natural conditions. CWD infection of carcass scavengers such as raccoons, opossums, and coyotes was not observed in a recent study in Wisconsin (22). In addition, natural transmission of CWD to cattle has not been observed in experimentally controlled natural exposure studies or targeted surveillance (2). However, CWD has been experimentally transmitted to cattle, sheep, goats, mink, ferrets, voles, and mice by intracerebral inoculation (2,29,33).

CWD is likely transmitted among mule, white-tailed deer, and elk without a major species barrier (1), and other members of the cervid family, including reindeer, caribou, and other species of deer worldwide, may be vulnerable to CWD infection. Black-tailed deer (a subspecies of mule deer) and European red deer (Cervus elaphus) are susceptible to CWD by natural routes of infection (1,34). Fallow deer (Dama dama) are susceptible to CWD by intracerebral inoculation (35). Continued study of CWD susceptibility in other cervids is of considerable interest.

Reasons for Caution

There are several reasons for caution with respect to zoonotic and interspecies CWD transmission. First, there is strong evidence that distinct CWD strains exist (36). Prion strains are distinguished by varied incubation periods, clinical symptoms, PrPSc conformations, and CNS PrPSc depositions (3,32). Strains have been identified in other natural prion diseases, including scrapie, BSE, and CJD (3). Intraspecies and interspecies transmission of prions from CWD-positive deer and elk isolates resulted in identification of >2 strains of CWD in rodent models (36), indicating that CWD strains likely exist in cervids. However, nothing is currently known about natural distribution and prevalence of CWD strains. Currently, host range and pathogenicity vary with prion strain (28,37). Therefore, zoonotic potential of CWD may also vary with CWD strain. In addition, diversity in host (cervid) and target (e.g., human) genotypes further complicates definitive findings of zoonotic and interspecies transmission potentials of CWD.

Intraspecies and interspecies passage of the CWD agent may also increase the risk for zoonotic CWD transmission. The CWD prion agent is undergoing serial passage naturally as the disease continues to emerge. In vitro and in vivo intraspecies transmission of the CWD agent yields PrPSc with an increased capacity to convert human PrPc to PrPSc (30). Interspecies prion transmission can alter CWD host range (38) and yield multiple novel prion strains (3,28). The potential for interspecies CWD transmission (by cohabitating mammals) will only increase as the disease spreads and CWD prions continue to be shed into the environment. This environmental passage itself may alter CWD prions or exert selective pressures on CWD strain mixtures by interactions with soil, which are known to vary with prion strain (25), or exposure to environmental or gut degradation.

Given that prion disease in humans can be difficult to diagnose and the asymptomatic incubation period can last decades, continued research, epidemiologic surveillance, and caution in handling risky material remain prudent as CWD continues to spread and the opportunity for interspecies transmission increases. Otherwise, similar to what occurred in the United Kingdom after detection of variant CJD and its subsequent link to BSE, years of prevention could be lost if zoonotic transmission of CWD is subsequently identified,



http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/ahead-of-print/article/18/3/11-0685_article.htm





snip...see full text and more here ;



Saturday, February 18, 2012

Occurrence, Transmission, and Zoonotic Potential of Chronic Wasting Disease

CDC Volume 18, Number 3—March 2012

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2012/02/occurrence-transmission-and-zoonotic.html





http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/





Sunday, January 29, 2012

Prion Disease Risks in the 21st Century 2011 PDA European Virus-TSE Safety Dr. Detwiler

Dr. Detwiler published Prion Disease Risks in the 21st Century 2011 PDA European Virus-TSE Safety Forum\Presentations TSE\ Page 33 and 34 of 44 ;

http://www.pda.org/



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/01/prion-disease-risks-in-21st-century.html





Wednesday, February 1, 2012

CJD and PLASMA / URINE PRODUCTS EMA Position Statements Alberto Ganan Jimenez, European Medicines Agency PDA TSE Safety Forum, 30 June 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/cjd-and-plasma-urine-products-ema.html





Wednesday, February 1, 2012



Prion Disease Risks in the 21st Century 2011 PDA European Virus-TSE Safety Update on CJD and VCJD Transmission RG Will



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/prion-disease-risks-in-21st-century.html







Monday, October 10, 2011

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

snip...

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

snip...

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf





see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html





Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat

snip...

http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html





Sunday, November 13, 2011





California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock





http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/california-bse-mad-cow-beef-recall-qfc.html







Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zf3lfz9NrT4




http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0tWkNvhO4g




http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zf3lfz9NrT4&feature=results_main&playnext=1&list=PL780BE2AF0B62A944





full text with source references ;


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/terry-singeltary-sr-on-creutzfeldt.html






Friday, February 10, 2012




Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update (2012/1) potential iatrogenic (healthcare-acquired) exposure to CJD, and on the National Anonymous Tonsil Archive



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/02/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-biannual.html






Sunday, February 12, 2012


National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 (August 19, 2011) including Texas


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/national-prion-disease-pathology.html







SOME OLD HISTORY ;



R-CALF

July 26, 2007 The Honorable Mike Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of Agriculture 14th Street and Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20250 Dear Secretary Johanns,

Yesterday, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) issued its investigative report of Canada’s 11th native case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which is available at http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/bccb2007/10investe.shtml.


Like the findings of the 11 preceding investigative reports, one for each confirmed case in cattle living in or originating from Canada, the cause of infection is inconclusive, though crosscontamination of animal feed was determined as the most likely source.

The report implies that CFIA allowed five cows from the same herd of cattle as the infected cow, which also consumed the same feed as the infected cow, to be destroyed and disposed of without first testing these animals for BSE. The report further indicates that CFIA intends to do the same thing with 36 more cows from the infected herd, despite the likelihood that some or all of them consumed the same contaminated feed as the animal that tested positive for BSE.

In the United Kingdom where, along with all of Europe and Japan, a far more comprehensive BSE testing regime is practiced, only 35 percent of BSE-infected herds had only one case of BSE while 49 percent of the BSE-infected herds had three or more BSE cases, with one herd having 124 cases. (See: http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/statistics/bse/con-cases.htm.) The information compiled from the United Kingdom’s BSE testing program enabled it to identify weaknesses in its BSE mitigation program, prompting the United Kingdom to progressively update its elementary ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban on four separate occasions, following the unsatisfactory results realized by its testing data after each preceding update.

If CFIA is not testing herd mates and feed mates of known BSE cases, as this report infers, then Canada would appear to be in violation of USDA’ Minimal Risk Region Rule. Failure to test cattle with a high likelihood of BSE does not constitute an investigation sufficient to confirm the adequacy of Canada’s BSE mitigation measures, nor does it comply with the requirement that Canada take additional risk mitigation measures, as necessary, following a BSE outbreak. (See Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 2, January 4, 2005, at 463.) Moreover, such a failure would render Canada’s surveillance program ineffective both for identifying the true population of infected animals and estimating whether its BSE outbreak is on the increase or decline. The testing of these herd mates and feed mates would, at least, provide us with some information

R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America P.O. Box 30715 Billings, MT 59107 Phone: 406-252-2516 Fax: 406-252-3176 E-mail: r-calfusa@r-calfusa.com Website: www.r-calfusa.com Mike Johanns, USDA Secretary of Agriculture July 26, 2007 Page 2 of 2

about the likelihood that some of the 92 animals that already had died and the 23 others that could not be located also were likely to be infected with the disease. R-CALF USA respectfully requests that USDA immediately determine if the inferences contained in the CFIA report regarding the disposal of untested herd mates and feed mates of the BSE-infected cow are actually statements of fact. If so, then we further request that USDA notify Canada that it is not in compliance with U.S. regulations and explain to Canada that it needs to immediately begin testing all known herd mates and feed mates of BSE-positive cattle in order to maintain its status as a “minimal risk” region under the regulations.

Sincerely, R.M. Thornsberry, D.V.M. R-CALF USA Board President Cc: The Honorable Tom Harkin The Honorable Saxby Chambliss The Honorable Max Baucus The Honorable Lindsey Graham The Honorable Collin Peterson The Honorable Bob Goodlatte

http://www.r-calfusa.com/BSE/072607RCALFLetterToJohanns.pdf







USDA Fights Court Decision Approving BSE Tests From Terry S. Singeltary Sr. flounder9@verizon.net 5-30-7

To: agsec@usda.gov Cc: john.clifford@aphis.usda.gov; usaha@usaha.org; jmeng@cpfbeef.com;LAVET22@aol.com Phyllis.Fong@usda.gov Sent: Tuesday, May 29, 2007 2:07 PM Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)

May 27, 2007

Honorable Michael Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of Agriculture Room 200 Jamie Whitten Federal Building Washington, D.C. 20250

CC

Honorable Judge James Robertson U.S. District Court 333 Constitution Ave. North West Washington, D. C. 20001

Subject: Request to let the Creekstone vs. USDA court decision stand.

Ref: Letter from United States Animal Health Association, dated May 22, 2007

Dear Mr. Secretary et al :

I am requesting that you allow the court decision in the Creekstone vs. USDA to stand so that Creekstone may begin testing the beef they process for BSE and or BASE and or any other TSE phenotype there of. WE must let them test since the USDA et al refuse to do so properly. This is not to say that there should be no strict TSE testing protocols. IF testing is to take place privately, there must be strict TSE testing protocol to assure the most up to date, sensitive, and validated tests are used, and used properly. These tests must be announced to the public in a timely manner at every step of the way, validated and confirmed by the federal government, Weybridge, and an independent third party consumer organization and there TSE expert of choice, in my opinion.

My mother died from a exceedingly rare strain of sporadic CJD i.e. the Heidenhain Variant of CJD. My neighbors mother also lost his mother to a form of sporadic CJD exactly one year previously from the day my mother died. BOTH cases were confirmed by autopsy. There is new data out about the BASE atypical BSE, which pathologically is more related to a phenotype of sporadic CJD, than the nvCJD in humans from the UK. To continue to ignore these scientific findings with the old UKBSEnvCJD only theory is not justified by science anymore. It is not logical.

The logic behind the reasons not to let test for TSE in the USA because of The Virus Serum Toxin Act of 1913 and or because of the recent letter from the USAHA (see letter below) bring forth, are totally bogus. NO one could screw the testing up any worse than the USDA has done in the past. The OIG and the GAO has shown this time and time again. The 2004 Enhanced BSE surveillance program where some 275,000+ cattle were tested for BSE was proven to be terribly flawed from the beginning. This documented time and time again. Even Paul Brown, known and respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'', and this was on March 15, 2006 ;

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r






CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm





PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program ­ Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf





Mr. Johanns,

The August 4, 1997 FDA BSE ruminant to ruminant feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper. In 2007 alone, 10 MILLION plus pounds of banned blood laced MBM has already gone out into commerce for the feeding of banned product to cattle. yes, were still feeding cows banned BSE/BASE product in 2007, almost 10 years after the voluntary ban was put in place. guess what, it aint working.

YOU and this Administration have failed terribly in protecting not only the consumer, but your precious commodity that you speak so highly of i.e. the beef industry. In your continued efforts to cover up the real mad cow problem in the USA, you have in fact only amplified it and continued it's spread, and in doing so, you have needlessly exposed millions to the TSE agent, from many different proven routes and sources. The only saving grace you have is the incubation period has been on your side. It will catch up. When it does, when the people finally figure all this out, when some of the millions you have needlessly exposed to this agent become clinical in the future, rest assured I will stand in line to see that you and your administration are convicted for murder.

What you and this administration have done over the past 8 years is criminal, in my opinion. I have watched not only you, but the Bush administration thumb there nose to science for almost 8 years, all to protect the beef industry. The science was there, but you chose to ignore it, and even manipulated science with the bogus BSE MRR policy, all the while your were implementing that, you were covering up another mad cow in Texas. But thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG, and an act of Congress, that mad cow was finally proven positive, unlike the other stumbling and staggering mad cow that was rendered without any test at all in Texas, but by then you had succeeded in the BSE MRR policy, the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally. You and this administration have done the same thing the UK did when they poisoned the globe with there exporting of BSE, except you made it legal now with the BSE MRR policy, and now we are dealing with BASE, a strain that is more virulent to humans. what happens when it mutates again?

When cwd deer and elk and there different phenotypes have all been rendered into feed, along with scrapie infected sheep in the USA, and a few TME to top that off, it will be a most interesting recipe will it not, and an interesting case study for humans for decades to come. sadly though, with the recent pet food scandal, and the deaths there of, we have learned a few things. one, that the elderly are expendable, but cats, dogs, and adolescents are not. and that the problem of our feeding of food producing animals has been tainted for decades. and with the melamine scandal, as with the mad cow feed scandal, it's the same old song and dance by you and the Bush administration, everything is o.k., will not hurt you, cover-up and protect the industry at all cost, and this will be another part of your sad legacy in History Sir.

To not allow BSE/TSE testing in the USA, testing that will find, only proves our point, you have and will continue to cover up the real mad cow problem in the USA. and the world knows this. ...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77519



UNITED STATES ANIMAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION 8100 Three Chopt Road, Suite 203 P. O. BOX K227 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23288 804- 285-3210 FAX 804-285-3367 E-Mail: usaha@usaha.org Web Site: www.usaha.org

May 22, 2007 Honorable Michael Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of Agriculture Room 200 Jamie Whitten Federal Building Washington, D.C. 20250

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA), wishes to express its encouragement to you and the Department of Agriculture to appeal the litigation surrounding private testing for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. We hope you will strongly consider this as you work with the Office of General Counsel on this suit.

To support this appeal, we offer that this sets a detrimental precedence on USDA's ability to regulate disease and testing processes in animal agriculture. As we appreciate the entrepreneurial spirit of Creekstone, the larger scale implications could lead to devastating impacts for food animal production in this country as itrelates to animal health. We do feel that private testing could hamper animal health officials' ability to locate disease occurrences, and exercise proper practices to trace, control and eliminate them. As you are aware, there are a number of factors that raise concern among animal health leaders and diagnosticians. We encourage you to thoroughly consider those upon your decision to appeal. We do recognize this is now a matter of the courts, and trust that our ability to safeguard animal health is not compromised as a result of this litigation. Please let us know if there is any further support we can provide.

Sincerely,

Lee M. Myers President, U.S. Animal Health Association Cc: Dr. John Clifford


===============================


Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory

TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2005. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, surgical, blood, medical, cosmetics etc. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Tranmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route. This would further have to be broken down to strain of species and then the route of transmission would further have to be broken down.

Accumulation and Transmission are key to the threshold from subclinical to clinical disease, and of that, I even believe that physical and or blunt trauma may play a role of onset of clinical symptoms in some cases, but key to all this, is to stop the amplification and transmission of this agent, the spreading of, no matter what strain. BUT, to continue with this myth that the U.K. strain of BSE one strain in cows, and the nv/v CJD, one strain in humans, and that all the rest of human TSE is one single strain i.e. sporadic CJD (when to date there are 6 different phenotypes of sCJD), and that no other animal TSE transmits to humans, to continue with this masquerade will only continue to spread, expose, and kill, who knows how many more in the years and decades to come. ONE was enough for me, My Mom, hvCJD, DOD 12/14/97 confirmed, which is nothing more than another mans name added to CJD, like CJD itself, Jakob and Creutzfeldt, or Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker syndrome, just another CJD or human TSE, named after another human. WE are only kidding ourselves with the current diagnostic criteria for human and animal TSE, especially differentiating between the nvCJD vs the sporadic CJD strains and then the GSS strains and also the FFI fatal familial insomnia strains or the ones that mimics one or the other of those TSE? Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously.

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr. and I am no scientist, no doctor and have no PhDs, but have been independently researching human and animal TSEs since the death of my Mother to the Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease on December 14, 1997 'confirmed'. ...TSS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS PREMIUM BEEF, L.L.C.,



Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al., Defendants.

:::::::::::

Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)

snip...

JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge

The government's additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would interfere with USDA's surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm. USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed, the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world, including as part of the USDA's own surveillance testing. - 18 -

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2006cv0544-22





Tue Apr 10, 2007 12:30 68.238.98.6

Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to the United States Date: April 10, 2007 at 10:33 am PST

"It most likely" entered the food supply "given that it was slaughtered," said Karen Eggert, a spokeswoman with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

"But it wouldn't have gone to slaughter if it was showing any clinical signs for BSE. We're not looking at this as a possibility that a BSE infected cow got into the United States," she said.

http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN1040765520070410





Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada

snip...

Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of BSE prevalence in the standing Canadian adult cattle population as of August 15, 2006. Based on the expected prevalence value under the BBC model and the estimated adult herd size (Table 1), the expected number of BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population is 4.1. By comparison, the expected value obtained under BSurvE Prevalence B is 3.9 per million, which corresponds to an estimated 23.2 BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population.

snip...

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/BSE_Prevalence.pdf





TEXAS MAD COW

THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;

During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.

http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml





Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.

snip...

Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.

Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.

Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.

Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.

Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf





FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html



http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm





====================================

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons


DISTRIBUTION AL



______________________________ PRODUCT a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,484 tons DISTRIBUTION TN and WV



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html



Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS

Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II ______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE Approximately 2,223 tons DISTRIBUTION KY



______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,220 tons DISTRIBUTION KY




______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.


REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 40 tons DISTRIBUTION LA and MS




______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.


REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,150 tons DISTRIBUTION MS




______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 87 tons DISTRIBUTION MS




______________________________ PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and MS





______________________________ PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN





END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html



Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST

PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6 CODE All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products. RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs DISTRIBUTION MI





END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html





Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST

PRODUCT a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.


REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL





END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html






Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST

PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????


DISTRIBUTION KY END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006




###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html



CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE

Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II ______________________________ PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons DISTRIBUTION Nationwide



END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html





Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006

Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration

New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217

Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391

May 17, 2006

WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06

FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204

Dear Mr. Shirley:

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.

Sincerely,

/S

Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District

http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm





-------- Original Message --------

Subject: CPR Raps USDA’s Veneman for Mad Cow Regs

Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2004 11:53:53 –0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

CPR Issue Areas

Special Issue:

CPR President Tom McGarity, a professor of food safety law at the University of Texas Law School, has called for a truly independent federal agency to oversee food safety enforcement. The current Mad Cow controversy, and the Bush Administration's response, lay bare the problems with an enforcement agency that is first and foremost a cheerleader for agri-business.

On January 13, 2004, McGarity wrote to Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman criticizing the Department of Agriculture's latest regulations addressing Mad Cow. McGarity points out that the regulations have no effective means of enforcement, effectively leaving it to industry to regulate itself. Read the letter, here .

Read the January 14, 2004 news release

about Tom McGarity's letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman, critizing the USDA's new Mad Cow regulations.

Read Tom McGarity's op-ed on Mad Cow and the need for a truly indepenedent food-safety agency, in the January 6, 2004 Dallas Morning News.

www.progressiveregulation.org January 13, 2004 Ms. Ann M. Veneman Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of Agriculture 1400 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20250-1300 Dear Secretary Veneman: I am writing on behalf of the Center for Progressive Regulation to request that you correct the public record with respect to misleading statements contained in USDA’s December 30 press release on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease) and to ask you to take more effective action to protect U.S. consumers from the risk of contracting variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (vCJD). The Center for Progressive Regulation is a nonprofit research and educational organization of university-affiliated academics with expertise in the legal, economic, and scientific issues related to regulation of health, safety, and the environment. Your December 30, 2003 press release dramatically announced that USDA would be implementing “additional safeguards to bolster the U.S. protection systems against" mad cow disease and "further protect public health.” The reassuring tone of your remarks at the December 30 press conference was, however, belied by the text of the actual regulations that were finally made public on January 8, 2004. On December 30 you assured the American public that USDA would protect the meat supply, but the package that came out on December 8 delivered very little in the way of effective governmental protections. The fine print of the January 8 regulations reveals that the rules with the greatest potential to enhance meat safety have no substantive content and merely allow individual companies to come up with their own procedures for preventing dangerous materials entering the food supply. It will be years before the verifiable system of national animal identification that you promised will be in place, despite your misleading suggestion that USDA would "begin immediate implementation" of the program. Other promises of forceful government action made on December 30 turn out on closer inspection to be irrelevant because the industry practices they address ended long ago. Center for Progressive Regulation P.O. Box 76239 Washington, DC 20013-1293 www.progressiveregulation.org cprinformation@earthlink.net

http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Mad_Cow_Letter.pdf





FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Matthew Freeman January 14, 2004 301-762-8980

CPR Raps USDA’s Veneman for Mad Cow Regs ‘New Regulations Riddled with Loopholes, Fail to Protect Consumers’ Washington, DC ---- Center for Progressive Regulation President Tom McGarity today called on Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman to go back to the drawing board with recent regulations issued by the department to protect the American consumer from Mad Cow and other beef-related illnesses. On Thursday, January 8, the Department released a series of new regulations, following up on Veneman’s December 30 declaration that “For more than a decade, the United States has had in place an aggressive surveillance, detection and response program for BSE. While we are confident that the United States has safeguards and firewalls needed to protect public health, these additional actions will further strengthen our protection systems.” The Secretary’s words and tone were consistent with what McGarity calls “the Administration’s ‘cheerleading for agri-business.’” “Since the beginning,” McGarity said in releasing his letter, “the Administration’s approach to this problem has been to combat Mad Cow disease with public relations initiatives, assuring us that the Secretary was serving beef for Christmas, but taking no significant steps to improve the current testing regime. These new regulations were a missed opportunity for the Administration to get serious about tightening up food safety requirements. The regulations are so full of loopholes that they will do little to protect the American consumer.” McGarity is a professor of food safety law at the University of Texas Law School and President of the Center for Progressive Regulation. He voiced his specific objections about the regulations in a letter to Veneman, delivered Tuesday, January 13. The letter urges the Department to reconsider its trust-the-industry approach to regulating this vital matter of food safety. CPR called for USDA to “promulgate a rule requiring that all cattle be tested for BSE prior to slaughter for human consumption and expand its . . . product holding guideline to include all BSE-tested cattle.” The new package of regulations contains two that are of little relevance, according to McGarity, writing: “Both the [new] ban on air injection stunning and the ban on mechanically separated meat imposed no burden whatsoever on the cattle industry and will not enhance the safety of meat, because neither technology is currently used in the U.S. It seems disingenuous at best for USDA to claim credit for taking action that will have no impact one way or the other.” Two of the remaining regulations announced by USDA are intended to ensure that certain parts of slaughtered cows (specific risk material or SRM) are not included in human food (eyes, brain matter, etc.). But these two regulations are marred by huge loopholes. Says McGarity in the letter: The SRM regulation does not specify “ the procedures and techniques that establishments must use to ensure that Special Risk Material . . . does not enter the food supply. Establishments are only required to come up with ‘written procedures’ for the ‘removal, segregation, and disposition of SRMs.’ The same is true for the rule governing Advanced Meat Recovery Systems (AMRS). USDA promises to ‘ensure the adequacy and effectiveness’ of each establishment’ s procedures, but it does not say how it will do that. And the rules provide no legally enforceable way for USDA to fulfill its promise, in any event. In short, there are no requirements for how establishments must go about removing SRM from food. There is only a general prohibition on the use of SRM for human food and the aspiration that companies will at some point in the future come up with adequate individual plans to remove SRM from food. USDA does not specify any criteria for the plans that establishments must draft. The regulations do not even specify how companies should go about determining whether meat at the end of the production process contains SRMs. The establishments are free to do whatever they want. There is not even a deadline for preparing the plan.” A second loophole permits the use of SRM from cattle less than 30 months old. Writes McGarity: “ The loophole for cattle less than 30 months old is not well supported. BSE [Mad Cow Disease] has been found in animals that were younger than 30 months old….While it may be true that younger cattle pose fewer risks, they are by no means risk-free. USDA does not explain why U.S. consumers should be intentionally subjected to such a high-consequence risk, even if the probability is low. Finally, the rules create a final loophole for bone marrow, even though USDA has acknowledged that bone marrow was determined to be infective in one experiment. Nevertheless, writes McGarity, “Bone marrow is not included in the definition of ‘specified risk material.’ The loophole for bone marrow is not well justified. USDA acknowledges that bone marrow was determined to be infective in one experiment, but it has elected not to include it as a Specified Risk Material. The only rationale provided is that the ‘findings were not conclusive.’ SRM Rule at 18. USDA should not await a ‘conclusive’ study before taking action to prevent exposing the U.S. population to a risk of BSE. The statute mandates a precautionary approach that does not require ‘conclusive’ demonstration that a meat food product will cause adverse health effects. It requires only that the meat contain a deleterious substance that ‘may render it injurious to health.’ 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(1).” In a recent op-ed published in the Dallas Morning News, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/viewpoints/stories/010604dnedimcgarity.112f3267a.html, McGarity called for a truly independent agency to oversee the food supply. He wrote: “Unfortunately, consumers can't rest comfortably because both the Agriculture Department and FDA report directly to the White House and therefore are subject to political pressures from one of the Bush administration's favorite constituencies – the meat industry. Congress should lodge the rule-making and enforcement functions of the meat safety laws in an independent agency whose primary responsibility isn't ensuring the economic well-being of agribusiness. The new agency shouldn't be subject to the political control of the White House, and it shouldn't be overseen by the House and Senate agriculture committees. Stringent food safety laws are critical to consumer confidence in the food supply, and they must be implemented and enforced by a strong federal regulator, not a cheerleader for the regulated industry.” The complete text of McGarity’ s letter is available on CPR’ s website at www.progressiveregulation.org. Founded in 2002, the Center for Progressive Regulation is a nonprofit research and educational organization of university-affiliated academics with expertise in the legal, economic, and scientific issues related to regulation of health, safety, and the environment. CPR supports regulatory action to protect health, safety, and the environment. Through research and commentary, CPR seeks to inform policy debates, critique anti-regulatory research, enhance public understanding of the issues, and open the regulatory process to public scrutiny. For a copy of McGarity’s letter, or to arrange interviews, contact Matthew Freeman at 301-762-8980, or at mfreeman@progressiveregulation.org. Visit CPR on the web at www.progressiveregulation.org. -- 30 --




http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Mad_Cow_Letter_NR.pdf






January 5, 2004 Thomas McGarity:

Only an independent agency can safeguard beef

12:17 AM CST on Tuesday, January 6, 2004 By THOMAS McGARITY The discovery of a Washington state cow infected with mad cow disease has consumers and the beef industry on edge – and for good reason. Nobody wants a mad cow outbreak – not consumers who eat beef and not the farmers who raise cattle. Memories of the British beef industry's severe hit from its mad cow fiasco a couple of years ago are all too fresh. A number of countries already have responded to the latest news by banning imports of U.S. beef, and it is reasonable to imagine that the news will dampen beef sales in supermarkets across the land. Reacting to this economic threat to an important domestic industry, the Bush administration has proposed new requirements for slaughtering cattle and processing meat. Consumers should welcome those actions, but they shouldn't take at face value the administration's assurances that the proposals will ensure a safe supply of beef. First, we haven't seen the fine print yet. The new restrictions, for example, will require establishments to implement unspecified "process controls" and "verification testing" to ensure that nerve tissue doesn't get into processed meat. We won't know how effective the restrictions will be until we see the loopholes. Second, the requirements are subject to legal challenge, and the U.S. meat industry has an impressive record of persuading courts to throw out Agriculture Department rules. Third, the proposals don't get to the heart of the problem, which is the absence of an independent regulatory authority to constrain a modern meat manufacturing industry that puts a huge premium on the efficient use of every part of every cow that enters the manufacturing process. The pressures to extract the last possible scrap of protein from every slaughtered animal result in a secondary market in which protein from cattle is fed to animals to supplement their diets. That also is an avenue for the spread of mad cow disease because the disease is transmitted when a cow eats material from the brain or nerve tissue of an infected cow. In 1997, the Agriculture Department attempted to cut off that avenue of infection at the front end of the meat production process by prohibiting feeding protein from cows to cattle. But the department and its sister agency, the Food and Drug Administration, depend upon the good faith of ranchers and feed producers to ensure that the rule isn't violated. Four years after the ban went into effect, the General Accounting Office concluded that many of the companies subject to the ban never had been inspected. Of those that were inspected, 364 were noncompliant, but only one received so much as a warning letter. The FDA says that it recently has improved its inspection procedures and that compliance has improved. But that assessment is based solely upon records prepared by the companies and not upon actual tests of the feed itself. The Agriculture Department's recent restrictions focus on the back end of the process and are aimed at ensuring that meat from infected cattle isn't consumed by humans. But even after the restrictions go into effect, a feed producer, rancher or meat processor in the extremely competitive meat market might cut corners, just as some Enron executives cut corners under similar market pressures. Of course, we could rely upon the good faith of the feed producers, ranchers and meat manufacturers, but consumers probably would sleep better if they knew that a vigorous federal regulator was sending a strong message that any cheaters will be caught and prosecuted. Unfortunately, consumers can't rest comfortably because both the Agriculture Department and FDA report directly to the White House and therefore are subject to political pressures from one of the Bush administration's favorite constituencies – the meat industry. Congress should lodge the rule-making and enforcement functions of the meat safety laws in an independent agency whose primary responsibility isn't ensuring the economic well-being of agribusiness. The new agency shouldn't be subject to the political control of the White House, and it shouldn't be overseen by the House and Senate agriculture committees. Stringent food safety laws are critical to consumer confidence in the food supply, and they must be implemented and enforced by a strong federal regulator, not a cheerleader for the regulated industry. Thomas O. McGarity is president of the Center for Progressive Regulation and a professor of food safety law at the University of Texas School of Law. His e-mail address is tmcgarity@mail.law.utexas.edu.



http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/McGarity_Mad_Cow.pdf




http://www.progressiveregulation.org/special_issue.cfm






TSS

########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############



also see ;



Subject: Letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman concerning false or misleading government reassurances on mad cow disease (HRG Publication #1690) Date: February 20, 2004 at 8:37 am PST

Letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman concerning false or misleading government reassurances on mad cow disease (HRG Publication #1690)

February 19, 2004

Secretary Ann M. Veneman U.S.Department of Agriculture 14th & Independence Ave., SW Washington, DC 20250 Fax: (202) 720-2166

Dear Secretary Veneman:

In an apparent attempt to reassure the public of the adequacy of its response to the recently diagnosed case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as mad cow disease, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has made several false or misleading statements. Here is the evidence:

The current surveillance system cannot detect BSE if it is present in only one in a million adult cattle, as the USDA has claimed;

The removal of nonambulatory ( downer ) cattle from the human food supply will not greatly reduce the risk to humans; and

Although presented as a public health measure, the new restrictions on advanced meat recovery (AMR) systems in reality only alter labeling regulations; consequently spinal cord from younger cattle can still be included in beef stock, extract and flavoring.

Surveillance for BSE

The USDA s surveillance website[1] claims that the agency s surveillance system should allow detection of a case if BSE truly exists at a level of one or more cases per million in the adult cattle population, a claim reiterated repeatedly by USDA officials in the aftermath of the Washington BSE case. This claim rests on a false assumption which has since rebutted by testing data from Europe, some of which actually appears on the USDA website.

It is certainly true that the risk of BSE is higher in downer than in non-downer cattle; this has been the justification for the USDA BSE surveillance program s particular focus to date on downer cattle. But the USDA goes further and assumes that all BSE infections that might exist in the United States would occur in the downer population. In fact, data from the European Commission demonstrate that 287 normal-appearing cattle testing positive for BSE in Europe in 2002.[2] While the proportion of non-downer cattle that tested positive for BSE in Europe was predictably lower than that proportion in the downer population (the same should be true domestically), there are approximately 230 times more non-downer adult animals than there are downer animals in the United States, according to the USDA s surveillance website (195,000 downers among 45 million adult cattle).1 Thus, unless the risk of BSE in downers is much higher than that among non-downers, there can actually be substantially more BSE cases among non-downers than among downers. By analogy, drivers of red sports cars may be at greater risk of incurring or causing injury than drivers of other cars, but most injuries do not involve red sports car drivers.

The attached figure illustrates this point. Based on the USDA s data on the numbers of animals in the downer and non-downer populations, we have constructed a curve that demonstrates how the fraction of total BSE risk that exists among downer cattle varies according to how many times more risky downer cattle are than non-downer cattle. If, for example, downer cattle are 500 times more at risk for BSE than non-downer cattle, 69% of all BSE cases would be expected among downer cattle and a policy of excluding all downer cattle would have a significant impact. On the other hand, if downers were only five times more risky, only 2% of the risk would be among downers. Actual testing data from Europe,2 not adjusted for animal age, suggest that we are closer to the latter than the former: cattle populations analogous to what are termed downer cattle in the United States have a BSE prevalence 31 times higher than non-downer cattle. If this ratio is applied (rather than the USDA s assumption that there is no risk whatsoever among non-downer animals and that the ratio is therefore infinite), we can see from the figure (indicated by the arrow) that only 12% of the total risk occurs among downers, with the remaining 88% among the normal-appearing cattle that are not currently being tested in the United States.

This observation has two main implications. First, the USDA claim that current testing can detect BSE at a level of one in a million cattle is false and should not be repeated. In order to truly be able to detect the one in a million risk, some mix of downer and non-downer testing will be necessary.

The numbers are daunting. In a scenario in which 50,000 tests would be performed on normal-appearing cattle and are all negative, one can still only assume (at the 95% confidence level standard in such calculations) that BSE does not exist at a prevalence exceeding 60 (not one) per million. If we apply that proportion to the 12% of the 35.7 million cattle slaughtered annually in the United States[3] that are over the age of 20 months1 (the age above which all BSE cases worldwide have been detected), that would still mean as many as 257 cattle could proceed to market in any one year without a single case being detected. The USDA needs to be forthright with the American public about these risks.

It is worth recalling that the USDA s surveillance program has never been directly concerned with protecting the food supply (as witnessed by the now-abandoned practice of allowing most cattle with pending BSE tests to enter the food supply); it was designed to monitor the epidemic, more than to prevent it. To completely eliminate BSE risk would require the testing of all cattle (or at least those over 20-30 months). A reasonable approach would be to test all downers and a large number of older non-downer cattle to get a better handle on the extent of the disease. This approach is consistent with that recently recommended by your international subcommittee,[4] the U.S. Food and Drug Administration s (FDA s) Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee[5] and an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine.[6]

The second implication is that although removing downer cattle from human consumption was appropriate because these animals are more risky, the overall risk to the public was only slightly reduced by this measure because only 12% of the risk resides in the downer population. The benefit of removing downer cattle from human consumption has been oversold as a public health protection measure. Strong enforcement of the FDA s feed ban and the removal of risky material from human consumption remain our primary protections against this disease.

In addition to these design and risk communication problems, USDA s surveillance program has been plagued by poor administration. In 2001, we conducted a study comparing the rates of BSE testing across states.[7] Instead of finding approximately equal testing rates, we found a 400- to 2,000-fold difference between the states with the highest and lowest testing rates, suggesting a program in disarray. There appears to be no accepted procedure for deciding which animals to test, a point echoed in the current dispute over whether the Washington BSE case was a downer animal.[8] ,[9] Moreover, some USDA inspectors have testified that the industry itself selects the cattle brains for testing.[10]

The Washington case has also highlighted the major deficiencies in our ability to track livestock. Only 29 of the 81 cattle in the same herd as the index BSE case could be located by the USDA investigation.[11] A comprehensive life-long tracking system must be implemented as soon as possible. But now that downer cattle have been removed from human consumption, farmers have an incentive to bury suspect animals on the farm, without notifying the USDA. Therefore, farmers should be compensated for providing their downer animals for testing and heavy penalties should be provided for any attempts to elude testing once an on-farm surveillance system is in place.

The recent discovery in a normal-appearing animal in Italy of an apparently new strain of BSE that may elude the tests currently in use in this country[12] underscores the need for the U.S. approval of the more sensitive and rapid tests in widespread use in Europe.

Meat Processing

For years, consumer groups have criticized the meat processing system in this country, arguing that certain practices can represent a BSE hazard. Concern has centered on mechanically separated beef (bones with attached muscle are crushed and pushed through an extruder to create a paste) and AMR (the use of belts and bone presses to remove meat from bone), both of which are intended to retrieve the last scraps of meat from a carcass. These processes have been used to produce hamburgers and hot dogs, for example.

Unfortunately, it has taken the Washington BSE case to get the USDA to act forcefully. It has banned the pneumatic stunning devices consumer groups have long condemned because they can disperse nervous tissue widely (and which the industry had largely abandoned anyway) and ruled that humans can no longer consume small intestine at all, as well as the brain, spinal cord and related structures of cattle over 30 months. It has also banned mechanically separated beef from cattle of all ages.

These changes are all welcome, but their impact should not be overestimated. First, while infectious activity has only been demonstrated experimentally in the nervous systems of cattle at about 32 months of age,[13] inherent limitations in the experiment (only 30 animals were tested), the high infectious load in spinal cord and proven contamination of AMR product with spinal cord (35% of samples were contaminated in a 2002 USDA survey[14] ) make the safest course to simply preclude the technology s use on vertebral columns for cattle of all ages.

More fundamentally, however, the USDA continues to present the AMR issue (at least for cattle under 30 months) as a food safety issue while it actually treats it as a labeling issue. Thus AMR contaminated by spinal cord is merely considered misbranded, which means it cannot carry the designation meat. None of this precludes labeling spinal cord as beef (or, less likely, spinal cord ) and passing it off as part of beef stock, extract or flavoring.

Second, it still remains possible to eat unprocessed brain and spinal cord in this country, as long as the source animal is under 30 months of age. While recognizing that these products are seen by some as regional or ethnic delicacies, the time has come to seriously consider simply removing brain and spinal cord from the human food supply altogether because together they represent nearly 90% of the infectious load in cattle with BSE.[15] At a minimum, brains and spinal cords need to be clearly labeled, along with a prominent warning about the attendant risk of BSE.

The USDA is charged with both promoting and regulating the agricultural sector. In its public pronouncements, it has emphasized the former over the latter. In contrast to what the USDA has repeatedly claimed or implied, the infected animal in Washington was probably not a downer (if it was, the claims for the effectiveness of the surveillance system would seem more credible), the surveillance system cannot detect the one in a million risk, the removal of downer animals from human food will have only a small protective effect on the safety of the food supply and spinal cord can still be consumed as beef. If the public and potential importers of U.S. cattle and cattle products are to be reassured, it can only be on the basis of accurate scientific information, rather than the false or misleading information that has represented a significant portion of the USDA response to date.

Yours sincerely,

Peter Lurie, MD, MPH Deputy Director

Sidney M. Wolfe, MD Director Public Citizen s Health Research Group

------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] http://cofcs66.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse-surveillance.html.

[2] Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General. Report on the Monitoring and Testing of Ruminants for the Presence of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) in 2002. European Commission, June 2003. Available at:

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/bse/testing/annual_report_2002_en.pdf.



[3] National Agricultural Statistics Service. http://www.usda.gov/nass/pubs/agr03/03_ch7.pdf.

[4] Kihm U, Hueston W, Matthews D, MacDiarmid SC, Heim D. Report on Measures Relating to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States. Available at:

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/US_BSE_Report.pdf.


[5] Ault A. Federal panel recommends more testing for mad cow. New York Times, February 14, 2004.

[6] Donnelly CA. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United States an epidemiologist s view. New England Journal of Medicine 2004;365:539-42.

[7] Public Citizen and Government Accountability Project. USDA'S Mad Cow Disease Surveillance Program: A Comparison of State Cattle-Testing Rates. Available at:

http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6783.


[8] McNeil DG. Man who killed mad cow has questions of his own. New York Times, February 3, 2004.

[9] Davis T, Waxman HA. Letter to USDA Secretary Ann Veneman. Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, February 17, 2004.

[10] Carney P. Affidavit. January 14, 2004. Available at:

http://www.citizen.org/documents/paulcarneyaffidavit.pdf.


[11] http://www.usda.gov/Newsroom/0074.04.html



[12] McNeil DG. Research in Italy turns up a new form of mad cow disease. New York Times, February 17, 2004.

[13] Brown P, Bradley R, Detwiler L, et al. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy as a Zoonotic Disease. International Life Sciences Institute. March 2003.

[14] Food Safety and Inspection Service. The follow-up to the beef AMR product survey of 2002. Available at: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/topics/AMRSurvey.pdf.

[15] 69 Fed Reg 1865. January 12, 2004.

mad cow 1687

------------------------------------------------------------------------

more resources

Press Releases

------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7301







-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman Regarding Canada’s Decision to Remove SRMs

Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2003 17:02:11 –0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: BSE-L CC: cjdvoice

Release No. 0254.03

by

Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman Regarding Canada’s Decision to Remove Specified Risk Material from Food Products July 18, 2002

“Today, Canadian officials announced that they are implementing additional safeguards to strengthen their system after the single BSE detection on May 20, 2003. We appreciate that Canada is moving quickly to address these issues. We commend the Canadian government for its thorough investigation of the situation as well as its willingness to have an international team of experts review the progress.

“The United States continues to have a very strong commitment to ensuring that the U.S. beef supply is safe. We look forward to the continued coordination among the United States, Canada and our other trading partners to address the various and complex issues regarding the single BSE case."

http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2003/07/0254.htm







Tuesday, November 02, 2010



BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html







Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle / position: Post

Doctoral Fellow





http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html








Tuesday, January 1, 2008



BSE OIE USDA

Subject: OIE BSE RECOMMENDATION FOR USA, bought and paid for by your local cattle dealers i.e. USDA Date: May 14, 2007 at 9:00 am PST



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/01/bse-oie-usda.html










Saturday, August 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html





48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???

NOT in your lifetime !

8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html







Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544

Date: September 4, 2007 at 9:47 am PST USDA

AUGUST 21, 2007

Mr. Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Post Office Box 42 Bacliff, Texas 77518-0042

Dear Mr. Singeltary:

This is in response to your e-mails to Secretary Johanns concerning private testing for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia involving Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC. We regret the delay in responding.

As you may know, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) filed an appeal of the U.S. District Court's order on June 15,2007. While we recognize your views, we cannot comment on any matters at issue in the pending litigation. However, we can assure you that USDA remains committed to ensuring effective, scientifically sound testing for significant animal diseases and to protecting U.S. animal and public health from BSE.

We understand that the effects of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) are devastating, and we are sorry to learn of the loss of your mother. Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD and other degenerative neurological diseases. Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide. However, no cases of vCJD-the form of BSE that can be transmitted from animals to humans-are known to have originated in the United States. Because the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is responsible for addressing concerns about CJD and other human health issues, you may wish to contact that agency directly. The address is CDC, HHS, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20201.

We also wish to clarify that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is the primary measure in place to protect animal health with regard to BSE. Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal tissues-often referred to as specified risk

Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr. Page 2

materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present, and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level. These additional controls include the Food Safety and Inspection Services' ban on nonambulatory cattle from the human food chain; a prohibition on air-injection stunning of slaughter cattle; the requirement of additional process controls in advanced meat recovery systems; and, a prohibition on the use of mechanically separated beef in human food. Additionally, protection from BSE and other diseases is achieved by conducting antemortem inspections of slaughter cattle and excluding any animals that display clinical signs of neurological disease or other abnormalities.

We appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns. To learn more about USDA's BSE surveillance and safeguarding activities, please visit our Web site at www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/index.shtml.



Sincerely,

Jere L. Dick Associate Deputy Administrator National Animal Health Policy and Programs Veterinary Services




============================END=========================



Greetings,

LIKE going back in time 25 to 30 years with the science in this reply to me from USDA on BSE. I would kindly like to comment;

Jere L. Dick states ;

Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD

Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide

THIS is very disturbing to me that even USDA officials family members are dying of sporadic CJD, but yet they refuse to acknowledge the science to date, instead to go by prehistoric science dating back some 3 decades. IN short, there is much more to this sad story than that of the UKBSEnvCJD ONLY hypothesis/myth. Evidently, USDA did not even read the most up to date science i submitted to them, or just chose to ignore it. we now know that the sporadic CJD may not be as sporadic or spontaneous as these officials would have us to believe. THE USA has had two cases of atypical BSE i.e. BASE, which is more similar to some sporadic CJD, than that of the nvCJD, plus, there are some questions pertaining to the potential of some of these sCJD case being tied to either CWD in deer and or elk, and to the scrapie in sheep and goats, and there's other science showing that friendly fire from these sources i.e. iCJD is a very real threat. ...tss

Jere L. Dick states ;

Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal tissues-often referred to as specified risk materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present, and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level.

EXACTLY, and this policy has failed terribly, see recalls of 1,000's of TONS of these banned products that is suppose to protect us from all strains of mad cow disease, that are being fed out in commerce as we speak ;



10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

NEW URL

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm





Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html






Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html






Monday, March 1, 2010

ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html






while the USA refuses to rapid TSE test USA cattle to find.



while the USA refuses to remove SRMs and MRMs.



while the USA still has mad cow feed ban warning letters in 2003

1 million annually for 5 years or they simply do not want to know.

USA BSE/TSE GBR risk factor to III asap...



TSS



Message --------



Subject: Statement by Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman Regarding Canada's Announcement of BSE Investigation May 20, 2003

Date: Tue, 20 May 2003 12:53:17 –0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

CC: CJDvoice , bloodcjd







Release No. 0166.03

Statement by Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman Regarding Canada's Announcement of BSE Investigation May 20, 2003





"I have spoken with Canada's Agriculture and Agri-Food Minister Lyle Vanclief a short time ago about Canada's investigation and feel that all appropriate measures are being taken in what appears to be an isolated case of bovine spongiform encephalophathy. Information suggests that risk to human health and the possibility of transmission to animals in the United States is very low.





"USDA is placing Canada under its BSE restriction guidelines and will not accept any ruminants or ruminant products from Canada pending further investigation. We are dispatching a technical team to Canada to assist in the investigation and will provide more detailed information as it becomes available."





"The United States remains diligent in its BSE surveillance and prevention efforts. In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration prohibited the use of most mammalian protein in the manufacture of animal feed intended for cows and other ruminants to stop the way the disease is thought to spread.





"Since 1989, the U.S. government has taken a series of preventive actions to protect against this animal disease. This includes USDA prohibitions on the import of live ruminants, such as cattle, sheep, goats and most ruminant products from countries that have or are considered to be at risk for having BSE.





"In fiscal year 2002, USDA tested 19,990 cattle for BSE using a targeted surveillance approach designed to test the highest risk animals, including downer animals (animals that are non-

ambulatory at slaughter), animals that die on the farm, older animals and animals exhibiting signs of neurological distress."



#TSS



USDA News oc.news@usda.gov 202 720-9035






Gerald Wells: Report of the Visit to USA, April-May 1989




snip...



The general opinion of those present was that BSE, as an overt disease phenomenon, _could exist in the USA, but if it did, it was very rare. The need for improved and specific surveillance methods to detect it as recognised...



snip...



It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_ regulatory responsibility for rendering plants in the US...



snip...



================================================================



*** 3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...



================================================================



snip...



http://web.archive.org/web/20060307063531/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf









and they meant it !




it’s all about trade, human and animal health, of a slow incubation disease, one that is 100% fatal disease, once clinical, does not matter. you are expendable $$




SNIP...




Dr. DeHaven has often represented the United States in delicate and often difficult trade negotiations. As the former U.S. Chief Veterinary Officer and U.S. delegate to the OIE, he routinely used his diplomatic skills as he facilitated agreements that are science-based. He was instrumental in building consensus that led to the current OIE BSE chapter



SNIP...



http://www.usaha.org/meetings/2007/2007_USAHA_Proceedings.pdf






The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 1, and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.





http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf






Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083




Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)



Report (0.2Mb)



Summary

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.



The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.



A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm







Monday, October 10, 2011

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

snip...



EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

snip...



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1





http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf







see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans ;





http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html







Thursday, August 12, 2010

Seven main threats for the future linked to prions

First threat

The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.



***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

Second threat



snip...



http://www.neuroprion.org/en/np-neuroprion.html







Sunday, November 13, 2011

California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/california-bse-mad-cow-beef-recall-qfc.html







Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zf3lfz9NrT4





http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0tWkNvhO4g





http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zf3lfz9NrT4&feature=results_main&playnext=1&list=PL780BE2AF0B62A944







full text with source references ;



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/08/terry-singeltary-sr-on-creutzfeldt.html






Friday, February 10, 2012



Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) biannual update (2012/1) potential iatrogenic (healthcare-acquired) exposure to CJD, and on the National Anonymous Tonsil Archive



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/02/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-cjd-biannual.html







Sunday, February 12, 2012



National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 (August 19, 2011) including Texas



http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/national-prion-disease-pathology.html





TSS

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