Monday, June 18, 2012

R-CALF Submits Incomplete Comments Under Protest in Bizarre Rulemaking “Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products”

R-CALF Submits Incomplete Comments Under Protest in Bizarre Rulemaking “Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products”




Incomplete Comments Under Protest in Bizarre Rulemaking


Billings, MT – To meet the June 14 “Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products” (Proposed Rule) comment deadline, R-CALF USA submitted incomplete comments. In a note before the 172-page comprehensive incomplete comments, R-CALF USA states, “R-CALF USA protests USDA’s refusal to grant sufficient time for the public to thoroughly evaluate this Proposed Rule. This Proposed Rule represents an extraordinarily bizarre and obfuscated rulemaking.”


“This Proposed Rule by the Obama Administration represents a greater risk to the safety of our U.S. food supply than any previous rulemaking by any previous Administration in recent memory,” said R-CALF USA CEO Bill Bullard. R-CALF USA begins its comments by sharing the basic structure of the Proposed Rule. The group calls it an amalgamation of three rulemakings rolled into one.


“The first rulemaking is APHIS’ mandatory response to Federal District Court Judge Lawrence L. Piersol’s Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction issued July 3, 2008, in a lawsuit filed against APHIS by R-CALF USA, Herman Schumacher, Robert Mack, Ernie Mertz, Wayne Nelson, South Dakota Stockgrowers Association, Center for Food Safety, Consumers Federation of America, Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease Foundation, Inc., Food & Water Watch, and Public Citizen. In his injunction order, Judge Piersol ordered APHIS to, inter alia, revise any provisions of APHIS’ rule entitled “Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines,” (OTM Rule) published at 72 Fed. Reg., 53314-53379 that APHIS deemed necessary after issuing a notice for public comments


“The second rulemaking in the amalgamated Proposed Rule is a quandary: On the one hand APHIS claims in its first rulemaking that it did not deem it necessary to revise any provisions in its OTM Rule pursuant to Judge Piersol’s order. However, on the other hand, and as described below, APHIS’s second rulemaking simultaneously makes substantive revisions to the OTM Rule, including revisions to the very provisions APHIS claimed were essential to its affirmation of the OTM Rule.


“The third rulemaking rolled into the Proposed Rule is an effort by APHIS to designate certain countries eligible to export ruminants and/or ruminant products to the United States, even if, as shown below, a country is affected by BSE and APHIS does not know whether BSE is progressing or declining within those countries.”


R-CALF USA continues its line of direct and honest evaluation in arguments from A to LL, and in six appendices. Each argument lends itself to the same conclusion – one that is written in the comments, “The Proposed OTM Rule is inconsistent with the congressional mandate to protect the health of U.S. livestock and the welfare of the American people by preventing the introduction and dissemination of infectious diseases, particularly one as pernicious as BSE.” “The Proposed Rule is unsalvageable and needs to be completely rewritten,” concluded Bullard.


# # #


R-CALF USA (Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, United Stockgrowers of America) is a national, nonprofit organization dedicated to ensuring the continued profitability and viability of the U.S. cattle industry. For more information, visit www.r-calfusa.com or, call 406-252-2516.






APHIS, Station 3A-03.8


4700 River Road Unit 118


Riverdale, MD 20737-1238


Via Facsimile and Federal Rulemaking Portal: www.regulations.gov


Re: R-CALF USA Comments in Docket No. APHIS-2008-0010: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products, Proposed Rule


Notice: R-CALF USA protests USDA’s refusal to grant sufficient time for the public to thoroughly evaluate this Proposed Rule. This Proposed Rule represents an extraordinarily bazaar and obfuscated rulemaking: On the one-hand it solicits public comment on USDA’s proposal to affirm the OTM Rule (which comprises about one-third of the Proposed Rule), and in the same breath used to state it was not making any changes to the OTM Rule, USDA nevertheless solicits public comments on its proposal to change the OTM Rule. R-CALF USA made four timely requests (now included in the record) for an extension to the comment period of not less than 60 days. R-CALF USA’s requests included legitimate and supportable reasons for the need for an extension of not less than 60 days, not the least of which is the fact that USDA announced the detection of a new BSE case in California on April 24, 2012, and USDA has not yet completed its epidemiological investigation of that case. Further, when USDA made the public announcement regarding the infected cow, it immediately attempted to assuage public concerns by assuring the public that the infected animal did not enter the food supply; that the feed ban is a primary control measure for BSE; and, it definitively stated that the strain of BSE detected was not generally associated with an animal consuming feed. The Proposed Rule, however, asserts that preventing BSE-infected cattle from entering the food supply is no longer essential to protecting public health; that requiring imported beef to be derived only from animals not subject to a feed ban for their entire lives is not essential to protecting public health. And, the Proposed Rule is silent on BSE transmission not caused either by the consumption of contaminated feed or by maternal transmission. For these and the other legitimate reasons R-CALF USA included in its four separate requests for an extension of not less than 60 days, the public must not be denied a right to comment on this Proposed Rule for at least 60 days following the completion of USDA’s epidemiological investigation of the California Cow.


R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America


P.O. Box 30715


Billings, MT 59107


Fax: 406-252-3176


Phone: 406-252-2516


Website: www.r-calfusa.com


E-mail: r-calfusa@r-calfusa.com


2


R-CALF USA’s comments below are incomplete as USDA did not provide adequate time for a careful and thorough public evaluation of this extraordinarily unusual and complex rule.


Dear Administrator:


The Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund – United Stockgrowers of America (R-CALF USA) appreciates this opportunity to submit comments on the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS’s) proposed rule entitled Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products, (Proposed Rule) published at 77 Fed. Reg., 15848-15913 (March 16, 2012).


R-CALF USA is a non-profit cattle-producer association that represents thousands of U.S. cattle producers in 45 states. R-CALF USA’s mission is to ensure the continued profitability and viability of independent U.S. cattle producers. The demographics of R-CALF USA’s membership are reflective of the demographics of the entire U.S. cattle industry, with membership ranging from the largest of U.S. cattle producers to the smallest. R-CALF USA’s membership consists primarily of cow-calf operators, cattle backgrounders, and feedlot owners. Various main street businesses are associate members of R-CALF USA. In addition to being producers of cattle, R-CALF USA members are also beef consumers and responsible stewards of the environment.


I. INTRODUCTION


snip...see full text 172 pages ;




Thursday, June 14, 2012


R-CALF USA Calls USDA Dishonest and Corrupt; Submits Fourth Request for Extension


R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America




Friday, May 25, 2012


R-CALF USDA’s New BSE Rule Eliminates Important Protections Needed to Prevent BSE Spread






Subject: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68




Comment from Terry Singeltary Document ID: APHIS-2008-0010-0008 Document Type: Public Submission This is comment on Proposed Rule: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products Docket ID: APHIS-2008-0010 RIN:0579-AC68




Topics: No Topics associated with this document View Document: More Document Subtype: Public Comment Status: Posted Received Date: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Date Posted: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Comment Start Date: March 16 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Comment Due Date: May 15 2012, at 11:59 PM Eastern Daylight Time Tracking Number: 80fdd617 First Name: Terry Middle Name: S. Last Name: Singeltary City: Bacliff Country: United States State or Province: TX Organization Name: CJD TSE PRION Submitter's Representative: CONSUMERS




Comment: comment submission Document ID APHIS-2008-0010-0001




Greetings USDA,




OIE et al, what a difference it makes with science, from one day to the next. i.e. that mad cow gold card the USA once held. up until that fateful day in December of 2003, the science of BSE was NO IMPORTS TO USA FROM BSE COUNTRY. what a difference a day makes$ now that the shoe is on the other foot, the USDA via the OIE, wants to change science again, just for trade $ I implore the OIE decision and policy makers, for the sake of the world, to refuse any status quo of the USA BSE risk assessment. if at al, the USA BSE GBR should be raise to BSE GBR IV, for the following reasons. North America is awash with many different TSE Prion strains, in many different species, and they are mutating and spreading. IF the OIE, and whatever policy makers, do anything but raise the risk factor for BSE in North America, they I would regard that to be highly suspicious. IN fact, it would be criminal in my opinion, because the OIE knows this, and to knowingly expose the rest of the world to this dangerous pathogen, would be ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’, just for the almighty dollar, once again. I warned the OIE about all this, including the risk factors for CWD, and the fact that the zoonosis potential was great, way back in 2002. THE OIE in collaboration with the USDA, made the legal trading of the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie a legal global commodity. yes, thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al, it’s now legal to trade the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie strain all around the globe. IF you let them, they will do the same thing with atypical BSE and CWD (both strains to date). This with science showing that indeed these TSE prion strains are transmissible. I strenuously urge the OIE et al to refuse any weakening to the USA trade protocols for the BSE TSE prion disease (all strains), and urge them to reclassify the USA with BSE GBR IV risk factor.






SEE REFERENCE SOURCES IN ATTACHMENTS






PLEASE SEE Terry S. Singeltary Sr. _Attachment_ WORD FILE ;












Monday, June 18, 2012


Johanns Introduces Legislation Banning EPA Aerial Surveillance on feedlots just more BSe




PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus


Nadine Mestre-Frances,1 Simon Nicot,2 Sylvie Rouland,1 Anne-Gaƫlle Biacabe,2 Isabelle Quadrio,3 Armand Perret-Liaudet,3 Thierry Baron,2 Jean-Michel Verdier1 1IN SER M UM2; Montpellier, France; 2Anses; Lyon, France; 3Hopitaux Civils de Lyon; Lyon, France


An atypical form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy has been identified in cattle in Europe, North America and Japan and was designed as L-type BSE (L-BSE) due to the lower apparent molecular mass of the unglycosylated, protease-resistant prion protein (PrPres) detected by western blot compared with classical BSE. Experimental evidences from studies in transgenic mice expressing human PrP and in primate models suggest a higher risk of transmission to humans of the L-BSE form than for classical BSE agent. However, a major unresolved issue concerns the potential transmissibility of the L-BSE agent by oral route. To address this question, we infected mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), a non-human primate model, with L-BSE by intracerebral or oral route.


Four adult lemurs were intracerebrally (IC) inoculated with 5mg of L-BSE infected brain homogenate of an atypical French BSE case (02-2528). Four young and four adult animals were fed with 5 mg or 50 mg of infected brain. After sacrifice, the brain tissues were biochemically and immunocytochemically investigated for PrPres.


The 4 animals IC inoculated died at 19 and 22 months postinoculation (mpi). They developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated movements, balance loss. Symptoms get worse according to the disease progression, until severe ataxia. Severe spongiosis was evidenced into the thalamus, the striatum, the mesencephalon, and the brainstem, whereas into the cortex the vacuolisation was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected into the thalamus, the striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral cortex, PrPres was prominently accumulated in plaques.


The orally inoculated animals showed similar clinical symptoms occurring between 27 and 34 mpi. Disease was characterized by progressive prostration, loss of appetite and poor appearance of the fur. Only one adult animal showed disequilibrium. PrPres was strongly accumulated only in the striatum and thalamus and weakly into the cortex. No plaques were evidenced. Two animals that were orally challenged at the age of two years are still alive and healthy 34 months after inoculation. The western blot analysis showed uniform molecular profiles, irrespective of the route or dose of infection, and included notably a PrPres form with low apparent molecular mass (~19 kDa) similar to the PrPres in the original cattle brain. However, the PrPres profile in lemurs was characterized by a higher proportion of di- and mono-glycosylated species (up to 95% of the total signal) than in the bovine L-BSE inoculum (~80%). In addition, small amounts of PrPres were detected by western blotting in the spleen of three animals (one intra-cerebrally inoculated and two fed with 5 mg of cattle brain).


Here, we demonstrate that the L-BSE agent can be transmitted by oral route from cattle to young and adult mouse lemurs. In comparison to IC inoculated animals, orally challenged lemurs were characterized by longer survival periods as expected with this route of infection.








Friday, May 25, 2012


R-CALF USDA’s New BSE Rule Eliminates Important Protections Needed to Prevent BSE Spread




Saturday, May 26, 2012


Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?


SNIP...


What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”


The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”


“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi State.


In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said


The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.


SNIP...




Sunday, May 27, 2012


CANADA PLANS TO IMPRISON ANYONE SPEAKING ABOUT MAD COW or ANY OTHER DISEASE OUTBREAK


CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING




Sunday, May 27, 2012


GAIN REPORT BSE Case in United States Will Not Affect Trade, States Canadian Food Inspection Agency






Subject: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68


Comment from Terry Singeltary Document ID: APHIS-2008-0010-0008 Document Type: Public Submission This is comment on Proposed Rule: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products Docket ID: APHIS-2008-0010 RIN:0579-AC68


Topics: No Topics associated with this document View Document: More Document Subtype: Public Comment Status: Posted Received Date: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Date Posted: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Comment Start Date: March 16 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Comment Due Date: May 15 2012, at 11:59 PM Eastern Daylight Time Tracking Number: 80fdd617 First Name: Terry Middle Name: S. Last Name: Singeltary City: Bacliff Country: United States State or Province: TX Organization Name: CJD TSE PRION Submitter's Representative: CONSUMERS


Comment: comment submission Document ID APHIS-2008-0010-0001


Greetings USDA,


OIE et al, what a difference it makes with science, from one day to the next. i.e. that mad cow gold card the USA once held. up until that fateful day in December of 2003, the science of BSE was NO IMPORTS TO USA FROM BSE COUNTRY. what a difference a day makes$ now that the shoe is on the other foot, the USDA via the OIE, wants to change science again, just for trade $ I implore the OIE decision and policy makers, for the sake of the world, to refuse any status quo of the USA BSE risk assessment. if at al, the USA BSE GBR should be raise to BSE GBR IV, for the following reasons. North America is awash with many different TSE Prion strains, in many different species, and they are mutating and spreading. IF the OIE, and whatever policy makers, do anything but raise the risk factor for BSE in North America, they I would regard that to be highly suspicious. IN fact, it would be criminal in my opinion, because the OIE knows this, and to knowingly expose the rest of the world to this dangerous pathogen, would be ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’, just for the almighty dollar, once again. I warned the OIE about all this, including the risk factors for CWD, and the fact that the zoonosis potential was great, way back in 2002. THE OIE in collaboration with the USDA, made the legal trading of the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie a legal global commodity. yes, thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al, it’s now legal to trade the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie strain all around the globe. IF you let them, they will do the same thing with atypical BSE and CWD (both strains to date). This with science showing that indeed these TSE prion strains are transmissible. I strenuously urge the OIE et al to refuse any weakening to the USA trade protocols for the BSE TSE prion disease (all strains), and urge them to reclassify the USA with BSE GBR IV risk factor.


SEE REFERENCE SOURCES IN ATTACHMENTS


PLEASE SEE Terry S. Singeltary Sr. _Attachment_ WORD FILE ;






***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


snip...




MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...


***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model




***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle




***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.




***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.




The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSEinfected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission.


In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.




in the url that follows, I have posted


SRM breaches first, as late as 2011.


then


MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until 2007, when they ceased posting them.


then,


MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES.


Friday, May 18, 2012


Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012






Wednesday, May 30, 2012


PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus






TSS

Johanns Introduces Legislation Banning EPA Aerial Surveillance on feedlots just more BSe

Jun14


Johanns Introduces Legislation Banning EPA Aerial Surveillance


on June 14th, 2012at 9:28 am


Posted In: Cattle, Cattle, Cow-Calf, EPA, Cattle, Feeder Cattle, Industry News, Cattle, SeedStock, Cattle, Stocker Cattle, Uncategorized


Sen. Mike Johanns, R-Neb., introduced an amendment June 12 to the farm bill banning the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) use of aerial surveillance after the agency failed to provide comprehensive answers about the program’s use nationwide.


“This is a trust issue, and farmers and ranchers don’t trust EPA doing low-level surveillance flights over their operations,” Johanns said. “EPA’s surveillance program only adds to the deficit of trust this closed-door agency has earned of late. It’s past time for Congress to put an end to EPA’s use of aerial surveillance.”


Johanns’ amendment specifically prohibits EPA from conducting aerial surveillance to inspect or to record images of agricultural operations. The amendment does not affect the use of traditional on-site inspections.



The amendment text is available ;







Source: johanns.senate.gov


Tags: Drones, EPA, Johanns, Nebraska, Surveillance







Johanns, is this not the same guy that covered up mad cow disease in the USDA for years and years, and to this day, still covering up the facts about mad cow disease and cjd in the USA ???


IS this not the same guy that helped cover up mad cow feed ban violations for these same FEEDLOTS, year, after year, after year, for how many years ??? (until they ceased issuing such data to the public, some time around 2007, 10 years post partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban).


now this guy wants to help cover up polluted waters from the same industry?


damn consumer does not have a chance with senator mike johanns.


Senator Mike Johanns, a senator NOT for the people, the consumer, but a senator for BIG AG $$$


Johanns questions EPA on feedlot flyovers


John Maday, Managing Editor, Drovers CattleNetwork | Updated: May 31, 2012


Have you noticed any small planes circling your local feedyard lately? If so, it could be the federal government conducting surveillance for enforcement of the Clean Water Act, and U.S. Senator Mike Johanns (R-Neb.) wants an explanation.


Johanns, who served as Secretary of Agriculture in the Bush administration, sent a letter this week to EPA administrator Lisa Jackson questioning the reported use of aerial surveillance. Nebraska’s entire Congressional delegation co-signed the letter.


Johanns also spoke with AgriTalk Radio host Mike Adams on Wednesday to outline his concerns.


“It’s happening, and I’m trying to find out just what’s involved,” Johanns says, adding that EPA has been flying small airplanes out of Sioux City, Iowa or Omaha, Neb., to take aerial photos of feedlots in eastern Nebraska, to assess compliance with the Clean Water Act.


Johanns assumes the agency intends to use the photos for investigations and potentially enforcement actions, but says the EPA has provided no information on the operation to Congress. In their letter to Administrator Jackson, the state’s Congressional delegation asks for an explanation of the statutory authority under which EPA is conducting the surveillance, along with the purpose of the flights, their frequency and their use in enforcement actions.


“My concerns are many,” Johanns says, noting that in Nebraska, the EPA and the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality are cooperative agencies, but the evidence suggests the flights are purely an EPA operation. USDA, he notes, has used aerial photography to survey crop conditions and to verify compliance with conservation programs, but EPA has “little trust out in the country, and people will get fired up.” Congress, he adds, now is catching up with the program after the fact, and EPA is not an agency with a warm relationship with Congress.


EPA provided AgriTalk with the following response:


“For nearly a decade, EPA has used aerial over-flights to verify compliance with environmental laws in impaired watersheds. Aerial over-flights are a cost-effective tool that helps the Agency and our state partners minimize costs and reduce the number of on-site inspections across the country as the Agency focuses on areas of the greatest concern. For animal feeding operations, EPA uses over-flights, state records and other publicly available sources of information to identify discharges of pollution. In no case has EPA taken an enforcement action solely on the basis of these over-flights. EPA and other state and federal agencies also use aircraft for responding to emergencies such as chemical releases or to assess environmental disasters.”


Read the letter from the Nebraska Congressional delegation to EPA administrator Jackson.










Johanns protecting BIG AG over human and animal health again $$$,



just like he did with mad cow disease, and we’re still having to deal with that.



after that cover-up, and usda mad cow follies there from, I don’t see how the man can get elected to anything. ...



what about runoff from these feedlots ? why would johanns even worry about that $$$




Detection of Protease-Resistant Prion Protein in Water from a CWD-Endemic Area


65


Tracy A. Nichols*1,2, Bruce Pulford1, Christy Wyckoff1,2, Crystal Meyerett1, Brady Michel1, Kevin Gertig3, Jean E. Jewell4, Glenn C. Telling5 and M.D. Zabel1 1Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523, USA 2National Wildlife Research Center, Wildlife Services, United States Department of Agriculture, Fort Collins, Colorado, 80521, USA 3Fort Collins Water and Treatment Operations, Fort Collins, Colorado, 80521, USA 4 Department of Veterinary Sciences, Wyoming State Veterinary Laboratory, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, 82070, USA 5Department of Microbiology, Immunology, Molecular Genetics and Neurology, Sanders Brown Center on Aging, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 40536, USA * Corresponding author- tracy.a.nichols@aphis.usda.gov


Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the only known transmissible spongiform encephalopathy affecting free-ranging wildlife. Experimental and epidemiological data indicate that CWD can be transmitted horizontally and via blood and saliva, although the exact mode of natural transmission remains unknown. Substantial evidence suggests that prions can persist in the environment, implicating it as a potential prion reservoir and transmission vehicle. CWD- positive animals can contribute to environmental prion load via biological materials including saliva, blood, urine and feces, shedding several times their body weight in possibly infectious excreta in their lifetime, as well as through decomposing carcasses. Sensitivity limitations of conventional assays hamper evaluation of environmental prion loads in water. Here we show the ability of serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (sPMCA) to amplify minute amounts of CWD prions in spiked water samples at a 1:1 x106 , and protease-resistant prions in environmental and municipal-processing water samples from a CWD endemic area. Detection of CWD prions correlated with increased total organic carbon in water runoff from melting winter snowpack. These data suggest prolonged persistence and accumulation of prions in the environment that may promote CWD transmission.


snip...


The data presented here demonstrate that sPMCA can detect low levels of PrPCWD in the environment, corroborate previous biological and experimental data suggesting long term persistence of prions in the environment2,3 and imply that PrPCWD accumulation over time may contribute to transmission of CWD in areas where it has been endemic for decades. This work demonstrates the utility of sPMCA to evaluate other environmental water sources for PrPCWD, including smaller bodies of water such as vernal pools and wallows, where large numbers of cervids congregate and into which prions from infected animals may be shed and concentrated to infectious levels.


snip...end...full text at ;
















MIKE JOHANNS, HEAD OF THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES



Subject: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$ Date: July 28, 2007 at 9:06 am PST


R-CALF


July 26, 2007 The Honorable Mike Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of Agriculture 14th Street and Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20250


Dear Secretary Johanns,


Yesterday, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) issued its investigative report of Canada’s 11th native case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which is available at http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/bccb2007/10investe.shtml. Like the findings of the 11 preceding investigative reports, one for each confirmed case in cattle living in or originating from Canada, the cause of infection is inconclusive, though crosscontamination of animal feed was determined as the most likely source.


The report implies that CFIA allowed five cows from the same herd of cattle as the infected cow, which also consumed the same feed as the infected cow, to be destroyed and disposed of without first testing these animals for BSE. The report further indicates that CFIA intends to do the same thing with 36 more cows from the infected herd, despite the likelihood that some or all of them consumed the same contaminated feed as the animal that tested positive for BSE.


In the United Kingdom where, along with all of Europe and Japan, a far more comprehensive BSE testing regime is practiced, only 35 percent of BSE-infected herds had only one case of BSE while 49 percent of the BSE-infected herds had three or more BSE cases, with one herd having 124 cases. (See: http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/statistics/bse/con-cases.htm.) The information compiled from the United Kingdom’s BSE testing program enabled it to identify weaknesses in its BSE mitigation program, prompting the United Kingdom to progressively update its elementary ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban on four separate occasions, following the unsatisfactory results realized by its testing data after each preceding update.


If CFIA is not testing herd mates and feed mates of known BSE cases, as this report infers, then Canada would appear to be in violation of USDA’ Minimal Risk Region Rule. Failure to test cattle with a high likelihood of BSE does not constitute an investigation sufficient to confirm the adequacy of Canada’s BSE mitigation measures, nor does it comply with the requirement that Canada take additional risk mitigation measures, as necessary, following a BSE outbreak. (See Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 2, January 4, 2005, at 463.) Moreover, such a failure would render Canada’s surveillance program ineffective both for identifying the true population of infected animals and estimating whether its BSE outbreak is on the increase or decline. The testing of these herd mates and feed mates would, at least, provide us with some information R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America


P.O. Box 30715 Billings, MT 59107 Phone: 406-252-2516 Fax: 406-252-3176 E-mail: r-calfusa@r-calfusa.com Website: www.r-calfusa.com


Mike Johanns, USDA Secretary of Agriculture July 26, 2007


Page 2 of 2


about the likelihood that some of the 92 animals that already had died and the 23 others that could not be located also were likely to be infected with the disease.


R-CALF USA respectfully requests that USDA immediately determine if the inferences contained in the CFIA report regarding the disposal of untested herd mates and feed mates of the BSE-infected cow are actually statements of fact. If so, then we further request that USDA notify Canada that it is not in compliance with U.S. regulations and explain to Canada that it needs to immediately begin testing all known herd mates and feed mates of BSE-positive cattle in order to maintain its status as a “minimal risk” region under the regulations.


Sincerely,


R.M. Thornsberry, D.V.M. R-CALF USA Board President Cc: The Honorable Tom Harkin The Honorable Saxby Chambliss The Honorable Max Baucus The Honorable Lindsey Graham The Honorable Collin Peterson The Honorable Bob Goodlatte







USDA Fights Court Decision Approving BSE Tests



From Terry S. Singeltary Sr. flounder9@verizon.net 5-30-7


To: agsec@usda.gov


Cc: john.clifford@aphis.usda.gov; usaha@usaha.org;


jmeng@cpfbeef.com;LAVET22@aol.com Phyllis.Fong@usda.gov


Sent: Tuesday, May 29, 2007 2:07 PM


Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)


May 27, 2007


Honorable Michael Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of Agriculture Room 200 Jamie Whitten Federal Building Washington, D.C. 20250


CC


Honorable Judge James Robertson U.S. District Court 333 Constitution Ave. North West Washington, D. C. 20001


Subject: Request to let the Creekstone vs. USDA court decision stand.


Ref: Letter from United States Animal Health Association, dated May 22, 2007


Dear Mr. Secretary et al :


I am requesting that you allow the court decision in the Creekstone vs. USDA to stand so that Creekstone may begin testing the beef they process for BSE and or BASE and or any other TSE phenotype there of. WE must let them test since the USDA et al refuse to do so properly. This is not to say that there should be no strict TSE testing protocols. IF testing is to take place privately, there must be strict TSE testing protocol to assure the most up to date, sensitive, and validated tests are used, and used properly. These tests must be announced to the public in a timely manner at every step of the way, validated and confirmed by the federal government, Weybridge, and an independent third party consumer organization and there TSE expert of choice, in my opinion.


My mother died from a exceedingly rare strain of sporadic CJD i.e. the Heidenhain Variant of CJD. My neighbors mother also lost his mother to a form of sporadic CJD exactly one year previously from the day my mother died. BOTH cases were confirmed by autopsy. There is new data out about the BASE atypical BSE, which pathologically is more related to a phenotype of sporadic CJD, than the nvCJD in humans from the UK. To continue to ignore these scientific findings with the old UKBSEnvCJD only theory is not justified by science anymore. It is not logical.


The logic behind the reasons not to let test for TSE in the USA because of The Virus Serum Toxin Act of 1913 and or because of the recent letter from the USAHA (see letter below) bring forth, are totally bogus. NO one could screw the testing up any worse than the USDA has done in the past. The OIG and the GAO has shown this time and time again. The 2004 Enhanced BSE surveillance program where some 275,000+ cattle were tested for BSE was proven to be terribly flawed from the beginning. This documented time and time again. Even Paul Brown, known and respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'', and this was on March 15, 2006 ;


"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."


Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.


USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.


"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end






CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...






PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE



Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM



"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."


OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;



Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program ­ Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service


Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III


Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006


Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain






Mr. Johanns,


The August 4, 1997 FDA BSE ruminant to ruminant feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper. In 2007 alone, 10 MILLION plus pounds of banned blood laced MBM has already gone out into commerce for the feeding of banned product to cattle. yes, were still feeding cows banned BSE/BASE product in 2007, almost 10 years after the voluntary ban was put in place. guess what, it aint working.


YOU and this Administration have failed terribly in protecting not only the consumer, but your precious commodity that you speak so highly of i.e. the beef industry. In your continued efforts to cover up the real mad cow problem in the USA, you have in fact only amplified it and continued it's spread, and in doing so, you have needlessly exposed millions to the TSE agent, from many different proven routes and sources. The only saving grace you have is the incubation period has been on your side. It will catch up. When it does, when the people finally figure all this out, when some of the millions you have needlessly exposed to this agent become clinical in the future, rest assured I will stand in line to see that you and your administration are convicted for murder.


What you and this administration have done over the past 8 years is criminal, in my opinion. I have watched not only you, but the Bush administration thumb there nose to science for almost 8 years, all to protect the beef industry. The science was there, but you chose to ignore it, and even manipulated science with the bogus BSE MRR policy, all the while your were implementing that, you were covering up another mad cow in Texas. But thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG, and an act of Congress, that mad cow was finally proven positive, unlike the other stumbling and staggering mad cow that was rendered without any test at all in Texas, but by then you had succeeded in the BSE MRR policy, the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally. You and this administration have done the same thing the UK did when they poisoned the globe with there exporting of BSE, except you made it legal now with the BSE MRR policy, and now we are dealing with BASE, a strain that is more virulent to humans. what happens when it mutates again?


When cwd deer and elk and there different phenotypes have all been rendered into feed, along with scrapie infected sheep in the USA, and a few TME to top that off, it will be a most interesting recipe will it not, and an interesting case study for humans for decades to come. sadly though, with the recent pet food scandal, and the deaths there of, we have learned a few things. one, that the elderly are expendable, but cats, dogs, and adolescents are not. and that the problem of our feeding of food producing animals has been tainted for decades. and with the melamine scandal, as with the mad cow feed scandal, it's the same old song and dance by you and the Bush administration, everything is o.k., will not hurt you, cover-up and protect the industry at all cost, and this will be another part of your sad legacy in History Sir.


To not allow BSE/TSE testing in the USA, testing that will find, only proves our point, you have and will continue to cover up the real mad cow problem in the USA. and the world knows this. ...




Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77519





UNITED STATES ANIMAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION 8100 Three Chopt Road, Suite 203 P. O. BOX K227 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23288 804- 285-3210 FAX 804-285-3367 E-Mail: usaha@usaha.org Web Site: www.usaha.org




May 22, 2007 Honorable Michael Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of Agriculture Room 200 Jamie Whitten Federal Building Washington, D.C. 20250




Dear Mr. Secretary:


The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA), wishes to express its encouragement to you and the Department of Agriculture to appeal the litigation surrounding private testing for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. We hope you will strongly consider this as you work with the Office of General Counsel on this suit.


To support this appeal, we offer that this sets a detrimental precedence on USDA's ability to regulate disease and testing processes in animal agriculture. As we appreciate the entrepreneurial spirit of Creekstone, the larger scale implications could lead to devastating impacts for food animal production in this country as itrelates to animal health. We do feel that private testing could hamper animal health officials' ability to locate disease occurrences, and exercise proper practices to trace, control and eliminate them. As you are aware, there are a number of factors that raise concern among animal health leaders and diagnosticians. We encourage you to thoroughly consider those upon your decision to appeal. We do recognize this is now a matter of the courts, and trust that our ability to safeguard animal health is not compromised as a result of this litigation. Please let us know if there is any further support we can provide.


Sincerely,


Lee M. Myers President, U.S. Animal Health Association Cc: Dr. John Clifford



===============================




Saturday, February 27, 2010


FINAL REPORT OF THE TESTING OF THE BELGIAN (VERMONT) SHEEP February 27, 2010



IN SHORT ;


August 15, 2000


OIG case # NY-3399-56 REDACTED, VT


''Enclosed is OIG's notification that they have scheduled an investigation of the following individual. REDACTED is alleged to have provided possibly inaccurate test results involving diseased sheep. However, because the results were determined to be inconclusive, no actual violation was actually committed.''


snip...



PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;









=============================================




Subject: Re: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$ Date: July 28, 2007 at 10:09 am PST


In Reply to: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$ posted by TSS on July 28, 2007 at 9:06 am:



Tue Apr 10, 2007 12:30 68.238.98.6


Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to the United States Date: April 10, 2007 at 10:33 am PST


"It most likely" entered the food supply "given that it was slaughtered," said Karen Eggert, a spokeswoman with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.


"But it wouldn't have gone to slaughter if it was showing any clinical signs for BSE. We're not looking at this as a possibility that a BSE infected cow got into the United States," she said.






Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada


snip...


Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of BSE prevalence in the standing Canadian adult cattle population as of August 15, 2006. Based on the expected prevalence value under the BBC model and the estimated adult herd size (Table 1), the expected number of BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population is 4.1. By comparison, the expected value obtained under BSurvE Prevalence B is 3.9 per million, which corresponds to an estimated 23.2 BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population.


snip...








THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP



JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED



OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7 MONTHS LATER



TEXAS MAD COW



THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;



During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.







Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.



snip...



Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.



Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.



Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.



Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.



Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.







TERRY CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD COW 7 MONTHS EARLIER



-------- Original Message --------


Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us


Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???


Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."


To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us>


Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;


Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?


and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???


terry


==============================


==============================


-------- Original Message --------


Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???


Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 –0600


From: Carla Everett


To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>


The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no informationabout the animal being in Texas. CarlaAt 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?>>thank you,>Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>



===================


===================



-------- Original Message --------


Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???


Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett


To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]>


our computer department was working on a place holder we could postUSDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonightby NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcementwhen we hear something.At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,


you wrote:


>why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?


>>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:


>November 22: Press Release title here


>>star image More BSE information


>>>>terry


>>Carla Everett wrote:


>>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...


>>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>



==========================


==========================




THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now $$$



NO, it's not pretty, hell, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take em or leave em, however, you cannot change them.


with kindest regards,



I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA 77518



Terry S. Singeltary Sr.



===============








THE SECRET MAD COW POSITIVE TEST, THAT WAS COVERED UP




Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program


An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.


snip...


4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half







USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used


WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.


In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.


The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.


Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.


"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."


Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.


These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.


In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.


Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.


The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.


Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.


"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."


Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.


Date: 8/25/05





"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."



THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!



THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS



USDA 2003


We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.


Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.


snip.............


Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.


Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .


Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.


snip...


FULL TEXT;


Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE


Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado


2005



=============================



CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006


The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.


The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.


These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.


"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."


Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.


USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.


"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end





CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...





Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005 Executive Summary: On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA's enhanced surveillance program.





Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive; experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure, and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported beyond the laboratory. . A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.





THIS confirms that the June 2004 Enhanced BSE cover-up, was just that. Like i said before, due to this terribly flawed system, those 388,000 testing to date for BSE in the USA were meaningless and should be retested. ...


Subject: USDA JOHANN'S MAD ABOUT FONG, PLANS HIS OWN LAB AND HIS OWN MAD COW ANTIBODIES ;-) Date: July 29, 2005 at 2:35 pm PST


Friday, July 29, 2005





USDA did not test possible mad cows


By Steve Mitchell United Press International Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM


WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.


USDA officials said the difference is made up in animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic laboratories, but these animals were not tested using the "gold standard" test employed by the agency for confirming acase of the deadly disease. Instead, the state labs used a less sensitive test that experts say could miss mad cow cases.


In addition, the state lab figures were not included in a March 2004 USDA document estimating the number of animals most likely to be infected among U.S. herds, and apparently were not given to a congressional committee that had requested agency data on the number of cows with brain disorder signs that had been tested for the disease.


"This is just adding to the demise of USDA's credibility," said Felicia Nestor, senior policy adviser to the Government Accountability Project, a group in Washington, D.C., that works with federal whistleblowers.


"If the USDA is going to exclude from testing the animals most likely to have the disease, that would seem to have a very negative impact on there liability of their conclusion," Nestor told UPI.


Nestor, who has monitored the USDA's mad cow surveillance program closely for several years, asked, "Are they deliberately avoiding testing animals that look like they have the disease?"


Concerns about the number of cows in U.S. herds with brain disorder symptoms have been heightened due to the recent case in Texas, in which USDA officials failed to test an animal with such symptoms, also known as central nervous system or CNS signs. This was a violation of USDA policy, which stipulates all CNS cows should be tested because they are considered the most likely to be mad cow infected. To date, the Washington cow that tested positive last December is the only confirmed case of mad cow disease -- also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- among U.S. herds.


The Texas incident has alarmed the public and members of Congress because humans can contract a fatal brain disorder called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from consuming meat infected with the mad cow pathogen. If the USDA's surveillance program is allowing the riskiest cows to go untested, it raises concerns about the ability of the monitoring system to detect the disease reliably in U.S. herds, Rep.Henry Waxman, D-Calif., charged in a May 13 letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman.


Dr. Peter Lurie, of the consumer group Public Citizen, said CNS cows should be the one category that absolutely has to be tested to have a sound surveillance system.


"CNS animals are far and away the most important animals to test," said Lurie, who has done several analyses of the USDA's mad cow surveillance program.


"If there's any category that needs 100 percent testing, that's it, because they would be the most likely place to find mad cow in America," he told UPI. "Any CNS cow that slips into the food supply represents a major case of malpractice by USDA, and similarly, the failure to test the brain of that animal to see if it was indeed infected is really a failure to protect the public."


USDA officials said the agency has no estimate on how many CNS cows occur in U.S. herds. But spokesman Ed Loyd has told UPI, and at least one other media outlet, that 500 CNS cows were tested in fiscal year 2003. Yet agency testing records for the first 10 months of FY 2003, obtained by UPI under the Freedom of Information Act, show only 254 animals that fall under the CNS category -- or about half the number Loyd cited.


After failing to respond to repeated requests from UPI for clarification of the apparent discrepancy, Loyd finally offered the explanation that an additional 45 CNS cows were tested by the USDA during the final two months of FY 2003. The remainder, he said, was made up by CNS cases tested at various state veterinary diagnostic laboratories.


"We also include data reported to us from state veterinary diagnostic laboratories, and all of these are CNS cases that have been tested for BSE using a histological examination," Loyd said.


"We were not using any other labs during this period, other than (the USDA lab), to run the IHC tests for BSE, which is the gold standard," he said. "This (state laboratory) information contributes important data to our surveillance effort."


However, the state labs did not use the immunohistochemistry test, which the USDA has called the "gold standard" for diagnosing mad cow disease. Instead, the labs used a different test called histopathology, which theUSDA itself does not use to confirm a case, opting instead for the more sensitive IHC test.


The histopathology test, unlike the IHC test, does not detect prions --misfolded proteins that serve as a marker for infection and can be spotted early on in the course of the illness. Rather, it screens forthe microscopic holes in the brain that are characteristic of advanced mad cow disease.


According to the USDA's Web site, histopathology proves reliable only if the brain sample is removed soon after the death of the animal. If there is too much of a delay, the Web site states, it can be "very difficult to confirm a diagnosis by histopathology" because the brain structures may have begun to disintegrate.


That is one reason the agency began using the IHC test -- it can confirm a diagnosis if the brain has begun disintegrating or been frozen for shipping.


The state labs used histopathology to screen 266 CNS cases in FY 2003, as well as 257 cases in FY 2002, according to Loyd. He did not explain why this information was not included in the testing records the agency provided to UPI and has not responded to requests for the identity of the state labs.


Linda Detwiler, a former USDA veterinarian who oversaw the agency's madcow testing program, told UPI the histopathology test probably is adequate for screening CNS cows. If they have mad cow disease, she said, it would likely be an advanced stage that should be obvious.


Other mad cow disease experts, however, said having a back-up test suchas IHC would be advisable, because histopathology tests sometimes can miss evidence of infection.


The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations offers similar recommendations in its protocol for conducing a histopathology test. The protocol states that even if histopathology is negative,"further sampling should be undertaken" in cases "where clinical signs have strongly suggested BSE" -- a criteria that includes all of the cows tested at the state labs.


The USDA seems to agree on the need for a back-up test. Its expanded surveillance program, which began June 1, calls for using IHC -- or another test called Western blot -- to confirm any positives found on rapid tests. The March 15 document that describes the new program does not mention using histopathology to confirm cases of mad cow disease.


"Subtle changes can be missed on histopathology that would probably not be as easy to miss using IHC," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments.


"Therefore I believe it is valuable to run (histopathology)," Mumford told UPI.


She noted that in Europe, two tests -- neither one the histopathology test -- are used to ensure no cases are missed. A rapid test is used initially for screening, followed by IHC as a confirmatory test.


Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the Swiss firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow disease, agrees about the possibility of a case being missed by histopathology.


"There were cases which were (histopathology) negative but still clearly positive with the other (testing) methods," Moser said. "BSE testing based on histology on sub-optimal tissue was probably one of the reasons why Germany was allegedly BSE-free until our test discovered that they were not" in 2000, Moser told UPI.


He agreed with Detwiler that histopathology should be suitable for most cases of CNS cows, but added it still can fail to detect the disease in some CNS cases -- particularly if the sample is not optimum.


"It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the subtle changes in a diseased brain from artifacts like ruptures in the tissue due to tissue damage during the sampling, transport or preparation," he said.


Loyd asserted the additional CNS cases from the state labs actually yielded a total of 565 such cows the USDA had tested -- 65 more than his original figure of 500. Whether the USDA considers its total to be 500 or 565, however, either figure would exceed the agency's own estimates for the total number of such cows that it identifies annually.


According to data the USDA provided to the House Committee on Government Reform, and numbers the agency included in the March document about its expanded surveillance plan, only 201 to 249 CNS cows are identified at slaughterhouses. Approximately 129 additional cases occur on farms annually. At most, that yields a combined total of 378 CNS cows, or nearly 200 less than the 565 Loyd claims the agency tested.


The USDA surveillance plan document makes no mention of the number of CNS animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic labs. The figure also does not appear to be included in the agency's estimates of the number of high-risk animals that occur in the United States each year. The latter number was used to help the USDA calculate the number of animals it will screen for mad cow disease in its expanded surveillance plan.


USDA officials also did not include the state lab figures in response to a question from the House Committee on Government Reform, a source close to the issue told UPI. The committee, on which Waxman is the ranking Democrat, had requested in a March 8 letter to Veneman that she provide "the number of BSE tests that were conducted on cattle exhibiting central nervous system symptoms" for each of the last five years.


Loyd did not respond to a request from UPI asking why agency officials did not provide that information to the committee or include it in USDA's explanation of its expanded surveillance plan.


The committee has taken note of the CNS issue and plans to delve into it further in a hearing slated for sometime in the next few months.


"The committee will explore this and other issues surrounding USDA and BSE testing at a hearing later this summer," Drew Crockett, spokesman for the committee, told UPI.


--


Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail sciencemail@upi.com


Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International





''USDA gets a D or D minus," said Caroline Smith Dewaal of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, an advocacy group based in Washington. ''The best thing that came out of this is the work of the inspector general."


It was the department's in-house watchdog, Inspector General Phyllis Fong, who skirted the USDA hierarchy by ordering retesting with a different method more than six months after a routine second-round test, known as the immunohistochemistry, or IHC, test proved negative for the disease.


Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, who assumed office in January, has said he neither knew about nor authorized the retesting by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa.


BESIDES the Texas mad cow that sat on the shelf for 7+ months before the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG finally did the end around Johanns et al and finally had Weybridge bring that negative cow back from the dead to finally being a confirmed mad cow (hint, hint, getting MRR implemented first), was this simply another bumbling of BSE protocol, or just same old same old;


Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755


USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623


Statement by Chief Veterinary Medical Officer John Clifford Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test ResultsJuly 27, 2005


snip...


Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending on the "slice" of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional "slices" of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.


I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal.


snip...





In Reply to: Re: Statement by Dr. John Clifford Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test Results posted by TSS on July 27, 2005 at 12:53 pm:


o.k., let me get this right. i am pondering here;-)


all the time this TEXAS positive, positive, (secret) positive, inconclusive, negative, then Weybridge confirmed 2nd BSE documented case (thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong),all this time this BSe going on in TEXAS, was plastered all over the news, this guy forgot about that sample, and it just sat up on some shelf wasting away for months, as to be in such bad shape, they now cannot even test it properly. r i g h t ... like ooops, sorry. ...end


============================================




Subject: BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA WILD OATS FILES FRIEND OF COURT BRIEFING


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET


Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU


Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:25:13 –0600








Subject: BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA DECLARATION OF PAUL W. BROWN, M.D.


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET


Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU


Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:24:12 –0600








Subject: BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET


Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU


Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:23:42 –0600







Subject: Creutzfeldt Jakob disease statistics published As at 3 November 2006


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET


Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU


Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:05:39 –0600








Subject: Fw: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26, 2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc.


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET


Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU


Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:03:47 –0600








Wednesday, November 17, 2010


MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE


Neb. inspector accused of faking mad cow tests


Published November 17, 2010








THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.


FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.


FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.


Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).


FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.


To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.


Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.


FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.


####







ALABAMA MAD COW


Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.






ALABAMA MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE


Subject: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26, 2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. Date: November 7, 2006 at 9:08 am PST Food and Drug Administration


New Orleans District


404 BNA Drive, Building 200, Suite 500


Nashville, TN 37217


Telephone: 615-366-7801


Facsimile: 615-366-7802


October 26, 2006


WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01


FEDERAL EXPRESS


OVERNIGHT DELIVERY


Mr. Christopher V. B. Smith


Corporate President, CEO


H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc.


228 Saugatuck Avenue


Westport, Connecticut 06880


Dear Mr. Smith:


On June 6, 8, 12-15, and 23, 2006, a U.S . Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected


your animal feed protein supplement manufacturing facility, located at 603 Railroad Avenue,


Albertville, Alabama. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in


Title 21, Code ofFederal Regulations, Part 589.2000 (21 CFR 589.2000), Animal Proteins Prohibited in


Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine


Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation, resulting


in products being manufactured and distributed by your facility because they are adulterated within the


meaning of Section 402(a)(4) [21 USC 342(a)(4)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the


Act) and misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.


Our investigation determined adulteration resulted from the failure of your firm to establish and


implement measures sufficient to prevent commingling or cross-contamination . The adulterated feed


was subsequently misbranded because it was not properly labeled. Specifically, we found :


" Your firm failed to establish and use cleanout procedures or other means to prevent carry-over of


products which contain or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein


or feeds which may be used for ruminants, as required by 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B) .


Specifically, you failed to establish and use such measures for a screw auger installed in February


2005 . This auger is used to convey both prohibited and non-prohibited material to bulk storage bins.


In addition, you failed to follow the cleanout procedure your firm had developed for the receiving


systems. Your feed is, therefore, adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21 USC 342(a)(4)] of the Act.


" You failed to label all products which contained or may have contained prohibited materials with the


BSE cautionary statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants," as required by 21 CFR


589.2000(e)(1)(i) . Such products are misbranded under Section 403(3) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the


Act. These misbranded products include the three Pro-Pak products mentioned below, as well as


Page 2 - H. J . Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, Alabama Warning Letter No. 2007-NOL-O 1


those bulk loads of individual feed ingredients processed through this common screw auger and


distributed between the time it was installed in February 2005, and June 9, 2006 .


This letter is not intended to serve as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a


manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall


operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.


We acknowledge your June 16, 2006, voluntary recall of three products you manufactured from


February 2005 to June 2006. The three products recalled were: Pro-Lak Protein Concentrate for


Lactating Dairy Animals; Pro-Amino II for PreFresh and Lactating Cows; and, Pro-Pak Marine & Animal Protein Concentrate for Use in Animal Feed. Recall effectiveness checks and other measures


will determine the merit of this recall . We recognize you now label all products with the required BSE


cautionary statement and we also acknowledge your intent, given verbally to New Orleans District


management of the FDA, to discontinue the production of supplements which do not contain prohibited


materials. In your written response to this letter, please confirm in writing you have taken these steps.


You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law, including the steps we acknowledge above and any additional steps you have taken. Your response should include an


explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.


Your reply should be directed to Kari L. Batey, Compliance Officer, at the address above. If you have


questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Ms. Batey at (615) 366-7808.


Sincerely,


,


Carol S . Sanchez


Acting District Director


New Orleans District


Enclosure: Form FDA 483


cc: Craig R. Waterhouse


Plant Manager


H.J. Baker & Bros., Inc.


603 Railroad Avenue


Albertville, Alabama 35951-3419






TSS



MORE 2006 FEED BAN VIOLATIONS BELOW, ''IN COMMERCE'' ;



Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA


SEPT 6, 2006


1961.72 TONS


IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST




PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.



REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons



DISTRIBUTION AL




______________________________



PRODUCT a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.



REASON Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,484 tons



DISTRIBUTION TN and WV







Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS



Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST



RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II



______________________________



PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.



REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE Approximately 2,223 tons



DISTRIBUTION KY


______________________________



PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.



REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,220 tons



DISTRIBUTION KY




______________________________



PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.



REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 40 tons



DISTRIBUTION LA and MS




______________________________




PRODUCT Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.



REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,150 tons



DISTRIBUTION MS


______________________________



PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.



REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 87 tons



DISTRIBUTION MS


______________________________



PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.



REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons



DISTRIBUTION AL and MS




______________________________




PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.



REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags



DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006



###








Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs



Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST



PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6 CODE All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.



RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.



REASON The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.



VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs



DISTRIBUTION MI



END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006



###







Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006



Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST



PRODUCT


a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;


b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;


c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;


d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;


e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;


f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;


g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;


h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;


i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;


j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;


k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;


l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;


m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6


CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006




RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.




REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons



DISTRIBUTION AL and FL





END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006


###






Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????


Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST


PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????


DISTRIBUTION KY


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006


###







CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE


Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II


______________________________



PRODUCT


a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;


b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;


c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;


d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk



RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006.




Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.




VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons




DISTRIBUTION Nationwide




END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006




###







Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006


Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST


Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration


New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217


Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391


May 17, 2006


WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06


FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY


Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204


Dear Mr. Shirley:


On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).


Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:


You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.


You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.


As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.


This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.


You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.


Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.


Sincerely,


/S


Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District






look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;


Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates


SNIP...SEE ;


Subject: Fw: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26, 2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc.


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET


Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU


Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:03:47 -0600










UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS PREMIUM BEEF,


L.L.C., Plaintiff,


v.


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,


Defendants.


:::::::::::


Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)


snip...


JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge


The government's additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would interfere with USDA's surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm. USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed, the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world, including as part of the USDA's own surveillance testing. - 18 -











Saturday, February 27, 2010


FINAL REPORT OF THE TESTING OF THE BELGIAN (VERMONT) SHEEP February 27, 2010


IN SHORT ;


August 15, 2000


OIG case # NY-3399-56 REDACTED, VT


''Enclosed is OIG's notification that they have scheduled an investigation of the following individual. REDACTED is alleged to have provided possibly inaccurate test results involving diseased sheep. However, because the results were determined to be inconclusive, no actual violation was actually committed.''


snip...


PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;










=============================================




Subject: Re: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$ Date: July 28, 2007 at 10:09 am PST


In Reply to: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$ posted by TSS on July 28, 2007 at 9:06 am:


Tue Apr 10, 2007 12:30 68.238.98.6


Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to the United States Date: April 10, 2007 at 10:33 am PST


"It most likely" entered the food supply "given that it was slaughtered," said Karen Eggert, a spokeswoman with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.


"But it wouldn't have gone to slaughter if it was showing any clinical signs for BSE. We're not looking at this as a possibility that a BSE infected cow got into the United States," she said.






Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada


snip...


Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of BSE prevalence in the standing Canadian adult cattle population as of August 15, 2006. Based on the expected prevalence value under the BBC model and the estimated adult herd size (Table 1), the expected number of BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population is 4.1. By comparison, the expected value obtained under BSurvE Prevalence B is 3.9 per million, which corresponds to an estimated 23.2 BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population.


snip...








full text ;









TEXAS MAD COW


THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;


During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.






Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.


snip...


Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.


Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.


Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.


Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.


Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.







THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.


FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.


FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.


Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).


FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.


To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.


Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.


FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.


####






ALABAMA MAD COW


Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.






UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS PREMIUM BEEF,


L.L.C., Plaintiff,


v.


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,


Defendants.


:::::::::::


Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)


snip...


JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge


The government's additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would interfere with USDA's surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm. USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed, the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world, including as part of the USDA's own surveillance testing. - 18 -














Saturday, February 27, 2010


FINAL REPORT OF THE TESTING OF THE BELGIAN (VERMONT) SHEEP February 27, 2010


IN SHORT ;


August 15, 2000


OIG case # NY-3399-56 REDACTED, VT


''Enclosed is OIG's notification that they have scheduled an investigation of the following individual. REDACTED is alleged to have provided possibly inaccurate test results involving diseased sheep. However, because the results were determined to be inconclusive, no actual violation was actually committed.''


snip...


PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;












=============================================




Subject: Re: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$ Date: July 28, 2007 at 10:09 am PST


In Reply to: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$ posted by TSS on July 28, 2007 at 9:06 am:


Tue Apr 10, 2007 12:30 68.238.98.6


Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to the United States Date: April 10, 2007 at 10:33 am PST


"It most likely" entered the food supply "given that it was slaughtered," said Karen Eggert, a spokeswoman with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.


"But it wouldn't have gone to slaughter if it was showing any clinical signs for BSE. We're not looking at this as a possibility that a BSE infected cow got into the United States," she said.








Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada


snip...


Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of BSE prevalence in the standing Canadian adult cattle population as of August 15, 2006. Based on the expected prevalence value under the BBC model and the estimated adult herd size (Table 1), the expected number of BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population is 4.1. By comparison, the expected value obtained under BSurvE Prevalence B is 3.9 per million, which corresponds to an estimated 23.2 BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population.


snip...






full text ;








TEXAS MAD COW


THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;


During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.






Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.


snip...


Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.


Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.


Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.


Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.


Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.







THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.


FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.


FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.


Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).


FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.


To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.


Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.


FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.


####






ALABAMA MAD COW


Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.






WASHINGTON MAD COW


Fifty-seven (57) animals were born into the birth herd from April 1996 to April 1998. Twenty-seven (27) of these animals were traced and confirmed dead, 25 animals (including the index case) were exported to the US, two animals were untraceable, ..........


The 48 animals were determined to be among 86 head sold to numerous buyers. Eighty (80) of these were traced and confirmed slaughtered, 2 were untraceable .......








USA MAD COW STRAIN MORE VIRULENT TO HUMANS THAN UK STRAIN


18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7 December 2006 are now available.


snip...


64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.


Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD.


snip...






3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse


Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve University


Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than 2 years.


***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.***


6:30 Close of Day One







2012 ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE MAD COW DISEASE DISCOVERED IN CALIFORNIA





Tuesday, April 24, 2012


MAD COW DISEASE USA 4TH CASE DOCUMENTED ATYPICAL BSE CALIFORNIA







Wednesday, April 25, 2012


4th MAD COW DISEASE U.S.A. CALIFORNIA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BSE 2012







Sunday, May 6, 2012


Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease, BSE May 2, 2012 IOWA State University OIE







Friday, May 18, 2012


Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012







PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus


Nadine Mestre-Frances,1 Simon Nicot,2 Sylvie Rouland,1 Anne-Gaƫlle Biacabe,2 Isabelle Quadrio,3 Armand Perret-Liaudet,3 Thierry Baron,2 Jean-Michel Verdier1


1IN SER M UM2; Montpellier, France; 2Anses; Lyon, France; 3Hopitaux Civils de Lyon; Lyon, France


An atypical form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy has been identified in cattle in Europe, North America and Japan and was designed as L-type BSE (L-BSE) due to the lower apparent molecular mass of the unglycosylated, protease-resistant prion protein (PrPres) detected by western blot compared with classical BSE. Experimental evidences from studies in transgenic mice expressing human PrP and in primate models suggest a higher risk of transmission to humans of the L-BSE form than for classical BSE agent. However, a major unresolved issue concerns the potential transmissibility of the L-BSE agent by oral route. To address this question, we infected mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), a non-human primate model, with L-BSE by intracerebral or oral route.


Four adult lemurs were intracerebrally (IC) inoculated with 5mg of L-BSE infected brain homogenate of an atypical French BSE case (02-2528). Four young and four adult animals were fed with 5 mg or 50 mg of infected brain. After sacrifice, the brain tissues were biochemically and immunocytochemically investigated for PrPres.


The 4 animals IC inoculated died at 19 and 22 months postinoculation (mpi). They developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated movements, balance loss. Symptoms get worse according to the disease progression, until severe ataxia. Severe spongiosis was evidenced into the thalamus, the striatum, the mesencephalon, and the brainstem, whereas into the cortex the vacuolisation was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected into the thalamus, the striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral cortex, PrPres was prominently accumulated in plaques.


The orally inoculated animals showed similar clinical symptoms occurring between 27 and 34 mpi. Disease was characterized by progressive prostration, loss of appetite and poor appearance of the fur. Only one adult animal showed disequilibrium. PrPres was strongly accumulated only in the striatum and thalamus and weakly into the cortex. No plaques were evidenced. Two animals that were orally challenged at the age of two years are still alive and healthy 34 months after inoculation. The western blot analysis showed uniform molecular profiles, irrespective of the route or dose of infection, and included notably a PrPres form with low apparent molecular mass (~19 kDa) similar to the PrPres in the original cattle brain. However, the PrPres profile in lemurs was characterized by a higher proportion of di- and mono-glycosylated species (up to 95% of the total signal) than in the bovine L-BSE inoculum (~80%). In addition, small amounts of PrPres were detected by western blotting in the spleen of three animals (one intra-cerebrally inoculated and two fed with 5 mg of cattle brain).


Here, we demonstrate that the L-BSE agent can be transmitted by oral route from cattle to young and adult mouse lemurs. In comparison to IC inoculated animals, orally challenged lemurs were characterized by longer survival periods as expected with this route of infection.











***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


snip...






MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...




***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model






***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle






***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.






***ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH






***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.






The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSEinfected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission.


In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.






10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007


Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II


PRODUCT


Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007


CODE


Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.


Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON


Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


42,090 lbs.


DISTRIBUTION


WI


___________________________________


PRODUCT


Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007


CODE


The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


9,997,976 lbs.


DISTRIBUTION


ID and NV


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007






in the url that follows, I have posted




SRM breaches first, as late as 2011.


then


MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until 2007, when they ceased posting them.


then,


MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES.


Friday, May 18, 2012


Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012






Saturday, May 26, 2012


Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?


SNIP...


What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”


The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”


“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi State.


In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said


The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.


SNIP...







Friday, May 25, 2012


R-CALF USDA’s New BSE Rule Eliminates Important Protections Needed to Prevent BSE Spread







Thursday, June 14, 2012


R-CALF USA Calls USDA Dishonest and Corrupt; Submits Fourth Request for Extension


R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America







Wednesday, June 13, 2012


MEXICO IS UNDER or MIS DIAGNOSING CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE AND OTHER PRION DISEASE SOME WITH POSSIBLE nvCJD







Sunday, May 27, 2012


CANADA PLANS TO IMPRISON ANYONE SPEAKING ABOUT MAD COW or ANY OTHER DISEASE OUTBREAK, CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING







price of prion poker goes up again $$$





Monday, June 11, 2012


Guidance for Industry Draft Guidance for Industry: Amendment to “Guidance for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by Blood and Blood Products”







2011 TO 2012 UPDATE





Saturday, December 3, 2011


Candidate Cell Substrates, Vaccine Production, and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies


Volume 17, Number 12—December 2011







Sunday, June 26, 2011


Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque







Monday, February 7, 2011


FDA’s Currently-Recommended Policies to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of CJD and vCJD by Blood and Blood Products 2011 ???







Saturday, March 5, 2011


MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE RISE IN NORTH AMERICA







Sunday, February 12, 2012


National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 (August 19, 2011) including Texas







Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis












full text with source references ;








Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.







BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL


BMJ


vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.


15 November 1999







BMJ


U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well...


2 January 2000







JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY


MARCH 26, 2003


RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States


Email Terry S. Singeltary: flounder@wt.net


I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which ar sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs i the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly exposeothers. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?







doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(03)00715-1 Copyright © 2003 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Newsdesk


Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America Xavier Bosch Available online 29 July 2003. Volume 3, Issue 8, August 2003, Page 463


"My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem."


............................













Wednesday, April 25, 2012



USA MAD COW DISEASE AND CJD THERE FROM SINGELTARY ET AL 1999 - 2012








U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001











layperson





Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

P.O. Box 42

Bacliff, Texas USA 77518








Monday, June 18, 2012


Johanns Introduces Legislation Banning EPA Aerial Surveillance on feedlots just more BSe