Jun14
Johanns Introduces Legislation Banning EPA Aerial Surveillance
on June 14th, 2012at 9:28 am
Posted In: Cattle, Cattle, Cow-Calf, EPA, Cattle, Feeder Cattle, Industry
News, Cattle, SeedStock, Cattle, Stocker Cattle, Uncategorized
Sen. Mike Johanns, R-Neb., introduced an amendment June 12 to the farm bill
banning the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) use of aerial surveillance
after the agency failed to provide comprehensive answers about the program’s use
nationwide.
“This is a trust issue, and farmers and ranchers don’t trust EPA doing
low-level surveillance flights over their operations,” Johanns said. “EPA’s
surveillance program only adds to the deficit of trust this closed-door agency
has earned of late. It’s past time for Congress to put an end to EPA’s use of
aerial surveillance.”
Johanns’ amendment specifically prohibits EPA from conducting aerial
surveillance to inspect or to record images of agricultural operations. The
amendment does not affect the use of traditional on-site inspections.
The amendment text is available ;
Source: johanns.senate.gov
Tags: Drones, EPA, Johanns, Nebraska, Surveillance
Johanns, is this not the same guy that covered up mad cow disease in the
USDA for years and years, and to this day, still covering up the facts about mad
cow disease and cjd in the USA ???
IS this not the same guy that helped cover up mad cow feed ban violations
for these same FEEDLOTS, year, after year, after year, for how many years ???
(until they ceased issuing such data to the public, some time around 2007, 10
years post partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban).
now this guy wants to help cover up polluted waters from the same industry?
damn consumer does not have a chance with senator mike johanns.
Senator Mike Johanns, a senator NOT for the people, the consumer, but a
senator for BIG AG $$$
Johanns questions EPA on feedlot flyovers
John Maday, Managing Editor, Drovers CattleNetwork | Updated: May 31, 2012
Have you noticed any small planes circling your local feedyard lately? If
so, it could be the federal government conducting surveillance for enforcement
of the Clean Water Act, and U.S. Senator Mike Johanns (R-Neb.) wants an
explanation.
Johanns, who served as Secretary of Agriculture in the Bush administration,
sent a letter this week to EPA administrator Lisa Jackson questioning the
reported use of aerial surveillance. Nebraska’s entire Congressional delegation
co-signed the letter.
Johanns also spoke with AgriTalk Radio host Mike Adams on Wednesday to
outline his concerns.
“It’s happening, and I’m trying to find out just what’s involved,” Johanns
says, adding that EPA has been flying small airplanes out of Sioux City, Iowa or
Omaha, Neb., to take aerial photos of feedlots in eastern Nebraska, to assess
compliance with the Clean Water Act.
Johanns assumes the agency intends to use the photos for investigations and
potentially enforcement actions, but says the EPA has provided no information on
the operation to Congress. In their letter to Administrator Jackson, the state’s
Congressional delegation asks for an explanation of the statutory authority
under which EPA is conducting the surveillance, along with the purpose of the
flights, their frequency and their use in enforcement actions.
“My concerns are many,” Johanns says, noting that in Nebraska, the EPA and
the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality are cooperative agencies, but
the evidence suggests the flights are purely an EPA operation. USDA, he notes,
has used aerial photography to survey crop conditions and to verify compliance
with conservation programs, but EPA has “little trust out in the country, and
people will get fired up.” Congress, he adds, now is catching up with the
program after the fact, and EPA is not an agency with a warm relationship with
Congress.
EPA provided AgriTalk with the following response:
“For nearly a decade, EPA has used aerial over-flights to verify compliance
with environmental laws in impaired watersheds. Aerial over-flights are a
cost-effective tool that helps the Agency and our state partners minimize costs
and reduce the number of on-site inspections across the country as the Agency
focuses on areas of the greatest concern. For animal feeding operations, EPA
uses over-flights, state records and other publicly available sources of
information to identify discharges of pollution. In no case has EPA taken an
enforcement action solely on the basis of these over-flights. EPA and other
state and federal agencies also use aircraft for responding to emergencies such
as chemical releases or to assess environmental disasters.”
Read the letter from the Nebraska Congressional delegation to EPA
administrator Jackson.
Johanns protecting BIG AG over human and animal health again $$$,
just like he did with mad cow disease, and we’re still having to deal with
that.
after that cover-up, and usda mad cow follies there from, I don’t see how
the man can get elected to anything. ...
what about runoff from these feedlots ? why would johanns even worry about
that $$$
Detection of Protease-Resistant Prion Protein in Water from a CWD-Endemic
Area
65
Tracy A. Nichols*1,2, Bruce Pulford1, Christy Wyckoff1,2, Crystal
Meyerett1, Brady Michel1, Kevin Gertig3, Jean E. Jewell4, Glenn C. Telling5 and
M.D. Zabel1 1Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, College of
Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort
Collins, CO 80523, USA 2National Wildlife Research Center, Wildlife Services,
United States Department of Agriculture, Fort Collins, Colorado, 80521, USA
3Fort Collins Water and Treatment Operations, Fort Collins, Colorado, 80521, USA
4 Department of Veterinary Sciences, Wyoming State Veterinary Laboratory,
University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, 82070, USA 5Department of Microbiology,
Immunology, Molecular Genetics and Neurology, Sanders Brown Center on Aging,
University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 40536, USA * Corresponding author-
tracy.a.nichols@aphis.usda.gov
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the only known transmissible spongiform
encephalopathy affecting free-ranging wildlife. Experimental and epidemiological
data indicate that CWD can be transmitted horizontally and via blood and saliva,
although the exact mode of natural transmission remains unknown. Substantial
evidence suggests that prions can persist in the environment, implicating it as
a potential prion reservoir and transmission vehicle. CWD- positive animals can
contribute to environmental prion load via biological materials including
saliva, blood, urine and feces, shedding several times their body weight in
possibly infectious excreta in their lifetime, as well as through decomposing
carcasses. Sensitivity limitations of conventional assays hamper evaluation of
environmental prion loads in water. Here we show the ability of serial protein
misfolding cyclic amplification (sPMCA) to amplify minute amounts of CWD prions
in spiked water samples at a 1:1 x106 , and protease-resistant prions in
environmental and municipal-processing water samples from a CWD endemic area.
Detection of CWD prions correlated with increased total organic carbon in water
runoff from melting winter snowpack. These data suggest prolonged persistence
and accumulation of prions in the environment that may promote CWD transmission.
snip...
The data presented here demonstrate that sPMCA can detect low levels of
PrPCWD in the environment, corroborate previous biological and experimental data
suggesting long term persistence of prions in the environment2,3 and imply that
PrPCWD accumulation over time may contribute to transmission of CWD in areas
where it has been endemic for decades. This work demonstrates the utility of
sPMCA to evaluate other environmental water sources for PrPCWD, including
smaller bodies of water such as vernal pools and wallows, where large numbers of
cervids congregate and into which prions from infected animals may be shed and
concentrated to infectious levels.
snip...end...full text at ;
MIKE JOHANNS, HEAD OF THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES
Subject: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$ Date:
July 28, 2007 at 9:06 am PST
R-CALF
July 26, 2007 The Honorable Mike Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S.
Department of Agriculture 14th Street and Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington,
DC 20250
Dear Secretary Johanns,
Yesterday, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) issued its
investigative report of Canada’s 11th native case of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE), which is available at http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/bccb2007/10investe.shtml.
Like the findings of the 11 preceding investigative reports, one for each
confirmed case in cattle living in or originating from Canada, the cause of
infection is inconclusive, though crosscontamination of animal feed was
determined as the most likely source.
The report implies that CFIA allowed five cows from the same herd of cattle
as the infected cow, which also consumed the same feed as the infected cow, to
be destroyed and disposed of without first testing these animals for BSE. The
report further indicates that CFIA intends to do the same thing with 36 more
cows from the infected herd, despite the likelihood that some or all of them
consumed the same contaminated feed as the animal that tested positive for BSE.
In the United Kingdom where, along with all of Europe and Japan, a far more
comprehensive BSE testing regime is practiced, only 35 percent of BSE-infected
herds had only one case of BSE while 49 percent of the BSE-infected herds had
three or more BSE cases, with one herd having 124 cases. (See: http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/statistics/bse/con-cases.htm.)
The information compiled from the United Kingdom’s BSE testing program enabled
it to identify weaknesses in its BSE mitigation program, prompting the United
Kingdom to progressively update its elementary ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban on
four separate occasions, following the unsatisfactory results realized by its
testing data after each preceding update.
If CFIA is not testing herd mates and feed mates of known BSE cases, as
this report infers, then Canada would appear to be in violation of USDA’ Minimal
Risk Region Rule. Failure to test cattle with a high likelihood of BSE does not
constitute an investigation sufficient to confirm the adequacy of Canada’s BSE
mitigation measures, nor does it comply with the requirement that Canada take
additional risk mitigation measures, as necessary, following a BSE outbreak.
(See Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 2, January 4, 2005, at 463.) Moreover, such
a failure would render Canada’s surveillance program ineffective both for
identifying the true population of infected animals and estimating whether its
BSE outbreak is on the increase or decline. The testing of these herd mates and
feed mates would, at least, provide us with some information R-CALF United
Stockgrowers of America
P.O. Box 30715 Billings, MT 59107 Phone: 406-252-2516 Fax: 406-252-3176
E-mail: r-calfusa@r-calfusa.com Website: www.r-calfusa.com
Mike Johanns, USDA Secretary of Agriculture July 26, 2007
Page 2 of 2
about the likelihood that some of the 92 animals that already had died and
the 23 others that could not be located also were likely to be infected with the
disease.
R-CALF USA respectfully requests that USDA immediately determine if the
inferences contained in the CFIA report regarding the disposal of untested herd
mates and feed mates of the BSE-infected cow are actually statements of fact. If
so, then we further request that USDA notify Canada that it is not in compliance
with U.S. regulations and explain to Canada that it needs to immediately begin
testing all known herd mates and feed mates of BSE-positive cattle in order to
maintain its status as a “minimal risk” region under the regulations.
Sincerely,
R.M. Thornsberry, D.V.M. R-CALF USA Board President Cc: The Honorable Tom
Harkin The Honorable Saxby Chambliss The Honorable Max Baucus The Honorable
Lindsey Graham The Honorable Collin Peterson The Honorable Bob Goodlatte
USDA Fights Court Decision Approving BSE Tests
From Terry S. Singeltary Sr. flounder9@verizon.net 5-30-7
To: agsec@usda.gov
Cc: john.clifford@aphis.usda.gov; usaha@usaha.org;
jmeng@cpfbeef.com;LAVET22@aol.com Phyllis.Fong@usda.gov
Sent: Tuesday, May 29, 2007 2:07 PM
Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544
(JR)
May 27, 2007
Honorable Michael Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of
Agriculture Room 200 Jamie Whitten Federal Building Washington, D.C. 20250
CC
Honorable Judge James Robertson U.S. District Court 333 Constitution Ave.
North West Washington, D. C. 20001
Subject: Request to let the Creekstone vs. USDA court decision stand.
Ref: Letter from United States Animal Health Association, dated May 22,
2007
Dear Mr. Secretary et al :
I am requesting that you allow the court decision in the Creekstone vs.
USDA to stand so that Creekstone may begin testing the beef they process for BSE
and or BASE and or any other TSE phenotype there of. WE must let them test since
the USDA et al refuse to do so properly. This is not to say that there should be
no strict TSE testing protocols. IF testing is to take place privately, there
must be strict TSE testing protocol to assure the most up to date, sensitive,
and validated tests are used, and used properly. These tests must be announced
to the public in a timely manner at every step of the way, validated and
confirmed by the federal government, Weybridge, and an independent third party
consumer organization and there TSE expert of choice, in my opinion.
My mother died from a exceedingly rare strain of sporadic CJD i.e. the
Heidenhain Variant of CJD. My neighbors mother also lost his mother to a form of
sporadic CJD exactly one year previously from the day my mother died. BOTH cases
were confirmed by autopsy. There is new data out about the BASE atypical BSE,
which pathologically is more related to a phenotype of sporadic CJD, than the
nvCJD in humans from the UK. To continue to ignore these scientific findings
with the old UKBSEnvCJD only theory is not justified by science anymore. It is
not logical.
The logic behind the reasons not to let test for TSE in the USA because of
The Virus Serum Toxin Act of 1913 and or because of the recent letter from the
USAHA (see letter below) bring forth, are totally bogus. NO one could screw the
testing up any worse than the USDA has done in the past. The OIG and the GAO has
shown this time and time again. The 2004 Enhanced BSE surveillance program where
some 275,000+ cattle were tested for BSE was proven to be terribly flawed from
the beginning. This documented time and time again. Even Paul Brown, known and
respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the CDC said he had ''absolutely
no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'', and this was on March 15,
2006 ;
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National
Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an
expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question
was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one
year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that
initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005
suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul
Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System
... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program Phase II and Food Safety and
Inspection Service
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat
Recovery Products - Phase III
Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain
Mr. Johanns,
The August 4, 1997 FDA BSE ruminant to ruminant feed ban was nothing more
than ink on paper. In 2007 alone, 10 MILLION plus pounds of banned blood laced
MBM has already gone out into commerce for the feeding of banned product to
cattle. yes, were still feeding cows banned BSE/BASE product in 2007, almost 10
years after the voluntary ban was put in place. guess what, it aint working.
YOU and this Administration have failed terribly in protecting not only the
consumer, but your precious commodity that you speak so highly of i.e. the beef
industry. In your continued efforts to cover up the real mad cow problem in the
USA, you have in fact only amplified it and continued it's spread, and in doing
so, you have needlessly exposed millions to the TSE agent, from many different
proven routes and sources. The only saving grace you have is the incubation
period has been on your side. It will catch up. When it does, when the people
finally figure all this out, when some of the millions you have needlessly
exposed to this agent become clinical in the future, rest assured I will stand
in line to see that you and your administration are convicted for murder.
What you and this administration have done over the past 8 years is
criminal, in my opinion. I have watched not only you, but the Bush
administration thumb there nose to science for almost 8 years, all to protect
the beef industry. The science was there, but you chose to ignore it, and even
manipulated science with the bogus BSE MRR policy, all the while your were
implementing that, you were covering up another mad cow in Texas. But thanks to
the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG, and an act of Congress, that mad cow was
finally proven positive, unlike the other stumbling and staggering mad cow that
was rendered without any test at all in Texas, but by then you had succeeded in
the BSE MRR policy, the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally. You and
this administration have done the same thing the UK did when they poisoned the
globe with there exporting of BSE, except you made it legal now with the BSE MRR
policy, and now we are dealing with BASE, a strain that is more virulent to
humans. what happens when it mutates again?
When cwd deer and elk and there different phenotypes have all been rendered
into feed, along with scrapie infected sheep in the USA, and a few TME to top
that off, it will be a most interesting recipe will it not, and an interesting
case study for humans for decades to come. sadly though, with the recent pet
food scandal, and the deaths there of, we have learned a few things. one, that
the elderly are expendable, but cats, dogs, and adolescents are not. and that
the problem of our feeding of food producing animals has been tainted for
decades. and with the melamine scandal, as with the mad cow feed scandal, it's
the same old song and dance by you and the Bush administration, everything is
o.k., will not hurt you, cover-up and protect the industry at all cost, and this
will be another part of your sad legacy in History Sir.
To not allow BSE/TSE testing in the USA, testing that will find, only
proves our point, you have and will continue to cover up the real mad cow
problem in the USA. and the world knows this. ...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77519
UNITED STATES ANIMAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION 8100 Three Chopt Road, Suite 203 P.
O. BOX K227 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23288 804- 285-3210 FAX 804-285-3367 E-Mail:
usaha@usaha.org Web Site: www.usaha.org
May 22, 2007 Honorable Michael Johanns Secretary of Agriculture U.S.
Department of Agriculture Room 200 Jamie Whitten Federal Building Washington,
D.C. 20250
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA), wishes to express its
encouragement to you and the Department of Agriculture to appeal the litigation
surrounding private testing for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. We hope you
will strongly consider this as you work with the Office of General Counsel on
this suit.
To support this appeal, we offer that this sets a detrimental precedence on
USDA's ability to regulate disease and testing processes in animal agriculture.
As we appreciate the entrepreneurial spirit of Creekstone, the larger scale
implications could lead to devastating impacts for food animal production in
this country as itrelates to animal health. We do feel that private testing
could hamper animal health officials' ability to locate disease occurrences, and
exercise proper practices to trace, control and eliminate them. As you are
aware, there are a number of factors that raise concern among animal health
leaders and diagnosticians. We encourage you to thoroughly consider those upon
your decision to appeal. We do recognize this is now a matter of the courts, and
trust that our ability to safeguard animal health is not compromised as a result
of this litigation. Please let us know if there is any further support we can
provide.
Sincerely,
Lee M. Myers President, U.S. Animal Health Association Cc: Dr. John
Clifford
===============================
Saturday, February 27, 2010
FINAL REPORT OF THE TESTING OF THE BELGIAN (VERMONT) SHEEP February 27,
2010
IN SHORT ;
August 15, 2000
OIG case # NY-3399-56 REDACTED, VT
''Enclosed is OIG's notification that they have scheduled an investigation
of the following individual. REDACTED is alleged to have provided possibly
inaccurate test results involving diseased sheep. However, because the results
were determined to be inconclusive, no actual violation was actually
committed.''
snip...
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;
=============================================
Subject: Re: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$
Date: July 28, 2007 at 10:09 am PST
In Reply to: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$
posted by TSS on July 28, 2007 at 9:06 am:
Tue Apr 10, 2007 12:30 68.238.98.6
Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to
the United States Date: April 10, 2007 at 10:33 am PST
"It most likely" entered the food supply "given that it was slaughtered,"
said Karen Eggert, a spokeswoman with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service.
"But it wouldn't have gone to slaughter if it was showing any clinical
signs for BSE. We're not looking at this as a possibility that a BSE infected
cow got into the United States," she said.
Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada
snip...
Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of BSE prevalence in the
standing Canadian adult cattle population as of August 15, 2006. Based on the
expected prevalence value under the BBC model and the estimated adult herd size
(Table 1), the expected number of BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian
adult cattle population is 4.1. By comparison, the expected value obtained under
BSurvE Prevalence B is 3.9 per million, which corresponds to an estimated 23.2
BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population.
snip...
THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP
JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED
OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7
MONTHS LATER
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE
BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i
confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i
contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal
was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of
67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated.
All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were
determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined
that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to
be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are
presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In
addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the
index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to
trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter
channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and
one calf was untraceable.
Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been
classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive
on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification
was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal
Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began
response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004.
Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the
index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA
and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index
herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels
well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was
thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05.
The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not
present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person
who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and
could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a
search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not
result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received
one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order
on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05.
There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and
Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of
interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have
died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A
final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest
at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been
exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold
order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received
two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67
head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory,
the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth
cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive.
Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not
found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on
Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the
identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified
as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace
Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This
herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was
conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner
of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further
information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the
livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by
that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest.
Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd
had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the
history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted.
The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an
animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7
contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State,
including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough
place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in
2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of
interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded
herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to
locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was
subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may
have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The
hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
TERRY CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD COW 7 MONTHS EARLIER
-------- Original Message --------
Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to
unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food
chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething,
but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you
confirm???
terry
==============================
==============================
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 –0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA
web site. We have no informationabout the animal being in Texas. CarlaAt 09:44
AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting
unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you
comment on this either way please?>>thank you,>Terry S. Singeltary
Sr.>>
===================
===================
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>
<[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]
us> <[log in to unmask]>
our computer department was working on a place holder we could postUSDA's
announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonightby
NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcementwhen
we hear something.At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,
you wrote:
>why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?
>>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:
>November 22: Press Release title here
>>star image More BSE information
>>>>terry
>>Carla Everett wrote:
>>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...
>>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>
==========================
==========================
THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now $$$
NO, it's not pretty, hell, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take em
or leave em, however, you cannot change them.
with kindest regards,
I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
===============
THE SECRET MAD COW POSITIVE TEST, THAT WAS COVERED UP
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used
WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17
that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in
9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S.
herd.
In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect
the disease in an infected Texas cow.
The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry
from The Associated Press.
Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the
department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached
439,126 on Aug. 17.
"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John
Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of
that."
Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford
said.
These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were
preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of
test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.
In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in
November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector
general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was
infected.
Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to
keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa.
Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send
fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.
The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up
in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks
ago.
Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to
help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June.
They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state
cow in December 2003.
"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not
simple tests, either."
Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got
conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests
are accepted by international animal health officials.
Date: 8/25/05
"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were
preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of
test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in
the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the
ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
USDA 2003
We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that
we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten
away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem
and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and
looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions
or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the
cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the
procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked
at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently
gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue
provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only
at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to
one area.
snip.............
Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another
important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not
guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and
the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not
collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting
lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area
with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form
of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't
get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging
variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our
systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In
Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they
found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They
found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had
to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA,
we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away
from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an
'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't
they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only
at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to
one area.
snip...
FULL TEXT;
Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE
Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
2005
=============================
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier
this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them,
but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case
indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a
decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA
officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a
picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought
that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as
calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable,
brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow
pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National
Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an
expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question
was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one
year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that
initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector
general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005
suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul
Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System
... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005 Executive Summary: On June
24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE
positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12
years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on
November 15, 2004, as part of USDA's enhanced surveillance program.
Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive;
experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure,
and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not
considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported
beyond the laboratory. . A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005,
returned positive for BSE.
THIS confirms that the June 2004 Enhanced BSE cover-up, was just that. Like
i said before, due to this terribly flawed system, those 388,000 testing to date
for BSE in the USA were meaningless and should be retested. ...
Subject: USDA JOHANN'S MAD ABOUT FONG, PLANS HIS OWN LAB AND HIS OWN MAD
COW ANTIBODIES ;-) Date: July 29, 2005 at 2:35 pm PST
Friday, July 29, 2005
USDA did not test possible mad cows
By Steve Mitchell United Press International Published 6/8/2004 9:30
PM
WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims
ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year,
but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency
tested only half that number.
USDA officials said the difference is made up in animals tested at state
veterinary diagnostic laboratories, but these animals were not tested using the
"gold standard" test employed by the agency for confirming acase of the deadly
disease. Instead, the state labs used a less sensitive test that experts say
could miss mad cow cases.
In addition, the state lab figures were not included in a March 2004 USDA
document estimating the number of animals most likely to be infected among U.S.
herds, and apparently were not given to a congressional committee that had
requested agency data on the number of cows with brain disorder signs that had
been tested for the disease.
"This is just adding to the demise of USDA's credibility," said Felicia
Nestor, senior policy adviser to the Government Accountability Project, a group
in Washington, D.C., that works with federal whistleblowers.
"If the USDA is going to exclude from testing the animals most likely to
have the disease, that would seem to have a very negative impact on there
liability of their conclusion," Nestor told UPI.
Nestor, who has monitored the USDA's mad cow surveillance program closely
for several years, asked, "Are they deliberately avoiding testing animals that
look like they have the disease?"
Concerns about the number of cows in U.S. herds with brain disorder
symptoms have been heightened due to the recent case in Texas, in which USDA
officials failed to test an animal with such symptoms, also known as central
nervous system or CNS signs. This was a violation of USDA policy, which
stipulates all CNS cows should be tested because they are considered the most
likely to be mad cow infected. To date, the Washington cow that tested positive
last December is the only confirmed case of mad cow disease -- also known as
bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- among U.S. herds.
The Texas incident has alarmed the public and members of Congress because
humans can contract a fatal brain disorder called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease from consuming meat infected with the mad cow pathogen. If the USDA's
surveillance program is allowing the riskiest cows to go untested, it raises
concerns about the ability of the monitoring system to detect the disease
reliably in U.S. herds, Rep.Henry Waxman, D-Calif., charged in a May 13 letter
to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman.
Dr. Peter Lurie, of the consumer group Public Citizen, said CNS cows should
be the one category that absolutely has to be tested to have a sound
surveillance system.
"CNS animals are far and away the most important animals to test," said
Lurie, who has done several analyses of the USDA's mad cow surveillance
program.
"If there's any category that needs 100 percent testing, that's it, because
they would be the most likely place to find mad cow in America," he told UPI.
"Any CNS cow that slips into the food supply represents a major case of
malpractice by USDA, and similarly, the failure to test the brain of that animal
to see if it was indeed infected is really a failure to protect the
public."
USDA officials said the agency has no estimate on how many CNS cows occur
in U.S. herds. But spokesman Ed Loyd has told UPI, and at least one other media
outlet, that 500 CNS cows were tested in fiscal year 2003. Yet agency testing
records for the first 10 months of FY 2003, obtained by UPI under the Freedom of
Information Act, show only 254 animals that fall under the CNS category -- or
about half the number Loyd cited.
After failing to respond to repeated requests from UPI for clarification of
the apparent discrepancy, Loyd finally offered the explanation that an
additional 45 CNS cows were tested by the USDA during the final two months of FY
2003. The remainder, he said, was made up by CNS cases tested at various state
veterinary diagnostic laboratories.
"We also include data reported to us from state veterinary diagnostic
laboratories, and all of these are CNS cases that have been tested for BSE using
a histological examination," Loyd said.
"We were not using any other labs during this period, other than (the USDA
lab), to run the IHC tests for BSE, which is the gold standard," he said. "This
(state laboratory) information contributes important data to our surveillance
effort."
However, the state labs did not use the immunohistochemistry test, which
the USDA has called the "gold standard" for diagnosing mad cow disease. Instead,
the labs used a different test called histopathology, which theUSDA itself does
not use to confirm a case, opting instead for the more sensitive IHC test.
The histopathology test, unlike the IHC test, does not detect prions
--misfolded proteins that serve as a marker for infection and can be spotted
early on in the course of the illness. Rather, it screens forthe microscopic
holes in the brain that are characteristic of advanced mad cow disease.
According to the USDA's Web site, histopathology proves reliable only if
the brain sample is removed soon after the death of the animal. If there is too
much of a delay, the Web site states, it can be "very difficult to confirm a
diagnosis by histopathology" because the brain structures may have begun to
disintegrate.
That is one reason the agency began using the IHC test -- it can confirm a
diagnosis if the brain has begun disintegrating or been frozen for
shipping.
The state labs used histopathology to screen 266 CNS cases in FY 2003, as
well as 257 cases in FY 2002, according to Loyd. He did not explain why this
information was not included in the testing records the agency provided to UPI
and has not responded to requests for the identity of the state labs.
Linda Detwiler, a former USDA veterinarian who oversaw the agency's madcow
testing program, told UPI the histopathology test probably is adequate for
screening CNS cows. If they have mad cow disease, she said, it would likely be
an advanced stage that should be obvious.
Other mad cow disease experts, however, said having a back-up test suchas
IHC would be advisable, because histopathology tests sometimes can miss evidence
of infection.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations offers similar
recommendations in its protocol for conducing a histopathology test. The
protocol states that even if histopathology is negative,"further sampling should
be undertaken" in cases "where clinical signs have strongly suggested BSE" -- a
criteria that includes all of the cows tested at the state labs.
The USDA seems to agree on the need for a back-up test. Its expanded
surveillance program, which began June 1, calls for using IHC -- or another test
called Western blot -- to confirm any positives found on rapid tests. The March
15 document that describes the new program does not mention using histopathology
to confirm cases of mad cow disease.
"Subtle changes can be missed on histopathology that would probably not be
as easy to miss using IHC," said Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE
expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides
advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments.
"Therefore I believe it is valuable to run (histopathology)," Mumford told
UPI.
She noted that in Europe, two tests -- neither one the histopathology test
-- are used to ensure no cases are missed. A rapid test is used initially for
screening, followed by IHC as a confirmatory test.
Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of the
Swiss firm Prionics, which manufactures tests for detecting mad cow disease,
agrees about the possibility of a case being missed by histopathology.
"There were cases which were (histopathology) negative but still clearly
positive with the other (testing) methods," Moser said. "BSE testing based on
histology on sub-optimal tissue was probably one of the reasons why Germany was
allegedly BSE-free until our test discovered that they were not" in 2000, Moser
told UPI.
He agreed with Detwiler that histopathology should be suitable for most
cases of CNS cows, but added it still can fail to detect the disease in some CNS
cases -- particularly if the sample is not optimum.
"It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the subtle changes in a
diseased brain from artifacts like ruptures in the tissue due to tissue damage
during the sampling, transport or preparation," he said.
Loyd asserted the additional CNS cases from the state labs actually yielded
a total of 565 such cows the USDA had tested -- 65 more than his original figure
of 500. Whether the USDA considers its total to be 500 or 565, however, either
figure would exceed the agency's own estimates for the total number of such cows
that it identifies annually.
According to data the USDA provided to the House Committee on Government
Reform, and numbers the agency included in the March document about its expanded
surveillance plan, only 201 to 249 CNS cows are identified at slaughterhouses.
Approximately 129 additional cases occur on farms annually. At most, that yields
a combined total of 378 CNS cows, or nearly 200 less than the 565 Loyd claims
the agency tested.
The USDA surveillance plan document makes no mention of the number of CNS
animals tested at state veterinary diagnostic labs. The figure also does not
appear to be included in the agency's estimates of the number of high-risk
animals that occur in the United States each year. The latter number was used to
help the USDA calculate the number of animals it will screen for mad cow disease
in its expanded surveillance plan.
USDA officials also did not include the state lab figures in response to a
question from the House Committee on Government Reform, a source close to the
issue told UPI. The committee, on which Waxman is the ranking Democrat, had
requested in a March 8 letter to Veneman that she provide "the number of BSE
tests that were conducted on cattle exhibiting central nervous system symptoms"
for each of the last five years.
Loyd did not respond to a request from UPI asking why agency officials did
not provide that information to the committee or include it in USDA's
explanation of its expanded surveillance plan.
The committee has taken note of the CNS issue and plans to delve into it
further in a hearing slated for sometime in the next few months.
"The committee will explore this and other issues surrounding USDA and BSE
testing at a hearing later this summer," Drew Crockett, spokesman for the
committee, told UPI.
--
Steve Mitchell is UPI's Medical Correspondent. E-mail
sciencemail@upi.com
Copyright © 2001-2004 United Press International
''USDA gets a D or D minus," said Caroline Smith Dewaal of the Center for
Science in the Public Interest, an advocacy group based in Washington. ''The
best thing that came out of this is the work of the inspector general."
It was the department's in-house watchdog, Inspector General Phyllis Fong,
who skirted the USDA hierarchy by ordering retesting with a different method
more than six months after a routine second-round test, known as the
immunohistochemistry, or IHC, test proved negative for the disease.
Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, who assumed office in January, has said
he neither knew about nor authorized the retesting by the National Veterinary
Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa.
BESIDES the Texas mad cow that sat on the shelf for 7+ months before the
Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG finally did the end around Johanns et al and
finally had Weybridge bring that negative cow back from the dead to finally
being a confirmed mad cow (hint, hint, getting MRR implemented first), was this
simply another bumbling of BSE protocol, or just same old same old;
Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755
USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623
Statement by Chief Veterinary Medical Officer John Clifford Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test ResultsJuly
27, 2005
snip...
Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive
results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously
experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending
on the "slice" of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory
and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional "slices" of tissue from
this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will
announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next
week.
I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the
protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June
2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the
veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send
it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not
optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The
carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to
human or animal health from this animal.
snip...
In Reply to: Re: Statement by Dr. John Clifford Regarding Non-Definitive
BSE Test Results posted by TSS on July 27, 2005 at 12:53 pm:
o.k., let me get this right. i am pondering here;-)
all the time this TEXAS positive, positive, (secret) positive,
inconclusive, negative, then Weybridge confirmed 2nd BSE documented case (thanks
to the Honorable Phyllis Fong),all this time this BSe going on in TEXAS, was
plastered all over the news, this guy forgot about that sample, and it just sat
up on some shelf wasting away for months, as to be in such bad shape, they now
cannot even test it properly. r i g h t ... like ooops, sorry. ...end
============================================
Subject: BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA WILD OATS FILES FRIEND OF COURT
BRIEFING
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:25:13 –0600
Subject: BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA DECLARATION OF PAUL W. BROWN, M.D.
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:24:12 –0600
Subject: BSE TESTING CREEKSTONE VS USDA
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Date: Sat, 11 Nov 2006 10:23:42 –0600
Subject: Creutzfeldt Jakob disease statistics published As at 3 November
2006
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:05:39 –0600
Subject: Fw: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26,
2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc.
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:03:47 –0600
Wednesday, November 17, 2010
MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns
STATE
Neb. inspector accused of faking mad cow tests
Published November 17, 2010
THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday,
April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central
nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering
into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If
it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been
shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for
swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply
chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly
monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA
established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K.
showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to
cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying
that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to
poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule
provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of
several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make
this strong system even stronger.
####
ALABAMA MAD COW
Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to
contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow
to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators
were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or
permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is
very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of
solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the
Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows
and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced
are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a
lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of
these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
ALABAMA MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE
Subject: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26, 2006
H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. Date: November 7, 2006 at 9:08 am PST Food and Drug
Administration
New Orleans District
404 BNA Drive, Building 200, Suite 500
Nashville, TN 37217
Telephone: 615-366-7801
Facsimile: 615-366-7802
October 26, 2006
WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01
FEDERAL EXPRESS
OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. Christopher V. B. Smith
Corporate President, CEO
H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc.
228 Saugatuck Avenue
Westport, Connecticut 06880
Dear Mr. Smith:
On June 6, 8, 12-15, and 23, 2006, a U.S . Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) investigator inspected
your animal feed protein supplement manufacturing facility, located at 603
Railroad Avenue,
Albertville, Alabama. The inspection revealed significant deviations from
the requirements set forth in
Title 21, Code ofFederal Regulations, Part 589.2000 (21 CFR 589.2000),
Animal Proteins Prohibited in
Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and
amplification of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of
this regulation, resulting
in products being manufactured and distributed by your facility because
they are adulterated within the
meaning of Section 402(a)(4) [21 USC 342(a)(4)] of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (the
Act) and misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC
343(a)(1)] of the Act.
Our investigation determined adulteration resulted from the failure of your
firm to establish and
implement measures sufficient to prevent commingling or cross-contamination
. The adulterated feed
was subsequently misbranded because it was not properly labeled.
Specifically, we found :
" Your firm failed to establish and use cleanout procedures or other means
to prevent carry-over of
products which contain or may contain protein derived from mammalian
tissues into animal protein
or feeds which may be used for ruminants, as required by 21 CFR
589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B) .
Specifically, you failed to establish and use such measures for a screw
auger installed in February
2005 . This auger is used to convey both prohibited and non-prohibited
material to bulk storage bins.
In addition, you failed to follow the cleanout procedure your firm had
developed for the receiving
systems. Your feed is, therefore, adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21
USC 342(a)(4)] of the Act.
" You failed to label all products which contained or may have contained
prohibited materials with the
BSE cautionary statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants," as
required by 21 CFR
589.2000(e)(1)(i) . Such products are misbranded under Section 403(3) [21
USC 343(a)(1)] of the
Act. These misbranded products include the three Pro-Pak products mentioned
below, as well as
Page 2 - H. J . Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, Alabama Warning Letter
No. 2007-NOL-O 1
those bulk loads of individual feed ingredients processed through this
common screw auger and
distributed between the time it was installed in February 2005, and June 9,
2006 .
This letter is not intended to serve as an all-inclusive list of violations
at your facility. As a
manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible
for ensuring your overall
operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance
with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you
should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly
correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or
injunction, without further notice.
We acknowledge your June 16, 2006, voluntary recall of three products you
manufactured from
February 2005 to June 2006. The three products recalled were: Pro-Lak
Protein Concentrate for
Lactating Dairy Animals; Pro-Amino II for PreFresh and Lactating Cows; and,
Pro-Pak Marine & Animal Protein Concentrate for Use in Animal Feed. Recall
effectiveness checks and other measures
will determine the merit of this recall . We recognize you now label all
products with the required BSE
cautionary statement and we also acknowledge your intent, given verbally to
New Orleans District
management of the FDA, to discontinue the production of supplements which
do not contain prohibited
materials. In your written response to this letter, please confirm in
writing you have taken these steps.
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of
receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your
firm into compliance with the law, including the steps we acknowledge above and
any additional steps you have taken. Your response should include an
explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their
recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days,
state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be
completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating
corrections have been made.
Your reply should be directed to Kari L. Batey, Compliance Officer, at the
address above. If you have
questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Ms. Batey at
(615) 366-7808.
Sincerely,
,
Carol S . Sanchez
Acting District Director
New Orleans District
Enclosure: Form FDA 483
cc: Craig R. Waterhouse
Plant Manager
H.J. Baker & Bros., Inc.
603 Railroad Avenue
Albertville, Alabama 35951-3419
TSS
MORE 2006 FEED BAN VIOLATIONS BELOW, ''IN COMMERCE'' ;
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA
SEPT 6, 2006
1961.72 TONS
IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick
Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d)
Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc.,
Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant
based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
PRODUCT a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with
Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June
28, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and
bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,484 tons
DISTRIBUTION TN and WV
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY,
LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and
letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may
contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE Approximately 2,223 tons
DISTRIBUTION KY
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on
July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may
contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,220 tons
DISTRIBUTION KY
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006.
FDA initiated recall is completed.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including
ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat
and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 40 tons
DISTRIBUTION LA and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26,
2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including
ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat
and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,150 tons
DISTRIBUTION MS
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26,
2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived
meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 87 tons
DISTRIBUTION MS
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived
meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50
lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder
Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird
Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble,
Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker
Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker
Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g)
Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by
telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall
is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with
ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN
COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall #
V-113-6 CODE All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing
H. J. Baker recalled feed products.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit
beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been
contaminated with mammalian protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
DISTRIBUTION MI
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125
TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST
PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall #
V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50
lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%,
Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to
20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall #
V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall #
V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6
CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL,
by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is
complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant
based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may
contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????
DISTRIBUTION KY
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS
NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),
Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED,
Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL,
by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat
and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006
Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST
Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration
New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217
Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391
May 17, 2006
WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06
FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State
Street Dallas, Texas 75204
Dear Mr. Shirley:
On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration
(FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson
Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations
from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part
589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This
regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this
regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are
misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).
Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including
sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and
to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:
You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent
carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds
which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same
equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot
water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do
not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian
tissues.
You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out
procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian
tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.
As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived
from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR
589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from
mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants."
Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from
mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is
misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.
This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your
facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are
responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture
and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to
correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations
do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in
regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further
notice.
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of
receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your
firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation
of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If
corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason
for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include
copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been
made.
Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie,
Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter,
please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.
Sincerely,
/S
Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm)
caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates
SNIP...SEE ;
Subject: Fw: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26,
2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc.
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:03:47 -0600
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS
PREMIUM BEEF,
L.L.C., Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,
Defendants.
:::::::::::
Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)
snip...
JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge
The government's additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would
interfere with USDA's surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore
rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could
produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm.
USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed,
the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world,
including as part of the USDA's own surveillance testing. - 18 -
Saturday, February 27, 2010
FINAL REPORT OF THE TESTING OF THE BELGIAN (VERMONT) SHEEP February 27,
2010
IN SHORT ;
August 15, 2000
OIG case # NY-3399-56 REDACTED, VT
''Enclosed is OIG's notification that they have scheduled an investigation
of the following individual. REDACTED is alleged to have provided possibly
inaccurate test results involving diseased sheep. However, because the results
were determined to be inconclusive, no actual violation was actually
committed.''
snip...
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;
=============================================
Subject: Re: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$
Date: July 28, 2007 at 10:09 am PST
In Reply to: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$
posted by TSS on July 28, 2007 at 9:06 am:
Tue Apr 10, 2007 12:30 68.238.98.6
Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to
the United States Date: April 10, 2007 at 10:33 am PST
"It most likely" entered the food supply "given that it was slaughtered,"
said Karen Eggert, a spokeswoman with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service.
"But it wouldn't have gone to slaughter if it was showing any clinical
signs for BSE. We're not looking at this as a possibility that a BSE infected
cow got into the United States," she said.
Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada
snip...
Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of BSE prevalence in the
standing Canadian adult cattle population as of August 15, 2006. Based on the
expected prevalence value under the BBC model and the estimated adult herd size
(Table 1), the expected number of BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian
adult cattle population is 4.1. By comparison, the expected value obtained under
BSurvE Prevalence B is 3.9 per million, which corresponds to an estimated 23.2
BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population.
snip...
full text ;
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE
BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i
confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i
contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal
was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of
67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated.
All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were
determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined
that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to
be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are
presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In
addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the
index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to
trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter
channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and
one calf was untraceable.
Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been
classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive
on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification
was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal
Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began
response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004.
Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the
index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA
and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index
herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels
well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was
thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05.
The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not
present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person
who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and
could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a
search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not
result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received
one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order
on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05.
There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and
Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of
interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have
died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A
final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest
at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been
exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold
order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received
two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67
head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory,
the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth
cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive.
Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not
found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on
Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the
identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified
as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace
Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This
herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was
conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner
of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further
information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the
livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by
that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest.
Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd
had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the
history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted.
The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an
animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7
contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State,
including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough
place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in
2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of
interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded
herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to
locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was
subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may
have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The
hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday,
April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central
nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering
into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If
it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been
shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for
swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply
chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly
monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA
established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K.
showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to
cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying
that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to
poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule
provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of
several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make
this strong system even stronger.
####
ALABAMA MAD COW
Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to
contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow
to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators
were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or
permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is
very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of
solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the
Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows
and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced
are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a
lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of
these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS
PREMIUM BEEF,
L.L.C., Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al.,
Defendants.
:::::::::::
Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)
snip...
JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge
The government's additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would
interfere with USDA's surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore
rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could
produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm.
USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed,
the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world,
including as part of the USDA's own surveillance testing. - 18 -
Saturday, February 27, 2010
FINAL REPORT OF THE TESTING OF THE BELGIAN (VERMONT) SHEEP February 27,
2010
IN SHORT ;
August 15, 2000
OIG case # NY-3399-56 REDACTED, VT
''Enclosed is OIG's notification that they have scheduled an investigation
of the following individual. REDACTED is alleged to have provided possibly
inaccurate test results involving diseased sheep. However, because the results
were determined to be inconclusive, no actual violation was actually
committed.''
snip...
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;
=============================================
Subject: Re: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$
Date: July 28, 2007 at 10:09 am PST
In Reply to: R-CALF TO JOHANNS ON USA BSe VS CANADA BSE July 26, 2007 $$$
posted by TSS on July 28, 2007 at 9:06 am:
Tue Apr 10, 2007 12:30 68.238.98.6
Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to
the United States Date: April 10, 2007 at 10:33 am PST
"It most likely" entered the food supply "given that it was slaughtered,"
said Karen Eggert, a spokeswoman with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service.
"But it wouldn't have gone to slaughter if it was showing any clinical
signs for BSE. We're not looking at this as a possibility that a BSE infected
cow got into the United States," she said.
Attachment 1: Estimation of BSE Prevalence in Canada
snip...
Table 5 summarizes the results of the estimation of BSE prevalence in the
standing Canadian adult cattle population as of August 15, 2006. Based on the
expected prevalence value under the BBC model and the estimated adult herd size
(Table 1), the expected number of BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian
adult cattle population is 4.1. By comparison, the expected value obtained under
BSurvE Prevalence B is 3.9 per million, which corresponds to an estimated 23.2
BSE-infected animals in the standing Canadian adult cattle population.
snip...
full text ;
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE
BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i
confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i
contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal
was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of
67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated.
All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were
determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined
that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to
be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are
presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In
addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the
index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to
trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter
channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and
one calf was untraceable.
Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been
classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive
on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification
was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal
Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began
response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004.
Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the
index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA
and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index
herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels
well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was
thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05.
The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not
present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person
who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and
could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a
search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not
result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received
one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order
on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05.
There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and
Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of
interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have
died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A
final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest
at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been
exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold
order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received
two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67
head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory,
the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth
cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive.
Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not
found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on
Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the
identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified
as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace
Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This
herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was
conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner
of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further
information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the
livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by
that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest.
Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd
had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the
history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted.
The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an
animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7
contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State,
including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough
place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in
2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of
interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded
herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to
locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was
subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may
have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The
hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday,
April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central
nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering
into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If
it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been
shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for
swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply
chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly
monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA
established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K.
showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to
cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying
that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to
poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule
provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of
several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make
this strong system even stronger.
####
ALABAMA MAD COW
Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to
contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow
to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators
were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or
permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is
very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of
solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the
Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows
and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced
are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a
lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of
these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
WASHINGTON MAD COW
Fifty-seven (57) animals were born into the birth herd from April 1996 to
April 1998. Twenty-seven (27) of these animals were traced and confirmed dead,
25 animals (including the index case) were exported to the US, two animals were
untraceable, ..........
The 48 animals were determined to be among 86 head sold to numerous buyers.
Eighty (80) of these were traced and confirmed slaughtered, 2 were untraceable
.......
USA MAD COW STRAIN MORE VIRULENT TO HUMANS THAN UK STRAIN
18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7
December 2006 are now available.
snip...
64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was
presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more
virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.
Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform
encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the
prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A
MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD.
snip...
3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse
Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western
Reserve University
Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain
discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were
also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these
atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi
Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated
transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE
or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated
mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in
contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than
2 years.
***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest
that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.***
6:30 Close of Day One
2012 ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE MAD COW DISEASE DISCOVERED IN CALIFORNIA
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
MAD COW DISEASE USA 4TH CASE DOCUMENTED ATYPICAL BSE CALIFORNIA
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
4th MAD COW DISEASE U.S.A. CALIFORNIA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BSE 2012
Sunday, May 6, 2012
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease, BSE May 2, 2012 IOWA
State University OIE
Friday, May 18, 2012
Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012
PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus
Nadine Mestre-Frances,1 Simon Nicot,2 Sylvie Rouland,1 Anne-Gaëlle
Biacabe,2 Isabelle Quadrio,3 Armand Perret-Liaudet,3 Thierry Baron,2 Jean-Michel
Verdier1
1IN SER M UM2; Montpellier, France; 2Anses; Lyon, France; 3Hopitaux Civils
de Lyon; Lyon, France
An atypical form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy has been identified
in cattle in Europe, North America and Japan and was designed as L-type BSE
(L-BSE) due to the lower apparent molecular mass of the unglycosylated,
protease-resistant prion protein (PrPres) detected by western blot compared with
classical BSE. Experimental evidences from studies in transgenic mice expressing
human PrP and in primate models suggest a higher risk of transmission to humans
of the L-BSE form than for classical BSE agent. However, a major unresolved
issue concerns the potential transmissibility of the L-BSE agent by oral route.
To address this question, we infected mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), a
non-human primate model, with L-BSE by intracerebral or oral route.
Four adult lemurs were intracerebrally (IC) inoculated with 5mg of L-BSE
infected brain homogenate of an atypical French BSE case (02-2528). Four young
and four adult animals were fed with 5 mg or 50 mg of infected brain. After
sacrifice, the brain tissues were biochemically and immunocytochemically
investigated for PrPres.
The 4 animals IC inoculated died at 19 and 22 months postinoculation
(mpi). They developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated
movements, balance loss. Symptoms get worse according to the disease
progression, until severe ataxia. Severe spongiosis was evidenced into the
thalamus, the striatum, the mesencephalon, and the brainstem, whereas into the
cortex the vacuolisation was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected
into the thalamus, the striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral
cortex, PrPres was prominently accumulated in plaques.
The orally inoculated animals showed similar clinical symptoms occurring
between 27 and 34 mpi. Disease was characterized by progressive prostration,
loss of appetite and poor appearance of the fur. Only one adult animal showed
disequilibrium. PrPres was strongly accumulated only in the striatum and
thalamus and weakly into the cortex. No plaques were evidenced. Two animals that
were orally challenged at the age of two years are still alive and healthy 34
months after inoculation. The western blot analysis showed uniform molecular
profiles, irrespective of the route or dose of infection, and included notably a
PrPres form with low apparent molecular mass (~19 kDa) similar to the PrPres in
the original cattle brain. However, the PrPres profile in lemurs was
characterized by a higher proportion of di- and mono-glycosylated species (up to
95% of the total signal) than in the bovine L-BSE inoculum (~80%). In addition,
small amounts of PrPres were detected by western blotting in the spleen of three
animals (one intra-cerebrally inoculated and two fed with 5 mg of cattle brain).
Here, we demonstrate that the L-BSE agent can be transmitted by oral route
from cattle to young and adult mouse lemurs. In comparison to IC inoculated
animals, orally challenged lemurs were characterized by longer survival periods
as expected with this route of infection.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases
constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European
approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...
***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate
Model
***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle
***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE
in these countries.
***ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN
AND ANIMAL HEALTH
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of
H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc
in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be
minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type,
and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSEinfected
cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the
extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before
and after transmission.
In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some
peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
in the url that follows, I have posted
SRM breaches first, as late as 2011.
then
MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until
2007, when they ceased posting them.
then,
MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES.
Friday, May 18, 2012
Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?
SNIP...
What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare
disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected
feed.”
The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown,
one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the
National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base
that statement.”
“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an
official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi
State.
In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the
origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said
The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a
spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger
outbreak.
SNIP...
Friday, May 25, 2012
R-CALF USDA’s New BSE Rule Eliminates Important Protections Needed to
Prevent BSE Spread
Thursday, June 14, 2012
R-CALF USA Calls USDA Dishonest and Corrupt; Submits Fourth Request for
Extension
R-CALF United Stockgrowers of America
Wednesday, June 13, 2012
MEXICO IS UNDER or MIS DIAGNOSING CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE AND OTHER PRION
DISEASE SOME WITH POSSIBLE nvCJD
Sunday, May 27, 2012
CANADA PLANS TO IMPRISON ANYONE SPEAKING ABOUT MAD COW or ANY OTHER DISEASE
OUTBREAK, CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING
price of prion poker goes up again $$$
Monday, June 11, 2012
Guidance for Industry Draft Guidance for Industry: Amendment to “Guidance
for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures to Reduce the Possible Risk of
Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
by Blood and Blood Products”
2011 TO 2012 UPDATE
Saturday, December 3, 2011
Candidate Cell Substrates, Vaccine Production, and Transmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathies
Volume 17, Number 12—December 2011
Sunday, June 26, 2011
Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque
Monday, February 7, 2011
FDA’s Currently-Recommended Policies to Reduce the Possible Risk of
Transmission of CJD and vCJD by Blood and Blood Products 2011 ???
Saturday, March 5, 2011
MAD COW ATYPICAL CJD PRION TSE CASES WITH CLASSIFICATIONS PENDING ON THE
RISE IN NORTH AMERICA
Sunday, February 12, 2012
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1
(August 19, 2011) including Texas
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health
Crisis
full text with source references ;
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al.
JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL
BMJ
vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
15 November 1999
BMJ
U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as
well...
2 January 2000
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary: flounder@wt.net
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment
on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD.
Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the
129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is
indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD
and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be
made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not
continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which ar
sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs i the USA
in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does
transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral
inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission
studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be
asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the
agent and needlessly exposeothers. In light of the findings of Asante and
Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and
surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many
sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(03)00715-1 Copyright © 2003 Published by Elsevier
Ltd. Newsdesk
Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America Xavier Bosch
Available online 29 July 2003. Volume 3, Issue 8, August 2003, Page 463
"My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my
mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever
since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer
and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem."
............................
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
USA MAD COW DISEASE AND CJD THERE FROM SINGELTARY ET AL 1999 - 2012
U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
layperson
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Monday, June 18, 2012
Johanns Introduces Legislation Banning EPA Aerial Surveillance on feedlots
just more BSe
