Tuesday, August 12, 2014




just for the record ;




In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells


3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...







Texas Animal Health Commission Box l2966 •Austin, Texas 78711 •(800) 550-8242• FAX (512) 719-0719 Linda Logan, DVM, PhD• Executive Director For info, contact Carla Everett, information officer, at 1-800-550-8242, ext. 710, or ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us


 For Immediate Release-- Feed Contamination Issue Resolved by FDA


Although many of you may have heard the latest regarding the resolution of the cattle feed contamination situation in Texas, I wanted to ensure that you received this statement issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the agency in charge of regulating feed components. The FDA has said the cattle involved are to be rendered and the material will not enter ruminant or human food channels. The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) will provided assistance to the FDA as requested and needed. FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT Today (Tuesday, Jan. the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants.


Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle. FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.


According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."


Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual. FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities. This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely. FDA will continue working with USDA as well as state and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.






> For Immediate Release-- Feed Contamination Issue Resolved by FDA


HMMM, TEXAS, 5.5 GRAMS TO A 600 POUND COW, no problem ??? really ??? let's see ;


It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.



it is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.



Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route


Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany


Background: In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.


Aims: The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.


Methods: Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).


Results: In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.


Conclusions: Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals. The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).



Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.



WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill many many cows.


look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;


Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates


Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys


Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.




BSE bovine brain inoculum 100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%) Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%) RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)


PrPres biochemical detection The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8


*Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.


Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula Published online January 27, 2005








„U.S. Department of Agriculture documents uncovered by United Press International provide new evidence the cow that tested positive for mad cow disease in Washington last December was healthy and not a "downer," as the agency has maintained.


The USDA has made such a claim since it announced the mad cow case on Dec. 23. Because the animal was a downer, officials said -- meaning it was unable to stand -- its detection is an indication the agency's national surveillance program for the disease is effective at detecting infected animals.


That position has come under fire recently, however. Last week, the House Committee on Government Reform sent a letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman, asking her to respond to the accounts of three eyewitnesses present at Vern's Moses Lake Meats in Moses Lake, Wash., where the cow was slaughtered Dec. 9, and other documents it uncovered indicating the cow was not a downer.


UPI has uncovered additional documents that provide further support the cow was walking at the time of inspection.


The documents indicate that a test for illegal antibiotics and a temperature reading are required to be performed on all downer animals. However, neither test was conducted, suggesting the animal was not a downer.


The adequacy of USDA's mad cow surveillance program hinges on resolving the downer dispute. The agency's program tests only downer cattle and those showing signs of central nervous system problems because these are the most likely to be infected. However, European inspectors have found hundreds of infected cows that did not display any symptoms.


If the Washington cow was not a downer, it raises the question of how many other, seemingly healthy animals infected with mad cow went undetected and were approved for human consumption. Humans can contract a fatal brain disorder, known as variant Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease, from eating meat tainted with the mad-cow pathogen.


According to documents detailing the inspection of the cow in Washington the day it was slaughtered, there is no indication the USDA veterinary medical officer who listed the animal as a downer conducted a required test for the presence of illegal antibiotics.


This test, called either a STOP (slow test on premises) or FAST (fast antimicrobial screening test), should be conducted on all downers, according to a 2001 directive issued by the agency's Food Safety and Inspection Services that was obtained by UPI.


The failure to conduct a STOP or FAST test indicates the veterinarian either did not follow proper procedures or the animal was not a downer, former USDA veterinarians told UPI. "That's neglect of duty" if the animal was indeed a downer, said Lester Friedlander, who worked for the agency from 1985 to 1995. "All downers have to have a STOP test done on them," he said.


The 2001 directive advises USDA veterinarians that the antibiotic tests are warranted on all downers, defined as "any animal that was non-ambulatory," and they should "retain the tested carcasses until the test results are received."


The Washington animal, however, does not appear to have been tested and its carcass was not retained


"They never did any lab work on it," Dave Louthan, the Vern's Moses employee who killed the animal and was present when the veterinarian inspected it, told UPI.


"The carcass was never retained," added Louthan, who has maintained the cow was not a downer and testified to that effect before the Washington state legislature earlier this month. The cow was slaughtered on Dec. 9, a Friday, at about 2:30 p.m. The antibiotic tests can take anywhere from six to 24 hours to obtain the results, meaning the veterinarian would have needed to return the next day, Saturday, to interpret the tests and either pass or reject the carcass for human consumption.


Louthan, who worked that Saturday, said neither the veterinarian nor the meat inspector was present.


He said the carcass was loaded on a truck on Saturday morning and shipped out Sunday night. By Monday afternoon, it had been turned into hamburger meat and was on its way to the store, he said.


Tom D'Amura, a former USDA veterinarian who now works as an independent support veterinarian for Sagebrush Veterinary Services in Arlington, Texas, said he found it curious that a STOP test was not done.


The inspection sheet lists pelvic injuries for the cow, meaning it was at least suspect, D'Amura told UPI. On top of that, it was a dairy cow, in which antibiotic use is common, he said. "Alarm bells should have gone off with the veterinarian; the cow would have been a prime candidate for a STOP test," he said. "She should have been retained for STOP until the results returned no matter the (mad cow) business."


Steven Cohen, a spokesman for USDA's FSIS, declined a request by UPI to speak to the inspecting veterinarian, whom Louthan identified as Rodney Thompson“.


„ An Eastside family who says they ate beef linked to the nation‘s only known case of mad cow disease yesterday filed a class-action lawsuit against QFC, claiming the grocery store chain negligently exposed them and others to „highly hazardous“ meat and did not properly notify them that they had bought it. Attorneys for Jill Crowson, a 52-year-old interior designer from Clyde Hill, filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court on behalf of her family and possibly hundreds of other customers who unwittingly bought and consumed beef potentially exposed to mad cow disease. „I was pretty upset about it,“ Crowson said. „I‘ve spent all of my kids‘ lives trying to be a responsible parent for them to keep them safe. I felt badly that the food I served could be harmful to their health.“ The lawsuit is believed to be the first stemming from this country‘s only confirmed case of mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, which was detected in a slaughtered Holstein from a Yakima Valley ranch on Dec. 23.


N either officials at Quality Food Centers‘ Bellevue headquarters, or Kroger – the company‘s Ohio-based corporate parent – could be reached for comment about the lawsuit yesterday. The suit contends the family bought and later ate ground beef from their local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern‘s Moses Lake Meats on Dec. 9 and included meat from the diseased Holstein. The beef was later shipped to wholesalers and retailers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada. On Dec. 23 – after government scientists confirmed the Holstein was infected with BSE – businesses began pulling potentially affected beef from store shelves under a voluntary recall.


But the family‘s suit claims that, although QFC was aware of the recall on Dec. 23, the store did not begin pulling the recalled beef from about 40 of its stores that carried it until Dec. 24. The company also did not try to warn customers about the recalled beef until Dec. 27 – and only then with small, inconspicuous signs inside the stores, the suit claims. Steve Berman, the family‘s attorney, said the company had „a duty to warn“ consumers who bought the beef under terms of the Washington Product Liability Act. QFC could‘ve easily notified customers by taking out TV, radio or newspaper ads, or by tracking and notifying those who bought the beef through customers‘ QFC Advantage Cards, Berman said. At Berman‘s downtown Seattle firm yesterday, Crowson described how on Dec. 22 and Dec. 23 – the day of the recall – she bought single packages of „9 percent leanest ground beef“ from her local QFC store at Bellevue Village.


Crowson took the beef home, cooked it and made tacos one night and spaghetti the next – serving the dinners to herself; her daughter, Laura, 22; son, Nicholas, 19; and her niece, Claire De Winter, 23. Members of the family also ate leftovers from those meals for the next several days, Crowson said. „When the news about mad cow came out, I instantly became concerned,“ Crowson said. „But the initial stories didn‘t mention anything about QFC, so I thought we were OK.“ While shopping at the grocery store a few days later, Crowson said she asked a store butcher whether QFC stores had sold any of the recalled beef. The butcher assured her they had not, she said.


The family only learned QFC had sold any of the beef in question after reading a news story Jan. 10 about a Mercer Island man who discovered his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store, Crowson said.Crowson later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking that it track purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card – a store discount card issued to customers. On Jan. 12, the company notified Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact, part of the recalled batch, she said. Scientists believe people who eat beef from infected cows can contract a fatal form of the disease. The family is „now burdened with the possibility that they presently carry (the disease) that may have an incubation period of up to 30 years,“ the lawsuit says. Lawyers for the family say they believe hundreds, if not thousands, of QFC customers, and those of other stores, likely ate beef from the recalled batch – the reason why Berman filed their legal claim as a class-action lawsuit. A USDA official this week said that up to 17,000 pounds of meat affected by the recall likely was eaten or thrown out by customers.


Berman added that an investigator from his firm learned that QFC buys beef for its „9 percent leanest ground beef“ products in large tubs that can weigh several hundred pounds, and then regrinds and packages the meat for sale. Because QFC stores regrind the beef before selling it, Berman contends that makes the store a manufacturer responsible under the Washington Product Liability Act for not selling any unsafe product. Scientists believe people who eat beef from cows infected with BSE can contract variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob, a fatal brain-wasting disease that has been detected in about 150 people worldwide. However, officials with the U.S. Agriculture Department have repeatedly said the risk from eating muscle cuts from an infected cow – the likely cut of meat processed and sold for hamburger in the recalled batch – is extremely low. Although Crowson said she tries not to „obsess over it,“ she is fearful that her family could one day become sick. „It‘s pretty scary,“ she said.


Because no medical test is available to determine whether a living person is infected with the disease, the couple‘s „stress and fear cannot be allayed,“ the lawsuit said. The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical monitoring costs. Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit isn‘t about money. „The more I‘ve thought about this, the angrier I‘ve gotten,“ she said.


„ A key witness in the criminal investigation announced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Inspector General Wednesday likely will be the agency veterinarian who inspected the cow infected with mad cow disease in Washington last December. The veterinarian, Rodney Thompson, is the only witness the USDA has who says the cow in Washington was a downer, meaning it was unable to stand or walk. Three other witnesses who saw the cow the day it was slaughtered -- on Dec. 9 at Vern‘s Moses Lake Meat Co. In Moses Lake, Wash. – have said the cow was walking. So far, Thompson has not publicly divulged his side of the story and it is uncertain whether under questioning he will maintain the cow was a downer. USDA spokespeople have kept Thompson sequestered from the press and have refused to provide information about him.


Dave Louthan, the Vern‘s Moses Lake employee who slaughtered the cow in question, alleges Thompson changed his inspection sheet under duress from USDA management to indicate the animal was a downer after it tested positive for mad cow disease. The alteration was done, Louthan contends, to support the agency‘s official position that their detection of the infected cow shows their surveillance program – which is based primarily on testing downer animals – is effective.


The USDA Office of Inspector General launched an investigation into the matter in early February, and Inspector General Phyllis K. Fong told a House appropriations subcommittee Wednesday the investigation was focused on „possible alteration of official records.“ Thompson has not spoken publicly about the issue, but USDA officers have distributed to reporters the Dec. 9 inspection sheet he filled out. It indicates the cow was a downer, although Thompson‘s signature on the sheet is blacked out. OIG spokesman Austin Chadwick told United Press International the investigation was spurred by a Feb. 3 New York Times article, in which Louthan said the cow was not a downer and alleged the inspection sheet had been changed.


„The USDA made (Thompson) do it,“ Louthan told UPI, emphasizing Thompson was „a good and honorable man“ who would never forge records on his own. If the cow was not a downer, it would raise the larger issue of whether USDA‘s mad cow surveillance program is based on faulty premises. Fong said her office had launched a separate investigation that will involve „an audit to review various aspects of USDA‘s response to the discovery of BSE, including the BSE response and surveillance plans.“ The USDA‘s mad cow surveillance program has been in question since the mad cow was first reported Dec. 23, 2003. The agency tests so few animals – only about 20,000 out of the 35 million slaughtered each year – some critics have said it is unlikely it could detect mad cow even if it was prevalent in the U.S. herd. UPI reported in January that mad cow testing records for the past two years, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, reveal the agency had not tested any animals in Washington state for the first seven months of 2003.


If the three eyewitnesses – Louthan, the driver of the trailer that delivered the cow and the co-manager of Vern‘s – are correct and the cow was walking, it raises the possibility that other seemingly healthy but infected cows went undetected and were approved for human c onsumption. This is theoretically possible because hundreds of cows in Europe have tested positive but showed no apparent symptoms of the disease. Thompson‘s inspection sheet shows he did not conduct two screening tests – body temperature and illegal antibiotic residue – that, according to USDA regulations, are considered mandatory for all downers, as previously reported by UPI. Former USDA veterinarians – including Lester Friedlander, who acted as a chief inspector at Taylor Packing in Wyalusing, Pa. – said this indicates the cow was either not a downer or Thompson failed to follow proper protocol. The veterinarians added they thought the latter possibility was unlikely because they never had encountered a situation where they could not get a body temperature and antibiotic residue test on a downer.


In addition, USDA regulations stipulate the cow carcass should have been retained since a mad cow test was being conducted. However, the carcass was processed and sent out to grocery stores more than a week before the positive test results came back. Louthan said he knew Thompson well and often worked „less than a foot away“ from him during his four-anda- half years at Vern‘s. „He‘s a really good veterinarian. I really liked him,“ said Louthan, who was laid off from Vern‘s shortly after telling reporters the cow in question was not a downer – contrary to Secretary Veneman‘s statements at the time.


„If Doc Thompson made a mistake, he‘s the kind of person who would step up and admit to it,“ he said. That is the reason the USDA has not allowed him to talk to the press – because he would be honest and tell the truth – Louthan contended. „If he‘s the same Rodney I‘ve always known, he‘s going to admit to it and say ‚Yeah, I forged the paperwork,‘“ he said. Thompson did not respond to e-mails sent by UPI two weeks ago, and attempts to reach him by phone last week at Vern‘s were unsuccessful.


Although plant management said Thompson was on the job last Friday, a meat inspector, who later was identified as Donald West, answered the phone line reserved for USDA officials at the plant and told UPI that Thompson had left for the day. West declined to identify himself or comment on the case and abruptly ended the conversation. Louthan said West previously had told him Thompson was given a promotion and bumped up three pay grades in an effort to keep him silent. UPI has been unable to verify any of Louthan‘s allegations, in part because the USDA has refused to give out any information on Thompson. In fact, agency officials will not even verify if Thompson is still a USDA employee, saying they cannot comment on an ongoing investigation.


Asked about the promotion and pay-raise allegations, USDA spokeswoman Alisa Harrison said, „I haven‘t heard of that at all ...I‘m sure that‘s part of what the (Inspector General) is taking a look at.“ Asked whether USDA officials pressured Thompson to alter documents, Harrison replied: „I cannot fathom that would happen ... I would assure you that‘s not something Secretary Veneman would do.“ Harrison declined to comment on the actions that would be taken if the OIG investigation found records had been forged. „I‘m not going to speculate or answer any hypothetical questions,“ she said. „It‘s important to let the investigation proceed.“


Thompson may soon have to give his account of the mad cow case whether USDA officials want him to or not. The House Government Reform Committee has opened its own investigation into the matter and requested in a Feb. 17 letter to Veneman that she „make available for interviews with our staff the USDA officials who are familiar with the operations at Vern‘s,“ which presumably would include Thompson. Harrison said the agency would comply with the committee‘s request and make Thompson available. „Je intend to fully cooperate with information requests made by the committee,“ she said. A source close to the committee‘s investigation who requested they not be identified, told UPI: „There haven‘t been any new interviews to date, but the investigation is definitely still ongoing and we‘re still interested in talking to people.“ The source added that Thompson is „certainly an interesting part of the investigation.“


„Our goal is to see trade resume as quickly as possible“, that is US Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman´s main task, but if trade will resume as quickly as the industry would like is uncertain. With the first BSE case found in the US, a lot of digging is being done into the credibility of the American feed safety system.


The fact that the first US-found BSE cow, according to DNA tests, originates from Canada indeed helps to open up borders, but does not determine that these borders actually will open up, said the international animal health organization OIE. According to OIE there are more aspects that play a role in re-aquiring BSE-free status. Top USDA officials and industry groups said that foreign countries should lift US beef bans. US-politicians also hammer on the BSE-case being Canadian and demand reopening of markets, but US chief veterinary officer Ron DeHaven does not want to go that far. „It is a North-American case, it was and it stays that way,“ he said.


In the meantime the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which has not implemented any new safeguards since the BSE-discovery, faces growing pressure to strengthen its ban on the use of cattle remains in certain animal feed. While the Agriculture Department(USDA) quickly imposed a series of new food safety rules, FDA officials still hesitated and said they needed time to install extra precautions.


Three tier firewall









Information on the Washington State Investigation of the ...

United States Department of Agriculture
This Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation concerned the identification ... facility in Moses Lake, Washington State, which tested positive for BSE two.
  • [PDF]

    BSE Audit Report - US Department of Agriculture

    United States Department of Agriculture
    OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL. Washington, D.C. 20250. January 25, 2006. REPLY TO. ATTN OF: 50601-10-KC. TO: W. Ron DeHaven. Administrator.
  • [PDF]

    A Review of the USDA's Expanded BSE Cattle Surveillance

    United States Department of Agriculture
    Mar 15, 2004 - for my colleagues and staff at OIG, BSE-related work is a top priority and one of ... identification of a BSE-infected cow in Washington State in ...


     Sunday, November 13, 2011 California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock


    QFC sued over mad cow case Grocer negligently exposed them to beef, family claims


    Friday, March 5, 2004





    highly suspect stumbling and staggering mad cow reported, however, NO TESTING DONE, ON ORDERS FROM AUSTIN $


    May 4, 2004


    Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms


    On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.


    FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.


    FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.


    Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison)...



    USDA regulations, any cow that exhibits signs of central nervous system (CNS)


    According to a 1997 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (NHIS) Memorandum, brain samples all of such animals should be sent for BSE testing.2 The memorandum notes that "it is essential that brain specimens be collected from adult cattle condemned for CNS signs as part of our national surveillance of BSE."


    The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5


    May 13,2004


    Page 2




    The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant to send the carcass for rendering.5


    This sequence of events is troubling, and it raises the question of whether this is an isolated incident. In 1997, USDA noted a major gap between the number of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms and the number of these cows actually tested for mad cow disease. The Department found:



    May 13, 2004


    Failure To Test Staggering Cow May Reflect Wider Problems Rep. Waxman raises concerns that the recent failure of USDA to test an impaired cow for BSE may not be an isolated incident, citing the failure of USDA to monitor whether cows condemned for central nervous system symptoms are actually tested for mad cow disease. - Letter to USDA


    July 13, 2004 IG Audit Finds Multiple Flaws in Mad Cow Surveillance Plan Rep. Waxman raises questions about the effectiveness and credibility of USDA's response to mad cow disease, citing an audit by the USDA Inspector General that finds systemic deficiencies in the Department's surveillance plan and new evidence that USDA misled the public in the wake of the detection of an infected cow in Washington State. - Letter to USDA



    IG Draft Audit



    SUPPRESSED peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002



    [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011]


    FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)



    Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the


     FSIS website:



    Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS.


    Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary.


    This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:



    Owens, Julie From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]


    Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments


    Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006


    Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;



    Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.


    October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number 07182.024



    Sunday, February 14, 2010


    [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)



    Thursday, April 9, 2009


    Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed Thursday, April 09, 2009


    Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed



    Greetings FDA et al,


    I kindly wish to comment on the following ;


    [Docket No. FDA-2002-N-0031] (formerly Docket No. 2002N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46


    [Federal Register: April 9, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 67)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 16160-16161] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ap09-18]



    Tuesday, September 14, 2010


    Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)



    FULL TEXT OF GOA REPORT BELOW (takes a while to load)


    2. Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts. GAO-02-183, January 25.



    January 2002


    MAD COW DISEASE Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts




    As you also requested, we considered, to the extent feasible, a study by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis and sponsored by USDA to examine the potential for BSE in the United States.2 That study, issued in November 2001, concluded that BSE is extremely unlikely to become established in the United States and that, if introduced here, it would be eliminated within 20 years.3 The authors acknowledged that those conclusions, which were based on a probabilistic simulation model developed for the study, could be influenced by a number of model assumptions that could not be verified with confidence—including assumptions about U.S. measures to prevent the introduction and spread of BSE.






    IN OTHER WORDS, in was meaningless, just words on paper, rules and regulations that were not complied with, much less enforced. as i so kindly said, a farce. how many reports from peer reviewed experts do we need to say that the USA BSE/TSE program is failing, has failed, and will fail in the future, how many do we have to have before someone does something, and i don't mean stand up there in front of God and the world and lie, i don't mean that, i mean when is something going to be done...TSS




    GAO Comments


    The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and Human Services’ letter dated January 9, 2002.


    1. Our report acknowledged FDA’s ongoing review but also notes that FDA has not set a date to announce a decision on the exemptions. The report also recognizes that recent research suggests the possibility of “silent” incubation in species not previously thought susceptible to TSEs. This research argues against waiting until BSE is found to strengthen measures shown to prevent the spread of the disease. As FDA notes, other countries strengthened their feed bans due to concerns about commingling prohibited and non-prohibited proteins. Such commingling is a common area of noncompliance in the United States.


    2. As FDA points out, its June 22, 2001, transmittal of compliance information to the Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce “made an effort to identify the fact that there were reporting problems, including incomplete data, i.e., blanks.” However, we do not believe that this caveat conveyed the extent to which the information could be inaccurate. In fact, noncompliance could be much higher than FDA reported, because FDA treated all firms with blanks on compliance questions as if they were in compliance. We found that over 700 inspection records for firms that handled prohibited proteins had blanks on compliance questions. In its response to the Chairman, FDA did not disclose that some of those records contained inspector comments stating that the firms were not in compliance. Nor did FDA disclose that, at the time it responded to the Chairman, it was aware of the need for “significant improvements in its data collection system for enforcing the feed ban.” As a result, we believe the data were misleading.


    3. We believe that the nature and severity of the problems we found in FDA’s management, oversight, and enforcement of the feed ban point to insufficient attention by FDA management. Moreover, the fact that FDA gave all headquarters responsibility to one individual—as an addon to that individual’s other duties—is further evidence of the relatively low priority FDA gave to its regulatory responsibility.


    4. Although FDA’s field inspectors and state inspectors carried out the inspections, FDA headquarters tracked overall compliance with the feed ban and brought together data on FDA field and state compliance inspections. In meetings with FDA officials, we were repeatedly told Page 52 GAO-02-183 Mad Cow Disease Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services that a single person had designed the program and the database to monitor inspections and, until January 2001, made all enforcement decisions. While administrative and other support may have been available for this person, the overall design and direction of feed ban implementation rested with this individual. Moreover, because FDA had no other information system, the database that individual developed was FDA’s only mechanism to monitor the program and track feed ban compliance.


    5. Although FDA cites a number of high-level interagency policy and technical initiatives aimed at ensuring that BSE-risk products do not enter the United States, our recommendation is grounded in problems we found at the operational level. First, the high error rates in importer-provided information found by Customs are unacceptable. Second, the ever-increasing volume of imported shipments strains inspection resources at both USDA and FDA. Third, we observed or were told by federal field personnel about problems affecting USDA and FDA staff responsible for reviewing import documentation and conducting inspections of shipments. FDA staff told us that they need integrated information technologies, dedicated inspection facilities, and additional staff to effectively address their workload.


    6. We do not agree that FDA has made extensive progress implementing our recommendation, based on the fact that it periodically meets with states on BSE-related issues and has increased the number of states under contracts to conduct inspections. With regard to its progress in identifying the universe of firms subject to the ban, our work shows that FDA’s efforts have not been successful. In reports, FDA states that the number of on-farm feed mills, feed blenders, and feed haulers is still unknown. FDA also asserts that the feed industry has undergone extensive consolidation, but it has not reconciled the number of firms inspected with industry or state estimates. Although FDA asserts it has incorporated into state contracts a requirement to identify firms subject to the ban, the contracts we reviewed did not include such provisions. Moreover, as recently as May 2001, we found that FDA was adding to its database information on inspections conducted in 1998 by states under contract.


    7. FDA agrees on the need for a comprehensive strategy for BSE but points out that it began an enforcement strategy in 1998. However, our review shows that the strategy did not contain criteria and timeframes for specific enforcement actions against firms that fail to comply with the feed ban, as our recommendation envisions. FDA’s contention that Page 53 GAO-02-183 Mad Cow Disease Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services its initial approach was to educate firms does not explain its failure to take action against firms found out of compliance on repeated inspections. Now that the feed ban has been in effect for more than 4 years, FDA points out that inspections have resulted in more than 200 recalls. However, those recalls consist of actions taken by 22 firms, one of which accounted for about 150 recalls. By FDA’s own estimates, more than 300 firms are out of compliance.


    8. Regardless of variations in state laws, FDA has instructed states to provide specific information on the feed ban inspections they conduct. We believe FDA should request these states to also include information on enforcement actions taken as a result of those feed ban inspections.


    9. While we agree that FDA has initiated efforts to increase the integrity and usefulness of the BSE inspection data, it has not taken the steps necessary to ensure that the inspection data are accurate and complete and recorded in a timely manner. For example, neither the steps listed in FDA’s letter nor the terms of the contracts we reviewed include periodic assessment of error rates or controls to help ensure data entered are complete and accurate. Moreover, FDA’s response does not address how the data on past BSE inspections will be merged with the Field Accomplishment Compliance Tracking System. Many of the firms have never before been subject to FDA oversight and would not have such control numbers to effectively merge the old and new data. Also, FDA has not included steps to capture timeliness of inspections, enforcement actions, and follow up, especially for past inspections. Page 54 GAO-02-183 Mad Cow Disease





    -------- Original Message --------


    Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease


    Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500


    From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."


    To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us


    Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............




    There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...


    Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx


    Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST In


    Reply to: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:


    Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected. just pondering... TSS






    -------- Original Message --------


    Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us


    Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???


    Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600


    From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."


    To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us>


    Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;


    Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?


    and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???




    -------- Original Message --------


    Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???


    Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 –0600


    From: Carla Everett


    To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>


    The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas. Carla At 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?>>


    thank you,>


    Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>


    -------- Original Message --------


    Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???


    Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett


    To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."


    References: ...snip tss


    our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something. At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,


    you wrote:


    >why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?


    >>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:


    >November 22: Press Release title here


    >>star image More BSE information




    >>Carla Everett wrote:


    >>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...


    >>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>


    -------- Original Message --------


    Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us


    Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???


    Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600


    From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."


    To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us>


    Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;


    Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?


    and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???








    USDA did not test possible mad cows


    By Steve Mitchell


    United Press International


    Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM


    WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year, but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency tested only half that number.






    "These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."




    THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS












    THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;


    During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.



    Executive Summary In June 2005,


    an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.




    Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.


    Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.


    Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.


    Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.


    Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.





    Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program


    An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.











    Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM


    "Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."






    Saturday, May 26, 2012


    Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?




    What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”


    The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”


    “We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi State.


    In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said


    The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.










    Saturday, August 4, 2012


    *** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012 (ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE)



    Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***


    see page 176 of 201 pages...tss



    *** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;





    Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST






    Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007




    Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007




    Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.


    Firm initiated recall is ongoing.




    Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.




    42,090 lbs.














    The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.




    Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.




    Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.




    9,997,976 lbs.




    ID and NV





    Friday, December 14, 2012


    DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012




    In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.


    Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:


    1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and


    2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.


    Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.


    The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.


    Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.


    There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.




    36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).


    The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).


    Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.




    The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).




    In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.




    In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible. For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.




    Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.







    Sunday, December 15, 2013







    The 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so flawed, that one of the top TSE prion Scientist for the CDC, Dr. Paul Brown stated ;


    Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.


    see ;



    Saturday, August 16, 2008


    Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)



    Tuesday, July 14, 2009 U.S.


    Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book


    Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST


    WHERE did we go wrong $$$



    Thursday, March 29, 2012


    atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012


    NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas



    Monday, June 02, 2014


    Confirmed Human BSE aka mad cow Variant CJD vCJD or nvCJD Case in Texas



    Monday, June 23, 2014






    Tuesday, July 01, 2014





    Thursday, July 03, 2014


    *** How Chronic Wasting Disease is affecting deer population and what’s the risk to humans and pets? ***



    Saturday, August 02, 2014


    *** Structural effects of PrP polymorphisms on intra- and inter-species prion transmission


    In contrast, the scrapie prions used in the deer transmission studies of Greenlee and colleagues were isolated from a sheep encoding A136, ***raising the possibility that deer may be susceptible to multiple scrapie strains.






    The unpredictable recurrences of prion epidemics, their incurable lethality, and the capacity of animal prions to infect humans, provide significant motivation to ascertain the parameters governing disease transmission. The unprecedented spread, and uncertain zoonotic potential of chronic wasting disease (CWD), a contagious epidemic among deer, elk, and other cervids, is of particular concern. Here we demonstrate that naturally occurring primary structural differences in cervid PrPs differentially impact the efficiency of intra- and interspecies prion transmission. Our results not only deliver new information about the role of primary structural variation on prion susceptibility, but also provide functional support to a mechanism in which plasticity of a tertiary structural epitope governs prion protein conversion and intra- and inter-species susceptibility to prions.-





    Monday, July 28, 2014


    Mitigating the Risk of Transmission and Environmental Contamination of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 2013 Annual Report



    *** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.



    Wednesday, July 23, 2014


    After the storm? UK blood safety and the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease



    Sunday, August 09, 2009


    CJD...Straight talk with...James Ironside...and...Terry Singeltary... 2009



    Tuesday, August 18, 2009


    * BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 – 2009



    Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease North America 2014


    Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease have now been discovered in a wide verity of species across North America. typical C-BSE, atypical L-type BASE BSE, atypical H-type BSE, atypical H-G BSE, of the bovine, typical and atypical Scrapie strains, in sheep and goats, with atypical Nor-98 Scrapie spreading coast to coast in about 5 years. Chronic Wasting Disease CWD in cervid is slowly spreading without any stopping it in Canada and the USA and now has mutated into many different strains. Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME outbreaks. These Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease have been silently mutating and spreading in different species in North America for decades.


    The USDA, FDA, et al have assured us of a robust Triple BSE TSE prion Firewall, of which we now know without a doubt, that it was nothing but ink on paper. Since the 1997 mad cow feed ban in the USA, literally tons and tons of banned mad cow feed has been put out into commerce, never to return, as late as December of 2013, serious, serious breaches in the FDA mad cow feed ban have been documented. The 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so flawed, that one of the top TSE prion Scientist for the CDC, Dr. Paul Brown stated ; Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.


    see ;



    The BSE surveillance and testing have also been proven to be flawed, and the GAO and OIG have both raised serious question as to just how flawed it has been (see GAO and OIG reports). North America has more documented TSE prion disease, in different documented species (excluding the Zoo BSE animals in the EU), then any other place on the Globe. This does not include the very likelihood that TSE prion disease in the domestic feline and canine have been exposed to high doses of the TSE prion disease vid pet food. To date, it’s still legal to include deer from cwd zone into pet food or deer food. Specified Risk Material i.e. SRM bans still being breach, as recently as just last month.


    nvCJD or what they now call vCJD, another case documented in Texas last month, with very little information being released to the public on about this case? with still the same line of thought from federal officials, ‘it can’t happen here’, so another vCJD blamed on travel of a foreign animal disease from another country, while ignoring all the BSE TSE Prion risk factors we have here in the USA and Canada, and the time that this victim and others, do spend in the USA, and exposed to these risk factors, apparently do not count in any way with regard to risk factor. a flawed process of risk assessment.


    sporadic CJD, along with new TSE prion disease in humans, of which the young are dying, of which long duration of illness from onset of symptoms to death have been documented, only to have a new name added to the pot of prion disease i.e. sporadic GSS, sporadic FFI, and or VPSPR. I only ponder how a familial type disease could be sporadic with no genetic link to any family member? when the USA is the only documented Country in the world to have documented two different cases of atypical H-type BSE, with one case being called atypical H-G BSE with the G meaning Genetic, with new science now showing that indeed atypical H-type BSE is very possible transmitted to cattle via oral transmission (Prion2014). sporadic CJD and VPSPR have been rising in Canada, USA, and the UK, with the same old excuse, better surveillance. You can only use that excuse for so many years, for so many decades, until one must conclude that CJD TSE prion cases are rising. a 48% incease in CJD in Canada is not just a blip or a reason of better surveillance, it is a mathematical rise in numbers. More and more we are seeing more humans exposed in various circumstance in the Hospital, Medical, Surgical arenas to the TSE Prion disease, and at the same time in North America, more and more humans are becoming exposed to the TSE prion disease via consumption of the TSE prion via deer and elk, cattle, sheep and goats, and for those that are exposed via or consumption, go on to further expose many others via the iatrogenic modes of transmission of the TSE prion disease i.e. friendly fire. I pondered this mode of transmission via the victims of sporadic FFI, sporadic GSS, could this be a iatrogenic event from someone sub-clinical with sFFI or sGSS ? what if?


    Two decades have passed since Dr. Ironside first confirmed his first ten nvCJD victims in 1995. Ten years later, 2005, we had Dr. Gambetti and his first ten i.e. VPSPR in younger victims. now we know that indeed VPSPR is transmissible. yet all these TSE prion disease and victims in the USA and Canada are being pawned off as a spontaneous event, yet science has shown, the spontaneous theory has never been proven in any natural case of TSE prion disease, and scientist have warned, that they have now linked some sporadic CJD cases to atypical BSE, to atypical Scrapie, and to CWD, yet we don’t here about this in the public domain. We must make all human and animal TSE prion disease reportable in every age group, in ever state and internationally, we must have a serious re-evaluation and testing of the USA cattle herds, and we must ban interstate movement of all cervids. Any voluntary effort to do any of this will fail. Folks, we have let the industry run science far too long with regards to the TSE prion disease. While the industry and their lobbyist continues to funnel junk science to our decision policy makers, Rome burns. ...end




    Sunday, June 29, 2014


    Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease North America 2014



    Tuesday, April 01, 2014


    *** Questions linger in U.S. CJD cases 2005, and still do in 2014 ***





    The Akron, Ohio-based CJD Foundation said the Center for Disease Control revised that number in October of 2004 to about one in 9,000 CJD cases per year in the population group age 55 and older.




    if not, why not...


    Friday, November 30, 2007






    Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis





    full text with source references ;



    just made a promise, never forget, and never let them forget...tss


    Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Case Report




    Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease autopsy case report 'MOM'


    DIVISION OF NEUROPATHOLOGY University of Texas Medical Branch 114 McCullough Bldg. Galveston, Texas 77555-0785




    DATE: 4-23-98


    TO: Mr. Terry Singeltary @ -------


    FROM: Gerald Campbell


    FAX: (409) 772-5315 PHONE: (409) 772-2881


    Number of Pages (including cover sheet):






    This document accompanying this transmission contains confidential information belonging to the sender that is legally privileged. This information is intended only for the use of the individual or entry names above. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying distribution, or the taking of any action in reliances on the contents of this telefaxed information is strictly prohibited. If you received this telefax in error, please notify us by telephone immediately to arrange for return of the original documents.




    Patient Account: 90000014-518


    Med. Rec. No.: (0160)118511Q


    Patient Name: POULTER, BARBARA Age: 63 YRS DOB: 10/17/34 Sex: F Admitting Race: C


    Attending Dr.: Date / Time Admitted : 12/14/97 1228 Copies to:


    UTMB University of Texas Medical Branch Galveston, Texas 77555-0543 (409) 772-1238 Fax (409) 772-5683 Pathology Report


    FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS Autopsy' Office (409)772-2858


    Autopsy NO.: AU-97-00435


    AUTOPSY INFORMATION: Occupation: Unknown Birthplace: Unknown


    Residence: Crystal Beach


    Date/Time of Death: 12/14/97 13:30


    Date/Time of Autopsy: 12/15/97 15:00


    Pathologist/Resident: Pencil/Fernandez


    Service: Private Restriction: Brain only




    I. Brain: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Heidenhain variant.


    snip...see full text ;







    Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

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