OIE and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Reinforce
Collaboration
10 March 2015 US - The meetings with Dr Frieden, CDC Director, and senior
staff representatives provided the opportunity to reaffirm several key topics of
common interest in order to pursue and strengthen efficient cooperation between
the two organisations. CDC is already recognised as an OIE Reference Centre by
OIE Member Countries. The main objectives of this cooperation are notably to
further support country compliance with OIE intergovernmental standards on
quality of veterinary systems using the OIE PVS Pathway, complementary to the
International Health Regulations (IHR) obligations of the Member States of the
World Health Organization (WHO), for the parallel strengthening of national
animal and public health services. This cooperation is highly relevant in the
context of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). Both the OIE and CDC have
confirmed their support to the One Health approach when addressing compliance
and capacity building needs of countries. Several topics of mutual interest were
explored, notably the prevention of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), global
rabies control in dog populations, leading to a drastic decrease in human cases,
as well as animal disease information systems, including zoonosis. Consideration
was also given to the need to strengthen national animal health systems and
their capacity to detect and respond to risks of wildlife origin, including
Ebola, also covering post rinderpest eradication activities, and biosecurity and
biosafety in veterinary laboratories. - See more at: http://www.thesheepsite.com/news/964/oie-and-centers-for-disease-control-and-prevention-reinforce-collaboration/#sthash.QOp2oSsu.dpuf
>>> OIE and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Reinforce
Collaboration <<<
Collaboration for what exactly ???
it sure isn’t protecting human and animals from Transmissible Spongiform
Encephalopathy TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease.
it would seem to me, the Collaboration in question is nothing more than to
protect big ag $$$
let’s review shall we...
Friday, December 5, 2014
SPECIAL ALERT The OIE recommends strengthening animal disease surveillance
worldwide
BSE TSE PRION AKA MAD COW TYPE DISEASE, THE SILENCE WAS DEAFENING $$$
IN A NUT SHELL ;
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate
declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The
OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status
based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other
significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,
‘’LOL LAUGH OUT LOUD’’...TSS
IT is of my opinion, that the OIE and the USDA et al, are the soul reason,
and responsible parties, for Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion
diseases, including typical and atypical BSE, typical and atypical Scrapie, and
all strains of CWD, and human TSE there from, spreading around the globe.
I have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority
on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading
Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS i
said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will
buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol,
commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should
do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization.
JUST because of low documented human body count with nvCJD and the long
incubation periods, the lack of sound science being replaced by political and
corporate science in relations with the fact that science has now linked some
sporadic CJD with atypical BSE and atypical scrapie, and the very real threat of
CWD being zoonosis, I believed the O.I.E. has failed terribly and again, I call
for this organization to be dissolved. ...
Monday, May 05, 2014
Member Country details for listing OIE CWD 2013 against the criteria of
Article 1.2.2., the Code Commission recommends consideration for listing
Monday, May 05, 2014
Member Country details for listing OIE CWD 2013 against the criteria of
Article 1.2.2., the Code Commission recommends consideration for listing
UPDATE May 13, 2014
Member Country details for listing OIE CWD 2013 against the criteria of
Article 1.2.2., the Code Commission recommends consideration for listing
Greetings everyone,
Finally, got a confirmation from top official inside OIE.
YES!
Indeed, CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD has been brought to the OIE table, by
more than one country, and WILL BE BROUGHT TO THE TABLE AGAIN, WHEN THE NEXT AD
HOC EXPERT GROUP IS CONVENED...tss
‘’On more than one occasion our Commission has received a request from a
Member Country to list CWD as a disease notifiable to the OIE. However, it is
not our practice to specify which Member Countries make specific requests to us.
All countries which submit national comments to us at our February and September
meetings are listed in the reports of our meetings. However, the country names
are not linked to specific comments or requests.’’
’’they may also evaluate CWD against the OIE’s CRITERIA.’’
‘’That is where the situation stands at present. Next time an ad hoc group
is convened to consider issues of listing and delisting, CWD will be evaluated.
I have no idea of time frames.’’
personal communication with OIE top official...tss
Rome was not built overnight I suppose...tss
> In response to a _Member Country’s_ detailed justification for listing
of chronic wasting disease of cervids (CWD) against the criteria of Article
1.2.2., the Code Commission _recommended_ this disease be reconsidered for
listing.
Annual report of the Scientific Network on BSE-TSE EFSA, Question No
EFSA-Q-2013-01004, approved on 11 December 2013
*** Further, it was addressed that recently discussions have being held at
OIE level on Chronic Wasting Disease of cervids.
page 6;
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS
COMMISSION Paris, 19–28 February 2013
In response to a Member Country’s detailed justification for listing of
chronic wasting disease of cervids (CWD) against the criteria of Article 1.2.2.,
the Code Commission recommended this disease be reconsidered for listing.
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS
COMMISSION Paris, 17–26 September 2013
Item 5 Criteria for listing diseases (Chapter 1.2.)
Comments were received from Australia, EU, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland,
Thailand and AU-IBAR The Code Commission noted a Member Country’s comment
suggesting that greater clarity was needed for the term ‘significant morbidity
and mortality’. As noted in the February 2013 report, the Code Commission
considered that the structured process of listing diseases, first by an expert
group whose conclusions are documented and circulated for Member Countries’
review and comment, then consideration by the World Assembly of Delegates before
final adoption, is sufficiently rigorous and transparent.
greetings,
what is criteria of Article 1.2.2. ???
curious as to what country detailed justification for listing ???
kind regards, terry
*******UPDATE ON OIE ARTICLE 1.2.2********
OIE Article 1.2.2.
The criteria for the inclusion of a disease, infection or infestation in
the OIE list are as follows:
1) International spread of the agent (via live animals or their products,
vectors or fomites) has been proven.
AND
2) At least one country has demonstrated freedom or impending freedom from
the disease, infection or infestation in populations of susceptible animals,
based on the animal health surveillance provisions of the Terrestrial Code, in
particular those contained in Chapter 1.4.
AND
3)
a) Natural transmission to humans has been proven, and human infection is
associated with severe consequences.
OR
b) The disease has been shown to cause significant morbidity or mortality
in domestic animals at the level of a
country or a zone.
OR
c) The disease has been shown to, or scientific evidence indicates that it
would, cause significant morbidity or
mortality in wild animal populations.
AND
4) A reliable means of detection and diagnosis exists and a precise case
definition is available to clearly identify cases
and allow them to be distinguished from other diseases, infections and
infestations.
OR
5) The disease or infection is an emerging disease with evidence of
zoonotic properties, rapid spread, or significant morbidity or mortality and a
case definition is available to clearly identify cases and allow them to be
distinguished from other diseases or infections.
2 2013 © OIE - Terrestrial Animal Health Code Chapter 1.2.- Criteria for
the inclusion of diseases, infections and infestations on the OIE list
*** URGENT CWD UPDATE Friday, January 17, 2014
FINALLY, 12 years later, the OIE becomes concerned with CWD to humans, not
that I did not try and warn them 12 years ago. ...kind regards, terry
Friday, January 17, 2014
Annual report of the Scientific Network on BSE-TSE EFSA, Question No
EFSA-Q-2013-01004, approved on 11 December 2013
*** Further, it was addressed that recently discussions have being held at
OIE level on Chronic Wasting Disease of cervids.
*** 2002 Singeltary vs O.I.E. on CWD to human risk factor ;
Subject: Re: CWD AMERICA ???
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 19:10:18 +0200
From: "INFORMATION DEPT"
Organization: O.I.E
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: <3d2f0169 .3="" wt.net=""> < 012901c229b2 ad43bb90=""
f00000a=""> 3D2F2358.5010700@wt.net
I agree with you Dr Terry. The OIE, namely the International Animal Health
Code Commission is working on making proposals to Member Countries to change the
OIE lists so to avoid some the problems mentioned in you e-mail. This will take
at least two years before adoption by the International Committee. For BSE,
countries asked the OIE to post information on BSE on the OIE web site.
Personally, I am interested in Chronic Wasting Disease and I follow what is
distributed through ProMed. Delegates of OIE Member Countries can propose
diseases to be added to the list.
Kind regards.
Karim Ben Jebara
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: "INFORMATION DEPT"
Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 8:43 PM
Subject: Re: CWD AMERICA ???
>>> *** Further, it was addressed that recently discussions have
being held at OIE level on Chronic Wasting Disease of cervids. <<<
> hello Dr. Jebara,
>
> many thanks for your swift and kind reply.
>
> if i am not mistaken, it was the same email address.
> it was 3 or 4 weeks ago i wrote, as it is, i don't
> save 'sent' emails anymore, unless very important.
>
> my main concern (besides the fact that a potential TSE
> has been in the USA cattle for some time, but the APHIS
> do not test to find), is that the CWD could very well be
> transmitting to humans, and i just did not see to much
> posted about it on OIE site.
>
> > Coming back to your question, Chronic Wasting Disease is not an
OIE
>
> > listed disease. Please see OIE disease lists at
>
>
> why is this TSE (CWD) not listed and followed as with BSE ?
>
> Article 1.1.3.2.
> 1. Countries shall make available to other countries, through
the
> OIE, whatever information is necessary to minimise the spread of
> important animal diseases and to assist in achieving better
worldwide
> control of these diseases.
>
>
> The USA CWD is an important animal disease.
>
> why is it not followed?
>
> > The decision to add or delete a disease from the OIE lists,
come
>
> > through proposals made by Member Countries and it has to be
adopted by
>
> > the International Committee.
>
> i _urgently_ suggest a proposal to the OIE to follow this disease
very
> closely, and to propose _more_ testing in the USA for TSEs in the
USA
> cattle...
>
> kindest regards,
> terry
>
> INFORMATION DEPT wrote:
>
> > Dear Sir,
> >
> > This is the first time that I receive your e-mail. To whom have
you written
> > in the OIE or to which address?
> >
> > Coming back to your question, Chronic Wasting Disease is not an
OIE listed
> > disease. Please see OIE disease lists at
> >
> > Countries should report to the OIE any disease even is not listed
in the
> > OIE's lists in some conditions (example: an exceptional
epidemiological
> > event). Please read Chapter 1.1.3 of the International animal
health code to
> > have more information on disease notification and
epidemiological
> > information agreed by OIE Member Countries at :
> >
> > The decision to add or delete a disease from the OIE lists, come
through
> > proposals made by Member Countries and it has to be adopted by
the
> > International Committee.
> >
> > Hope that I answered to your question.
> >
> > Best regards.
> >
> > Dr Karim Ben Jebara
> > Head
> > Animal Health Information Department
> > OIE
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
> > To:
> > Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 6:18 PM
> > Subject: CWD AMERICA ???
> >
> >
> >
> >>I WROTE TO OIE RECENTLY ASKING 'WHY OIE DOES NOT FOLLOW CWD
IN
> >>AMERICA' ? with no reply ? i am still seeking an answer
?
> >>
> >>many thanks,
> >>and kind regards,
> >>terry
=====================
Monday, May 05, 2014
*** Member Country details for listing OIE CWD 2013 against the criteria of
Article 1.2.2., the Code Commission recommends consideration for listing ***
STILL WAITING...TSS
Sunday, December 28, 2014
*** CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE AKA MAD DEER DISIEASE
USDA USAHA INC DECEMBER 28, 2014
SEE FEED ;
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip...
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation
(21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin)
from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With
regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may
not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered
at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the
animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a
requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD
eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to
slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive
animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from
the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES.
It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin
processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible
risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk
protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data
on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these
products.
snip...
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of
deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of
Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011). The clinical signs
of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span
weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive
salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in
interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams,
2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected
with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Given this, if CWD was to be
introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer
populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with
CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via
affected venison.
snip...
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and
can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip...
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil
and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a
bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are
present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with
CWD prion.
snip...
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving
between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling
to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing,
footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible.
For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the
increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant
uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip...
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher
probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer
given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists
and returning GB residents.
snip...
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly
magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef
ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and
slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of
free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier.
Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE
and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion
diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease
through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can
be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size
of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic
individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a
potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine
Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December
4, 2013
TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD
COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were
wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on
paper $$$
full text ;
Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. This is a Comment on the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products
For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Show agency attachment(s) AttachmentsView All (0) Empty
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Comment View document:Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
;
I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from
the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA
and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is
any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just
saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present
mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?
North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species
(excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and
or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented
evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine
spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just
not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid
CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type
BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to
date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical
Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different
strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow
case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC.
typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al),
and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical
Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid
populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk
assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to
trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day
December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats
the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries
throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated
to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the
OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion
disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type
disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about
money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating
disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure,
sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion
disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its
all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the
infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$
the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing
but ink on paper.
for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and
that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE
GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all
TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk
assessments be made stronger than before.
lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to
America.
Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest
year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases
dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to
date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad
cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the
number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the
USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in
2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD
COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in
my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow
disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE
mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.
Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in
farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)
Country/Year
snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA
triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease.
...TSS No documents available. AttachmentsView All (1) Empty Docket No.
APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and
Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of
Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
2014
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice
overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may
result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent.
*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical
similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype
at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and
another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].
snip...
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
snip...
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far
classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.
*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that
some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type
Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME)
and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
snip...
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that
could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set
out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE
which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is
scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that
this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial
distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC)
signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and
H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and
spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains
of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type
mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because
they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type
BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian
hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or
a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE.
***In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for
atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time
for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific
information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose
the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by
the same protective measures.
BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD-like prion
strains in transgenic mice expressing human prion protein
*** Surprisingly, however, BSE transmission to these transgenic mice, in
addition to producing a vCJD-like phenotype, can also result in a distinct
molecular phenotype that is indistinguishable from that of sporadic CJD with
PrPSc type 2.
These data suggest that more than one BSEderived prion strain might infect
humans;
***it is therefore possible that some patients with a phenotype consistent
with sporadic CJD may have a disease arising from BSE exposure.
snip...
These studies further strengthen the evidence that vCJD is caused by a
BSE-like prion strain.
Also, remarkably, the key neuropathological hallmark of vCJD, the presence
of abundant florid PrP plaques, can be recapitulated on BSE or vCJD transmission
to these mice.
***However, the most surprising aspect of the studies was the finding that
an alternate pattern of disease can be induced in 129MM Tg35 mice from primary
transmission of BSE, with a molecular phenotype indistinguishable from that of a
subtype of sporadic CJD. This finding has important potential implications as it
raises the possibility that some humans infected with BSE prions may develop a
clinical disease indistinguishable from classical CJD associated with type 2
PrPSc. This is, in our experience, the commonest molecular sub-type of sporadic
CJD. In this regard, it is of interest that the reported incidence of sporadic
CJD has risen in the UK since the 1970s (Cousens et al., 1997)...
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: re-BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 10:23:43 -0000
From: "Asante, Emmanuel A" e.asante@ic.ac.uk
To: "'flounder@wt.net'" flounder@wt.net
Dear Terry,
I have been asked by Professor Collinge to respond to your request. I am a
Senior Scientist in the MRC Prion Unit and the lead author on the paper. I have
attached a pdf copy of the paper for your attention.
Thank you for your interest in the paper.
In respect of your first question, the simple answer is, ***yes. As you
will find in the paper, we have managed to associate the alternate phenotype to
type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. It is too early to be able to claim
any further sub-classification in respect of Heidenhain variant CJD or Vicky
Rimmer's version. It will take further studies, which are on-going, to establish
if there are sub-types to our initial finding which we are now reporting. The
main point of the paper is that, as well as leading to the expected new variant
CJD phenotype, BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an
alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc.
I hope reading the paper will enlighten you more on the subject. If I can
be of any further assistance please to not hesitate to ask. Best wishes.
Emmanuel Asante
In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be
drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs
and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2
PrPSc?
Published March 26, 2003
AS I support COOL, let us not forget, the rest of the story i.e.
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease,
Abroad, and North America. It seems this word BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type
disease get’s lost in transmission, if you know what I mean.
let’s review this shall we...so soon we forget...terry
Monday, March 9, 2015
R-CALF USA Helps Promote COOL to White House Domestic Policy Council To the
White House Domestic Policy Council staff, http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2015/03/r-calf-usa-helps-promote-cool-to-white.html
Saturday, February 28, 2015
BSE CANADA UPDATE Transcript - Technical Briefing to Provide an Update on
Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alberta February 27, 2015
4:00 p.m.
Monday, February 23, 2015
20th BSE Case Raises New Concerns about Canada's Feeding Practices and
Voluntary Testing Program; Highlights Importance of COOL
about those mad sheep of mad river valley, the ones from Belgium. please
see my decade old quest for the truth, and it isn’t pretty;
Friday, February 20, 2015
APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays
2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease
Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015
Discussion:
The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics
similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and
Japan.
*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated
feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these
countries. ***
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
*** PLOS Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic
Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
PLOS Singeltary Comment ;
*** ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States ? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
Saturday, January 24, 2015
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Atypical Pros and Cons
Saturday, January 31, 2015
RAPID ADVICE 17-2014 : Evaluation of the risk for public health of casings
in countries with a “negligible risk status for BSE” and on the risk of
modification of the list of specified risk materials (SRM) with regard to BSE
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
2013
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
Tuesday, February 17, 2015
Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President
Thursday, July 24, 2014
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05
Study of Atypical Bse
Sunday, December 28, 2014
Reverse Freedom of Information Act request rFOIA FSIS USDA APHIS TSE PRION
aka BSE MAD COW TYPE DISEASE December 2014
Thursday, October 02, 2014
[Docket No. APHIS-2013-0064] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and
VPSPr PRIONPATHY
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
Saturday, August 30, 2014
Maine Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified
Risk Materials SRM TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease
Friday, December 19, 2014
Rancho Alleged Cancerous Eyeball Case Going To Trial
Saturday, November 10, 2012
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk
Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK
MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
SRMs
Friday, August 8, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
Saturday, April 5, 2008
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS
KANSAS
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the
tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
Thursday, November 18, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92
BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS
Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent
application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglas
represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA
provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various
injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation
revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a
computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the
service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was
placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in
restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports
to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska
cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska
ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle
including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow
Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections
of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about
feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for
laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to
the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation
by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE
inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his
reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he
submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year
term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in
restitution.
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1
include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for
specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over
SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in
future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are
completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs
February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602)
525-2681
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD
COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of
Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail
fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel
Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease
relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without
that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at
risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their
continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm
Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government
funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004,
Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from
cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The
Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty
months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous
system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle.
Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per
obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle
Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow
disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the
sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm
Fresh Meats.
Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that
Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted
Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or
caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in
order to steal government moneys.
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified
corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the
extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have
jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its
place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to
effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect,
obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not
subject to payment by the USDA;
(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests
to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not
subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;
(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s
testing laboratory that were false and misleading;
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA
that were false and misleading;
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify,
internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats
was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from
cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to
fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads
prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds
carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud
convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for
the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence,
Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide
appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those
guidelines in determining a sentence.
Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The
investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE
NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #
WE can only hope that this is a single incident. BUT i have my doubts. I
remember when the infamous TOKEN Purina Feed Mill in Texas was feeding up to 5.5
grams of potentially and probably tainted BANNED RUMINANT feed to cattle, and
the FDA was bragging at the time that the amount of potentially BANNED product
was so little and the cattle were so big ;
"It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in
origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no
evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The
potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the
feed were contaminated."
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a
cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a
processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed. ... FDA's
investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into
"meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was
able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by
the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
WE now know all that was a lie. WE know that literally Thousands of TONS of
BANNED and most likely tainted product is still going out to commerce. WE know
now and we knew then that .005 to a gram was lethal. WE know that CWD infected
deer and elk, scrapie infected sheep, BSE and BASE infected cattle have all been
rendered and fed back to livestock (including cattle) for human and animal
consumption.
Paul Brown, known and respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the
CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'',
and this was on March 15, 2006 ;
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National
Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an
expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question
was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one
year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that
initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005
suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul
Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System
... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain
Thursday, November 28, 2013
Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch
Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows
seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our
children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high
risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they
did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a
recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked
the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse),
not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type
disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can
lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE
NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???
Saturday, September 21, 2013
Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry
Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT
DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH
RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ??? this recall was not for the welfare of the animals.
...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)
try this link ;
Sunday, November 13, 2011
*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer
livestock
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves
Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle
Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia
Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1,
Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature
Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821
Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014
Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics
Abstract
Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie
prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human
prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the
capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human
prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to
confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to
that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the
possible link between animal and human prions.
Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
Suspect symptoms
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep
infected with scrapie?
28 Mar 01 Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein
deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of
a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to
BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have
focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in
flocks across Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by
some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French
Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses,
south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who
coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he
now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been
caused by eating infected mutton or lamb...
2001
Suspect symptoms
What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep
infected with scrapie?
28 Mar 01
Like lambs to the slaughter
31 March 2001
by Debora MacKenzie Magazine issue 2284.
FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a
degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary
was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded
an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by
chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of
campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is
caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on
sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across
Europe and North America.
Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight
to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found
that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.
"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by
some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French
Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses,
south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who
coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he
now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been
caused by eating infected mutton or lamb.
Scrapie has been around for centuries and until now there has been no
evidence that it poses a risk to human health. But if the French finding means
that scrapie can cause sCJD in people, countries around the world may have
overlooked a CJD crisis to rival that caused by BSE.
Deslys and colleagues were originally studying vCJD, not sCJD. They
injected the brains of macaque monkeys with brain from BSE cattle, and from
French and British vCJD patients. The brain damage and clinical symptoms in the
monkeys were the same for all three. Mice injected with the original sets of
brain tissue or with infected monkey brain also developed the same
symptoms.
As a control experiment, the team also injected mice with brain tissue from
people and animals with other prion diseases: a French case of sCJD; a French
patient who caught sCJD from human-derived growth hormone; sheep with a French
strain of scrapie; and mice carrying a prion derived from an American scrapie
strain. As expected, they all affected the brain in a different way from BSE and
vCJD. But while the American strain of scrapie caused different damage from
sCJD, the French strain produced exactly the same pathology.
"The main evidence that scrapie does not affect humans has been
epidemiology," says Moira Bruce of the neuropathogenesis unit of the Institute
for Animal Health in Edinburgh, who was a member of the same team as Deslys.
"You see about the same incidence of the disease everywhere, whether or not
there are many sheep, and in countries such as New Zealand with no scrapie." In
the only previous comparisons of sCJD and scrapie in mice, Bruce found they were
dissimilar.
But there are more than 20 strains of scrapie, and six of sCJD. "You would
not necessarily see a relationship between the two with epidemiology if only
some strains affect only some people," says Deslys. Bruce is cautious about the
mouse results, but agrees they require further investigation. Other trials of
scrapie and sCJD in mice, she says, are in progress.
People can have three different genetic variations of the human prion
protein, and each type of protein can fold up two different ways. Kretschmar has
found that these six combinations correspond to six clinical types of sCJD: each
type of normal prion produces a particular pathology when it spontaneously
deforms to produce sCJD.
But if these proteins deform because of infection with a disease-causing
prion, the relationship between pathology and prion type should be different, as
it is in vCJD. "If we look at brain samples from sporadic CJD cases and find
some that do not fit the pattern," says Kretschmar, "that could mean they were
caused by infection."
There are 250 deaths per year from sCJD in the US, and a similar incidence
elsewhere. Singeltary and other US activists think that some of these people
died after eating contaminated meat or "nutritional" pills containing dried
animal brain. Governments will have a hard time facing activists like Singeltary
if it turns out that some sCJD isn't as spontaneous as doctors have
insisted.
Deslys's work on macaques also provides further proof that the human
disease vCJD is caused by BSE. And the experiments showed that vCJD is much more
virulent to primates than BSE, even when injected into the bloodstream rather
than the brain. This, says Deslys, means that there is an even bigger risk than
we thought that vCJD can be passed from one patient to another through
contaminated blood transfusions and surgical instruments.
Friday, January 30, 2015
*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
snip...
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far
classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.
*** Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that
some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type
Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME)
and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
snip...
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
*** Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
*** These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that
could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
Subject: *** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies
diagnosed with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease aka mad cow type
disease
what is CJD ? just ask USDA inc., and the OIE, they are still feeding the
public and the media industry fed junk science that is 30 years old.
why doesn’t some of you try reading the facts, instead of rubber stamping
everything the USDA inc says.
sporadic CJD has now been linked to BSE aka mad cow disease, Scrapie, and
there is much concern now for CWD and risk factor for humans.
My sincere condolences to the family and friends of the House Speaker Becky
Lockhart. I am deeply saddened hear this.
with that said, with great respect, I must ask each and every one of you
Politicians that are so deeply saddened to hear of this needless death of the
Honorable House Speaker Becky Lockhart, really, cry me a friggen river. I am
seriously going to ask you all this...I have been diplomatic for about 17 years
and it has got no where. people are still dying. so, are you all stupid or
what??? how many more need to die ??? how much is global trade of beef and other
meat products that are not tested for the TSE prion disease, how much and how
many bodies is this market worth?
Saturday, January 17, 2015
*** Becky Lockhart 46, Utah’s first female House speaker, dies diagnosed
with the extremely rare Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Thursday, January 15, 2015
41-year-old Navy Commander with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease CJD TSE
Prion: Case Report
Wednesday, December 31, 2014
NASDA BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE, PRION, Policy Statements updated with
amendments passed during the NASDA Annual Meeting Updated September 18, 2014
Sunday, December 28, 2014
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE AKA MAD DEER DISIEASE USDA
USAHA INC DECEMBER 28, 2014
*** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE nvCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC ***
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European
the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed
investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to
European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The
specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is less clear
largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where
other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.
Sunday, December 14, 2014
ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14,
2001 JAMA
snip...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
