The Federal Government Is Unprepared for a Large-Scale Animal Disease
Outbreak
By Eric Katz May 28, 2015 Leave a comment
RELATED Agriculture Department Identifies $1.4 Billion in Savings to Avoid
Furloughs May 28, 2015
Federal agencies do not have enough veterinarians to respond to a major
crisis, according to a new report, nor do they know how many animal physicians
they would need in such an event.
The Government Accountability Office said agencies are not adequately
monitoring and developing their animal doctors. In addition to their normal
responsibilities, the vets would play a critical role in responding to a
widespread viral outbreak.
Most veterinarians in the federal government work at the Agriculture
Department, where they maintain the health of American livestock and oversee the
humane treatment of animals during slaughter, and at the Health and Human
Services Department, where they conduct research related to animal and human
disease. Since 2009, in response to GAO-determined shortcomings, the departments
have attempted to boost their veterinarian workforce planning efforts.
Despite those steps, and efforts by the Office of Personnel Management and
Congress, GAO said the veterinarian workforce “remains high risk.” The auditors
said HHS and USDA must do a better job determining and addressing skill gaps and
addressing other human capital needs. They also said OPM should give agencies
direct-hire authority when a “critical need” for animal physicians arises.
USDA has done a better job of making improvements than HHS, GAO found.
Still, Agriculture has no plans for how it will augment its workforce to
“respond to a large-scale emergency.” If, for example, there were an outbreak of
the highly contagious foot-in-mouth disease, or the highly infectious Newcastle
disease, USDA would not be well positioned to respond, GAO said.
The department has made some estimates to determine its needs in such an
emergency, but GAO said they are not reliable. Its current workforce, the
auditors added, is only capable of handling a routine workload.
USDA agreed “more could be done” to improve its emergency-response
preparation, while OPM said it would evaluate the need for direct-hire authority
for veterinarians.
(Image via Eugene Chernetsov / Shutterstock.com)
GAO FEDERAL VETERINARIANS Efforts Needed to Improve Workforce Planning
May 2015
FEDERAL VETERINARIANS
Efforts Needed to Improve Workforce Planning
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken actions to ensure that
component agencies include veterinarians in workforce planning efforts for
meeting routine needs, but the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has
not done so. GAO has identified top leadership involvement as a key principle
for workforce planning. For example, USDA provided guidance to its component
agencies to assess and develop strategies for its workforce. In accordance with
this guidance, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)—the agency that
inspects slaughter plants—developed a workforce plan that included recruitment
incentives and other strategies for veterinarians. HHS’s Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) also included veterinarians in its workforce plans, but HHS
did not provide guidance or direction to FDA or other component agencies to do
so. GAO recommended in 2009 that USDA and HHS conduct department-wide
assessments of their veterinarian workforces. The efforts of USDA and its
component agencies met the intent of the recommendation. GAO believes that the
recommendation to HHS is still valid. Direction and guidance from HHS could help
integrate its component agencies’ workforce planning efforts for veterinarians
into a department-wide assessment.
USDA participated in a government-wide study to estimate the veterinarians
needed to respond to animal disease outbreaks, but because of limitations in the
study, the estimates are not reliable for purposes of effective emergency
response planning. For example, the estimates were based on a USDA model that
had not been verified or validated. Moreover, USDA has not developed a detailed
plan to augment or train its workforce to respond to an economically devastating
or highly contagious outbreak. Without reliable estimates of the veterinarians
needed or how it will augment and train its workforce, USDA cannot ensure it
will have enough veterinarians to adequately respond.
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and other federal agencies have
taken steps toward achieving the goals outlined in OPM’s government-wide
strategic plan for the veterinarian workforce, primarily through an interagency
group OPM created. However, in each of the three goals, the interagency group
did not follow through on next steps and made limited progress. For example, to
improve recruiting, OPM granted government-wide direct-hire authority in 2009 to
enable agencies to hire qualified veterinarians without regard to certain
federal hiring requirements. However, OPM did not follow through on plans to
review agencies’ use of the authority. As a result, OPM cannot determine the
overall impact on recruitment or whether the authority should continue or be
modified. Monitoring and evaluating progress toward human capital goals is among
the key principles GAO has identified for effective strategic workforce
planning. According to OPM officials, the group did not consistently monitor
progress toward goals in part because it did not have sufficient leadership
support from participating agencies. OPM and group members, including USDA and
HHS, recognize a need for a higher level of leadership but have not identified
officials to serve in this capacity. Obtaining leadership support—including from
USDA and HHS, the major federal employers of civilian veterinarians—and
monitoring and evaluating progress could help emphasize the importance of
completing work under these goals and better position OPM to ensure progress or
take appropriate actions if progress is limited.
United States Government Accountability Office
Why GAO Did This Study
USDA and HHS veterinarians perform crucial work for public and animal
health and for emergency response to an economically devastating or highly
contagious animal disease—where USDA has a lead role. In 2009, USDA and HHS
committed to department-wide efforts to address veterinarian workforce
challenges, such as recruitment. In 2010, OPM issued a strategic plan for
federal veterinarians to help improve recruiting initiatives and emergency
response plans. GAO was asked to review workforce planning for federal
veterinarians. This report examines (1) department-wide efforts USDA and HHS
have made for their routine veterinarian workforces, (2) the extent to which
USDA has identified the veterinarians needed for emergency response to an animal
disease outbreak, and (3) the steps OPM and other federal agencies have taken to
achieve the goals of the government-wide strategic plan for the veterinarian
workforce. GAO reviewed USDA, HHS, and government-wide workforce plans and
interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that USDA assess and addressveterinarian
workforce needs for emergency response to an animal disease outbreak, and that
OPM review agencies’ use of direct-hire authority for veterinarians and monitor
and evaluate progress and obtain leadership support for achieving
government-wide veterinary workforce goals. USDA partially agreed, noting that
it has taken steps to assess its emergency needs. GAO believes the
recommendation remains valid. OPM agreed with both recommendations.
View GAO-15-495. For more information, contact John Neumann at (202)
512-3841 or neumannj@gao.gov.
USDA, APHIS, FSIS, HHS, ET AL, on animal disease preparedness grade score =
F+.
With Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE prion disease aka mad cow
disease, one mad cow caused total chaos, and to this day, the USA is not, and
has never been prepared.
all one has to do is look at mad cow disease, something these agencies
can’t even say now, but look at that blunder, Larry, Curly, and Moe could have
done a better job.
but that’s what happens when you let the wolf guard the henhouse. industry
governing and regulating itself will never work, especially when all they do is
ignore sound science, for the sake of the industry.
I know that there are a lot of very dedicated folks working for these
federal agencies, and I do applaud them, and I probably have not said that
enough. but, when you have the industry and their lobbyist infiltrated in policy
and decision making for human and animal health, over riding any sound decisions
based on sound science, there lay the problem, and nothing will get fixed as
long as this continues to happen.
ANOTHER CONCERN OF MINE HAS BEEN BIOTERRORISM. please see why ;
Air Traffic passengers, hidden meat products, and mad cow type disease BSE
TSE Prion ;
Docket No: 02-088-1 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins
Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of
2002;
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 –0600
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: regulations@aphis.usda.gov Docket No: 02-088-1
Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use,
and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins
Greetings,
i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for
biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known
BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA. please be
warned;
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 –0800
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding
system)
MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to
Foot-and-Mouth [Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]
snip...
Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine,
including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or
animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance
with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.
snip...
From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no
impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the
proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the
importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from
those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform
encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants
and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been
in Greece is prohibited.
snip...
========================
What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the
country?
Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were
imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to
the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from
ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece
during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and
prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use
were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product. Sources: World
Trade Atlas
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country? Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived
to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from
Greece arrived via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine
inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of
agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could
potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE;
most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although
one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida,
Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers.
None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a
ranch or farm while in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and
APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
Greetings list members, i just cannot accept this;
> 23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)
> The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
> products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
what kind of statement is this?
how stupid do they think we are?
it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Slovenia?
There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.
APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air
passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could
potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to
Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or
ranch in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the
Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers
originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights. As
part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air
passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural
interest in fiscal year 2000.
Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items
that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items
reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Source: US
Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection
data base
What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from
Austria? Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat,
animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified
species. Source: World Trade Atlas
snip...
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Austria?
A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US
airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria
arrived in the US via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural
quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled
for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat
(non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE.
None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to
visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US. Source: US Dept.
of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ
Greetings FDA and public,
if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check
out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low
number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much
for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.
[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air
passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal
year 2001.
Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat
items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these
passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work
on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]
if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers
with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i
am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers
as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid
me.
[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was
imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS
is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]
more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of
these species are capable of carrying a TSE?
snip...
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from
Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived
in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural
quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled
for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001.
Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat
items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these
passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work
on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural
Quarantine Inspection data base.
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
Japan?
Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan
arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers
from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture
quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for
items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.
Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could
potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an
average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items
were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their
visit to the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from
the affected country?
A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from
Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in
Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring,
8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural
interest.
Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of
items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the
passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while
in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE,
FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY. Source: US Department of Transportation, and
APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;
more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';
To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM
POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again
References: <3dc198e3 .8090704="" wt.net=""> Content-Type: text/plain;
charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean
Greetings again List Members, let me kick a madcow around here a bit.
on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding
system. the USDA/APHIS states;
> During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from
> Poland included non-species specific animal products
> used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal
> products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product
> imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant
> material.
NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially
_cross-contamination_, it states;
ANNEX 1 Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001
EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND
STABILITY
The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable
system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from
1987 onwards. This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system
and increased over time. The continuing very high external challenge supported
this development. Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK
Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence
provided on compliance. Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in
cattle feed. BSE surveillance: Not sufficient before 2001. Cross-contamination:
Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time
and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.
see full text and ANNEX 1 at;
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of
Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98
FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY
Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO DOCKET
2003N-0312]
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net]
Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 1:03 PM
To: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov
Cc: ggraber@cvm.fda.gov; Linda.Grassie@fda.gov; BSE-L
Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION
TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]
Greetings FDA,
my name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr., i lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain
Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease).
i would kindly like to comment on the proposed HACCP method of detecting
and or preventing TSEs in the human/animal feed supply.
it seems to me by implementing something that was designed for Astronauts
instead of cattle, something that the GAO has already stated is terribly flawed
(HACCP), i find it very disturbing to continue to insist on refusing to use
rapid TSE TESTING in sufficient numbers to find TSEs, as with other Countries
that they too once thought they were BSE free. for example, it took Italy 1
MILLION rapid TSE tests since 2001 to find 102 cases of BSE. THE USA has only
tested 48,000 cattle in the 14 years of surveillance. there is documented proof
that indeed the USA cattle have been infected with a TSE for decades, but the
FDA/USDA and other USA Gov. agencies continue to conveniently ignore these
findings. YOU must not ignore what Richard Marsh found. Plus, you must not
ignore Asante/Collinge new findings that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine
genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type
2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD. The USA has been feeding ruminant
by-products back to cattle, deer, elk and sheep for decades, and TSEs in these
species have been recycled for feed for decades in the USA. The rendering
process here in the USA will not kill this agent. to implement any HACCP over
massive rapid TSE testing is only prolonging the inevitable, and will only allow
the agent to spread further. it is simply a band-aid approach to something that
needs a tourniquet...
3. Meat and Poultry: Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety
Rules Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses. GAO-02-902, August
30.
FSIS Is Not Ensuring that Plants' HACCP Plans Meet Regulatory
Requirements
snip...
According to FSIS's food safety systems correlation reviews, inspectors are
not consistently identifying and documenting failures of plants' HACCP plans to
meet regulatory requirements. Furthermore, FSIS does not expect its inspectors
to determine whether HACCP plans are based on sound science--the cornerstone of
an effective plan. While in-depth verification reviews examine the scientific
aspects of HACCP plans, they have been conducted in very few plants, and
consumer safety officers hired to review the scientific soundness of HACCP plans
may take several years to assess the plans at all plants. Moreover, inspectors
in 55 percent of the 5,000 plants nationwide did not document any HACCP
violations during fiscal year 2001. When we brought this information to the
attention of FSIS officials, they were surprised that so many plants had no
HACCP violations for an entire year.
snip...
2. USDA believes that the title of the report is misleading. We disagree.
We believe the title accurately reflects the concerns detailed throughout the
body of the report.
snip...
FDA acknowledges that it has not yet identified and inspected all firms
subject to the ban” pg. 3 ;
The report concludes that “federal actions do not sufficiently ensure that
all BSE-infected animals or products are kept out or that if BSE were found it
would be detected promptly and not spread to other cattle through animal feed or
enter the human food chain” italics added pg. 3 ;
***********2015*********
THE last documented mad cow in the USA was in California, was an Atypical
BSE BASE TSE prion aka mad cow type disease, the most lethal strain documented
to date, and of which has now been linked to sporadic CJD. we have not heard
much about BSE aka mad cow disease, due to the Governments covering up mad cow
disease. all one as to do is look at the BSE MRR, which is a doctrine for the
legal trading of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease
around the globe. you can thank the OIE, USDA, WTO, just to name a few off the
top of my head. it's all about trade folks, nothing else matters, when it comes
to the TSE prion disease, due to the long incubation period, and no trace back
efforts, even though that once clinical, all of the tse prion disease are fatal.
then the federal governments continue to ignore more updated and ongoing sound
science, peer review science, that indeed sporadic cjd is linked to not only
atypical BSE mad cow disease, but also to atypical scrapie i.e the Nor-98 and
typical scrapie as well. or the fact that the 1997 ruminant feed ban aka mad cow
feed ban was and still is a terrible failure. but they don’t print that. ...just
saying. now, you think I am crazy for saying this....now think back to asbestos
and tobacco, and how those two man made killers were covered up for 100 years as
cancer causing and killers, by our fine federal friends. for your fileS, use as
you wish, but it’s the truth as I have come to know it from daily research of
all said science, since my mothers demise to the heidenhain variant of
creutzfeldt jakob disease i.e. hvcjd. ...just made a promise to mom, never
forget, and never let them forget. ...kind regards, terry
Thursday, May 28, 2015
OIE cuts six European countries' mad cow risk level, while increasing risk
factors for humans to the BSE TSE PRION DISEASE around the globe
Wednesday, May 27, 2015
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation
spontaneous atypical BSE ???
don’t let anyone fool you. spontaneous TSE prion disease is a hoax in
natural cases, never proven.
all one has to do is look at France. France is having one hell of an
epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem
solved $$$ same as the USA, that’s why they stopped testing for BSE mad cow
disease in numbers they could find any with, after those atypical BSE cases
started showing up. shut down the testing to numbers set up by OIE that are so
low, you could only by accident find a case of BSE aka mad cow disease. and this
brilliant idea by the WHO et al, to change the name of mad cow disease, thinking
that might change things is preposterous. it’s all about money now folks, when
the OIE, USDA and everyone else went along and made the TSE prion disease aka
mad cow type disease a legal trading commodity by the BSE MRR policy, I would
say everyone bit off more then they can chew, and they will just have to digest
those TSE Prions coming from North America, and like it, and just prey you don’t
get a mad cow type disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE
prion disease in the decades to come, and or pass it to some other poor soul via
the iatrogenic medical surgical tissue friendly fire mode of transmission i.e.
second hand transmission. it’s real folks, just not documented much, due to lack
of trace back efforts. all iatrogenic cjd is, is sporadic cjd, until the
iatrogenic event is tracked down and documented, and put into the academic and
public domain, which very seldom happens. ...
As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been
reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.
FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many
spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$
so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases
in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+
cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with
any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
snip...see link ;
Saturday, May 09, 2015
Expression of genes involved in the T cell signalling pathway in
circulating immune cells of cattle 24 months following oral challenge with
Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE)
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip...
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation
(21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin)
from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With
regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may
not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered
at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the
animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a
requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD
eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to
slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive
animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from
the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES.
It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin
processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible
risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk
protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data
on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these
products.
snip...
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of
deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of
Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).
The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and
behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition,
signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a
fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an
altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids
experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB,
for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate
if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the
human food-chain via affected venison.
snip...
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and
can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip...
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil
and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a
bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are
present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with
CWD prion.
snip...
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving
between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling
to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing,
footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible.
For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the
increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant
uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip...
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher
probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer
given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists
and returning GB residents.
snip...
NEW URL LINK ;
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
***
Sunday, December 15, 2013
*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Friday, May 22, 2015
Chronic Wasting Disease and Program Updates - 2014 NEUSAHA Annual Meeting
12-14 May 2014
Friday, May 15, 2015
Grass Plants Bind, Retain, Uptake, and Transport Infectious Prions
Report
Thursday, April 30, 2015
Immediate and ongoing detection of prions in the blood of hamsters and deer
following oral, nasal, or blood inoculations
Wednesday, April 22, 2015
Circulation of prions within dust on a scrapie affected farm
Friday, April 24, 2015
The placenta shed from goats with classical scrapie is infectious to goat
kids and lambs
Saturday, March 15, 2014
Potential role of soil properties in the spread of CWD in western Canada
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
*** Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves
Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle
Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia
Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1,
Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature
Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821
Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014
Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics
Abstract
Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie
prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human
prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the
capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human
prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to
confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie
prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to
that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in
these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to
those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that
scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the
possible link between animal and human prions.
Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Scrapie from sheep could infect humans with 'mad cow disease', study finds
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
Sunday, March 29, 2015
Uncommon prion disease induced in macaque ten years after scrapie
inoculation
Friday, January 30, 2015
*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***
Friday, February 20, 2015
APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays
2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease
Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015
PRION2015 CONFERENCE FORT COLLINS
May 2015
Wednesday May 27
14:45 Jean-Phillipe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission, France,
Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation
periods: *** IMPLICATIONS FOR BSE AND SCRAPIE RISK ASSESSMENT IN HUMAN
POPULATIONS.
16:45
Quingzhong Kong Case Western Reserve University
***Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions
Sunday, May 3, 2015
PRION2015 FORT COLLINS
Sunday, April 12, 2015
*** Research Project: Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 2014 Annual Report ***
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2015/04/research-project-transmission.html
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
*** COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING COOL H.R. 2393 Agriculture Chairman K.
Michael Conaway (R-TX) Fears of US imports infected with mad cow disease is
emerging as an issue in trans-Pacific trade talks
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
*** Minimise transmission risk of CJD and vCJD in healthcare settings Last
updated 15 May 2015 ***
Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential
Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease
Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3,
2014
Singeltary comment ;
Comment from Terry Singeltary This is a Comment on the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) Notice: Draft Guidance for Industry on Ensuring Safety of
Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm; Availability
For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Show agency attachment(s) Attachments View All (0)
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Comment View document:
WI
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
*** See attached file(s) No documents available. Attachments View All (1)
Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm
Terry Singeltary Comment View Attachment:
Sunday, April 5, 2015
*** Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed
On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 ***
Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed
On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 Singeltary Comment
Greetings FDA et al,
I wish to comment on Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed
Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180.
Once again, I wish to kindly bring up the failed attempt of the FDA and the
ruminant to ruminant mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997. This feed ban is still
failing today, as we speak. Even more worrisome, is the fact it is still legal
to feed cervids to cervids in the USA, in fact, the FDA only _recommends_ that
deer and elk considered to be of _high_ risk for CWD do not enter the animal
food chain, but there is NO law, its only voluntary, a recipe for a TSE prion
disaster, as we have seen with the ruminant to ruminant feed ban for cattle,
where in 2007, one decade post August 1997 mad cow feed ban, where in 2007
10,000,000 POUNDS OF BANNED BLOOD LACED MEAT AND BONE MEAL WHEN OUT INTO
COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. Since 2007, these BSE feed ban rules have been breached
time and time again. tons and tons of mad cow feed went out in Alabama as well,
where one of the mad cows were documented, just the year before in 2006, and in
2013 and 2014, breaches so bad (OAI) Official Action Indicated were issued.
those are like the one issued where 10 million pounds of banned blood laced meat
and bone meal were fed out.
What is the use of having a Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal
Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180, if it cannot be
enforced, as we have seen with a mandatory ruminant to ruminant feed ban?
I strenuously once again urge the FDA and its industry constituents, to
make it MANDATORY that all ruminant feed be banned to all ruminants, and this
should include all cervids as soon as possible for the following
reasons...
======
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administrations BSE Feed Regulation (21
CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from
deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to
feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used
for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high
risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed
system.
***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.
======
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***
31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT
19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
2013
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
DOCKET-- 03D-0186 -- FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer
and Elk in Animal Feed; Availability Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:47:37 0500 EMC 1
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol #: 1
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT SUBMISSION ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
*** See attached file(s) No documents available. Attachments View All (1)
Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm
Terry Singeltary Comment View Attachment:
Sunday, April 5, 2015
*** Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed
On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 ***
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of
Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
This is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
Notice: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and
Approvals: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal
Products
For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Comment View document:Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
;
I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from
the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA
and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is
any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just
saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present
mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?
North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species
(excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and
or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented
evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine
spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just
not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid
CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type
BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to
date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical
Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different
strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow
case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC.
typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al),
and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical
Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid
populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk
assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to
trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day
December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats
the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries
throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated
to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the
OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion
disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type
disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about
money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating
disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure,
sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion
disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its
all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the
infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$
the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing
but ink on paper.
for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and
that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE
GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all
TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk
assessments be made stronger than before.
lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to
America.
Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest
year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases
dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to
date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad
cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the
number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the
USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in
2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD
COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in
my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow
disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE
mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.
Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in
farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)
Country/Year
snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA
triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease.
...TSS
No documents available. AttachmentsView All (1) Empty Docket No.
APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and
Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of
Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission
Tuesday, February 17, 2015
*** Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President ***
we just can’t learn from our past mistakes, and thanks to the OIE, USDA,
WTO et al, we are now back to square one, thanks to the BSE MRR policy, the
legal trading of all strains of the TSE prion aka mad cow type agent.
sometimes, you just can’t fix stupid. ...just saying...tss
UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD
OTHERS BEEF AND VEAL
LIVE CATTLE http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075059/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf
EMBRYOS http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075116/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab03.pdf
GELATIN ETC http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075315/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab02.pdf
SEMEN http://web.archive.org/web/20060517075135/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11g/tab04.pdf
Thursday, May 28, 2015
*** OIE cuts six European countries' mad cow risk level, while increasing
risk factors for humans to the BSE TSE PRION DISEASE around the globe
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
Minimise transmission risk of CJD and vCJD in healthcare settings Last
updated 15 May 2015
Saturday, May 09, 2015
Psychiatric Symptoms in Patients With Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease
WHO issues best practices for naming new human infectious diseases Note
for the media
8 May 2015 | GENEVA - WHO today called on scientists, national authorities
and the media to follow best practices in naming new human infectious diseases
to minimize unnecessary negative effects on nations, economies and people.
Terms that should be avoided in disease names include geographic locations
(e.g. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, Spanish Flu, Rift Valley fever),
people’s names (e.g. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Chagas disease), species of
animal or food (e.g. swine flu, bird flu, monkey pox), cultural, population,
industry or occupational references (e.g. legionnaires), and terms that incite
undue fear (e.g. unknown, fatal, epidemic).
Greetings WHO,
I kindly submit the following, and I will continue to call it what it is,
aka mad cow disease, and not only linked to the bovine and nvCJD to humans. mad
cow disease has now been linked to sporadic cjd, and scrapie has now been linked
to sporadic cjd, with great concern for chronic wasting disease in cerevids i.e.
cwd. or just call it what it is, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE
Prion disease. but I will call it for what it is, mad cow type disease, simply
because of what the stigma brings, and as long as USDA INC are still feeding
cows to cows, the OIE, and WHO continues to disregard the safety of humans there
from mad cow type disease, through the continued denial and blatant disregard
for the science to date, I refuse to play the game of denial. it is what it is,
and trying to protect the industries involved, by changing the name, it will NOT
stop the disease, only help the industry from the stigma. it is what it is, the
mad cow has been out of the barn, and there is no putting it back now. it is
what it is $$$...
kindest regards, terry
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14,
2001 JAMA
snip...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net
