Friday, May 29, 2015

US Federal Government Is Unprepared for a Large-Scale Animal Disease Outbreak

The Federal Government Is Unprepared for a Large-Scale Animal Disease Outbreak

 

By Eric Katz May 28, 2015 Leave a comment

 

 RELATED Agriculture Department Identifies $1.4 Billion in Savings to Avoid Furloughs May 28, 2015

 

Federal agencies do not have enough veterinarians to respond to a major crisis, according to a new report, nor do they know how many animal physicians they would need in such an event.

 

The Government Accountability Office said agencies are not adequately monitoring and developing their animal doctors. In addition to their normal responsibilities, the vets would play a critical role in responding to a widespread viral outbreak.

 

Most veterinarians in the federal government work at the Agriculture Department, where they maintain the health of American livestock and oversee the humane treatment of animals during slaughter, and at the Health and Human Services Department, where they conduct research related to animal and human disease. Since 2009, in response to GAO-determined shortcomings, the departments have attempted to boost their veterinarian workforce planning efforts.

 

Despite those steps, and efforts by the Office of Personnel Management and Congress, GAO said the veterinarian workforce “remains high risk.” The auditors said HHS and USDA must do a better job determining and addressing skill gaps and addressing other human capital needs. They also said OPM should give agencies direct-hire authority when a “critical need” for animal physicians arises.

 

USDA has done a better job of making improvements than HHS, GAO found. Still, Agriculture has no plans for how it will augment its workforce to “respond to a large-scale emergency.” If, for example, there were an outbreak of the highly contagious foot-in-mouth disease, or the highly infectious Newcastle disease, USDA would not be well positioned to respond, GAO said.

 

The department has made some estimates to determine its needs in such an emergency, but GAO said they are not reliable. Its current workforce, the auditors added, is only capable of handling a routine workload.

 

USDA agreed “more could be done” to improve its emergency-response preparation, while OPM said it would evaluate the need for direct-hire authority for veterinarians.

 

(Image via Eugene Chernetsov / Shutterstock.com)

 


 

GAO FEDERAL VETERINARIANS Efforts Needed to Improve Workforce Planning

 

 May 2015

 

FEDERAL VETERINARIANS

 

Efforts Needed to Improve Workforce Planning

 

What GAO Found

 

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken actions to ensure that component agencies include veterinarians in workforce planning efforts for meeting routine needs, but the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has not done so. GAO has identified top leadership involvement as a key principle for workforce planning. For example, USDA provided guidance to its component agencies to assess and develop strategies for its workforce. In accordance with this guidance, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)—the agency that inspects slaughter plants—developed a workforce plan that included recruitment incentives and other strategies for veterinarians. HHS’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also included veterinarians in its workforce plans, but HHS did not provide guidance or direction to FDA or other component agencies to do so. GAO recommended in 2009 that USDA and HHS conduct department-wide assessments of their veterinarian workforces. The efforts of USDA and its component agencies met the intent of the recommendation. GAO believes that the recommendation to HHS is still valid. Direction and guidance from HHS could help integrate its component agencies’ workforce planning efforts for veterinarians into a department-wide assessment.

 

USDA participated in a government-wide study to estimate the veterinarians needed to respond to animal disease outbreaks, but because of limitations in the study, the estimates are not reliable for purposes of effective emergency response planning. For example, the estimates were based on a USDA model that had not been verified or validated. Moreover, USDA has not developed a detailed plan to augment or train its workforce to respond to an economically devastating or highly contagious outbreak. Without reliable estimates of the veterinarians needed or how it will augment and train its workforce, USDA cannot ensure it will have enough veterinarians to adequately respond.

 

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and other federal agencies have taken steps toward achieving the goals outlined in OPM’s government-wide strategic plan for the veterinarian workforce, primarily through an interagency group OPM created. However, in each of the three goals, the interagency group did not follow through on next steps and made limited progress. For example, to improve recruiting, OPM granted government-wide direct-hire authority in 2009 to enable agencies to hire qualified veterinarians without regard to certain federal hiring requirements. However, OPM did not follow through on plans to review agencies’ use of the authority. As a result, OPM cannot determine the overall impact on recruitment or whether the authority should continue or be modified. Monitoring and evaluating progress toward human capital goals is among the key principles GAO has identified for effective strategic workforce planning. According to OPM officials, the group did not consistently monitor progress toward goals in part because it did not have sufficient leadership support from participating agencies. OPM and group members, including USDA and HHS, recognize a need for a higher level of leadership but have not identified officials to serve in this capacity. Obtaining leadership support—including from USDA and HHS, the major federal employers of civilian veterinarians—and monitoring and evaluating progress could help emphasize the importance of completing work under these goals and better position OPM to ensure progress or take appropriate actions if progress is limited.

 

United States Government Accountability Office

 

Why GAO Did This Study

 

USDA and HHS veterinarians perform crucial work for public and animal health and for emergency response to an economically devastating or highly contagious animal disease—where USDA has a lead role. In 2009, USDA and HHS committed to department-wide efforts to address veterinarian workforce challenges, such as recruitment. In 2010, OPM issued a strategic plan for federal veterinarians to help improve recruiting initiatives and emergency response plans. GAO was asked to review workforce planning for federal veterinarians. This report examines (1) department-wide efforts USDA and HHS have made for their routine veterinarian workforces, (2) the extent to which USDA has identified the veterinarians needed for emergency response to an animal disease outbreak, and (3) the steps OPM and other federal agencies have taken to achieve the goals of the government-wide strategic plan for the veterinarian workforce. GAO reviewed USDA, HHS, and government-wide workforce plans and interviewed relevant officials.

 

What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that USDA assess and addressveterinarian workforce needs for emergency response to an animal disease outbreak, and that OPM review agencies’ use of direct-hire authority for veterinarians and monitor and evaluate progress and obtain leadership support for achieving government-wide veterinary workforce goals. USDA partially agreed, noting that it has taken steps to assess its emergency needs. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid. OPM agreed with both recommendations.

 

View GAO-15-495. For more information, contact John Neumann at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao.gov.

 


 

USDA, APHIS, FSIS, HHS, ET AL, on animal disease preparedness grade score = F+.

 

With Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE prion disease aka mad cow disease, one mad cow caused total chaos, and to this day, the USA is not, and has never been prepared.

 

all one has to do is look at mad cow disease, something these agencies can’t even say now, but look at that blunder, Larry, Curly, and Moe could have done a better job.

 

but that’s what happens when you let the wolf guard the henhouse. industry governing and regulating itself will never work, especially when all they do is ignore sound science, for the sake of the industry.

 

I know that there are a lot of very dedicated folks working for these federal agencies, and I do applaud them, and I probably have not said that enough. but, when you have the industry and their lobbyist infiltrated in policy and decision making for human and animal health, over riding any sound decisions based on sound science,  there lay the problem, and nothing will get fixed as long as this continues to happen.

 

ANOTHER CONCERN OF MINE HAS BEEN BIOTERRORISM. please see why ;

 

Air Traffic passengers, hidden meat products, and mad cow type disease BSE TSE Prion ;

 

Docket No: 02-088-1 Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins

 

Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;

 

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 –0600

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

To: regulations@aphis.usda.gov Docket No: 02-088-1

 

Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins

 


 

Greetings,

 

i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA. please be warned;

 

Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 –0800

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system)

 

MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth [Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]

 

snip...

 

Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine, including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.

 

snip...

 

From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been in Greece is prohibited.

 

snip...

 


 

========================

 

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the country?

 

Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product. Sources: World Trade Atlas

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country? Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.

 

Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE;

 

most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

Greetings list members, i just cannot accept this;

 

> 23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)

 

> The data do not provide a species of origin code for these

 

> products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

 

what kind of statement is this?

 

how stupid do they think we are?

 

it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Slovenia?

 

There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000. APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or ranch in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

 

A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights. As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.

 

Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from Austria? Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat, animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified species. Source: World Trade Atlas

 

snip...

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Austria?

 

A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria arrived in the US via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.

 

Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US. Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ

 


 

Greetings FDA and public,

 

if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.

 

[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001.

 

Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]

 

if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me.

 

[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]

 

more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of these species are capable of carrying a TSE?

 

snip...

 

A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001.

 

Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.

 


 

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.

 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Japan?

 

Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights. Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000.

 

Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

 

A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural interest.

 

Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE, FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY. Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

 


 

search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;

 


 

more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';

 

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again

 

References: <3dc198e3 .8090704="" wt.net=""> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean

 

Greetings again List Members, let me kick a madcow around here a bit.

 

on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding system. the USDA/APHIS states;

 

> During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from

 

> Poland included non-species specific animal products

 

> used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal

 

> products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product

 

> imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant

 

> material.

 

NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially _cross-contamination_, it states;

 

ANNEX 1 Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001

 

EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND STABILITY

 

The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from 1987 onwards. This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and increased over time. The continuing very high external challenge supported this development. Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence provided on compliance. Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed. BSE surveillance: Not sufficient before 2001. Cross-contamination: Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.

 

see full text and ANNEX 1 at;

 


 


 

Sunday, January 11, 2015

 

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

 


 


 

Owens, Julie

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

 

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM

 

To: FSIS RegulationsComments

 

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98

 


 

FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY

 


 

 Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net]

 

Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 1:03 PM

 

To: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov

 

Cc: ggraber@cvm.fda.gov; Linda.Grassie@fda.gov; BSE-L

 

 Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]

 

 Greetings FDA,

 

my name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr., i lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease).

 

i would kindly like to comment on the proposed HACCP method of detecting and or preventing TSEs in the human/animal feed supply.

 

it seems to me by implementing something that was designed for Astronauts instead of cattle, something that the GAO has already stated is terribly flawed (HACCP), i find it very disturbing to continue to insist on refusing to use rapid TSE TESTING in sufficient numbers to find TSEs, as with other Countries that they too once thought they were BSE free. for example, it took Italy 1 MILLION rapid TSE tests since 2001 to find 102 cases of BSE. THE USA has only tested 48,000 cattle in the 14 years of surveillance. there is documented proof that indeed the USA cattle have been infected with a TSE for decades, but the FDA/USDA and other USA Gov. agencies continue to conveniently ignore these findings. YOU must not ignore what Richard Marsh found. Plus, you must not ignore Asante/Collinge new findings that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest _sporadic_ CJD. The USA has been feeding ruminant by-products back to cattle, deer, elk and sheep for decades, and TSEs in these species have been recycled for feed for decades in the USA. The rendering process here in the USA will not kill this agent. to implement any HACCP over massive rapid TSE testing is only prolonging the inevitable, and will only allow the agent to spread further. it is simply a band-aid approach to something that needs a tourniquet...

 

3. Meat and Poultry: Better USDA Oversight and Enforcement of Safety

 

Rules Needed to Reduce Risk of Foodborne Illnesses. GAO-02-902, August 30.

 

FSIS Is Not Ensuring that Plants' HACCP Plans Meet Regulatory Requirements

 

snip...

 

According to FSIS's food safety systems correlation reviews, inspectors are not consistently identifying and documenting failures of plants' HACCP plans to meet regulatory requirements. Furthermore, FSIS does not expect its inspectors to determine whether HACCP plans are based on sound science--the cornerstone of an effective plan. While in-depth verification reviews examine the scientific aspects of HACCP plans, they have been conducted in very few plants, and consumer safety officers hired to review the scientific soundness of HACCP plans may take several years to assess the plans at all plants. Moreover, inspectors in 55 percent of the 5,000 plants nationwide did not document any HACCP violations during fiscal year 2001. When we brought this information to the attention of FSIS officials, they were surprised that so many plants had no HACCP violations for an entire year.

 

snip...

 

2. USDA believes that the title of the report is misleading. We disagree. We believe the title accurately reflects the concerns detailed throughout the body of the report.

 

snip...

 


 


 

FDA acknowledges that it has not yet identified and inspected all firms subject to the ban” pg. 3 ;

 


 

The report concludes that “federal actions do not sufficiently ensure that all BSE-infected animals or products are kept out or that if BSE were found it would be detected promptly and not spread to other cattle through animal feed or enter the human food chain” italics added pg. 3 ;

 


 

***********2015*********

 

THE last documented mad cow in the USA was in California, was an Atypical BSE BASE TSE prion aka mad cow type disease, the most lethal strain documented to date, and of which has now been linked to sporadic CJD. we have not heard much about BSE aka mad cow disease, due to the Governments covering up mad cow disease. all one as to do is look at the BSE MRR, which is a doctrine for the legal trading of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease around the globe. you can thank the OIE, USDA, WTO, just to name a few off the top of my head. it's all about trade folks, nothing else matters, when it comes to the TSE prion disease, due to the long incubation period, and no trace back efforts, even though that once clinical, all of the tse prion disease are fatal. then the federal governments continue to ignore more updated and ongoing sound science, peer review science, that indeed sporadic cjd is linked to not only atypical BSE mad cow disease, but also to atypical scrapie i.e the Nor-98 and typical scrapie as well. or the fact that the 1997 ruminant feed ban aka mad cow feed ban was and still is a terrible failure. but they don’t print that. ...just saying. now, you think I am crazy for saying this....now think back to asbestos and tobacco, and how those two man made killers were covered up for 100 years as cancer causing and killers, by our fine federal friends. for your fileS, use as you wish, but it’s the truth as I have come to know it from daily research of all said science, since my mothers demise to the heidenhain variant of creutzfeldt jakob disease i.e. hvcjd. ...just made a promise to mom, never forget, and never let them forget. ...kind regards, terry

 

 Thursday, May 28, 2015

 

OIE cuts six European countries' mad cow risk level, while increasing risk factors for humans to the BSE TSE PRION DISEASE around the globe

 


 

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation

 


 

spontaneous atypical BSE ???

 

don’t let anyone fool you. spontaneous TSE prion disease is a hoax in natural cases, never proven.

 

all one has to do is look at France. France is having one hell of an epidemic of atypical BSE, probably why they stopped testing for BSE, problem solved $$$ same as the USA, that’s why they stopped testing for BSE mad cow disease in numbers they could find any with, after those atypical BSE cases started showing up. shut down the testing to numbers set up by OIE that are so low, you could only by accident find a case of BSE aka mad cow disease. and this brilliant idea by the WHO et al, to change the name of mad cow disease, thinking that might change things is preposterous. it’s all about money now folks, when the OIE, USDA and everyone else went along and made the TSE prion disease aka mad cow type disease a legal trading commodity by the BSE MRR policy, I would say everyone bit off more then they can chew, and they will just have to digest those TSE Prions coming from North America, and like it, and just prey you don’t get a mad cow type disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease in the decades to come, and or pass it to some other poor soul via the iatrogenic medical surgical tissue friendly fire mode of transmission i.e. second hand transmission. it’s real folks, just not documented much, due to lack of trace back efforts. all iatrogenic cjd is, is sporadic cjd, until the iatrogenic event is tracked down and documented, and put into the academic and public domain, which very seldom happens. ...

 

As of December 2011, around 60 atypical BSE cases have currently been reported in 13 countries, *** with over one third in France.

 


 

FRANCE STOPS TESTING FOR MAD COW DISEASE BSE, and here’s why, to many spontaneous events of mad cow disease $$$

 

so 20 cases of atypical BSE in France, compared to the remaining 40 cases in the remaining 12 Countries, divided by the remaining 12 Countries, about 3+ cases per country, besides Frances 20 cases. you cannot explain this away with any spontaneous BSe. ...TSS

 

Sunday, October 5, 2014

 

France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease

 


 

19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT

 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

snip...see link ;

 

Saturday, May 09, 2015

 

Expression of genes involved in the T cell signalling pathway in circulating immune cells of cattle 24 months following oral challenge with Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE)

 


 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 

*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

 

snip...

 

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

 

Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:

 

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and

 

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

 

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.

 

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.

 

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.

 

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.

 

snip...

 

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).

 

The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).

 

Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.

 

snip...

 

The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).

 

snip...

 

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.

 

snip...

 

In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible. For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.

 

snip...

 

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.

 

snip...

 


 

NEW URL LINK ;

 


 

Friday, December 14, 2012

 

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

 


 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 

*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 


 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION ***

 


 

Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

Friday, May 22, 2015

 

Chronic Wasting Disease and Program Updates - 2014 NEUSAHA Annual Meeting 12-14 May 2014

 


 

Friday, May 15, 2015

 

Grass Plants Bind, Retain, Uptake, and Transport Infectious Prions

 

Report

 


 

Thursday, April 30, 2015

 

Immediate and ongoing detection of prions in the blood of hamsters and deer following oral, nasal, or blood inoculations

 


 

Wednesday, April 22, 2015

 

Circulation of prions within dust on a scrapie affected farm

 


 

Friday, April 24, 2015

 

The placenta shed from goats with classical scrapie is infectious to goat kids and lambs

 


 

Saturday, March 15, 2014

 

Potential role of soil properties in the spread of CWD in western Canada

 


 

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

 

*** Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions

 

Hervé Cassard,1, n1 Juan-Maria Torres,2, n1 Caroline Lacroux,1, Jean-Yves Douet,1, Sylvie L. Benestad,3, Frédéric Lantier,4, Séverine Lugan,1, Isabelle Lantier,4, Pierrette Costes,1, Naima Aron,1, Fabienne Reine,5, Laetitia Herzog,5, Juan-Carlos Espinosa,2, Vincent Beringue5, & Olivier Andréoletti1, Affiliations Contributions Corresponding author Journal name: Nature Communications Volume: 5, Article number: 5821 DOI: doi:10.1038/ncomms6821 Received 07 August 2014 Accepted 10 November 2014 Published 16 December 2014 Article tools Citation Reprints Rights & permissions Article metrics

 

Abstract

 

Although Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is the cause of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, the zoonotic potential of scrapie prions remains unknown. Mice genetically engineered to overexpress the human ​prion protein (tgHu) have emerged as highly relevant models for gauging the capacity of prions to transmit to humans. These models can propagate human prions without any apparent transmission barrier and have been used used to confirm the zoonotic ability of BSE. Here we show that a panel of sheep scrapie prions transmit to several tgHu mice models with an efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. The serial transmission of different scrapie isolates in these mice led to the propagation of prions that are phenotypically identical to those causing sporadic CJD (sCJD) in humans. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.

 

Subject terms: Biological sciences• Medical research At a glance

 


 

Tuesday, December 16, 2014

 

Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions

 

Scrapie from sheep could infect humans with 'mad cow disease', study finds

 


 


 

why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

 

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

 

snip...

 

R. BRADLEY

 


 

Sunday, March 29, 2015

 

Uncommon prion disease induced in macaque ten years after scrapie inoculation

 


 

Friday, January 30, 2015

 

*** Scrapie: a particularly persistent pathogen ***

 


 

Friday, February 20, 2015

 

APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays 2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015

 


 

PRION2015 CONFERENCE FORT COLLINS

 

May 2015

 

Wednesday May 27

 

14:45 Jean-Phillipe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission, France,

 

Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: *** IMPLICATIONS FOR BSE AND SCRAPIE RISK ASSESSMENT IN HUMAN POPULATIONS.

 

16:45

 

Quingzhong Kong Case Western Reserve University

 

***Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions

 


 

Sunday, May 3, 2015

 

PRION2015 FORT COLLINS

 


 

Sunday, April 12, 2015

 

*** Research Project: Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 2014 Annual Report ***

 


 

Tuesday, May 19, 2015

 

*** COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING COOL H.R. 2393 Agriculture Chairman K. Michael Conaway (R-TX) Fears of US imports infected with mad cow disease is emerging as an issue in trans-Pacific trade talks

 


 

Tuesday, May 26, 2015

 

*** Minimise transmission risk of CJD and vCJD in healthcare settings Last updated 15 May 2015 ***

 


 

Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease

 

Received July 24, 2014; Accepted September 16, 2014; Published November 3, 2014

 


 

Singeltary comment ;

 


 

Comment from Terry Singeltary This is a Comment on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Notice: Draft Guidance for Industry on Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm; Availability

 

For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon

 

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Comment View document:

 


 


 

WI

 

REASON

 

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

9,997,976 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

*** See attached file(s) No documents available. Attachments View All (1) Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Terry Singeltary Comment View Attachment:

 


 

Sunday, April 5, 2015

 

*** Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 ***

 


 

Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 Singeltary Comment

 

Greetings FDA et al,

 

I wish to comment on Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180.

 

Once again, I wish to kindly bring up the failed attempt of the FDA and the ruminant to ruminant mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997. This feed ban is still failing today, as we speak. Even more worrisome, is the fact it is still legal to feed cervids to cervids in the USA, in fact, the FDA only _recommends_ that deer and elk considered to be of _high_ risk for CWD do not enter the animal food chain, but there is NO law, its only voluntary, a recipe for a TSE prion disaster, as we have seen with the ruminant to ruminant feed ban for cattle, where in 2007, one decade post August 1997 mad cow feed ban, where in 2007 10,000,000 POUNDS OF BANNED BLOOD LACED MEAT AND BONE MEAL WHEN OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. Since 2007, these BSE feed ban rules have been breached time and time again. tons and tons of mad cow feed went out in Alabama as well, where one of the mad cows were documented, just the year before in 2006, and in 2013 and 2014, breaches so bad (OAI) Official Action Indicated were issued. those are like the one issued where 10 million pounds of banned blood laced meat and bone meal were fed out.

 

What is the use of having a Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180, if it cannot be enforced, as we have seen with a mandatory ruminant to ruminant feed ban?

 

I strenuously once again urge the FDA and its industry constituents, to make it MANDATORY that all ruminant feed be banned to all ruminants, and this should include all cervids as soon as possible for the following reasons...

 

======

 

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administrations BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system.

 

***However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

 

======

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 

*** Ruminant feed ban for cervids in the United States? ***

 

31 Jan 2015 at 20:14 GMT

 


 

19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT

 

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

 


 

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION

 


 

2013

 

Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 


 

DOCKET-- 03D-0186 -- FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Use of Material From Deer and Elk in Animal Feed; Availability Date: Fri, 16 May 2003 11:47:37 0500 EMC 1 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Vol #: 1

 


 


 

PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT SUBMISSION ;

 


 

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

 

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

 

REASON

 

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

42,090 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

WI

 

REASON

 

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

 

9,997,976 lbs.

 

DISTRIBUTION

 

ID and NV

 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

 


 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

*** See attached file(s) No documents available. Attachments View All (1) Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Terry Singeltary Comment View Attachment:

 


 

Sunday, April 5, 2015

 

*** Guidance for Industry Ensuring Safety of Animal Feed Maintained and Fed On-Farm Draft Guidance FDA-2014-D-1180 ***

 


 

Sunday, January 11, 2015

 

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

 


 

This is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposals, Submissions, and Approvals: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products

 

For related information, Open Docket Folder Docket folder icon

 

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Comment View document:Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission ;

 

I believe that there is more risk to the world from Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease now, coming from the United States and all of North America, than there is risk coming to the USA and North America, from other Countries. I am NOT saying I dont think there is any risk for the BSE type TSE prion coming from other Countries, I am just saying that in 2015, why is the APHIS/USDA/FSIS/FDA still ignoring these present mad cow risk factors in North America like they are not here?

 

North America has more strains of TSE prion disease, in more species (excluding zoo animals in the early BSE days, and excluding the Feline TSE and or Canine TSE, because they dont look, and yes, there has been documented evidence and scientific studies, and DEFRA Hound study, that shows the canine spongiform encephalopathy is very possible, if it has not already happened, just not documented), then any other Country in the world. Mink TME, Deer Elk cervid CWD (multiple strains), cBSE cattle, atypical L-type BSE cattle, atypical H-type BSE cattle, atyical HG type BSE cow (the only cow documented in the world to date with this strain), typical sheep goat Scrapie (multiple strains), and the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which has been linked to sporadic CJD, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie has spread from coast to coast. sporadic CJD on the rise, with different strains mounting, victims becoming younger, with the latest nvCJD human mad cow case being documented in Texas again, this case, NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL CDC.

 

typical BSE can propagate as nvCJD and or sporadic CJD (Collinge et al), and sporadic CJD has now been linked to atypical BSE, Scrapie and atypical Scrapie, and scientist are very concerned with CWD TSE prion in the Cervid populations. in my opinion, the BSE MRR policy, which overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then made BSE confirmed countries legal to trade mad cow disease, which was all brought forth AFTER that fateful day December 23, 2003, when the USA lost its gold card i.e. BSE FREE status, thats the day it all started. once the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat by USDA inc and the OIE, then the legal trading of Scrapie was validated to be a legal trading commodity, also shoved through by the USDA inc and the OIE, the world then lost 30 years of attempted eradication of the BSE TSE prion disease typical and atypical strains, and the BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease was thus made a legal trading commodity, like it or not. its all about money now folks, trade, to hell with human health with a slow incubating disease, that is 100% fatal once clinical, and forget the fact of exposure, sub-clinical infection, and friendly fire there from i.e. iatrogenic TSE prion disease, the pass it forward mode of the TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease. its all going to be sporadic CJD or sporadic ffi, or sporadic gss, or now the infamous VPSPr. ...problem solved $$$

 

the USDA/APHIS/FSIS/FDA triple mad cow BSE firewall, well, that was nothing but ink on paper.

 

for this very reason I believe the BSE MRR policy is a total failure, and that this policy should be immediately withdrawn, and set back in place the BSE GBR Risk Assessments, with the BSE GBR risk assessments set up to monitor all TSE PRION disease in all species of animals, and that the BSE GBR risk assessments be made stronger than before.

 

lets start with the recent notice that beef from Ireland will be coming to America.

 

Ireland confirmed around 1655 cases of mad cow disease. with the highest year confirming about 333 cases in 2002, with numbers of BSE confirmed cases dropping from that point on, to a documentation of 1 confirmed case in 2013, to date. a drastic decrease in the feeding of cows to cows i.e. the ruminant mad cow feed ban, and the enforcement of that ban, has drastically reduced the number of BSE cases in Europe, minus a few BABs or BARBs. a far cry from the USDA FDA triple BSE firewall, which was nothing more than ink on paper, where in 2007, in one week recall alone, some 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED POTENTIAL MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE IN THE USA. this is 10 years post feed ban. in my honest opinion, due to the blatant cover up of BSE TSE prion aka mad cow disease in the USA, we still have no clue as to the true number of cases of BSE mad cow disease in the USA or North America as a whole. ...just saying.

 

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom)

 

Country/Year

 

snip...please see attached pdf file, with references of breaches in the USA triple BSE mad cow firewalls, and recent science on the TSE prion disease. ...TSS

 

No documents available. AttachmentsView All (1) Empty Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission View Attachment:

 


 

Sunday, January 11, 2015

 

Docket No. APHIS-2014-0107 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Animals and Animal Products Singeltary Submission

 


 

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

 

*** Could we spot the next BSE?, asks BVA President ***

 


 

we just can’t learn from our past mistakes, and thanks to the OIE, USDA, WTO et al, we are now back to square one, thanks to the BSE MRR policy, the legal trading of all strains of the TSE prion aka mad cow type agent.

 

sometimes, you just can’t fix stupid. ...just saying...tss

 

UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD

 


 


 


 

OTHERS BEEF AND VEAL

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

Thursday, May 28, 2015

 

*** OIE cuts six European countries' mad cow risk level, while increasing risk factors for humans to the BSE TSE PRION DISEASE around the globe

 


 

 Tuesday, May 26, 2015

 

Minimise transmission risk of CJD and vCJD in healthcare settings Last updated 15 May 2015

 


 

 Saturday, May 09, 2015

 

Psychiatric Symptoms in Patients With Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 


 

 WHO issues best practices for naming new human infectious diseases Note for the media

 

8 May 2015 | GENEVA - WHO today called on scientists, national authorities and the media to follow best practices in naming new human infectious diseases to minimize unnecessary negative effects on nations, economies and people.

 

Terms that should be avoided in disease names include geographic locations (e.g. Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, Spanish Flu, Rift Valley fever), people’s names (e.g. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Chagas disease), species of animal or food (e.g. swine flu, bird flu, monkey pox), cultural, population, industry or occupational references (e.g. legionnaires), and terms that incite undue fear (e.g. unknown, fatal, epidemic).

 


 

Greetings WHO,

 

I kindly submit the following, and I will continue to call it what it is, aka mad cow disease, and not only linked to the bovine and nvCJD to humans. mad cow disease has now been linked to sporadic cjd, and scrapie has now been linked to sporadic cjd, with great concern for chronic wasting disease in cerevids i.e. cwd. or just call it what it is, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease. but I will call it for what it is, mad cow type disease, simply because of what the stigma brings, and as long as USDA INC are still feeding cows to cows, the OIE, and WHO continues to disregard the safety of humans there from mad cow type disease, through the continued denial and blatant disregard for the science to date, I refuse to play the game of denial. it is what it is, and trying to protect the industries involved, by changing the name, it will NOT stop the disease, only help the industry from the stigma. it is what it is, the mad cow has been out of the barn, and there is no putting it back now. it is what it is $$$...

 

kindest regards, terry

 

Saturday, December 13, 2014

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Publications TSE prion disease

 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

 

snip...

 


 

 

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net