USDA Consolidates Regulations for Laboratory Testing USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service sent this bulletin at 01/23/2020 02:15 PM EST
The United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is making it easier for animal diagnostic laboratories to carry out vital livestock disease testing on behalf of the agency. USDA is updating regulations that outline how the agency approves laboratories outside the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) and the National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) to conduct official testing for animal diseases, as well as how they can remain approved. USDA will now use a single, user-friendly process for laboratory approval and consolidate the existing regulations into one location.
Approved laboratories play a vital role in our animal health efforts, by providing us with proven, accurate results in a specific timeframe. We rely on these laboratories every day to provide clear information about the health status of the nation’s many herds and flocks. These changes will make it easier for laboratories to understand what they need to do to become approved and remain approved to conduct a wide variety of official tests for USDA.
USDA made one clarifying change from the original proposal, based on public comments. The final rule defines the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) as being primarily composed of Federal, State and university-associated animal health laboratories. This change is because on a case-by-case basis, the NAHLN may use private laboratories if their capabilities are needed.
Existing approved laboratories would begin using the new process when it is time for their next renewal. USDA would implement the new process for newly-requested approvals immediately when the rule takes effect on February 24, 2020.
USDA won't let firm test its cattle for BSE Filed Under: BSE By: Robert Roos | Apr 09, 2004 Share Tweet LinkedIn Email Print & PDF Apr 9, 2004 (CIDRAP News) – The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has rejected a Kansas beef company's proposal to test all its cattle for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in a bid to reopen Asian markets for the company's meat.
The department told Creekstone Farms of Arkansas City, Kan., yesterday that its request for a license to use rapid BSE tests in a private marketing program cannot be granted, according to a statement today by Bill Hawks, USDA undersecretary for marketing and regulatory programs.
"The test is now licensed for animal health surveillance purposes," Hawks stated. "The use of the test as proposed by Creekstone would have implied a consumer safety aspect that is not scientifically warranted."
Before the discovery of a single BSE case in Washington state last December, Creekstone had been exporting 15% to 20% of its meat to Japan, company officials have said. The BSE case prompted Japan and many other countries to ban American beef. Japan tests all its own cattle for BSE and wants the United States to do the same as a condition for lifting the import ban.
The USDA announced a major expansion of its BSE testing program in mid-March but has rejected calls for testing of all cattle, saying it is not scientifically justified. Hawks' statement today mentioned the plan to increase testing and noted that an international panel of BSE experts concluded that testing of all cattle is unnecessary because the disease doesn't appear in younger animals.
"We are continuing our discussions with all of our trading partners so that trade can resume based on international scientific standards set by the World Organization for Animal Health," Hawks' statement concluded.
Creekstone's proposal to test all its cattle surfaced in late February. The company planned to set up its own laboratory and use a rapid test to get results in about 4 hours. Under the plan, any carcasses that tested positive would be destroyed, the company said. The firm slaughters about 1,000 head of cattle daily.
CIDRAP News was unable to reach Creekstone officials today for comment on the USDA decision. But a report today by Meatingplace.com, a meat industry news service, said Creekstone may fight the USDA decision in court. In a letter to Creekstone employees, company officials vowed to "fight this decision in order to provide what our customers want and maintain the viability of our plant," according to the report.
The story quoted John Stewart, Creekstone's chief executive officer, as saying the company has laid off about half its workers and has been losing about $40,000 a day because of the Japanese and South Korean ban on US beef.
More BSE screening tests approved When the Creekstone proposal was first reported, the USDA had not approved any rapid BSE tests. Since then it has approved several, including three this week. On Mar 29 the department announced that seven state veterinary labs would help in the expanded BSE surveillance program, using rapid screening tests. Any samples that tested positive in the screening tests would undergo confirmatory testing at the USDA's national veterinary lab in Ames, Iowa, officials said.
The USDA granted temporary approval of three rapid BSE tests this week, pending submission of further documents, according to Andrea McNally, a spokeswoman for USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) in Washington, DC.
Roche Diagnostics of Indianapolis received a USDA permit to distribute and sell a BSE test made by Prionics AG, a Swiss firm, McNally told CIDRAP News. The Prionics test is a Western Blot test called Prionics-Check WESTERN, according to a Prionics statement. The company says the test was used 18 million times from 2001 through 2003, with no false-positive results.
McNally said the USDA granted Pierce Biotechnology, Rockford, Ill., a license to produce another Prionics test, this one an ELISA, or enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay.
In addition, McNally said Abbott Laboratories of Abbott Park, Ill., has received a USDA permit to distribute and sell a BSE test made by Enfer Scientific Ltd. of Ireland. The Enfer test is approved for cattle testing in Europe and Japan and has been used on more than 3 million samples, according to an Abbott news release.
The USDA previously approved rapid BSE tests made by Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, Calif., and IDEXX Laboratories Inc., Westbrook, Me.
DeHaven named head of APHIS In other developments, Ron DeHaven, who managed the USDA's investigation of the BSE case, was named today as the new administrator of APHIS. DeHaven, who has been deputy administrator of APHIS for veterinary services for the past 2 years, replaces Bobby Acord, who retired Apr 3, according to a USDA news release.
DeHaven's appointment was announced by Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman.
See also:
Apr 9 USDA news release on appointment of DeHaven to head APHIS http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2004/04/0140.html
Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544 Date: September 4, 2007 at 9:47 am PST
USDA
AUGUST 21, 2007
Mr. Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Post Office Box Bacliff, Texas 77518-00
Dear Mr. Singeltary:
This is in response to your e-mails to Secretary Johanns concerning private testing for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia involving Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC. We regret the delay in responding.
As you may know, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) filed an appeal of the U.S. District Court's order on June 15,2007. While we recognize your views, we cannot comment on any matters at issue in the pending litigation. However, we can assure you that USDA remains committed to ensuring effective, scientifically sound testing for significant animal diseases and to protecting U.S. animal and public health from BSE.
We understand that the effects of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) are devastating, and we are sorry to learn of the loss of your mother. Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD and other degenerative neurological diseases. Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide. However, no cases of vCJD-the form of BSE that can be transmitted from animals to humans-are known to have originated in the United States. Because the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is responsible for addressing concerns about CJD and other human health issues, you may wish to contact that agency directly. The address is CDC, HHS, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20201.
We also wish to clarify that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is the primary measure in place to protect animal health with regard to BSE. Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal tissues-often referred to as specified risk
Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr. Page 2
materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present, and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level. These additional controls include the Food Safety and Inspection Services' ban on nonambulatory cattle from the human food chain; a prohibition on air-injection stunning of slaughter cattle; the requirement of additional process controls in advanced meat recovery systems; and, a prohibition on the use of mechanically separated beef in human food. Additionally, protection from BSE and other diseases is achieved by conducting antemortem inspections of slaughter cattle and excluding any animals that display clinical signs of neurological disease or other abnormalities.
We appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns. To learn more about USDA's BSE surveillance and safeguarding activities, please visit our Web site at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_... ndex.shtml.
Sincerely,
Jere L. Dick
Associate Deputy Administrator
National Animal Health Policy and Programs Veterinary Services
============================END=========================
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS PREMIUM BEEF, L.L.C., Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al., Defendants. ::::::::::: Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)
snip...
JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge
The government's additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would interfere with USDA's surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm. USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed, the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world, including as part of the USDA's own surveillance testing.
- 18 -
***> SOoo, what changed USDA APHIS ET AL minds, to let industry regulate themselves now $$$
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, typical and atypical, Testing USDA ET AL
***> I urge every Country around the Globe to Declare an Extraordinary Emergency Due To A Foreign Animal Disease Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion from the USA, Canada, and Mexico (they have no clue), all of North America should have this Declaration of Emergency, just like the one called way back when the shoe was on the other foot with the mad sheep of mad river valley, except this time, it's not a wag the dog false flag, this is for real...terry
***> OIG case # NY-3399-56 REDACTED, VT
***> ''Enclosed is OIG's notification that they have scheduled an investigation of the following individual. REDACTED is alleged to have provided possibly inaccurate test results involving diseased sheep. However, because the results were determined to be inconclusive, no actual violation was actually committed.''
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2015
APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays 2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015
Comment #6: WHAT happened to the test results and MOUSE BIO-ASSAYS of those imported sheep from Belgium that were confiscated and slaughtered from the Faillace's, what sort of TSE did these animals have?
Response: It is not clear how the test results referred to in this comment are relevant to the Harvard BSE Risk Assessment Update. Sheep were not considered in the risk assessment.
Comment #7: WHY is it that the Farm of the Mad Sheep of Mad River Valley were quarantined for 5 years, but none of these farms from Texas and Alabama with Atypical TSE in the Bovine, they have not been quarantined for 5 years, why not, with the real risk of BSE to sheep, whom is to say this was not BSE ?
Response: This comment pertains to policy. As such, it is not addressed here.
[PDF]Owens, Julie Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006 - USDA Food Safety ...
www.fsis.usda.gov/.../2006-0011-1.p... Cached
Food Safety and Inspection Service Loading... by F Greetings - 2006 - Related articles Aug 3, 2006 -
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] ... [Federal Register: July 12, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 133)]. [Notices] ..... group as compared to prior years, we found that conflicting APHIS instructions .....
WHY is it that the Farm of the Mad Sheep of Mad River Valley were quarantined for 5 years, but none of these.
Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program  Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain
Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress FY 2007 - 2nd Half
Two Texas Companies Sentenced and Fined for Misbranding Meat Products In April 2007, two closely held and related Texas companies pled guilty in Federal court and were sentenced to 12 months of probation and ordered to pay $10,250 in fines for misbranding meat products. One of the companies sold adulterated meat products to a retail store in New Mexico. Additionally, portions of the invoices failed to properly and consistently identify the meat products as being from cattle more than 30 months old at time of slaughter. This information is required to be disclosed because of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease") concerns. No adulterated meat reached consumers.
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html
http://www.fda.gov/ora/about/enf_story/archive/2001/ch5/default.htm
THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve Mitchell writes:
Analysis: What that mad cow means
By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent
WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.
Despite this, Brown said the U.S. prevalence of mad cow, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, did not significantly threaten human or cattle health.
"Overall, my view is BSE is highly unlikely to pose any important risk either in cattle feed or human feed," he said.
However, Jean Halloran of Consumers Union in Yonkers, N.Y., said consumers should be troubled by the USDA's secrecy and its apparent plan to dramatically cut back the number of mad cow tests it conducts.
"Consumers should be very concerned about how little we know about the USDA's surveillance program and the failure of the USDA to reveal really important details," Halloran told UPI. "Consumers have to be really concerned if they're going to cut back the program," she added.
Last year the USDA tested more than 300,000 animals for the disease, but it has proposed, even in light of a third case, scaling back the program to 40,000 tests annually.
"They seem to be, in terms of actions and policies, taking a lot more seriously the concerns of the cattle industry than the concerns of consumers," Halloran said. "It's really hard to know what it takes to get this administration to take action to protect the public."
The USDA has insisted that the safeguards of a ban on incorporating cow tissue into cattle feed (which is thought to spread the disease) and removal of the most infectious parts of cows, such as the brain and spinal cord, protect consumers. But the agency glosses over the fact that both of these systems have been revealed to be inadequately implemented.
The feed ban, which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration, has been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in two reports, the most recent coming just last year. The GAO said the FDA's enforcement of the ban continues to have weaknesses that "undermine the nation's firewall against BSE."
USDA documents released last year showed more than 1,000 violations of the regulations requiring the removal of brains and spinal cords in at least 35 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with some plants being cited repeatedly for infractions. In addition, a violation of similar regulations that apply to beef exported to Japan is the reason why Japan closed its borders to U.S. beef in January six weeks after reopening them.
Other experts also question the adequacy of the USDA's surveillance system. The USDA insists the prevalence of mad cow disease is low, but the agency has provided few details of its surveillance program, making it difficult for outside experts to know if the agency's monitoring plan is sufficient.
"It's impossible to judge the adequacy of the surveillance system without having a breakdown of the tested population by age and risk status," Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments, told UPI.
"Everybody would be happier and more confident and in a sense it might be able to go away a little bit for (the USDA) if they would just publish a breakdown on the tests," Mumford added.
UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days. This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized that it cannot locate it.
Mumford said the prevalence of the disease in U.S. herds is probably quite low, but there have probably been other cases that have so far gone undetected. "They're only finding a very small fraction of that low prevalence," she said.
Mumford expressed surprise at the lack of concern about the deadly disease from American consumers. "I would expect the U.S. public to be more concerned," she said.
Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics, a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or more easily transmitted from person to person.
"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures" and even through the blood supply, Moser said.
© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS
Friday, February 18, 2011
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS ''PLEADS GUILTY"
NOT TO EVER, EVER, FORGET;
WHAT ABOUT YOUR CHILDREN EATING ALL THOSE MAD COW HAMBURGERS VIA THE NSLP ???
WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 50 YEARS ???
YOU can thank these folks for the exposure to out children all across the Nation, via the National School Lunch Program NSLP, where for 4 years or more, dead stock downer cattle were fed to our children via the NSLP. dead stock downer cows are the most high risk for mad cow type disease. have your children been exposed ??? are you and them one of the ones that will have a lifetime of what and see, if you get creutzfeldt jakob disease ??? see here ;
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE
DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???
you can check and see here ;
THIS DOCUMENT, THAT LISTED ALL SCHOOLS IN THE USA THAT FED THEIR CHILDREN THE MOST HIGH RISK CATTLE FOR MAD COW DISEASE FOR 4 YEARS, HAS BEEN CONVENIENTLY REMOVED FROM THE WWW, so in the years, decades to come, if any of these poor children come down with mad cow type disease cjd tse prion, nobody will ever know...However, i have them listed and you can see them here;
Hallmark - Westland SFA Report by State 3-24-2008 Page 1 of 226
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Manitoba veterinarian has been fined $10,000 for falsifying certification documents for U.S. bound cattle and what about mad cow
disease ?
FDA Reports on VFD Compliance
John Maday
August 30, 2019 09:46 AM
VFD-Form 007 (640x427)
Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach. ( John Maday )
Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary.
On August 29, FDA released its first report on inspection and compliance activities. The report, titled “Summary Assessment of Veterinary Feed Directive Compliance Activities Conducted in Fiscal Years 2016 – 2018,” is available online.
Overall, the FDA reports a high level of compliance across the affected livestock-industry sectors.
In fiscal year 2016, FDA began a small, three-part pilot inspection program that began with inspectors visiting feed distributors to review randomly selected VFD documents. The inspectors then selected one VFD at the distributor and conducted further inspections of the veterinarian and producer (client) named on that VFD.
In fiscal years 2017 and 2018, FDA continued those three-part inspections and expanded the program to include state feed regulatory partners. In fiscal year 2017, state personnel inspected VFD distributors and reviewed selected VFDs for compliance with the requirements. In 2018, those state inspectors began conducting three-part inspections, similar to those conducted by the FDA investigators. With state inspectors contributing, the number of VFD inspections increased from 57 in 2016 to 130 in 2017 and 269 during 2018.
Of the 269 inspections during 2018, 230 required no action, 38 indicated voluntary action and just one indicated official enforcement action.
Key findings in the report include:
Distributors (2018)
Distributor had notified FDA of their intent to distribute VFD feeds -- 94.8%
Distributors who distributed a VFD feed that complied with the terms of the VFD -- 91.5%
Distributors who manufacture VFD feed: Drug inventory or production records showed the correct amount of drug was added to the feed for the VFD reviewed -- 96.7%
Distributors who manufacture VFD feed: Labels and formulas matched the VFD reviewed -- 91.0%
Distributor’s VFD feed labels contained the VFD caution statement -- 77.2%
Veterinarians
Veterinarians had an active license in the state where the VFD feed authorized on the VFD order(s) is being fed -- 100%
VFDs included veterinarians’ electronic or written signature -- 98.6%
VFDs included the withdrawal time, special instructions, and/or cautionary statements -- 95.3%
Producers
Client did not feed VFD feed beyond the expiration date on the VFD -- 100%
Client fed VFD feed to the animals authorized on the VFD (number, species, and/or production class) -- 100%
Client fed VFD feed for the duration identified on the VFD -- 100%
Client complied with the special instructions on the VFD -- 100%
FDA issued just one warning letter following inspections during fiscal year 2018, for a feed mill that “adulterated and misbranded VFD feed by distributing VFD feed to other distributors without first receiving an acknowledgment letter, in addition to adulterating and misbranding medicated and non-medicated feed for other reasons.”
In its report, FDA reminds stakeholders that VFD medicated feeds must be used in according to the approved conditions of use and must be under the oversight of a licensed veterinarian and consistent with a lawful VFD order. The agency intends to continue monitoring compliance, and to provide education, but FDA will also use enforcement strategies when voluntary compliance with the VFD final rule requirements is not achieved.
See the full summary report from FDA.
For more on the VFD rules and compliance, see these articles from BovineVetOnline.com.
VFD Audits: What to Expect
VFD Audits: Start with the Feed Distributor
FDA Draft Guidance Updates VFD Q&A
***>''Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements.''<***
THE USA Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) of August 1997 was/is a colossal failure. it was nothing but ink on paper.
But worse yet, recent science has shown that cwd tse prion will transmit to pigs by ORAL routes, and now science shows that scrapie tse prion will also transmit to pigs by oral route. Terrible news...
cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my!
***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006).
Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable.
Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: Experimental transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent to swine after oral or intracranial inoculation
Author
item Moore, Sarah - Orise Fellow item West Greenlee, M - Iowa State University item Kondru, Naveen - Iowa State University item Manne, Sireesha - Iowa State University item Smith, Jodi item Kunkle, Robert item Kanthasamy, Anumantha - Iowa State University item Greenlee, Justin
Submitted to: Journal of Virology
Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal
Publication Acceptance Date: 7/6/2017
Publication Date: 9/12/2017
Citation: Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H., Kondru, N., Manne, S., Smith, J.D., Kunkle, R.A., Kanthasamy, A., Greenlee, J.J. 2017. Experimental transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent to swine after oral or intracranial inoculation. Journal of Virology. 91(19):e00926-17. https://doi.org/10.1128/JVI.00926-17.
Interpretive Summary: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a fatal disease of wild and captive deer and elk that causes damaging changes in the brain. The infectious agent is an abnormal protein called a prion that has misfolded from its normal state. Whether CWD can transmit to swine is unknown. This study evaluated the potential of pigs to develop CWD after either intracranial or oral inoculation. Our data indicates that swine do accumulate the abnormal prion protein associated with CWD after intracranial or oral inoculation. Further, there was evidence of abnormal prion protein accumulation in lymph nodes. Currently, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from deer or elk. In addition, feral swine could be exposed to infected carcasses in areas where CWD is present in wildlife populations. This information is useful to wildlife managers and individuals in the swine and captive cervid industries. These findings could impact future regulations for the disposal of offal from deer and elk slaughtered in commercial operations. U.S. regulators should carefully consider the new information from this study before relaxing feed ban standards designed to control potentially feed borne prion diseases.
Technical Abstract: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a naturally occurring, fatal neurodegenerative disease of cervids. The potential for swine to serve as a host for the agent of chronic wasting disease is unknown. The purpose of this study was to investigate the susceptibility of swine to the CWD agent following oral or intracranial experimental inoculation. Crossbred piglets were assigned to one of three groups: intracranially inoculated (n=20), orally inoculated (n=19), or non-inoculated (n=9). At approximately the age at which commercial pigs reach market weight, half of the pigs in each group were culled ('market weight' groups). The remaining pigs ('aged' groups) were allowed to incubate for up to 73 months post inoculation (MPI). Tissues collected at necropsy were examined for disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) by western blotting (WB), antigen-capture immunoassay (EIA), immunohistochemistry (IHC) and in vitro real-time quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC). Brain samples from selected pigs were also bioassayed in mice expressing porcine prion protein. Four intracranially inoculated aged pigs and one orally inoculated aged pig were positive by EIA, IHC and/or WB. Using RT-QuIC, PrPSc was detected in lymphoid and/or brain tissue from pigs in all inoculated groups. Bioassay was positive in 4 out of 5 pigs assayed. This study demonstrates that pigs can serve as hosts for CWD, though with scant PrPSc accumulation requiring sensitive detection methods. Detection of infectivity in orally inoculated pigs using mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs could act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity.
cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my!
***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006).
Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable.
cwd scrapie pigs oral routes
***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***
>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <***
***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 5="" 6="" at="" by="" detected="" eia.="" examined="" group="" in="" intracranial="" least="" lymphoid="" month="" months="" of="" one="" pigs="" positive="" prpsc="" quic="" the="" tissues="" was="">6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 4="" and="" group="" months="" oral="">6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%).
***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period.
This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease.
Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip.....
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.
snip.....
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).
The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.
snip.....
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip.....
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.
snip.....
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip.....
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.
snip.....
TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017
*** EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***
MONDAY, JUNE 24, 2019
APHIS, FSIS, USDA, FDA, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE, BSE, CWD, Scrapie, Camel TSE Prion Disease, CJD Humans
THURSDAY, AUGUST 08, 2019
Raccoons accumulate PrPSc after intracranial inoculation with the agents of chronic wasting disease (CWD) or transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) but not atypical scrapie
FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2019
Chronic Wasting Disease in Cervids: Implications for Prion Transmission to Humans and Other Animal Species
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019
MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019
WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2019
***> The agent of transmissible mink encephalopathy passaged in sheep is similar to BSE-L
IT would seem prudent to, do as to others, as you wish they would do unto you.
THE BSE TSE Prion Minimal Risk Region MRR policy is a incredibly failed policy. it was designed and set up to fail from the start.
now we have cwd tse prion saturating the USA, cwd tse prion spreading across from Europe, we have mad camel disease in Africa, and we now know that the cwd will transmit to pigs by oral routes. this is terrible. see;
Let's take a look at the facts shall we $BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, NORTH AMERICA TYPICAL AND ATYPICALExperimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Micesnip...see full text;IBNC BSE TSE Prion mad cow disease***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***Posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMTWEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 2018
The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challengeTUESDAY, JULY 30, 2019
Guidelines for reporting surveillance data on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in the EU within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 APPROVED: 9 July 2019
WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019
The European Union Summary Report On Surveillance For The Presence Of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE): The Situation In 2017
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States.
reading up on this study from Prion 2018 Conference, very important findings ;
***> This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
***> These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2018
Experimental Infection of Cattle With a Novel Prion Derived From Atypical H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 2018
USDA finds BSE infection in Florida cow 08/28/18 6:43 PM
http://animalhealthreportpriontse..blogspot.com/2018/08/usda-finds-bse-infection-in-florida-cow.html
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018
USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection USDA 08/29/2018 10:00 AM EDT
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Atypical BSE Confirmed Florida Update USA August 28, 2018
MONDAY, JANUARY 09, 2017
Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle
CDC Volume 23, Number 2—February 2017
*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017
USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 2017
In vitro amplification of H-type atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy by protein misfolding cyclic amplification
"When considering the atypical L-BSE and H-BSE diseases of cattle, they have been assessed in both non-human primate and transgenic mouse bioassays (with mice transgenic for human PRNP) and both model systems indicate that H-BSE and L-BSE may have increased zoonotic potential compare with C-BSE.
***The detection of all types of BSE is therefore of significant importance."
Saturday, June 25, 2011
Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque
"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"
***> P.108: Successful oral challenge of adult cattle with classical BSE
Sandor Dudas1,*, Kristina Santiago-Mateo1, Tammy Pickles1, Catherine Graham2, and Stefanie Czub1 1Canadian Food Inspection Agency; NCAD Lethbridge; Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada; 2Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture; Pathology Laboratory; Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada
Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) is a feed- and food-borne fatal neurological disease which can be orally transmitted to cattle and humans. Due to the presence of contaminated milk replacer, it is generally assumed that cattle become infected early in life as calves and then succumb to disease as adults. Here we challenged three 14 months old cattle per-orally with 100 grams of C-type BSE brain to investigate age-related susceptibility or resistance. During incubation, the animals were sampled monthly for blood and feces and subjected to standardized testing to identify changes related to neurological disease. At 53 months post exposure, progressive signs of central nervous system disease were observed in these 3 animals, and they were euthanized. Two of the C-BSE animals tested strongly positive using standard BSE rapid tests, however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE.
We are further examining explanations for the unusual disease presentation in the third challenged animal.
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification
Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama
National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan
To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA).
Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.
Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human transgenic mice, our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
P.170: Potential detection of oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle using in vitro conversion
***P.170: Potential detection of oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle using in vitro conversion
Sandor Dudas, John G Gray, Renee Clark, and Stefanie Czub Canadian Food Inspection Agency; Lethbridge, AB Canada
Keywords: Atypical BSE, oral transmission, RT-QuIC
The detection of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has had a significant negative impact on the cattle industry worldwide. In response, governments took actions to prevent transmission and additional threats to animal health and food safety. While these measures seem to be effective for controlling classical BSE, the more recently discovered atypical BSE has presented a new challenge. To generate data for risk assessment and control measures, we have challenged cattle orally with atypical BSE to determine transmissibility and mis-folded prion (PrPSc) tissue distribution. Upon presentation of clinical symptoms, animals were euthanized and tested for characteristic histopathological changes as well as PrPSc deposition.
The H-type challenged animal displayed vacuolation exclusively in rostral brain areas but the L-type challenged animal showed no evidence thereof. To our surprise, neither of the animals euthanized, which were displaying clinical signs indicative of BSE, showed conclusive mis-folded prion accumulation in the brain or gut using standard molecular or immunohistochemical assays. To confirm presence or absence of prion infectivity, we employed an optimized real-time quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC) assay developed at the Rocky Mountain Laboratory, Hamilton, USA.
Detection of PrPSc was unsuccessful for brain samples tests from the orally inoculated L type animal using the RT-QuIC. It is possible that these negative results were related to the tissue sampling locations or that type specific optimization is needed to detect PrPSc in this animal. We were however able to consistently detect the presence of mis-folded prions in the brain of the H-type inoculated animal. Considering the negative and inconclusive results with other PrPSc detection methods, positive results using the optimized RT-QuIC suggests the method is extremely sensitive for H-type BSE detection. This may be evidence of the first successful oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle and additional investigation of samples from these animals are ongoing.
Detection of PrPBSE and prion infectivity in the ileal Peyer’s patch of young calves as early as 2 months after oral challenge with classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Ivett Ackermann1 , Anne Balkema‑Buschmann1 , Reiner Ulrich2 , Kerstin Tauscher2 , James C. Shawulu1 , Markus Keller1 , Olanrewaju I. Fatola1 , Paul Brown3 and Martin H. Groschup1*
Abstract
In classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-BSE), an orally acquired prion disease of cattle, the ileal Peyer’s patch (IPP) represents the main entry port for the BSE agent. In earlier C-BSE pathogenesis studies, cattle at 4–6 months of age were orally challenged, while there are strong indications that the risk of infection is highest in young animals. In the present study, unweaned calves aged 4–6 weeks were orally challenged to determine the earli‑ est time point at which newly formed PrPBSE and BSE infectivity are detectable in the IPP. For this purpose, calves were culled 1 week as well as 2, 4, 6 and 8 months post-infection (mpi) and IPPs were examined for BSE infectivity using a bovine PrP transgenic mouse bioassay, and for PrPBSE by immunohistochemistry (IHC) and protein misfolding cyclic amplifcation (PMCA) assays. For the frst time, BSE prions were detected in the IPP as early as 2 mpi by transgenic mouse bioassay and PMCA and 4 mpi by IHC in the follicular dendritic cells (FDCs) of the IPP follicles. These data indi‑ cate that BSE prions propagate in the IPP of unweaned calves within 2 months of oral uptake of the agent.
In summary, our study demonstrates for the frst time PrPBSE (by PMCA) and prion infectivity (by mouse bioassay) in the ileal Peyer’s patch (IPP) of young calves as early as 2 months after infection. From 4 mpi nearly all calves showed PrPBSE positive IPP follicles (by IHC), even with PrPBSE accumulation detectable in FDCs in some animals. Finally, our results confrm the IPP as the early port of entry for the BSE agent and a site of initial propagation of PrPBSE and infectivity during the early pathogenesis of the disease. Terefore, our study supports the recommendation to remove the last four metres of the small intestine (distal ileum) at slaughter, as designated by current legal requirements for countries with a controlled BSE risk status, as an essential measure for consumer and public health protection.
A study comparing preclinical cattle infected naturally with BSE to clinically affected cattle either naturally or experimentally infected with BSE by the oral route found the most abundant PrPSc in the brainstem area (39), which is consistent with ascension to the brain from the gut by sympathetic and parasympathetic projections (40). In our experiment, abundant prions were observed in the brainstem of cattle with clinical signs of BSE, which is similar to the amount in their thalamus or midbrain regions. Interestingly, prions in the brainstem of cattle with clinical evidence of BSE seeded the RT-QuIC reactions faster than any other brain region despite the brainstem area having lower EIA OD values (Table 2) in comparison to other brain regions. This suggests that higher concentrations of prions do not necessarily seed the reaction faster. Perhaps prions of the brainstem exist in a preferred conformation for better conversion despite being present in lower concentrations.
snip...
IT is of my opinion, that the OIE and the USDA et al, are the soul reason, and responsible parties, for Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion diseases, including typical and atypical BSE, typical and atypical Scrapie, and all strains of CWD, and human TSE there from, spreading around the globe. I have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. JUST because of low documented human body count with nvCJD and the long incubation periods, the lack of sound science being replaced by political and corporate science in relations with the fact that science has now linked some sporadic CJD with atypical BSE and atypical scrapie, and the very real threat of CWD being zoonosis, I believed the O.I.E. has failed terribly and again, I call for this organization to be dissolved...
Monday, May 05, 2014
Member Country details for listing OIE CWD 2013 against the criteria of Article 1.2.2., the Code Commission recommends consideration for listing
Friday, December 5, 2014
SPECIAL ALERT The OIE recommends strengthening animal disease surveillance worldwide
IN A NUT SHELL ; (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006) 11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,
MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 2019
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Surveillance FDA USDA APHIS FSIS UPDATE 2019
Saturday, December 15, 2018
***> ADRD Summit RFI Singeltary COMMENT SUBMISSION BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, AND HUMAN TSE PRION DISEASE December 14, 2018
SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 2019
https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573
PRION 2016 TOKYO
Saturday, April 23, 2016
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Taylor & Francis
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160
Low levels of classical BSE infectivity in rendered fat tissue
***> FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2018 MAD COW USA FLASHBACK Texas Style
FRIDAY DECEMBER 14, 2018
THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 2019
MAD COW USDA DISEASE BSE TSE Prion
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015
Former Ag Secretary Ann Veneman talks women in agriculture and we talk mad cow disease USDA and what really happened
HOW TO COVER UP MAD COW DISEASE IN TEXAS
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018
OIE Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, United States of America Information received on 29/08/2018 from Dr John Clifford, Official Delegate, Chief Trade Advisor, APHIS USDA
''The event is resolved. No more reports will be submitted.''
well, so much for those herd mates exposed to this atypical BSE cow, and all those trace in and trace outs.
The OIE, USDA, and the BSE MRR policy is a joke, a sad, very sad joke...
Saturday, July 23, 2016
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION SURVEILLANCE, TESTING, AND SRM REMOVAL UNITED STATE OF AMERICA UPDATE JULY 2016
Tuesday, July 26, 2016
Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion UPDATE JULY 2016
Monday, June 20, 2016
Specified Risk Materials SRMs BSE TSE Prion Program
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2019
USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection Aug 29, 2018 A Review of Science 2019
10,000,000 MILLION POUNDS BLOOD LACED MEAT AND BONE MEAL OUT INTO COMMERCE 2007
ONE DECADE POST MAD COW FEED BAN OF AUGUST 1997...2007
2007
10,000,000 POUNDS
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush,
WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
PAGE NOT FOUND
ALABAMA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE 2006
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim’s" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6
CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
125 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and FL
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6
CODE
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
27,694,240 lbs
DISTRIBUTION
MI
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6
CODE
None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
?????
DISTRIBUTION
KY
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
=====
PRODUCT
Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
CODE
No code or lot number.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Mars Petcare US, Clinton, OK, by telephone on May 21, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Product may have contained prohibited materials without cautionary statement on the label.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
208,820 pounds
DISTRIBUTION
TX
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 26, 2009
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????
DISTRIBUTION KY
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6
CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal..
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006
Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration
New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217
Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391
May 17, 2006
WARNING LETTER NO.. 2006-NOL-06
FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204
Dear Mr. Shirley:
On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).
Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:
You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.
You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.
As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.
This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.
Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.
Sincerely,
/S
Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District
PLEASE NOTE, THE FDA URLS FOR OLD WARNING LETTERS ARE OBSOLETE AND DO NOT WORK IN MOST CASES.. I LOOKED UP THE OLD ONE ABOVE AND FOUND IT, BUT HAVE NOT DONE THAT FOR THE OTHERS TO FOLLOW. THE DATA IS VALID THOUGH!
Subject: MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE USA 2006 RECALL UPDATE
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[log in to unmask]>
Reply-To: SAFETY <[log in to unmask]>
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2006 14:10:37 -0500
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS
IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
snip...
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II
______________________________
snip...
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal..
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS
Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST
PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6
CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248..128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6
CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
Product Details
Product Description:
CalDensity Black Label, CalDensity White Label with HA, packaged in white plastic 5, 15, 25, 40, 60 lb pails with plastic liner and white plastic lid. Reason for Recall:
During an FDA inspection it was found that the CalDensity Black label and CalDensity White Label with HA product containers did not include the precautionary statement DO NOT FEED TO CATTLE OR OTHER RUMINANTS
Product Quantity: 50,935 lbs
Recall Number: V-209-2012
Code Information: 042009, 051009, 061209, 071509, 091009, 011510, 030310, 031610, 052610, 092410, 120110, 011211, 020111, 030911, 050111, 071111 & 090111. Classification: Class II Event Details
Event ID: 61880
Voluntary / Mandated:
Voluntary: Firm Initiated
Product Type:
Veterinary
Initial Firm Notification of Consignee or Public:
E-Mail
Status:
Terminated
Distribution Pattern:
Nationwide distribution: AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, FL, GA, IA, ID, IL, KY, LA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OK, PA, SC, TX, UT, VA, WA & WV. No shipments were made to foreign countries including Canada.
Recalling Firm:
Process Managers LLC
485 Gawthrope Dr
Winchester, KY 40391-8910
United States
Recall Initiation Date:
1/6/2012
Center Classification Date:
9/7/2012
Date Terminated:
1/24/2014
Product Details
Product Description:
Regular Chicken 50# Ingredients: Corn, Wheat, Oats, Oyster shells, Medium Grit, CCC, ADS, Plant Protein Products, Animal Protein Products, Processed Grain By-Products, Roughage Products, Animal Fat procession with DHA, etc
Reason for Recall:
During an FDA sample collection, the firms 50# Regular Chicken Feed was found to contain mammalian protein. The label does not contain the warning statement.
Product Quantity:
5400lbs (50lb bags)
Recall Number:
V-137-2013
Code Information:
8/6/2012
Classification:
Class III
Event Details
Event ID:
63743
Voluntary / Mandated:
Voluntary: Firm Initiated
Product Type:
Veterinary
Initial Firm Notification of Consignee or Public:
Other
Status:
Terminated
Distribution Pattern:
Midland MI area only.
Recalling Firm:
Cohoons Elevator Inc.
802 Townsend St
Midland, MI 48640-5362
United States
Recall Initiation Date:
11/21/2012
Center Classification Date:
2/8/2013
Date Terminated:
2/12/2013
V. Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD
FDA continues to consider materials from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD to be acceptable for use in NON-RUMINANT animal feeds in accordance with current agency regulations, 21 CFR 589.2000.
Deer and elk not considered at high risk include:
(1) deer and elk from areas not declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and
(2) deer and elk that were not at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
2017 Section 21 C.F.R. 589.2000, Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed
Subject: MICHIGAN FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE BREACH APRIL 4, 2017
MICHIGAN FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE BREACH APRIL 4, 2017
FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory
11998 DET-DO MI 48846-847 OPR 4/4/2017 OAI
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/bseinspections.csv
NAI = NO ACTION INDICATED
OAI = OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED
VAI = VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED
RTS = REFERRED TO STATE
OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions...end...TSS
TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017
*** EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***
TUESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2017
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE 2016 to 2017 BSE TSE PRION
FY 2016 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 2
4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 1
FY 2015 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 2
FY 2014 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, *** 2
4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 1
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 1
4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, *** 1
FY 2013 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 5 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 5 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
FY 2012 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 5 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 4 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
FY 2011 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 5 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants."Specifically, ***
4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 4 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants."Specifically, ***
4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
FY 2010 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 3 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 3 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
FY 2009 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 10 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 4 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 3 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
FY 2008 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 7 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, *** 4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
FY 2007 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 3 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 3 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 2 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
FY 2006 Inspectional Observation Summaries
4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 6 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants."Specifically, ***
4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 5 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 4 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***
4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 2 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***
*** PLEASE SEE THIS URGENT UPDATE ON CWD AND FEED ANIMAL PROTEIN ***
Sunday, March 20, 2016
Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed ***UPDATED MARCH 2016*** Singeltary Submission
SEE MAD COW FEED VIOLATIONS AFER MAD COW FEED VIOLATIONS ;
Tuesday, April 19, 2016
Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0764 for Animal Feed Regulatory Program Standards Singeltary Comment Submission
17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997
Monday, October 26, 2015
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE October 2015
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997 2013
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
Friday, September 4, 2009
FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL NOW, WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE TO TALK ABOUT THIS ANYMORE $$$
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019
***> MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019
CDC
New Outbreak of TSE Prion in NEW LIVESTOCK SPECIES
Mad Camel Disease
Volume 24, Number 6—June 2018 Research
Prion Disease in Dromedary Camels, Algeria Abstract
Prions cause fatal and transmissible neurodegenerative diseases, including Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans, scrapie in small ruminants, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). After the BSE epidemic, and the associated human infections, began in 1996 in the United Kingdom, general concerns have been raised about animal prions. We detected a prion disease in dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) in Algeria. Symptoms suggesting prion disease occurred in 3.1% of dromedaries brought for slaughter to the Ouargla abattoir in 2015–2016. We confirmed diagnosis by detecting pathognomonic neurodegeneration and disease-specific prion protein (PrPSc) in brain tissues from 3 symptomatic animals. Prion detection in lymphoid tissues is suggestive of the infectious nature of the disease. PrPSc biochemical characterization showed differences with BSE and scrapie. Our identification of this prion disease in a geographically widespread livestock species requires urgent enforcement of surveillance and assessment of the potential risks to human and animal health.
SNIP...
The possibility that dromedaries acquired the disease from eating prion-contaminated waste needs to be considered.
Tracing the origin of prion diseases is challenging. In the case of CPD, the traditional extensive and nomadic herding practices of dromedaries represent a formidable factor for accelerating the spread of the disease at long distances, making the path of its diffusion difficult to determine. Finally, the major import flows of live animals to Algeria from Niger, Mali, and Mauritania (27) should be investigated to trace the possible origin of CPD from other countries. Camels are a vital animal species for millions of persons globally. The world camel population has a yearly growth rate of 2.1% (28). In 2014, the population was estimated at ≈28 million animals, but this number is probably underestimated.. Approximately 88% of camels are found in Africa, especially eastern Africa, and 12% are found in Asia. Official data reported 350,000 dromedaries in Algeria in 2014 (28).
On the basis of phenotypic traits and sociogeographic criteria, several dromedary populations have been suggested to exist in Algeria (29). However, recent genetic studies in Algeria and Egypt point to a weak differentiation of the dromedary population as a consequence of historical use as a cross-continental beast of burden along trans-Saharan caravan routes, coupled with traditional extensive/nomadic herding practices (30).
Such genetic homogeneity also might be reflected in PRNP. Studies on PRNP variability in camels are therefore warranted to explore the existence of genotypes resistant to CPD, which could represent an important tool for CPD management as it was for breeding programs for scrapie eradication in sheep. In the past 10 years, the camel farming system has changed rapidly, with increasing setup of periurban dairy farms and dairy plants and diversification of camel products and market penetration (13). This evolution requires improved health standards for infectious diseases and, in light of CPD, for prion diseases.
The emergence of another prion disease in an animal species of crucial importance for millions of persons worldwide makes it necessary to assess the risk for humans and develop evidence-based policies to control and limit the spread of the disease in animals and minimize human exposure. The implementation of a surveillance system for prion diseases would be a first step to enable disease control and minimize human and animal exposure. Finally, the diagnostic capacity of prion diseases needs to be improved in all countries in Africa where dromedaries are part of the domestic livestock. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/24/6/17-2007_article ;
***> IMPORTS AND EXPORTS <***
***SEE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF BANNED ANIMAL PROTEIN AKA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA DECADES AFTER POST BAN ***
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip.....
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.
snip.....
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).
The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.
snip.....
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip.....
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.
snip.....
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip.....
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.
snip.....
***> In summary, our results establish aerosols as a surprisingly efficient modality of prion transmission. This novel pathway of prion transmission is not only conceptually relevant for the field of prion research, but also highlights a hitherto unappreciated risk factor for laboratory personnel and personnel of the meat processing industry. In the light of these findings, it may be appropriate to revise current prion-related biosafety guidelines and health standards in diagnostic and scientific laboratories being potentially confronted with prion infected materials. While we did not investigate whether production of prion aerosols in nature suffices to cause horizontal prion transmission, the finding of prions in biological fluids such as saliva, urine and blood suggests that it may be worth testing this possibility in future studies.
Adriano Aguzzi ''We even showed that a prion AEROSOL will infect 100% of mice within 10 seconds of exposure''...
WOW!...tss
THURSDAY, AUGUST 08, 2019
Raccoons accumulate PrPSc after intracranial inoculation with the agents of chronic wasting disease (CWD) or transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) but not atypical scrapie
Rabbits are not resistant to prion infection
Francesca Chianinia,1, Natalia Fernández-Borgesb,c,1, Enric Vidald , Louise Gibbarda , Belén Pintadoe , Jorge de Castroc , Suzette A. Priolaf , Scott Hamiltona , Samantha L. Eatona , Jeanie Finlaysona , Yvonne Panga , Philip Steelea , Hugh W. Reida , Mark P. Dagleisha , and Joaquín Castillab,c,g,2 a
Moredun Research Institute, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, Scotland, United Kingdom; b CIC bioGUNE, Derio 48160, Bizkaia, Spain; g IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao 48011, Bizkaia, Spain; c Department of Infectology, Scripps Florida, Jupiter, FL 33458; f Laboratory of Persistent Viral Diseases, Rocky Mountain Laboratories, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Hamilton, MT 59840; d Centre de Recerca en Sanitat Animal (CReSA), UAB-IRTA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain; and e Centro Nacional de Biotecnología (CNB), 28049 Cantoblanco, Madrid, Spain
Edited by Reed B. Wickner, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, and approved February 16, 2012 (received for review December 6, 2011)
The ability of prions to infect some species and not others is determined by the transmission barrier. This unexplained phenomenon has led to the belief that certain species were not susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and therefore represented negligible risk to human health if consumed. Using the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) technique, we were able to overcome the species barrier in rabbits, which have been classified as TSE resistant for four decades. Rabbit brain homogenate, either unseeded or seeded in vitro with disease-related prions obtained from different species, was subjected to serial rounds of PMCA. De novo rabbit prions produced in vitro from unseeded material were tested for infectivity in rabbits, with one of three intracerebrally challenged animals succumbing to disease at 766 d and displaying all of the characteristics of a TSE, thereby demonstrating that leporids are not resistant to prion infection. Material from the brain of the clinically affected rabbit containing abnormal prion protein resulted in a 100% attack rate after its inoculation in transgenic mice overexpressing rabbit PrP. Transmissibility to rabbits (>470 d) has been confirmed in 2 of 10 rabbits after intracerebral challenge. Despite rabbits no longer being able to be classified as resistant to TSEs, an outbreak of “mad rabbit disease” is unlikely.
snip...
In summary, after 3 y postchallenge with three different rabbitderived inocula, we have obtained one positive clinical case, one possible preclinical case, two intercurrent deaths, and six animals that have remained healthy. Although the incubation periods do not directly correlate with the degree of susceptibility, these data might indicate that rabbits are poorly susceptible to prion infection. Although the rabbits used in this study were not inbred, they all had identical full-length PrP sequences and, to date, no difference has been detected in the ORF PrP sequence in any other published rabbit PrP sequence placed in GenBank. To further investigate this, two types of second passage experiment were performed; three raPrPTg mice and 10 rabbits were all intracerebrally inoculated using brain homogenate from the clinically affected rabbit. In contrast to 100% of the de novo RaPrPSc-inoculated transgenic mice having succumbed to a standard clinical prion disease and thereby demonstrating a high rate of transmissibility in vivo, two of 10 rabbits developed a TSE (477 and 540 dpi, respectively) to date. A plausible explanation for the evident differences between these two transmission studies would be the high level of rabbit PrPC expression (4- to 6-fold) in the murine model. In addition, it is well known that even if overexpression does not increase susceptibility, it can significantly reduce the incubation time of disease (2). However, the two positive TSE cases in the second rabbit passage, even though 8 rabbits remained clinically normal at 560 dpi, have led us to conclude that rabbits can no longer be considered a prionresistant species. The long incubation times, even after a second passage, might be due to the presence of some unknown, and probably rare, susceptibility factor in rabbits, which may also be present, for example, in equids and canids.
To critically evaluate this risk, several experiments are currently underway to characterize this new prion disease in rabbits and other species to examine its ability to cross the species barrier. In addition, supplementary experiments have been initiated in rabbits and also in transgenic mice that overexpress rabbit PrPC, to evaluate their susceptibilities to other important prion diseases including CWD and BSE. There are several factors that any potential new TSE epidemic would require: (i) the new prion should be efficiently transmitted through the homologous species; (ii) animals should be edible by humans and should be slaughtered at an age at which the disease has developed, thereby increasing the chance that prions have replicated (especially for those prions that require long incubation times); and (iii) the meat and bone meal should be recycled and fed to new members of the same species. In the light of these data and taking into account the previous three factors, it is unlikely there will be an outbreak of “mad rabbit disease,” and consumers of rabbit meat face much less of a risk than consumers of cattle or sheep products.
THE USA FDA MAD COW FEED BAN OF 1997 WAS NOTHING MORE THAN INK ON PAPER, NEVER ENFORCED...terry
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2019
FDA Reports on VFD Compliance
Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary.
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 21, 2019
In vitro detection of haematogenous prions in white-tailed deer orally dosed with low concentrations of chronic wasting disease
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 06, 2019
Estimating relative CWD susceptibility and disease progression in farmed white-tailed deer with rare PRNP alleles
> However, to date, no CWD infections have been reported in people.
key word here is ‘reported’. science has shown that CWD in humans will look like sporadic CJD. SO, how can one assume that CWD has not already transmitted to humans? they can’t, and it’s as simple as that. from all recorded science to date, CWD has already transmitted to humans, and it’s being misdiagnosed as sporadic CJD. …terry
*** LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ ***
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion aka mad deer disease zoonosis
We hypothesize that:
(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;
(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;
(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans; and
(4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.
ZOONOTIC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE
Prion 2017 Conference
First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress Stefanie Czub1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Christiane Stahl-Hennig3, Michael Beekes4, Hermann Schaetzl5 and Dirk Motzkus6 1
University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine/Canadian Food Inspection Agency; 2Universitatsklinikum des Saarlandes und Medizinische Fakultat der Universitat des Saarlandes; 3 Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen; 4 Robert-Koch-Institut Berlin; 5 University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine; 6 presently: Boehringer Ingelheim Veterinary Research Center; previously: Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen
This is a progress report of a project which started in 2009. 21 cynomolgus macaques were challenged with characterized CWD material from white-tailed deer (WTD) or elk by intracerebral (ic), oral, and skin exposure routes. Additional blood transfusion experiments are supposed to assess the CWD contamination risk of human blood product. Challenge materials originated from symptomatic cervids for ic, skin scarification and partially per oral routes (WTD brain). Challenge material for feeding of muscle derived from preclinical WTD and from preclinical macaques for blood transfusion experiments. We have confirmed that the CWD challenge material contained at least two different CWD agents (brain material) as well as CWD prions in muscle-associated nerves.
Here we present first data on a group of animals either challenged ic with steel wires or per orally and sacrificed with incubation times ranging from 4.5 to 6.9 years at postmortem. Three animals displayed signs of mild clinical disease, including anxiety, apathy, ataxia and/or tremor. In four animals wasting was observed, two of those had confirmed diabetes. All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals. Protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuiC) and PET-blot assays to further substantiate these findings are on the way, as well as bioassays in bank voles and transgenic mice.
At present, a total of 10 animals are sacrificed and read-outs are ongoing. Preclinical incubation of the remaining macaques covers a range from 6.4 to 7.10 years. Based on the species barrier and an incubation time of > 5 years for BSE in macaques and about 10 years for scrapie in macaques, we expected an onset of clinical disease beyond 6 years post inoculation.
PRION 2017 DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice
Hermann M. Schatzl, Samia Hannaoui, Yo-Ching Cheng, Sabine Gilch (Calgary Prion Research Unit, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada) Michael Beekes (RKI Berlin), Walter Schulz-Schaeffer (University of Homburg/Saar, Germany), Christiane Stahl-Hennig (German Primate Center) & Stefanie Czub (CFIA Lethbridge).
To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys. Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years.
After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were detected in spinal cord and brain of some euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and pre-clinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles.
Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate.
The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD..
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
READING OVER THE PRION 2018 ABSTRACT BOOK, LOOKS LIKE THEY FOUND THAT from this study ;
P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States
Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1) (1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA..
SEEMS THAT THEY FOUND Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD
states.
states.
AND ANOTHER STUDY;
P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease
Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2) (1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio..
IN THIS STUDY, THERE WERE autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017,
AND
included 104 patients. SEEMS THEY FOUND THAT The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%),
AND
THAT The Majority of cases were male (60%), AND half of them had exposure to wild game.
snip…
see more on Prion 2017 Macaque study from Prion 2017 Conference and other updated science on cwd tse prion zoonosis below…terry
PRION 2019 ABSTRACTS
1. Interspecies transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent
Justin Greenlee
Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, USDA Agriculture Research Service
ABSTRACT
The presentation will summarize the results of various studies conducted at our research center that assess the transmissibility of the chronic wasting disease (CWD) agent to cattle, pigs, raccoons, goats, and sheep. This will include specifics of the relative attack rates, clinical signs, and microscopic lesions with emphasis on how to differentiate cross-species transmission of the CWD agent from the prion diseases that naturally occur in hosts such as cattle or sheep. Briefly, the relative difficulty of transmitting the CWD agent to sheep and goats will be contrasted with the relative ease of transmitting the scrapie agent to white-tailed deer.
53. Evaluation of the inter-species transmission potential of different CWD isolates
Rodrigo Moralesa, Carlos Kramma,b, Paulina Sotoa, Adam Lyona, Sandra Pritzkowa, Claudio Sotoa
aMitchell Center for Alzheimer’s disease and Related Brain Disorders, Dept. of Neurology, McGovern School of Medicine University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, TX, USA; bFacultad de Medicina, Universidad de los Andes, Santiago, Chile
ABSTRACT
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) has reached epidemic proportions in North America and has been identified in South Korea and Northern Europe. CWD-susceptible cervid species are known to share habitats with humans and other animals entering the human food chain. At present, the potential of CWD to infect humans and other animal species is not completely clear. The exploration of this issue acquires further complexity considering the differences in the prion protein sequence due to species-specific variations and polymorphic changes within species. While several species of cervids are naturally affected by CWD, white-tailed deer (WTD) is perhaps the most relevant due to its extensive use in hunting and as a source of food. Evaluation of inter-species prion infections using animals or mouse models is costly and time consuming. We and others have shown that the Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) technology reproduces, in an accelerated and inexpensive manner, the inter-species transmission of prions while preserving the strain features of the input PrPSc. In this work, we tested the potential of different WTD-derived CWD isolates to transmit to humans and other animal species relevant for human consumption using PMCA. For these experiments, CWD isolates homozygous for the most common WTD-PrP polymorphic changes (G96S) were used (96SS variant obtained from a pre-symptomatic prion infected WTD). Briefly, 96GG and 96SS CWD prions were adapted in homologous or heterologous substrate by PMCA through several (15) rounds. End products, as well as intermediates across the process, were tested for their inter-species transmission potentials. A similar process was followed to assess seed-templated misfolding of ovine, porcine, and bovine PrPC. Our results show differences on the inter-species transmission potentials of the four adapted materials generated (PrPC/PrPSc polymorphic combinations), being the homologous combinations of seed/substrate the ones with the greater apparent zoonotic potential. Surprisingly, 96SS prions adapted in homologous substrate were the ones showing the easiest potential to template PrPC misfolding from other animal species. In summary, our results show that a plethora of different CWD isolates, each comprising different potentials for inter-species transmission, may exist in the environment. These experiments may help to clarify an uncertain and potentially worrisome public health issue. Additional research in this area may be useful to advise on the design of regulations intended to stop the spread of CWD and predict unwanted zoonotic events.
56. Understanding chronic wasting disease spread potential for at-risk species
Catherine I. Cullingham, Anh Dao, Debbie McKenzie and David W. Coltman
Department of Biological Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton AB, Canada
CONTACT Catherine I. Cullingham cathy.cullingham@ualberta.ca
ABSTRACT
Genetic variation can be linked to susceptibility or resistance to a disease, and this information can help to better understand spread-risk in a population. Wildlife disease incidence is increasing, and this is resulting in negative impacts on the economy, biodiversity, and in some instances, human health. If we can find genetic variation that helps to inform which individuals are susceptible, then we can use this information on at-risk populations to better manage negative consequences. Chronic wasting disease, a fatal, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy of cervids (both wild and captive), continues to spread geographically, which has resulted in an increasing host-range. The disease agent (PrPCWD) is a misfolded conformer of native cellular protein (PrPC). In Canada, the disease is endemic in Alberta and Saskatchewan, infecting primarily mule deer and white-tail deer, with a smaller impact on elk and moose populations. As the extent of the endemic area continues to expand, additional species will be exposed to this disease, including bison, bighorn sheep, mountain goat, and pronghorn antelope. To better understand the potential spread-risk among these species, we reviewed the current literature on species that have been orally exposed to CWD to identify susceptible and resistant species. We then compared the amino acid polymorphisms of PrPC among these species to determine whether any sites were linked to susceptibility or resistance to CWD infection. We sequenced the entire PrP coding region in 578 individuals across at-risk populations to evaluate their potential susceptibility. Three amino acid sites (97, 170, and 174; human numbering) were significantly associated with susceptibility, but these were not fully discriminating. All but one species among the resistant group shared the same haplotype, and the same for the susceptible species. For the at-risk species, bison had the resistant haplotype, while bighorn sheep and mountain goats were closely associated with the resistant type. Pronghorn antelope and a newly identified haplotype in moose differed from the susceptible haplotype, but were still closely associated with it. These data suggest pronghorn antelope will be susceptible to CWD while bison are likely to be resistant. Based on this data, recommendations can be made regarding species to be monitored for possible CWD infection.
KEYWORDS: Chronic wasting disease; Prnp; wildlife disease; population genetics; ungulates
Thursday, May 23, 2019
Prion 2019 Emerging Concepts CWD, BSE, SCRAPIE, CJD, SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM Schedule and Abstracts
see full Prion 2019 Conference Abstracts
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 04, 2018
Cervid to human prion transmission 5R01NS088604-04 Update
ZOONOTIC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE
Prion 2017 Conference
First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress Stefanie Czub1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Christiane Stahl-Hennig3, Michael Beekes4, Hermann Schaetzl5 and Dirk Motzkus6 1
University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine/Canadian Food Inspection Agency; 2Universitatsklinikum des Saarlandes und Medizinische Fakultat der Universitat des Saarlandes; 3 Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen; 4 Robert-Koch-Institut Berlin; 5 University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine; 6 presently: Boehringer Ingelheim Veterinary Research Center; previously: Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen
This is a progress report of a project which started in 2009. 21 cynomolgus macaques were challenged with characterized CWD material from white-tailed deer (WTD) or elk by intracerebral (ic), oral, and skin exposure routes. Additional blood transfusion experiments are supposed to assess the CWD contamination risk of human blood product. Challenge materials originated from symptomatic cervids for ic, skin scarification and partially per oral routes (WTD brain). Challenge material for feeding of muscle derived from preclinical WTD and from preclinical macaques for blood transfusion experiments. We have confirmed that the CWD challenge material contained at least two different CWD agents (brain material) as well as CWD prions in muscle-associated nerves.
Here we present first data on a group of animals either challenged ic with steel wires or per orally and sacrificed with incubation times ranging from 4.5 to 6.9 years at postmortem. Three animals displayed signs of mild clinical disease, including anxiety, apathy, ataxia and/or tremor. In four animals wasting was observed, two of those had confirmed diabetes. All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals. Protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuiC) and PET-blot assays to further substantiate these findings are on the way, as well as bioassays in bank voles and transgenic mice.
At present, a total of 10 animals are sacrificed and read-outs are ongoing. Preclinical incubation of the remaining macaques covers a range from 6.4 to 7.10 years. Based on the species barrier and an incubation time of > 5 years for BSE in macaques and about 10 years for scrapie in macaques, we expected an onset of clinical disease beyond 6 years post inoculation.
PRION 2017 DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice
Hermann M. Schatzl, Samia Hannaoui, Yo-Ching Cheng, Sabine Gilch (Calgary Prion Research Unit, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada) Michael Beekes (RKI Berlin), Walter Schulz-Schaeffer (University of Homburg/Saar, Germany), Christiane Stahl-Hennig (German Primate Center) & Stefanie Czub (CFIA Lethbridge).
To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys. Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years.
After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were detected in spinal cord and brain of some euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and pre-clinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles.
Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate.
The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD..
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
READING OVER THE PRION 2018 ABSTRACT BOOK, LOOKS LIKE THEY FOUND THAT from this study ;
P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States
Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1) (1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA..
SEEMS THAT THEY FOUND Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD
states.
states.
AND ANOTHER STUDY;
P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease
Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2) (1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio..
IN THIS STUDY, THERE WERE autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017,
AND
included 104 patients. SEEMS THEY FOUND THAT The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%),
AND
THAT The Majority of cases were male (60%), AND half of them had exposure to wild game.
snip…
see more on Prion 2017 Macaque study from Prion 2017 Conference and other updated science on cwd tse prion zoonosis below…terry
PRION 2019 ABSTRACTS
1. Interspecies transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent
Justin Greenlee
Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, USDA Agriculture Research Service
ABSTRACT
The presentation will summarize the results of various studies conducted at our research center that assess the transmissibility of the chronic wasting disease (CWD) agent to cattle, pigs, raccoons, goats, and sheep. This will include specifics of the relative attack rates, clinical signs, and microscopic lesions with emphasis on how to differentiate cross-species transmission of the CWD agent from the prion diseases that naturally occur in hosts such as cattle or sheep. Briefly, the relative difficulty of transmitting the CWD agent to sheep and goats will be contrasted with the relative ease of transmitting the scrapie agent to white-tailed deer.
53. Evaluation of the inter-species transmission potential of different CWD isolates
Rodrigo Moralesa, Carlos Kramma,b, Paulina Sotoa, Adam Lyona, Sandra Pritzkowa, Claudio Sotoa
aMitchell Center for Alzheimer’s disease and Related Brain Disorders, Dept. of Neurology, McGovern School of Medicine University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, TX, USA; bFacultad de Medicina, Universidad de los Andes, Santiago, Chile
ABSTRACT
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) has reached epidemic proportions in North America and has been identified in South Korea and Northern Europe. CWD-susceptible cervid species are known to share habitats with humans and other animals entering the human food chain. At present, the potential of CWD to infect humans and other animal species is not completely clear. The exploration of this issue acquires further complexity considering the differences in the prion protein sequence due to species-specific variations and polymorphic changes within species. While several species of cervids are naturally affected by CWD, white-tailed deer (WTD) is perhaps the most relevant due to its extensive use in hunting and as a source of food. Evaluation of inter-species prion infections using animals or mouse models is costly and time consuming. We and others have shown that the Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) technology reproduces, in an accelerated and inexpensive manner, the inter-species transmission of prions while preserving the strain features of the input PrPSc. In this work, we tested the potential of different WTD-derived CWD isolates to transmit to humans and other animal species relevant for human consumption using PMCA. For these experiments, CWD isolates homozygous for the most common WTD-PrP polymorphic changes (G96S) were used (96SS variant obtained from a pre-symptomatic prion infected WTD). Briefly, 96GG and 96SS CWD prions were adapted in homologous or heterologous substrate by PMCA through several (15) rounds. End products, as well as intermediates across the process, were tested for their inter-species transmission potentials. A similar process was followed to assess seed-templated misfolding of ovine, porcine, and bovine PrPC. Our results show differences on the inter-species transmission potentials of the four adapted materials generated (PrPC/PrPSc polymorphic combinations), being the homologous combinations of seed/substrate the ones with the greater apparent zoonotic potential. Surprisingly, 96SS prions adapted in homologous substrate were the ones showing the easiest potential to template PrPC misfolding from other animal species. In summary, our results show that a plethora of different CWD isolates, each comprising different potentials for inter-species transmission, may exist in the environment. These experiments may help to clarify an uncertain and potentially worrisome public health issue. Additional research in this area may be useful to advise on the design of regulations intended to stop the spread of CWD and predict unwanted zoonotic events.
56. Understanding chronic wasting disease spread potential for at-risk species
Catherine I. Cullingham, Anh Dao, Debbie McKenzie and David W. Coltman
Department of Biological Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton AB, Canada
CONTACT Catherine I. Cullingham cathy.cullingham@ualberta.ca
ABSTRACT
Genetic variation can be linked to susceptibility or resistance to a disease, and this information can help to better understand spread-risk in a population. Wildlife disease incidence is increasing, and this is resulting in negative impacts on the economy, biodiversity, and in some instances, human health. If we can find genetic variation that helps to inform which individuals are susceptible, then we can use this information on at-risk populations to better manage negative consequences. Chronic wasting disease, a fatal, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy of cervids (both wild and captive), continues to spread geographically, which has resulted in an increasing host-range. The disease agent (PrPCWD) is a misfolded conformer of native cellular protein (PrPC). In Canada, the disease is endemic in Alberta and Saskatchewan, infecting primarily mule deer and white-tail deer, with a smaller impact on elk and moose populations. As the extent of the endemic area continues to expand, additional species will be exposed to this disease, including bison, bighorn sheep, mountain goat, and pronghorn antelope. To better understand the potential spread-risk among these species, we reviewed the current literature on species that have been orally exposed to CWD to identify susceptible and resistant species. We then compared the amino acid polymorphisms of PrPC among these species to determine whether any sites were linked to susceptibility or resistance to CWD infection. We sequenced the entire PrP coding region in 578 individuals across at-risk populations to evaluate their potential susceptibility. Three amino acid sites (97, 170, and 174; human numbering) were significantly associated with susceptibility, but these were not fully discriminating. All but one species among the resistant group shared the same haplotype, and the same for the susceptible species. For the at-risk species, bison had the resistant haplotype, while bighorn sheep and mountain goats were closely associated with the resistant type. Pronghorn antelope and a newly identified haplotype in moose differed from the susceptible haplotype, but were still closely associated with it. These data suggest pronghorn antelope will be susceptible to CWD while bison are likely to be resistant. Based on this data, recommendations can be made regarding species to be monitored for possible CWD infection.
KEYWORDS: Chronic wasting disease; Prnp; wildlife disease; population genetics; ungulates
Thursday, May 23, 2019
Prion 2019 Emerging Concepts CWD, BSE, SCRAPIE, CJD, SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM Schedule and Abstracts
see full Prion 2019 Conference Abstracts
*** now, let’s see what the authors said about this casual link, personal communications years ago, and then the latest on the zoonotic potential from CWD to humans from the TOKYO PRION 2016 CONFERENCE.
see where it is stated NO STRONG evidence. so, does this mean there IS casual evidence ???? “Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans”
From: TSS (216-119-163-189.ipset45.wt.net)
Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???
Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST
From: "Belay, Ermias"
To: Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM
Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
Dear Sir/Madam,
In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD.. That assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article and call me if you have questions or need more clarification (phone: 404-639-3091). Also, we do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with prion disease from eating venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in any other forum is limited to the patients we investigated.
Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
-----Original Message-----
From: Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM
Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM .......snip........end..............TSS
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008 1: Vet Res. 2008 Apr 3;39(4):41 A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease Sigurdson CJ.
snip...
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,
snip... full text ;
> However, to date, no CWD infections have been reported in people.
sporadic, spontaneous CJD, 85%+ of all human TSE, just not just happen. never in scientific literature has this been proven.
if one looks up the word sporadic or spontaneous at pubmed, you will get a laundry list of disease that are classified in such a way;
sporadic = 54,983 hits https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=sporadic
spontaneous = 325,650 hits https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=spontaneous
key word here is 'reported'. science has shown that CWD in humans will look like sporadic CJD. SO, how can one assume that CWD has not already transmitted to humans? they can't, and it's as simple as that. from all recorded science to date, CWD has already transmitted to humans, and it's being misdiagnosed as sporadic CJD. ...terry
*** LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ ***
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2019
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion and THE FEAST 2003 CDC an updated review of the science 2019
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 04, 2014
Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes 2005–2011
Authors, though, acknowledged the study was limited in geography and sample size and so it couldn't draw a conclusion about the risk to humans. They recommended more study. Dr. Ermias Belay was the report's principal author but he said New York and Oneida County officials are following the proper course by not launching a study. "There's really nothing to monitor presently. No one's sick," Belay said, noting the disease's incubation period in deer and elk is measured in years. "
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019
MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019
***> In conclusion, sensory symptoms and loss of reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome can be explained by neuropathological changes in the spinal cord. We conclude that the sensory symptoms and loss of lower limb reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome is due to pathology in the caudal spinal cord. <***
***> The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.<***
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
***> All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals.<***
***> In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II) <***
***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***
Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.
https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
PRION 2016 TOKYO
Saturday, April 23, 2016
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Taylor & Francis
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160
1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.
Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.
snip...
The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.
Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).
Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.
Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0
Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)
C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK
National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland
SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
IN CONFIDENCE
SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES
IN CONFIDENCE
A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes
Annick Le Dur*,?, Vincent Béringue*,?, Olivier Andréoletti?, Fabienne Reine*, Thanh Lan Laï*, Thierry Baron§, Bjørn Bratberg¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte?, Pierre Sarradin**, Sylvie L. Benestad¶, and Hubert Laude*,?? +Author Affiliations
*Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires and ?Génétique Biochimique et Cytogénétique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France; ?Unité Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène, 31066 Toulouse, France; §Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels, 69364 Lyon, France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology, National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway
***Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA (received for review March 21, 2005)
Abstract
Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that affect humans and animals and can transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation. Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and "cases" that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice.
*** These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.
OR
***The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
OR
*** Intriguingly, these conclusions suggest that some pathological features of Nor98 are reminiscent of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease.
OR here;
*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.
VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE ...price of prion poker goes up again $
OR-10: Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy is transmissible in bank voles
Romolo Nonno,1 Michele Di Bari,1 Laura Pirisinu,1 Claudia D’Agostino,1 Stefano Marcon,1 Geraldina Riccardi,1 Gabriele Vaccari,1 Piero Parchi,2 Wenquan Zou,3 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 Umberto Agrimi1 1Istituto Superiore di Sanità; Rome, Italy; 2Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Università di Bologna; Bologna, Italy; 3Case Western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA
Background. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is a recently described “sporadic”neurodegenerative disease involving prion protein aggregation, which has clinical similarities with non-Alzheimer dementias, such as fronto-temporal dementia. Currently, 30 cases of VPSPr have been reported in Europe and USA, of which 19 cases were homozygous for valine at codon 129 of the prion protein (VV), 8 were MV and 3 were MM. A distinctive feature of VPSPr is the electrophoretic pattern of PrPSc after digestion with proteinase K (PK). After PK-treatment, PrP from VPSPr forms a ladder-like electrophoretic pattern similar to that described in GSS cases. The clinical and pathological features of VPSPr raised the question of the correct classification of VPSPr among prion diseases or other forms of neurodegenerative disorders. Here we report preliminary data on the transmissibility and pathological features of VPSPr cases in bank voles.
Materials and Methods. Seven VPSPr cases were inoculated in two genetic lines of bank voles, carrying either methionine or isoleucine at codon 109 of the prion protein (named BvM109 and BvI109, respectively). Among the VPSPr cases selected, 2 were VV at PrP codon 129, 3 were MV and 2 were MM. Clinical diagnosis in voles was confirmed by brain pathological assessment and western blot for PK-resistant PrPSc (PrPres) with mAbs SAF32, SAF84, 12B2 and 9A2.
Results. To date, 2 VPSPr cases (1 MV and 1 MM) gave positive transmission in BvM109. Overall, 3 voles were positive with survival time between 290 and 588 d post inoculation (d.p.i.). All positive voles accumulated PrPres in the form of the typical PrP27–30, which was indistinguishable to that previously observed in BvM109 inoculated with sCJDMM1 cases.
In BvI109, 3 VPSPr cases (2 VV and 1 MM) showed positive transmission until now. Overall, 5 voles were positive with survival time between 281 and 596 d.p.i.. In contrast to what observed in BvM109, all BvI109 showed a GSS-like PrPSc electrophoretic pattern, characterized by low molecular weight PrPres. These PrPres fragments were positive with mAb 9A2 and 12B2, while being negative with SAF32 and SAF84, suggesting that they are cleaved at both the C-terminus and the N-terminus. Second passages are in progress from these first successful transmissions.
Conclusions. Preliminary results from transmission studies in bank voles strongly support the notion that VPSPr is a transmissible prion disease. Interestingly, VPSPr undergoes divergent evolution in the two genetic lines of voles, with sCJD-like features in BvM109 and GSS-like properties in BvI109.
The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.
THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 2020
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has updated the following chapter of the Accredited Veterinarian's Manual: Chapter 13 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Programs
FRIDAY, JANUARY 17, 2020
Montana Moose Tests Positive for Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PRION in Libby Area
Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks 2019 CWD Surveillance Hunter Test Results CWD TSE PRION LOOKS LIKE 136 POSITIVE SO FAR, count them up...
FRIDAY, JANUARY 17, 2020
Tennessee Approximately 400 deer tested positive for Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion
FRIDAY, JANUARY 17, 2020
North Dakota 11 Positive Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion detected since Sept 1, 2019
TUESDAY, JANUARY 07, 2020
Michigan Total CWD TSE Prion Positive Suspect-Positive Deer Jump To 174 confirmed to date
TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 2020
Michigan MDARD has confirmed chronic wasting disease (CWD) in 3 white-tailed deer from a Newaygo County deer farm
FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 2020
Minnesota Investigation leads to additional CWD positive deer on Pine County farm
THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 2020
Wisconsin Confirms CWD Detected In Marquette and Marathon County
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 08, 2020
Wisconsin Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Positives in Farm-raised Deer in 2019
The majority of the positives have come after 2013 when DATCP began letting some deer farms and hunting ranches continue operating after CWD was detected on their property.
TUESDAY, JANUARY 07, 2020
Oklahoma Farmed Elk Lincoln County CWD Depopulation 3 Positive Elk with 1 Additional Dead Trace Out Confirmed Positive
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2019
TEXAS Val Verde County White-tailed Deer Tests Positive for Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion State Positive NOW at 147 Confirmed
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2019
Texas TAHC, Administrative Code, Title 4, Part 2, Chapter 40, Chronic Wasting Disease Amendments Open For Comment beginning December 20, 2019 thru January 20, 2020 Terry Singeltary Comments Submission
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2019
TEXAS ANIMAL HEALTH COMMISSION EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ORDER DECLARING A CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE HIGH RISK AREA CONTAINMENT ZONE FOR PORTIONS OF VAL VERDE COUNTY
SUNDAY, JANUARY 05, 2020
Arkansas Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion 2019 to 2020 Totals As Of December 3, 2019 399 Confirmed with more pending results
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2019
Pennsylvania Steady Climb of CWD TSE Prion Confirms 250 Positive To Date In Wild Cervid As At September 12, 2019
Pennsylvania Captive Cervid Industry Total CWD TSE Prion ??? anyone's guess...
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 2019 In Vitro detection of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) prions in semen and reproductive tissues of white tailed deer bucks (Odocoileus virginianus
SUNDAY, AUGUST 02, 2015 TEXAS CWD, Have you been ThunderStruck, deer semen, straw bred bucks, super ovulation, and the potential TSE Prion connection, what if?
TUESDAY, JANUARY 07, 2020
Michigan Total CWD TSE Prion Positive Suspect-Positive Deer Jump To 174 confirmed to date
SATURDAY, JANUARY 04, 2020
Mississippi CWD TOTALS JUST ABOUT DOUBLE Since October 1, 2019 To Date Statewide Total is 37 Confirmed
THURSDAY, JANUARY 02, 2020
Missouri MDC officially reports more than 20 new cases of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 2019
Montana 16 more deer positive for CWD first time positive hunting district 705 in southeast
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2019
Illinois CWD TSE Prion 90 CWD-positive deer with 826 confirmed positive Total positives through June 30, 2019
CANADA CWD TSE PRION
Notice to Industry – Updates to the federal management of chronic wasting disease in farmed cervids March 15th, 2019 – Ottawa, ON – The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has updated its national chronic wasting disease (CWD) program to better focus on disease prevention and risk management.
Disease management is a shared responsibility. Efforts to eradicate CWD in the farmed cervid population have not been successful. The CFIA's current approach aims to reduce the risk of the disease spreading by encouraging producers to adopt strong risk mitigation measures.
Enrolling and participating in a Voluntary Herd Certification Program (VHCP) is important to help prevent the introduction of CWD to a farm. A VHCP requires enrolled producers to take measures to mitigate the risk of CWD, including ongoing surveillance testing of mature dead cervids and implementation of biosecurity measures.
Starting April 1, 2019, the CFIA will order depopulation with compensation only for affected herds that have achieved level D or higher of a VHCP. Generally, these herds will have participated in a VHCP for 12 months or more.
The CFIA will continue to investigate all animals suspected of having CWD and conduct confirmatory testing to determine whether CWD is present in a herd. Confirmation of CWD in a herd will trigger the CFIA's CWD disease response. The CFIA's CWD VHCP response includes movement controls, ordering destruction and disposal of infected herds, cleaning and disinfection of contaminated premises, and providing compensation to producers.
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2018
Quebec, Canada CFIA confirmed the discovery four new positive red deer Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in a deer farm
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2018
Québec federal officials found third case Chronic Wasting Disease CWD domestic red deer on a farm reported Boileau
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2018
Canada Saskatchewan New Case Of CWD TSE PRION Detected Near Melfort Released on November 7, 2018
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2018
Alberta, Canada 2017 Fall CWD TSE Prion Surveillance Results
TUESDAY, JULY 03, 2018
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Global Report Update, USA, CANADA, KOREA, NORWAY, FINLAND, Game Farms and Fake news
SUNDAY, JULY 14, 2019
Korea Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion additional cases were observed in red deer, sika deer, and their crossbred deer in 2010 and 2016, beyond that, anyone's guess
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2019
Norway Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Detected in Sixth Moose
A novel type of Chronic Wasting Disease detected in European moose ( Alces alces ) in Norway
Volume 24, Number 12—December 2018 Research Novel Type of Chronic Wasting Disease Detected in Moose (Alces alces), Norway
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2019
Sweden The third case of CWD in moose in Arjeplog is now established
SATURDAY, MARCH 10, 2018
FINLAND REPORTS FIRST CASE OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION IN A moose or European elk (Alces alces)
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2018
Norway New additional requirements for imports of hay and straw for animal feed from countries outside the EEA due to CWD TSE Prion
Norway New additional requirements for imports of hay and straw for animal feed from countries outside the EEA due to CWD TSE Prion
$$$$$
***> NORWAY CWD UPDATE December 2018
Report from the Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food and Environment (VKM) 2018: 16
Factors that can contribute to spread of CWD – an update on the situation in Nordfjella, Norway
Opinion of Panel on biological hazards of the Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food and Environment
13.12.2018
ISBN: 978-82-8259-316-8
ISSN: 2535-4019
Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food and Environment (VKM)
Po 222 Skøyen
0213 Oslo
Norway
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2018
Norway, Nordfjella VKM 2018 16 Factors that can contribute to spread of CWD TSE Prion UPDATE December 14, 2018
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2018
***> Norway New additional requirements for imports of hay and straw for animal feed from countries outside the EEA due to CWD TSE Prion
new link;
MONDAY, JUNE 12, 2017
Rethinking Major grain organizations opposition to CFIA's control zone approach to Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion Mad Deer Type Disease 2017?
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 05, 2014
CFIA CWD and Grain Screenings due to potential risk factor of spreading via contamination of grain, oil seeds, etc.
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2013
Uptake of Prions into Plants
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2019
Australia Assessment of bulk wheat from Canada Part B: Animal biosecurity risk advice, CWD TSE Prion concerns are mounting
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CONGRESS Serial No. 107-117 May 16, 2002
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE
JOINT OVERSIGHT HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORESTS AND FOREST HEALTH JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION
May 16, 2002
Serial No. 107-117
snip...
Mr. MCINNIS. Today, this joint Subcommittee hearing will explore an issue of immeasurable importance to the growing number of communities in wide-ranging parts of this country, the growing incidence of Chronic Wasting Disease in North America’s wild and captive deer and elk populations. In a matter of just a few months, this once parochial concern has grown into something much larger and much more insidious than anyone could have imagined or predicted.
As each day passes, this problem grows in its size, scope, and consequence. One thing becomes clear. Chronic Wasting Disease is not a Colorado problem. It is a Wisconsin problem or a Nebraska or Wyoming problem. It is a national problem and anything short of a fully integrated, systematic national assault on this simply will not do, which is precisely why we brought our group together here today.
snip...
So this is a disease that is spreading throughout the continent and it is going to require a national response as well as the efforts that are currently taking place in States like Wisconsin, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, the interest they now have down in Texas and some of the neighboring States that have large white-tailed deer population and also elk.
This is a huge issue for us, Mr. Chairman, in the State of Wisconsin. I want to commend Governor McCallum and your staff and the various agencies for the rapid response that you have shown, given the early detection of CWD after the last deer hunting season. The problem that we have, though, is just a lack of information, good science in regards to what is the best response, how dangerous is this disease. We cannot close the door, quite frankly, with the paucity of scientific research that is out there right now in regards to how the disease spreads, the exposure of other livestock herds—given the importance of our dairy industry in the State, that is a big issue—and also the human health effects.
TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2020
2004 European Commission Chronic wasting disease AND TISSUES THAT MIGHT CARRY A RISK FOR HUMAN FOOD AND ANIMAL FEED CHAINS REPORT UPDATED 2020
SATURDAY, JANUARY 18, 2020
United States wildlife and wildlife product imports from 2000–2014 and TSE PRION aka Mad Cow Type Disease
***> HUMAN TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE 1 IN 5,000 NOT ONE IN A MILLION!
***> I urge every Country around the Globe to Declare an Extraordinary Emergency Due To A Foreign Animal Disease Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion from the USA, Canada, and Mexico (they have no clue), all of North America should have this Declaration of Emergency against them, just like the one called way back when the shoe was on the other foot with the mad sheep of mad river valley, except this time, it's not a wag the dog false flag, this is for real...terry
MONDAY, JANUARY 20, 2020
sporadic CJD one in a million, FAKE NEWS PEOPLE!
this myth has been incorrect for decades, and had been stated as such by a few, but again, the media is too lazy to do it's job and print the facts.
WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019
Incomplete inactivation of atypical scrapie following recommended autoclave decontamination procedures USDA HERE'S YOUR SIGN!
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2019
Experts testify United States is underprepared for bioterrorism threats Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease
MONDAY, JUNE 24, 2019
APHIS, FSIS, USDA, FDA, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE, BSE, CWD, Scrapie, Camel TSE Prion Disease, CJD Humans
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2019
Sheep Are Susceptible to the Bovine Adapted Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy agent by Intracranial Inoculation and Have Evidence of Infectivity in Lymphoid Tissues
***> ''indicating that sheep inoculated with the bovine TME agent harbor infectivity in their lymph nodes despite a lack of detection with conventional immunoassays.''
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2019
Review: Update on Classical and Atypical Scrapie in Sheep and Goats
WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019
Incomplete inactivation of atypical scrapie following recommended autoclave decontamination procedures USDA HERE'S YOUR SIGN!
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2019
Estimating the impact on food and edible materials of changing scrapie control measures: The scrapie control model
FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 2019
USDA APHIS SCRAPIE TSE PRION Sheep and Goat Health Update 2019
THE tse prion aka mad cow type disease is not your normal pathogen.
The TSE prion disease survives ashing to 600 degrees celsius, that’s around 1112 degrees farenheit.
you cannot cook the TSE prion disease out of meat.
you can take the ash and mix it with saline and inject that ash into a mouse, and the mouse will go down with TSE.
Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production as well.
the TSE prion agent also survives Simulated Wastewater Treatment Processes.
IN fact, you should also know that the TSE Prion agent will survive in the environment for years, if not decades.
you can bury it and it will not go away.
The TSE agent is capable of infected your water table i.e. Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area.
it’s not your ordinary pathogen you can just cook it out and be done with.
***> that’s what’s so worrisome about Iatrogenic mode of transmission, a simple autoclave will not kill this TSE prion agent.
1: J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1994 Jun;57(6):757-8
***> Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease to a chimpanzee by electrodes contaminated during neurosurgery.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Asher DM, Kobrine A, Amyx HL, Sulima MP, Gajdusek DC.
Laboratory of Central Nervous System Studies, National Institute of
Neurological Disorders and Stroke, National Institutes of Health,
Bethesda, MD 20892.
Stereotactic multicontact electrodes used to probe the cerebral cortex of a middle aged woman with progressive dementia were previously implicated in the accidental transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) to two younger patients. The diagnoses of CJD have been confirmed for all three cases. More than two years after their last use in humans, after three cleanings and repeated sterilisation in ethanol and formaldehyde vapour, the electrodes were implanted in the cortex of a chimpanzee. Eighteen months later the animal became ill with CJD. This finding serves to re-emphasise the potential danger posed by reuse of instruments contaminated with the agents of spongiform encephalopathies, even after scrupulous attempts to clean them.
PMID: 8006664 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
172. Establishment of PrPCWD extraction and detection methods in the farm soil
Kyung Je Park, Hoo Chang Park, In Soon Roh, Hyo Jin Kim, Hae-Eun Kang and Hyun Joo Sohn
Foreign Animal Disease Division, Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency, Gimcheon, Gyeongsangbuk-do, Korea
ABSTRACT
Introduction: Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) is a fatal neurodegenerative disorder, which is so-called as prion diseases due to the causative agents (PrPSc). TSEs are believed to be due to the template-directed accumulation of disease-associated prion protein, generally designated PrPSc. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the prion disease that is known spread horizontally. CWD has confirmed last in Republic of Korea in 2016 since first outbreak of CWD in 2001. The environmental reservoirs mediate the transmission of this disease. The significant levels of infectivity have been detected in the saliva, urine, and faeces of TSE-infected animals. Soil can serve as a stable reservoir for infectious prion proteins. We found that PrPCWD can be extracted and detected in CWD contaminated soil which has kept at room temperature until 4 years after 0.001 ~ 1% CWD exposure and natural CWD-affected farm soil through PBS washing and sPMCAb.
Materials and Methods: Procedure of serial PMCAb. CWD contaminated soil which has kept at room temperature (RT) for 1 ~ 4 year after 0.001%~1% CWD brain homogenates exposure for 4 months collected 0.14 g. The soil was collected by the same method once of year until 4 year after stop CWD exposure. We had conducted the two steps. There are two kinds of 10 times washing step and one amplification step. The washing step was detached PrPSc from contaminated soil by strong vortex with maximum rpm. We harvest supernatant every time by 10 times. As the other washing step, the Washed soil was made by washing 10 times soil using slow rotator and then harvest resuspended PBS for removing large impurity material. Last step was prion amplification step for detection of PrPCWD in soil supernatant and the washed soil by sPMCAb. Normal brain homogenate (NBH) was prepared by homogenization of brains with glass dounce in 9 volumes of cold PBS with TritonX-100, 5 mM EDTA, 150 mM NaCl and 0.05% Digitonin (sigma) plus Complete mini protease inhibitors (Roche) to a final concentration of 5%(w/v) NBHs were centrifuged at 2000 g for 1 min, and supernatant removed and frozen at −70 C for use. CWD consisted of brain from natural case in Korea and was prepared as 10%(w/v) homogenate. Positive sample was diluted to a final dilution 1:1000 in NBH, with serial 3:7 dilutions in NBH. Sonication was performed with a Misonix 4000 sonicator with amplitude set to level 70, generating an average output of 160W with two teflon beads during each cycle. One round consisted of 56 cycles of 30 s of sonication followed 9 min 30 s of 37°C incubation. Western Blotting (WB) for PrPSc detection. The samples (20 µL) after each round of amplification were mixed with proteinase K (2 mg/ml) and incubated 37°C for 1 h. Samples were separated by SDS-PAGE and transferred onto PVDF membrane. After blocking, the membrane was incubated for 1 h with 1st antibody S1 anti rabbit serum (APQA, 1:3000) and developed with enhanced chemiluminescence detection system.
Results: We excluded from first to third supernatant in view of sample contamination. It was confirmed abnormal PrP amplification in all soil supernatants from fourth to tenth. From 0.01% to 1% contaminated washed soils were identified as abnormal prions. 0.001% contaminated washed soil did not show PrP specific band (Fig 1). The soil was collected by the same method once of year until 4 year after stop CWD exposure. After sPMCAb, there were no PrPCWD band in from second to fourth year 0.001% washed soil. but It was confirmed that the abnormal prion was amplified in the washing supernatant which was not amplified in the washed soil. we have decided to use soil supernatant for soil testing (Fig. 2). After third rounds of amplification, PrPSc signals observed in three out of four sites from CWD positive farm playground. No signals were observed in all soil samples from four CWD negative farm (Fig. 3).
Conclusions: Our studies showed that PrPCWD persist in 0.001% CWD contaminated soil for at least 4 year and natural CWD-affected farm soil. When cervid reintroduced into CWD outbreak farm, the strict decontamination procedures of the infectious agent should be performed in the environment of CWD-affected cervid habitat.
===
186. Serial detection of hematogenous prions in CWD-infected deer
Amy V. Nalls, Erin E. McNulty, Nathaniel D. Denkers, Edward A. Hoover and Candace K. Mathiason
Department of Microbiology, Immunology, and Pathology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA
CONTACT Amy V. Nalls amy.nalls@colostate.edu
ABSTRACT
Blood contains the infectious agent associated with prion disease affecting several mammalian species, including humans, cervids, sheep, and cattle. It has been confirmed that sufficient prion agent is present in the blood of both symptomatic and asymptomatic carriers to initiate the amyloid templating and accumulation process that results in this fatal neurodegenerative disease. Yet, to date, the ability to detect blood-borne prions by in vitro methods remains difficult.
We have capitalized on blood samples collected from longitudinal chronic wasting disease (CWD) studies in the native white-tailed deer host to examine hematogenous prion load in blood collected minutes, days, weeks and months post exposure. Our work has focused on refinement of the amplification methods RT-QuIC and PMCA. We demonstrate enhanced in vitro detection of amyloid seeding activity (prions) in blood cell fractions harvested from deer orally-exposed to 300 ng CWD positive brain or saliva.
These findings permit assessment of the role hematogenous prions play in the pathogenesis of CWD and provide tools to assess the same for prion diseases of other mammalian species.
Considering the oral secretion of prions, saliva from CWD-infected deer was shown to transmit disease to other susceptible naïve deer when harvested from the animals in both the
and preclinical stages69
of infection, albeit within relatively large volumes of saliva (50 ml). In sheep with preclinical, natural scrapie infections, sPMCA facilitated the detection of PrPSc within buccal swabs throughout most of the incubation period of the disease with an apparent peak in prion secretion around the mid-term of disease progression.70
The amounts of prion present in saliva are likely to be low as indicated by CWD-infected saliva producing prolonged incubation periods and incomplete attack rates within the transgenic mouse bioassay.41
snip...
Indeed, it has also been shown that the scrapie and CWD prions are excreted in urine, feces and saliva and are likely to be excreted from skin. While levels of prion within these excreta/secreta are very low, they are produced throughout long periods of preclinical disease as well as clinical disease. Furthermore, the levels of prion in such materials are likely to be increased by concurrent inflammatory conditions affecting the relevant secretory organ or site. Such dissemination of prion into the environment is very likely to facilitate the repeat exposure of flockmates to low levels of the disease agent, possibly over years.
snip...
Given the results with scrapie-contaminated milk and CWD-contaminated saliva, it seems very likely that these low levels of prion in different secreta/excreta are capable of transmitting disease upon prolonged exposure, either through direct animal-to-animal contact or through environmental reservoirs of infectivity.
the other part, these tissues and things in the body then shed or secrete prions which then are the route to other animals into the environment, so in particular, the things, the secretions that are infectious are salvia, feces, blood and urine. so pretty much anything that comes out of a deer is going to be infectious and potential for transmitting disease.
***>>> Recently, we have been using PMCA to study the role of environmental prion contamination on the horizontal spreading of TSEs. These experiments have focused on the study of the interaction of prions with plants and environmentally relevant surfaces. Our results show that plants (both leaves and roots) bind tightly to prions present in brain extracts and excreta (urine and feces) and retain even small quantities of PrPSc for long periods of time. Strikingly, ingestion of prioncontaminated leaves and roots produced disease with a 100% attack rate and an incubation period not substantially longer than feeding animals directly with scrapie brain homogenate. Furthermore, plants can uptake prions from contaminated soil and transport them to different parts of the plant tissue (stem and leaves). Similarly, prions bind tightly to a variety of environmentally relevant surfaces, including stones, wood, metals, plastic, glass, cement, etc. Prion contaminated surfaces efficiently transmit prion disease when these materials were directly injected into the brain of animals and strikingly when the contaminated surfaces were just placed in the animal cage. These findings demonstrate that environmental materials can efficiently bind infectious prions and act as carriers of infectivity, suggesting that they may play an important role in the horizontal transmission of the disease.
========================
Since its invention 13 years ago, PMCA has helped to answer fundamental questions of prion propagation and has broad applications in research areas including the food industry, blood bank safety and human and veterinary disease diagnosis.
2018 - 2019
***> This is very likely to have parallels with control efforts for CWD in cervids.
Rapid recontamination of a farm building occurs after attempted prion removal
Kevin Christopher Gough, BSc (Hons), PhD1, Claire Alison Baker, BSc (Hons)2, Steve Hawkins, MIBiol3, Hugh Simmons, BVSc, MRCVS, MBA, MA3, Timm Konold, DrMedVet, PhD, MRCVS3 and Ben Charles Maddison, BSc (Hons), PhD2
Abstract
The transmissible spongiform encephalopathy scrapie of sheep/goats and chronic wasting disease of cervids are associated with environmental reservoirs of infectivity.
Preventing environmental prions acting as a source of infectivity to healthy animals is of major concern to farms that have had outbreaks of scrapie and also to the health management of wild and farmed cervids.
Here, an efficient scrapie decontamination protocol was applied to a farm with high levels of environmental contamination with the scrapie agent.
Post-decontamination, no prion material was detected within samples taken from the farm buildings as determined using a sensitive in vitro replication assay (sPMCA).
A bioassay consisting of 25 newborn lambs of highly susceptible prion protein genotype VRQ/VRQ introduced into this decontaminated barn was carried out in addition to sampling and analysis of dust samples that were collected during the bioassay.
Twenty-four of the animals examined by immunohistochemical analysis of lymphatic tissues were scrapie-positive during the bioassay, samples of dust collected within the barn were positive by month 3.
The data illustrates the difficulty in decontaminating farm buildings from scrapie, and demonstrates the likely contribution of farm dust to the recontamination of these environments to levels that are capable of causing disease.
snip...
As in the authors' previous study,12 the decontamination of this sheep barn was not effective at removing scrapie infectivity, and despite the extra measures brought into this study (more effective chemical treatment and removal of sources of dust) the overall rates of disease transmission mirror previous results on this farm. With such apparently effective decontamination (assuming that at least some sPMCA seeding ability is coincident with infectivity), how was infectivity able to persist within the environment and where does infectivity reside? Dust samples were collected in both the bioassay barn and also a barn subject to the same decontamination regime within the same farm (but remaining unoccupied). Within both of these barns dust had accumulated for three months that was able to seed sPMCA, indicating the accumulation of scrapie-containing material that was independent of the presence of sheep that may have been incubating and possibly shedding low amounts of infectivity.
This study clearly demonstrates the difficulty in removing scrapie infectivity from the farm environment. Practical and effective prion decontamination methods are still urgently required for decontamination of scrapie infectivity from farms that have had cases of scrapie and this is particularly relevant for scrapiepositive goatherds, which currently have limited genetic resistance to scrapie within commercial breeds.24 This is very likely to have parallels with control efforts for CWD in cervids.
Acknowledgements The authors thank the APHA farm staff, Tony Duarte, Olly Roberts and Margaret Newlands for preparation of the sheep pens and animal husbandry during the study. The authors also thank the APHA pathology team for RAMALT and postmortem examination.
Funding This study was funded by DEFRA within project SE1865.
Competing interests None declared.
Saturday, January 5, 2019
Rapid recontamination of a farm building occurs after attempted prion removal
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2019
BSE infectivity survives burial for five years with only limited spread
***> CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS PRION CONFERENCE 2018
P69 Experimental transmission of CWD from white-tailed deer to co-housed reindeer
Mitchell G (1), Walther I (1), Staskevicius A (1), Soutyrine A (1), Balachandran A (1)
(1) National & OIE Reference Laboratory for Scrapie and CWD, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) continues to be detected in wild and farmed cervid populations of North America, affecting predominantly white-tailed deer, mule deer and elk. Extensive herds of wild caribou exist in northern regions of Canada, although surveillance has not detected the presence of CWD in this population. Oral experimental transmission has demonstrated that reindeer, a species closely related to caribou, are susceptible to CWD. Recently, CWD was detected for the first time in Europe, in wild Norwegian reindeer, advancing the possibility that caribou in North America could also become infected. Given the potential overlap in habitat between wild CWD-infected cervids and wild caribou herds in Canada, we sought to investigate the horizontal transmissibility of CWD from white-tailed deer to reindeer.
Two white-tailed deer were orally inoculated with a brain homogenate prepared from a farmed Canadian white-tailed deer previously diagnosed with CWD. Two reindeer, with no history of exposure to CWD, were housed in the same enclosure as the white-tailed deer, 3.5 months after the deer were orally inoculated. The white-tailed deer developed clinical signs consistent with CWD beginning at 15.2 and 21 months post-inoculation (mpi), and were euthanized at 18.7 and 23.1 mpi, respectively. Confirmatory testing by immunohistochemistry (IHC) and western blot demonstrated widespread aggregates of pathological prion protein (PrPCWD) in the central nervous system and lymphoid tissues of both inoculated white-tailed deer. Both reindeer were subjected to recto-anal mucosal associated lymphoid tissue (RAMALT) biopsy at 20 months post-exposure (mpe) to the white-tailed deer. The biopsy from one reindeer contained PrPCWD confirmed by IHC. This reindeer displayed only subtle clinical evidence of disease prior to a rapid decline in condition requiring euthanasia at 22.5 mpe. Analysis of tissues from this reindeer by IHC revealed widespread PrPCWD deposition, predominantly in central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissues. Western blot molecular profiles were similar between both orally inoculated white-tailed deer and the CWD positive reindeer. Despite sharing the same enclosure, the other reindeer was RAMALT negative at 20 mpe, and PrPCWD was not detected in brainstem and lymphoid tissues following necropsy at 35 mpe. Sequencing of the prion protein gene from both reindeer revealed differences at several codons, which may have influenced susceptibility to infection.
Natural transmission of CWD occurs relatively efficiently amongst cervids, supporting the expanding geographic distribution of disease and the potential for transmission to previously naive populations. The efficient horizontal transmission of CWD from white-tailed deer to reindeer observed here highlights the potential for reindeer to become infected if exposed to other cervids or environments infected with CWD.
***> Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years
***> Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded.
Gudmundur Georgsson,1 Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3
Correspondence
Gudmundur Georgsson ggeorgs@hi.is
1 Institute for Experimental Pathology, University of Iceland, Keldur v/vesturlandsveg, IS-112 Reykjavı´k, Iceland
2 Laboratory of the Chief Veterinary Officer, Keldur, Iceland
3 Bethesda, Maryland, USA
Received 7 March 2006 Accepted 6 August 2006
In 1978, a rigorous programme was implemented to stop the spread of, and subsequently eradicate, sheep scrapie in Iceland. Affected flocks were culled, premises were disinfected and, after 2–3 years, restocked with lambs from scrapie-free areas. Between 1978 and 2004, scrapie recurred on 33 farms. Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded. Of special interest was one farm with a small, completely self-contained flock where scrapie recurred 18 years after culling, 2 years after some lambs had been housed in an old sheephouse that had never been disinfected. Epidemiological investigation established with near certitude that the disease had not been introduced from the outside and it is concluded that the agent may have persisted in the old sheep-house for at least 16 years.
TITLE: PATHOLOGICAL FEATURES OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE IN REINDEER AND DEMONSTRATION OF HORIZONTAL TRANSMISSION
*** DECEMBER 2016 CDC EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE JOURNAL CWD HORIZONTAL TRANSMISSION
SEE;
Back around 2000, 2001, or so, I was corresponding with officials abroad during the bse inquiry, passing info back and forth, and some officials from here inside USDA aphis FSIS et al. In fact helped me get into the USA 50 state emergency BSE conference call way back. That one was a doozy. But I always remember what “deep throat” I never knew who they were, but I never forgot;
Some unofficial information from a source on the inside looking out -
Confidential!!!!
As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland. Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!! A very frightening revelation!!!
---end personal email---end...tss
Infectivity surviving ashing to 600*C is (in my opinion) degradable but infective. based on Bown & Gajdusek, (1991), landfill and burial may be assumed to have a reduction factor of 98% (i.e. a factor of 50) over 3 years. CJD-infected brain-tissue remained infectious after storing at room-temperature for 22 months (Tateishi et al, 1988). Scrapie agent is known to remain viable after at least 30 months of desiccation (Wilson et al, 1950). and pastures that had been grazed by scrapie-infected sheep still appeared to be contaminated with scrapie agent three years after they were last occupied by sheep (Palsson, 1979).
Dr. Paul Brown Scrapie Soil Test BSE Inquiry Document
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2019
BSE infectivity survives burial for five years with only limited spread
2002 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy Update
Ray Bradley
Veterinary Laboratories Agency, New Haw, Addlestone, KT15 3NB, United Kingdom, Email: raybradley@btinternet.com
Received 8 July 2002, accepted 24 July 2002
snip...
TSE IN CAPTIVE WILD ANIMALS
TSE almost certainly related to BSE (but as yet not proven by experimental challenge) has been reported in five species of captive wild Felidae in Great Britain (GB) (Bradley 1997). These are: cheetah 5 cases (with five further cases in cheetah exported from the UK to Ireland (1), Australia (1) and France (2+1unknown)), lions 3, ocelots 3, pumas 3 and tigers 3. All of these are assumed to have been exposed following consumption of uncooked cattle carcasses containing infected central nervous tissue. This might have been present in heads, necks or other parts of the vertebral column. Protection was secured by the 1990 SBO ban and there have been very few cases that were born thereafter. TSE has also been reported in captive wild Bovidae in GB (Bradley 1997), but not elsewhere or in any natural environment inhabited by these animals. Eight species have been affected. In two, a nyala and a greater kudu, brain tissue has been inoculated into in-bred strains of mice. This shows the disease is experimentally transmissible and that the agent responsible is biologically indistinguishable from the BSE agent, i.e. it is of the same strain type (Bruce et al. 1994). The number of confirmed TSE by species is: Arabian oryx, bison, gemsbok, nyala and scimitar-horned oryx, one each; ankole, two; eland and greater kudu, six. All these species have presumably been exposed to infected MBM in concentrate diets that had similar formulations to those used in cattle feed before 1988. The reason for the cases occurring after 1988 (BAB cases) is, as in cattle, presumably cross contamination of diets with MBM intended for use in non-ruminant species. So far as records permit, no cases have been reported in animals born after January 1993.
BSE is considered to occur in 16 species: cattle, domestic cats, nyala and greater kudu (types of antelopes), gemsbok, eland, Arabian oryx, scimitar-horned oryx, ankole, bison, cheetah, lion, tiger, puma, ocelot and humans (brains from Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) patients). Other than feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE) in domestic cats, all these are rare diseases in captive wild animals in the UK. Cases of FSE have also been found in cheetah in Ireland, France and Australia, but only in captive animals exported from the UK. There have not been any reports of naturally occurring cases of TSE in pigs or poultry. The spread of BSE is associated with concentrate feeding and the vehicle of infectivity was meat and bonemeal (MBM). There is continuing controversy on the origin of BSE. There were changes in rendering practices and evidence suggest this may have changed the evolution of the epidemic.
It was thought likely that at least some, and probably all, of the cases in zoo animals were caused by the BSE agent. Strong support for this hypothesis came from the findings of Bruce and others (1994) ( Bruce, M.E., Chree, A., McConnell, I., Foster, J., Pearson, G. & Fraser, H. (1994) Transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy and scrapie to mice: strain variation and species barrier. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 343, 405-411: J/PTRSL/343/405 ), who demonstrated that the pattern of variation in incubation period and lesion profile in six strains of mice inoculated with brain homogenates from an affected kudu and the nyala, was similar to that seen when this panel of mouse strains was inoculated with brain from cattle with BSE. The affected zoo bovids were all from herds that were exposed to feeds that were likely to have contained contaminated ruminant-derived protein and the zoo felids had been exposed, if only occasionally in some cases, to tissues from cattle unfit for human consumption.
snip...
10. The case of SE in a cheetah that occurred during the period, involved a 7 year-old female which had been born and lived all her life at Whipsnade (except for the final stages when she was moved to the Animal Hospital at Regent’s Park for diagnosis and treatment). This animal, which died in December 1993, had been fed on cuts of meat and bone from carcases of cattle unfit for human consumption and it was thought likely that she had been exposed to spinal cord (Kirkwood, J.K., Cunningham, A.A., Flach, E.J., Thornton, S.M. & Wells, G.A.H. (1995) Spongiform encephalopathy in another captive cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus): evidence for variation in susceptibility or incubation periods between species. Journal of Zoo and Wildlife Medicine 26, 577-582: J/ZWM/26/577).
11. During the period we also collated information on cases of SE that occurred in wild animals at or from other zoos in the British Isles. The total number of cases of which I was aware in June 1996, when I presented a review on occurrence of spongiform encephalopathies in zoo animals (at the Royal College of Pathologists’ Symposium on Transmitting prions: BSE, CJD, and other TSEs, The Royal Society, London, 4th July 1996), was 25, involving 10 species. The animals involved were all from the families Bovidae and Felidae, and comprised: 1 Nyala Tragelaphus angasi, 5 Eland Taurotragus oryx, 6 greater kudu Tragelaphus strepsiceros, 1 Gemsbok Oryx gazella, 1 Arabian oryx Oryx leucoryx, 1 Scimitar-horned oryx Oryx dammah, 4 Cheetah Acinonyx jubatus, 3 Puma Felis concolor 2 Ocelot Felis pardalis, and 1 Tiger Panthera tigris. (A spongiform encephalopathy, which was thought probably to have a different aetiology, had also been reported in 3 ostriches Struthio camelus in Germany). This list did not include cases of BSE in domesticated species in zoos (ie BSE in Ankole or other cattle, or SEs, assumed to be scrapie, in mouflon sheep Ovis musimon).
NEW URL ;
41.The hound work could have provided valuable evidence that a scrapie-like agent may have been present in cattle offal long before the BSE epidemic was recognised. The MAFF hound survey remains unpublished.
Histopathological support to various other published MAFF experiments
42.These included neuropathological examination of material from experiments studying the attempted transmission of BSE to chickens and pigs (CVL 1991) and to mice (RVC 1994).
It was thought likely that at least some, and probably all, of the cases in zoo animals were caused by the BSE agent. Strong support for this hypothesis came from the findings of Bruce and others (1994) ( Bruce, M.E., Chree, A., McConnell, I., Foster, J., Pearson, G. & Fraser, H. (1994) Transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy and scrapie to mice: strain variation and species barrier. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 343, 405-411: J/PTRSL/343/405 ), who demonstrated that the pattern of variation in incubation period and lesion profile in six strains of mice inoculated with brain homogenates from an affected kudu and the nyala, was similar to that seen when this panel of mouse strains was inoculated with brain from cattle with BSE. The affected zoo bovids were all from herds that were exposed to feeds that were likely to have contained contaminated ruminant-derived protein and the zoo felids had been exposed, if only occasionally in some cases, to tissues from cattle unfit for human consumption.
snip...
The BSE Inquiry / Statement No 324
Dr James Kirkwood (not scheduled to give oral evidence)
Statement to the BSE Inquiry
James K Kirkwood BVSc PhD FIBiol MRCVS
[This witness has not been asked to give oral evidence in Phase 1 of the Inquiry]
1. I became involved in the field of TSEs through my work as Head of the Veterinary Science Group at the Zoological Society of London’s Institute of Zoology. I held this post from November 1984 until June 1996, when I took up my present post at UFAW. During this time, concurrent with the BSE epidemic, cases of scrapie-like spongiform encephalopathies occurred in animals at the Zoological Society of London’s collections at Regent’s Park and Whipsnade and in other zoos. It was appropriate to investigate the epidemiology of these cases in order to try to determine the possible impact on zoo animals and breeding programmes, and to consider how the disease in zoo animals might be controlled.
2. Throughout the period from 1985 to March 1996, I worked at the Institute of Zoology (IoZ). I was Head of the Veterinary Science Group of the IoZ and Senior Veterinary Officer of the Zoological Society of London (ZSL). I was responsible for the provision of the veterinary service for the ZSL collections.
3. During the period from 1985 to March 1996, scrapie-like spongiform encephalopathies were diagnosed in the following animals which died, or were euthanased, at London Zoo and Whipsnade:
Animal Sex Date of Death Age (mos)
Arabian Oryx Oryx leucoryx F 24.3.89 38
Greater kudu Tragelaphus strepsiceros (Linda) F 18.8.89 30
Greater kudu (Karla) F 13.11.90 19 Greater kudu (Kaz) M 6.6.91 37
Greater kudu (Bambi) M 24.10.91 36
Greater kudu (346/90) M 26.2.92 18
Greater kudu (324/90) F 22.11.92 38
Cheetah Acinonyx jubatus (Michelle) F 22.12.93 91
All these cases were described in papers published in the scientific literature (as cited below).
Subject: DEER SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY SURVEY & HOUND STUDY
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2002 17:04:51 -0700
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: BSE-L
Greetings BSE-L,
is there any other CWD surveys/testing in the UK on their deer? what sort of testing has been done to date on UK/EU deer? any input would be helpful... thank you
DEER SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY SURVEY
3. This will be a low key study with no publicity to avoid unnecessary media interest. It will be carried out in two stages ;
(I) A small scale examination of around 30 deer brains to establish the normal histology of the healthy brain; and
(II) A larger scale random examination of 300 or more adult deer brains drawn from both deer farms and parks to establish whether there is any evidence of a cervine spongiform encephalopathy. ...
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food Veterinary Investigation Centre West House. Station Road. Thirsk Y07 IPZ Telephone: 0845·522065 Fax: 0845·525224
Your reference
Our reference RJH/ASB
Date 4 November 1992
DEER SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY SURVEY
Dear Paul
I have now found time to review the 10 deer- brains collected from Mr Walker farm··via Winchester Via Winchester VIC. In answer to your specific question was there sufficient difference in preservation of brain tissue to warrant the extra effort involved in rapid brain removal on the farm, the answer is definitely "Yes." The original five brains (Winchester ref M487/11) showed varying degrees of autolytic vacuolation affecting both white and grey matter throughout the brain. vacuolation and separation of Purkinje cells and marked perivascular spaces. These artifacts made interpretation of subtle, specific pathological vacuolation more difficult. By contrast the second submission (Winchester reference N736/2) showed excellent preservation of white and grey matter. Any vacuolar Change present could be confidently interpreted as pathological albeit of unknown pathogenesis.
I can only reiterate the comments made by Gerald Wells and myself at the preliminary discussion at Weybridge in Autumn 1991. If the survey's purpose is an accurate histopathological interpretation of brain tissue. the material must be collected in a pristine state. This is particularly valid when looking for ar unrecognised and undefined spongiform encephalopathy in a new species. Deer brains are very large structures which take a lot of fixation and therefore must be handled sympathetically from the start. We have already seen the problems encountered in comparatively smaller hound brains where delayed fixation was a major limitation on interpretation of true pathological change.
The bottom line must be that if a pathologist's expertise is to be used, it is critical to collect artefact free brain material. If the politics or economics do not allow this, then I would suggest that an electron microscopy survey involving detection of scrapie associated fibrils would be much more appropriate.
Best wishes Yours sincerely
R J HIGGINS VIO 92/11.4/2.1
HOUND SURVEY
I am sorry, but I really could have been a co-signatory of Gerald's minute.
I do NOT think that we can justify devoting any resources to this study, especially as larger and more important projects such as the pathogenesis study will be quite demanding.
If there is a POLITICAL need to continue with the examination of hound brains then it should be passed entirely to the VI Service.
J W WILESMITH Epidemiology Unit 18 October 1991
Mr. R Bradley
cc: Mr. G A H Wells
***> 3.3. Mr R J Higgins in conjunction with Mr G A Wells and Mr A C Scott would by the end of the year, identify the three brains that were from the ''POSITIVE'' end of the lesion spectrum.
HOUND SURVEY PATHOLOGICAL REPORT (see positive results) and MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMAN...
ya'll thought i was making this stuff up didn't ya...i don't make this stuff up!
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
second supplementary
snip...see history and full text here;
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019
***> MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019
CDC
New Outbreak of TSE Prion in NEW LIVESTOCK SPECIES
Mad Camel Disease
Volume 24, Number 6—June 2018 Research
Prion Disease in Dromedary Camels, Algeria Abstract
Prions cause fatal and transmissible neurodegenerative diseases, including Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans, scrapie in small ruminants, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). After the BSE epidemic, and the associated human infections, began in 1996 in the United Kingdom, general concerns have been raised about animal prions. We detected a prion disease in dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) in Algeria. Symptoms suggesting prion disease occurred in 3.1% of dromedaries brought for slaughter to the Ouargla abattoir in 2015–2016. We confirmed diagnosis by detecting pathognomonic neurodegeneration and disease-specific prion protein (PrPSc) in brain tissues from 3 symptomatic animals. Prion detection in lymphoid tissues is suggestive of the infectious nature of the disease. PrPSc biochemical characterization showed differences with BSE and scrapie. Our identification of this prion disease in a geographically widespread livestock species requires urgent enforcement of surveillance and assessment of the potential risks to human and animal health.
SNIP...
The possibility that dromedaries acquired the disease from eating prion-contaminated waste needs to be considered.
Tracing the origin of prion diseases is challenging. In the case of CPD, the traditional extensive and nomadic herding practices of dromedaries represent a formidable factor for accelerating the spread of the disease at long distances, making the path of its diffusion difficult to determine. Finally, the major import flows of live animals to Algeria from Niger, Mali, and Mauritania (27) should be investigated to trace the possible origin of CPD from other countries. Camels are a vital animal species for millions of persons globally. The world camel population has a yearly growth rate of 2.1% (28). In 2014, the population was estimated at ≈28 million animals, but this number is probably underestimated.. Approximately 88% of camels are found in Africa, especially eastern Africa, and 12% are found in Asia. Official data reported 350,000 dromedaries in Algeria in 2014 (28).
On the basis of phenotypic traits and sociogeographic criteria, several dromedary populations have been suggested to exist in Algeria (29). However, recent genetic studies in Algeria and Egypt point to a weak differentiation of the dromedary population as a consequence of historical use as a cross-continental beast of burden along trans-Saharan caravan routes, coupled with traditional extensive/nomadic herding practices (30).
Such genetic homogeneity also might be reflected in PRNP. Studies on PRNP variability in camels are therefore warranted to explore the existence of genotypes resistant to CPD, which could represent an important tool for CPD management as it was for breeding programs for scrapie eradication in sheep. In the past 10 years, the camel farming system has changed rapidly, with increasing setup of periurban dairy farms and dairy plants and diversification of camel products and market penetration (13). This evolution requires improved health standards for infectious diseases and, in light of CPD, for prion diseases.
The emergence of another prion disease in an animal species of crucial importance for millions of persons worldwide makes it necessary to assess the risk for humans and develop evidence-based policies to control and limit the spread of the disease in animals and minimize human exposure. The implementation of a surveillance system for prion diseases would be a first step to enable disease control and minimize human and animal exposure. Finally, the diagnostic capacity of prion diseases needs to be improved in all countries in Africa where dromedaries are part of the domestic livestock. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/24/6/17-2007_article ;
***> IMPORTS AND EXPORTS <***
***SEE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF BANNED ANIMAL PROTEIN AKA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA DECADES AFTER POST BAN ***
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip.....
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.
snip.....
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).
The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.
snip.....
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip.....
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.
snip.....
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip.....
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.
snip.....
***> In summary, our results establish aerosols as a surprisingly efficient modality of prion transmission. This novel pathway of prion transmission is not only conceptually relevant for the field of prion research, but also highlights a hitherto unappreciated risk factor for laboratory personnel and personnel of the meat processing industry. In the light of these findings, it may be appropriate to revise current prion-related biosafety guidelines and health standards in diagnostic and scientific laboratories being potentially confronted with prion infected materials. While we did not investigate whether production of prion aerosols in nature suffices to cause horizontal prion transmission, the finding of prions in biological fluids such as saliva, urine and blood suggests that it may be worth testing this possibility in future studies.
Adriano Aguzzi ''We even showed that a prion AEROSOL will infect 100% of mice within 10 seconds of exposure''
WOW!...tss
THURSDAY, AUGUST 08, 2019
Raccoons accumulate PrPSc after intracranial inoculation with the agents of chronic wasting disease (CWD) or transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) but not atypical scrapie
Rabbits are not resistant to prion infection
Francesca Chianinia,1, Natalia Fernández-Borgesb,c,1, Enric Vidald , Louise Gibbarda , Belén Pintadoe , Jorge de Castroc , Suzette A. Priolaf , Scott Hamiltona , Samantha L. Eatona , Jeanie Finlaysona , Yvonne Panga , Philip Steelea , Hugh W. Reida , Mark P. Dagleisha , and Joaquín Castillab,c,g,2 a
Moredun Research Institute, Penicuik, Near Edinburgh EH26 0PZ, Scotland, United Kingdom; b CIC bioGUNE, Derio 48160, Bizkaia, Spain; g IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao 48011, Bizkaia, Spain; c Department of Infectology, Scripps Florida, Jupiter, FL 33458; f Laboratory of Persistent Viral Diseases, Rocky Mountain Laboratories, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Hamilton, MT 59840; d Centre de Recerca en Sanitat Animal (CReSA), UAB-IRTA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain; and e Centro Nacional de Biotecnología (CNB), 28049 Cantoblanco, Madrid, Spain
Edited by Reed B. Wickner, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, and approved February 16, 2012 (received for review December 6, 2011)
The ability of prions to infect some species and not others is determined by the transmission barrier. This unexplained phenomenon has led to the belief that certain species were not susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and therefore represented negligible risk to human health if consumed. Using the protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA) technique, we were able to overcome the species barrier in rabbits, which have been classified as TSE resistant for four decades. Rabbit brain homogenate, either unseeded or seeded in vitro with disease-related prions obtained from different species, was subjected to serial rounds of PMCA. De novo rabbit prions produced in vitro from unseeded material were tested for infectivity in rabbits, with one of three intracerebrally challenged animals succumbing to disease at 766 d and displaying all of the characteristics of a TSE, thereby demonstrating that leporids are not resistant to prion infection. Material from the brain of the clinically affected rabbit containing abnormal prion protein resulted in a 100% attack rate after its inoculation in transgenic mice overexpressing rabbit PrP. Transmissibility to rabbits (>470 d) has been confirmed in 2 of 10 rabbits after intracerebral challenge. Despite rabbits no longer being able to be classified as resistant to TSEs, an outbreak of “mad rabbit disease” is unlikely.
snip...
In summary, after 3 y postchallenge with three different rabbitderived inocula, we have obtained one positive clinical case, one possible preclinical case, two intercurrent deaths, and six animals that have remained healthy. Although the incubation periods do not directly correlate with the degree of susceptibility, these data might indicate that rabbits are poorly susceptible to prion infection. Although the rabbits used in this study were not inbred, they all had identical full-length PrP sequences and, to date, no difference has been detected in the ORF PrP sequence in any other published rabbit PrP sequence placed in GenBank. To further investigate this, two types of second passage experiment were performed; three raPrPTg mice and 10 rabbits were all intracerebrally inoculated using brain homogenate from the clinically affected rabbit. In contrast to 100% of the de novo RaPrPSc-inoculated transgenic mice having succumbed to a standard clinical prion disease and thereby demonstrating a high rate of transmissibility in vivo, two of 10 rabbits developed a TSE (477 and 540 dpi, respectively) to date. A plausible explanation for the evident differences between these two transmission studies would be the high level of rabbit PrPC expression (4- to 6-fold) in the murine model. In addition, it is well known that even if overexpression does not increase susceptibility, it can significantly reduce the incubation time of disease (2). However, the two positive TSE cases in the second rabbit passage, even though 8 rabbits remained clinically normal at 560 dpi, have led us to conclude that rabbits can no longer be considered a prionresistant species. The long incubation times, even after a second passage, might be due to the presence of some unknown, and probably rare, susceptibility factor in rabbits, which may also be present, for example, in equids and canids.
To critically evaluate this risk, several experiments are currently underway to characterize this new prion disease in rabbits and other species to examine its ability to cross the species barrier. In addition, supplementary experiments have been initiated in rabbits and also in transgenic mice that overexpress rabbit PrPC, to evaluate their susceptibilities to other important prion diseases including CWD and BSE. There are several factors that any potential new TSE epidemic would require: (i) the new prion should be efficiently transmitted through the homologous species; (ii) animals should be edible by humans and should be slaughtered at an age at which the disease has developed, thereby increasing the chance that prions have replicated (especially for those prions that require long incubation times); and (iii) the meat and bone meal should be recycled and fed to new members of the same species. In the light of these data and taking into account the previous three factors, it is unlikely there will be an outbreak of “mad rabbit disease,” and consumers of rabbit meat face much less of a risk than consumers of cattle or sheep products.
THE USA FDA MAD COW FEED BAN OF 1997 WAS NOTHING MORE THAN INK ON PAPER, NEVER ENFORCED...terry
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2019
FDA Reports on VFD Compliance
Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary.
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 21, 2019
In vitro detection of haematogenous prions in white-tailed deer orally dosed with low concentrations of chronic wasting disease
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 06, 2019
Estimating relative CWD susceptibility and disease progression in farmed white-tailed deer with rare PRNP alleles
***> Two variants of the apex There are two variants of the apex, one infectious variant and one variant which we assume is not contagious.
***> one variant which we assume is not contagious.
what kind of BS Junk Science is this? please tell me?
do we NOW 'ASSUME' science and make regulations there from?
to assume that a dangerous pathogen is NOT contagious, and then make regulations there from, is absolutely not scientific, it's what i call 'for profit' science, or junk science $
but, on the other hand we have;
''The NA elk, however, is in-between, with a low amounts of abnormal PrP deposition (Race et al., 2007) associated with longer incubation periods (Moore et al., 2018) and low prevalence (Mysterud and Edmunds, 2019).''
so, lives longer in the environment, has longer to spread the tse prion agent.
look, it's either a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease, or it's not.
a very dangerous precedent has been set $$$
this reminds me of ;
IBNC BSE TSE Prion mad cow disease
***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***
Posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2019
TSE surveillance statistics exotic species and domestic cats Update December 2019
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2019
***> The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie
BIO-RAD
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: susan_berg@bio-rad.com
Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,
Happy Holidays!
I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing and there inconclusive.
IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated, or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?
HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- , BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?
IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?
What am I missing?
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." snip...end
Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results
snip...END
WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;
Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04
Finally spoke with ;
Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant phone conversation with XXXX XXXXX about the USDA and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem to keep having. X was very very cautious as to speak directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB. X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation of some sort. X would only speak of what other countries do, and that i should take that as an answer. I told X I understood that it was a very loaded question and X agreed several times over and even said a political one.
my question;
Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive, without WB, and considering the new atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???
ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not want any of this recorded or repeated.
again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of retaliation, but again said X tell me what other countries are doing and finding, and that i should take it from there. "very difficult to answer"
"very political"
"very loaded question"
outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech. in house WB, SAF, along with IHC, HP, several times etc. you should see at several talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT IS NEGATIVE. again, look what the rest of the world is doing. said something about Dr. Houston stating; any screening assay, always a chance for human error. but with so many errors (i am assuming X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false positives? said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but were positive''. ...
TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Your questions
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800
From: To: flounder@wt.net
Hi Terry:
............................................snip
Let me know your phone number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test. Thank you
Regards
Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email:
=================================
END...TSS
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=====================================================
continued...
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: RE: Greetings again Professor Aguzzi ... TSS
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2005 09:19:49 +0100
From: "Adriano Aguzzi" T
o: "'Terry S. Singeltary Sr.'"
Dear Mr. Singeltary
I sympathize with your wish to have the most sensitive assay implemented. However, the situation is not as simple as one might think. In the case of homogeneously distributed agent, biochemical detection of PrPSc is indeed likely to be more sensitive than immunohistochemistry. In the case of variegated, punctate distribution of the agent, morphological methods may indeed be an asset.
There are also issues of feasibility. In my laboratory, we routinely run phosphotungstic acid precipitation followed by Western blotting. However, this is an extraordinarily cumbersome procedure. The sensitivity is increased vastly, but the amount of work needed is also amazing. There is no way I could see our own procedure implemented for mass screening of millions of cows - unless one would draft a veritable army of laboratory technicians.
For all these reasons, while I see all your points, I feel unable to offer a strong public opinion in favor or against any specific methods. The final decision needs to take into account a variety of complex factors, and that is why I believe that it is best left to a panel of experts rather than to a public discussion.
Best regards Adriano Aguzzi
____________________________
Prof. Adriano Aguzzi (MD PhD hc FRCP FRCPath) Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital of Zürich Schmelzbergstrasse 12, CH-8091 Zürich, Switzerland Tel. ++41-1-255 2107 Tel. (direct line): 2869 Fax: ++41-1-255 4402, cellular: +41-79-320 1516 http://www.unizh.ch/pathol/neuropathologie/
-----Original Message-----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:flounder@wt.net]
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 20:18
To: adriano@pathol.unizh.ch
Subject: Greetings again Professor Aguzzi ... TSS
Greetings again Professor Aguzzi,
A kind greetings from Texas. I hope you do not mind, but I must ask you several questions that will put you in the hot seat. Someone with credibility must come forward, such as yourself and speak out about the fact of the non scientific approach that USDA et al has take after the first diagnosis of BSE in the USA. This being, the refusal to use Western Blot on any suspicious or inconclusive BSE/TSE test. IHC is like a brain biopsy on trying to diagnose a CJD case. IF you take the sample from a part of the brain that is not that tainted, you will not get a reading. WB is much more sensitive, especially now with the Phospohtugstic acid precipitation step. IF Prusiners CDI was validated, who knows, that might even be more sensitive. Bottom line, we need you to come forward and state publicly ''the facts'' about USDA et al decision not to use WB on not only questionable samples, but on ALL samples. would you be willing to comment on this, to me or someone from the media (under the understanding it will be for the public)? I have several questions for you??? This is very very important in terms of human health (i.e. that nov. pos. pos. incl. neg cow).
P.S. there is one other top TSE scientist that has come forward and said what the USDA et al did with that cow was ''not logical''. (this will not be published for another 3 or 4 weeks). ONE other TOP TSE scientist saying the same thing would be much better for the public to hear and understand. anyway, does not hurt to ask, and i hope you come through here for us. I know this is a very loaded question, but times a wasting, and human health is at risk here...
thank you, with kindest regards,
I am sincerely,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
I would like to add to the first paragraph of Adriano Aguzzis comments. We have seen cases in Europe, where a positive result obtained with our Western blot rapid test(Prionics-Check WESTERN)could not be confirmed with IHC, but with the OIE-Western blot procedure, and we have also seen cases where the result could be confirmed by IHC but not by OIE-Western blot. As Adrino Aguzzi pointed out both IHC and OIE-Western have their limitations, but when combined and when performed well they pick up BSE reliably. In case of doubt, i.e. if a rapid test comes out consistently positive but an initial attempt of confirmation with IHC (or OIE-Western) fails, we recommend to routinely do a second test with the respective alternative method. This is the procedure most national reference centers, which are responsible for final confirmation of BSE cases, are following. Regards Markus Moser Prionics
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys USDA REFUSAL TO USE WB ON TEXAS COW WITH BSE SYMPTOMS (FULL TEXT)
Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 11:53:47 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys
1. What is the standard regime for testing of suspect animals in the EU?
The regime is an initial screening by a high-output test, the Bio-Rad test. If a result raises suspicion, a confirmatory test is conducted with the Western blot test.
2. How long has this been the case?
Its a fairly recent development. Only recently has the Western blot test become sensitive enough, with the addition of phospohtungstic acid precipitation step. The Bio-Rad test (which Deslys helped develop) is extremely sensitive, and the standard Western blot is extremely reliable with high-signal test results. However, it had to be made more sensitive for low-signal (samples with low density of malformed prions) samples. It has been made more sensitive.
Reproducibility is the problem with the IHC test. It is not standardized; depending on the lab and its protocols, or even on the technician involved in the test, one can get conflicting results.
3. Is there a way to measure the three tests in sensitivity, accuracy and objectivity?
Historically, yes. The IHC was the gold standard at one point, but we have shifted to the Western blot. It requires less work, it is more sensitive and its results are reproducible. IHC relies on localization. If you have a weak signal case, you may get lucky and test a spot with a high concentration of prions. But the opposite it true too; you can miss an infection by testing a sample with low concentrations. Western blot is much better for low signal situations.
4. The USDA in 2003 used the Western blot to confirm the BSE case in Washington state, and it sent samples to the U.K. for independent testing. In the case this November, which it announced was negative, it instead used the IHC test and did not send samples to the U.K. Is this good science?
Its not logical. If you have two consecutive questionable screenings, you do another test. I can only advise, its managements duty at USDA to make the decisions. But when you have a discrepancy between the rapid test and the IHC, it is only logical to confirm it with another test.
5. We are hearing now about a new strain of BSE, atypical BSE or aBSE. Or BaSE. We have heard that IHC, the so-called gold standard, cannot detect the variant. Is this true?
Yes. There have been a few cases, one in Italy, one in Belgium, one here in France. It seems to only affect very old animals. The distribution in the brain is very different than we see with BSE, it looks very different. The IHC test will come back negative.
This his a very recent phenomenon. I have no opinion on its virulence. We do not know where it comes from. It could be a version of sporadic infection. Western blot caught them, but we would not even know it existed if we werent running systematic testing in the EU.
BSE was around for a long time before we caught it and by then, it was everywhere. It had become highly infectious. It probably amplified due to low-temperature rendering. The disease was recycled through the food chain, and was given time to amplify. By the time it was identified, even good cooking couldnt eliminate it.
I cant stress enough that systematic testing is necessary. Withdrawing all positives from the food chain is the best way to break the cycle.
What can happen with testing of only cattle that are clearly at risk is that several can remain undetected. Canada has tested about 30,000 head of cattle and has three positives. That would indicate that there are probably undiscovered cases. And what happens then is that the disease is allowed to amplify. You have to maintain testing.
When people choose to protect their economic interests over public health, it can have a boomerang effect. It happened all through Europe. They always deny; its not OUR problem, it is our neighbors problem. And then a single case is discovered and the public reacts. The economic results are devastating. It would be better to just assume BSE is present and use systematic testing as protection. That way, the public is reassured that it is not entering the food supply.
By systematic testing, I mean doing as we do in the EU, which is to test every animal over 30 months of age when it is slaughtered. In Europe, three times as many cases of BSE have been caught by systematic testing as by clinical testing (of clearly sick animals). In 2004, eight clinical cases were discovered, 29 were discovered at rendering plants, and 17 at slaughter. We should be using these tests as a weapon to protect the public and to give them assurance that the food supply is being protected.
6. USDAs list of specified risk materials excludes some products, like blood and bone meal, that are banned in the EU and UK. Is our feed supply safe?
With SRMs, where do you stop? Tests have found prions in meat, nerves travel through meat, and so on. The main infectivity is in the brain and the spinal cord. A blood and bone meal ban in animal feed is not really necessary, because except in cases of highly infective animals, it is unlikely that they are dangerous in themselves. If you combine systematic testing and targeted SRM removal, the brain and the spinal column in cattle over 30 months, you can have a compromise that is both safer and less costly than expanded feed bans.
Certainly, you can stop the spread of BSE with a total ban on offal. But it has to be a total ban. It cant be given to sheep or swine or poultry. It would be very expensive and virtually impossible to accomplish. You can have farmers using the wrong feed or transportation errors.
Systematic testing makes far more sense. I think of it as a thermometer. It not only allows us to catch the disease, it also allows us to monitor its progress. We can watch the levels of infectivity and if they start going up instead of down, we can take measures.
To an extent, our environment is contaminated. About 10 percent of wild animals test positive for TSEs. If you recycle these agents, they can evolve and get more dangerous. This is probably what happened with BSE. It wasnt very dangerous until it evolved to the disease we know today.
People complain that testing is very expensive. It is much more expensive to kill and test whole herds.
7. In your opinion, is infected feed the sole method of transmission of BSE, apart from the very rare maternal transmission?
Feed is the main problem. However, we are seeing some other possibilities, including through fat and greases. Calves are fed milk extracts, with the cream removed. To make it nutritious, they are using fat and grease from cattle.
(FOLLOW QUESTION: Would that allow BSE to develop into an infective level in cattle younger than 30 months, assuming they might be getting infected at a younger age?)
8. You were involved in a study that tested two primates who were fed infected brain tissue. One eventually died of TSE; the other survived. The press reported that the main finding was that it would take something on the order of 1.5 kilograms of infected matter to create an infection, but that seems to be an oversimplification. Could you explain it further?
The findings suggest that as little as five grams is enough to infect. The 1.5 kilo figure is the amount of infected tissue that would have to be ingested from an animal that would be below the threshold of infection, and would test negative. In other words, even though a younger animal may be developing the disease, it would take a considerable amount of tissue to transmit the disease.
An animal could be just below the testing level, and not be particularly dangerous. But that is why you have to keep testing. Once it reaches the threshold, it can become highly infective.
9. BSE is a pretty horrifying disease, but overall, it has killed less than 200 humans, and only a handful in recent years. Listeria, by comparison, kills thousands every year. Overall, how do you rate the threat from BSE?
The overall risk is not particularly high. Over two million infected animals went into the food chain in Europe, 400,000 of them before the SRMs, the brains and spinal column, were removed from the carcass. Less than 200 died, and less than 4,000 are at risk of developing the disease. What we know now is that one particle is not going to kill you. There has to be condensation of the prions to be truly dangerous.
This is not a sterile world. But the danger is that now that the crisis appears to be over, attention will turn elsewhere and that will allow the disease to amplify again. Just as we stopped paying attention to AIDS when medication seemed to control it, then were surprised when a new and more infectious and aggressive strain appeared, we could be surprised by a more serious strain of BSE. That is why I support systematic testing for the long term. The object is to keep levels of BSE low, and to recognize the danger if it suddenly pops back up. ...END
TSS
######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 16:12:06 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED
The US plans to measure the incidence of mad cow disease in its cattle with a test that its own officials have said gives too many false positives. Some experts fear the choice reflects an official desire to downplay the impact of the first positive BSE tests that emerge, when they turn out not to be confirmed.
Last week the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) approved two tests, including one made by the Californian firm BioRad, for screening up to 300,000 cattle for BSE, starting in July. No more tests will be licensed for months. Announcing the testing plan, chief veterinary officer Ron DeHaven cautioned that "there will be positive results", many of them false.
BioRad's antibody-based test for the prion protein that causes BSE has given numerous false positives in Belgium and Germany. And in Japan only 8 of 113 cattle that repeatedly tested positive with BioRad were confirmed by slower tests that do not give false positives.
The USDA even wrote last May that "it is well known" that tests like BioRad's give false positives. It states that other kinds of quick tests are more suitable for testing for very low levels of BSE, which are expected in the US.
The second quick test approved by the USDA, made by Maine-based IDEXX, could also in theory give false positives. It remains unclear how reliable it is, because there has been little practical experience with the test so far. It is not yet approved for use in Europe, where the vast majority of BSE tests are done.
Debora MacKenzie, Brussels correspondent, New Scientist. tel +32-2-245-0412 fax +32-2-245-0552 mobile +32-49-754-0444
http://www.newscientist.com/
=====================
Greetings,
odd that the USDA et al approves two US-OWNED tests that are _known_ to give false positives, when they know other rapid TSE test are much more reliable. IT's like they purposely do not want to find any TSE in the USA bovine, so they pick the worst test available. The USDA own experts think BioRad is not suitable for supposedly BSE/TSE free and low incidence areas, so why did they choose this test and or the IDEXX, which i dont think has even been submitted to the EU for evaluation and has no commercial experiance to my knowledge. You could almost get the feeling they are deliberately skipping over Prionics for the least supperior TSE rapid test. I believe the Canadians finally did choose prionics. maybe paul or marcus might comment? seems if North America is going to be a consolidated BEEF trading market amongst themselves and expect to export there tainted products everywhere, they could at least come up with the same TSE rapid Test. how can one use a less reliable test and the other use a more reliable test, and it all be the same? i know there is a word Dehaven used, but it slips my mind now, (consolidated markets) that's not it, but you get the just of my thoughts, i think;-)...TSS
########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 00:53:39 +0100
From: Moser Markus
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
Regarding your question about Canada's BSE-test choice for their official BSE surveillance, I can confirm that they chose the Prionics-Check Western rapid test. Regards Markus
CONTINUED
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 01:11:04 +0100
From: Roland Heynkes
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
Dear Terry,
odd that the USDA et al approves two US-OWNED tests that are _known_ to give false positives, when they know other rapid TSE test are much more reliable.
the BioRad-test seems to be the most sensitive rapid BSE test and it is clear that you "get" false positive results when you try to confirm its results with a less sensitive method like immune histochemistry. Poorly trained technicians of course may produce some false positives with the BioRad-test, but immune histochemistry produces many false negatives especially in the hands of not very experienced people. Generally the false negative and not the much fewer false positive results are the problem of all actually available BSE tests.
It is therefore not so easy to say, if the BioRad-test produced a false positive or if the confirming test produced a false negative result and which of them is more reliable. I for sure would not eat the meat of a cow which was seemingly false positive tested with the BioRad-test.
IT's like they purposely do not want to find any TSE in the USA bovine, so they pick the worst test available.
The BioRad-test is definitively not the worst test available (have a look on the EU results) and when a government does not want to get positive results, it uses immune histochemistry instead.
The USDA own experts think BioRad is not suitable for supposedly BSE/TSE free and low incidence areas, so why did they choose this test and or the IDEXX, which i dont think has even been submitted to the EU for evaluation and has no commercial experiance to my knowledge.
Are you sure that USDA has experts for BSE testing?
You could almost get the feeling they are deliberately skipping over Prionics for the least supperior TSE rapid test. I believe the Canadians finally did choose prionics. maybe paul or marcus might comment?
The Prionics western blot test is also a good rapid test which of course does not produce false positive results. In addition this test allows to see new variants of BSE, which would not be seen with the BioRad. But at least in Europe its positive results become confirmed by the OIE Western blot exactly as the BioRad results. Because of this control step the BioRad test cannot produce significantly more problems.
seems if North America is going to be a consolidated BEEF trading market amongst themselves and expect to export there tainted products everywhere, they could at least come up with the same TSE rapid Test. how can one use a less reliable test and the other use a more reliable test, and it all be the same? i know there is a word Dehaven used, but it slips my mind now, (consolidated markets) that's not it, but you get the just of my thoughts, i think;-)...TSS
Not the minor differences between the rapid tests are the problem, but the much to low testing numbers and the prefered IHC-testing in the USA. In Germany we test every month as many as the USA is going to test per year (mostly with BioRad) - and we have only 13 million cattle.
kind regards
Roland
########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED
Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 02:51:09 +0100
From: Moser Markus
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
Dear Roland Immunohistochemistry, correctly executed, is the gold standard, together with the OIE Western blotting method. It allows detection of infection even in cases where prion aggregates can only be detected in few individual cells. It is certainly not less sensitive than either Bio-Rad or Prionics. In fact, the abundant data on all three methods indicate equal diagnostic sensitivity (if sampling is done appropriate: note that immunohistochemistry has to be conducted on different tissue samples, since the tissue has to be formalin fixed). In case a BSE case obtained with a rapid test cannot be confirmed in a first approach with one of the gold standard methods, the second method will be used. I agree, that the sensitivity of immunohistochemistry can be negatively influenced e.g. by only looking at a limited number of slides or by not carefully examining the slides for prion aggregates. However, if a rapid test is not confirmed by immunohistochemistry due to a sloppy analysis, it will still show up in the OIE Western blot. Nevertheless, it is of course possible, that a true positive result cannot be confirmed e.g. if only the tissue sample used for the initial testing contained prion aggregates, which is theoretically possible, since the aggregates are not evenly distributed in the tissue. This is why it is not formally possible to disproof with 100% certainty an initial positive diagnosis (and you are right: it's certainly wise to rather not eat any suspicious animals). Nevertheless, false positives cannot in general be attributed to faulty confirmatory tests, but to the fact that the ELISA method simply produces a certain rate of false positives, which is why we offer rapid BSE tests on both platforms, the ELISA and the Western technology. And we make it clear to our customers, that when choosing the Prionics-Check LIA (the ELISA based test) coping with occasional false positive results will be inevitable. The LIA is therefore mostly used in European countries, with well established levels of BSE, while the Prionics-Check Western is also used in BSE-free countries (where a maximum positive predictive value is important to support the conclusion of low frequency or absence of BSE, which would otherwise be difficult for the reason you indicated and I mentioned above, i.e. due to the reason that it is hard to formally disprove an initial diagnosis with absolute certainty). Regards, Markus
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: ''INCONCLUSIVE'' IS NEGATIVE or so they claim...OFFICIAL REPORT
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2005 16:59:27 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@LISTSERV.KALIV.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE References: <41a3b789 .6080907="" wt.net=""> <41a4ed7c .4090501="" wt.net="">
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ##################### --------
Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 21:07:51 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <419e14e2 .5040104="" wt.net=""> <6 .0.0.22.2.20041119113601.02682730="" tahc.state.tx.us=""> <41a2724f .3000901="" wt.net=""> <6 .0.0.22.2.20041122174504.02796d38="" tahc.state.tx.us=""> <41a27ebc .4050700="" wt.net=""> <6 .0.0.22.2.20041122183204.02801d88="" tahc.state.tx.us="">
ok, thank you Carla. i hate rumors and 'inconclusive' announcements. kind regards, terry Carla Everett wrote:
> our computer department was working on a place holder we could post
> USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be
> announced tonight
> by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA
> announcement
> when we hear something.
> > > At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:
> >> why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?
>> >> Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:
>> November 22: Press Release title here
>> >> star image More BSE information
>> >> >> >> terry
>> >> Carla Everett wrote: no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...
>>> no confirmation on location of animal.
I still want my Texas mad cows confirmed BY WB! TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 21:07:51 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <419e14e2 .5040104="" wt.net=""> <6 .0.0.22.2.20041119113601.02682730="" tahc.state.tx.us=""> <41a2724f .3000901="" wt.net=""> <6 .0.0.22.2.20041122174504.02796d38="" tahc.state.tx.us=""> <41a27ebc .4050700="" wt.net=""> <6 .0.0.22.2.20041122183204.02801d88="" tahc.state.tx.us="">
ok, thank you Carla. i hate rumors and 'inconclusive' announcements.
kind regards, terry
Carla Everett wrote:
our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something.
At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:
why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: November 22: Press Release title here star image More BSE information
terry
Carla Everett wrote:
no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test... no confirmation on location of animal.
I still want my Texas mad cows confirmed BY WB!
TSS
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0339.xml
http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/06/0217.xml
48 HOUR BSE TEST TURN AROUND TURNS INTO ALMOST A YEAR, from Nov. 2004 when Texas TAHC first announced BSE postive, then took it back, and then almost one year later, Nov. 2005, a final BSE positive confirmation was announced, after only scientist around the globe, and literally an act of Congress took place by the Honorable Fong order the sample retested. ...Thank YOU!
ONE YEAR LATER, finally confirmed $$$
Release No. 0233.05 Contact: USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623
Printable version Email this page
TRANSCRIPT OF MEDIA CONFERENCE WITH REMARKS MADE BY AGRICULTURE SECRETARY MIKE JOHANNS, DR. JOHN CLIFFORD, CHIEF VETERINARY OFFICER, ANIMAL PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, AND DR. DANNY MATTHEWS, TSE PROGRAM MANAGER, VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY, WEYBRIDGE, ENGLAND - WASHINGTON D.C. - JUNE 24, 2005
SNIP...
"So let me start first with the test results. As you are aware, last November we had an inconclusive report from a rapid screening test. USDA then conducted two IHC confirmatory tests, and both came out negative. A few weeks ago an additional confirmatory test was conducted, and that test is referred to as the Western blot test.
"On June 10 I learned that test was reactive and shared those results at that time.
"We now have the test results from the lab in Weybridge, England, as well as the results from additional testing in our own lab, and again I am here today to share those results with you.
"The results confirm the presence of BSE in this animal, an animal that was blocked from entering the food supply thanks to the firewalls that are in place. It is critically important to note that this animal was identified as a high risk animal. A sample was taken, and the carcass was incinerated.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
TSS
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
FLORIDA MAD COW 2018
SATURDAY, JANUARY 18, 2020
United States wildlife and wildlife product imports from 2000–2014 and TSE PRION aka Mad Cow Type Disease
***> HUMAN TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE 1 IN 5,000 NOT ONE IN A MILLION!
***> I urge every Country around the Globe to Declare an Extraordinary Emergency Due To A Foreign Animal Disease Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion from the USA, Canada, and Mexico (they have no clue), all of North America should have this Declaration of Emergency, just like the one called way back when the shoe was on the other foot with the mad sheep of mad river valley, except this time, it's not a wag the dog false flag, this is for real...terry
SATURDAY, JANUARY 18, 2020
United States wildlife and wildlife product imports from 2000–2014 and TSE PRION aka Mad Cow Type Disease
***> HUMAN TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE 1 IN 5,000 NOT ONE IN A MILLION!
***> I urge every Country around the Globe to Declare an Extraordinary Emergency Due To A Foreign Animal Disease Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion from the USA, Canada, and Mexico (they have no clue), all of North America should have this Declaration of Emergency, just like the one called way back when the shoe was on the other foot with the mad sheep of mad river valley, except this time, it's not a wag the dog false flag, this is for real...terry
THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 2017
*** Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States revisited 2017 Singeltary et al
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
To the Editor:
In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.
Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex
1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323.
Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America
Xavier Bosch
Published: August 2003
Summary;
“My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.”
49-year-old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). So he decided to gather hundreds of documents on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) and realised that if Britons could get variant CJD from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Americans might get a similar disorder from chronic wasting disease (CWD) the relative of mad cow disease seen among deer and elk in the USA. Although his feverish search did not lead him to the smoking gun linking CWD to a similar disease in North American people, it did uncover a largely disappointing situation.
Singeltary was greatly demoralised at the few attempts to monitor the occurrence of CJD and CWD in the USA. Only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal TSEs should be reportable nationwide and internationally, he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). "I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source."
Until recently, CWD was thought to be confined to the wild in a small region in Colorado. But since early 2002, it has been reported in other areas, including Wisconsin, South Dakota, and the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. Indeed, the occurrence of CWD in states that were not endemic previously increased concern about a widespread outbreak and possible transmission to people and cattle.
To date, experimental studies have proven that the CWD agent can be transmitted to cattle by intracerebral inoculation and that it can cross the mucous membranes of the digestive tract to initiate infection in lymphoid tissue before invasion of the central nervous system. Yet the plausibility of CWD spreading to people has remained elusive.
Part of the problem seems to stem from the US surveillance system. CJD is only reported in those areas known to be endemic foci of CWD. Moreover, US authorities have been criticised for not having performed enough prionic tests in farm deer and elk.
Although in November last year the US Food and Drug Administration issued a directive to state public-health and agriculture officials prohibiting material from CWD-positive animals from being used as an ingredient in feed for any animal species, epidemiological control and research in the USA has been quite different from the situation in the UK and Europe regarding BSE.
"Getting data on TSEs in the USA from the government is like pulling teeth", Singeltary argues. "You get it when they want you to have it, and only what they want you to have."
Norman Foster, director of the Cognitive Disorders Clinic at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI, USA), says that "current surveillance of prion disease in people in the USA is inadequate to detect whether CWD is occurring in human beings"; adding that, "the cases that we know about are reassuring, because they do not suggest the appearance of a new variant of CJD in the USA or atypical features in patients that might be exposed to CWD. However, until we establish a system that identifies and analyses a high proportion of suspected prion disease cases we will not know for sure". The USA should develop a system modelled on that established in the UK, he points out.
Ali Samii, a neurologist at Seattle VA Medical Center who recently reported the cases of three hunters "two of whom were friends" who died from pathologically confirmed CJD, says that "at present there are insufficient data to claim transmission of CWD into humans"; adding that "[only] by asking [the questions of venison consumption and deer/elk hunting] in every case can we collect suspect cases and look into the plausibility of transmission further". Samii argues that by making both doctors and hunters more aware of the possibility of prions spreading through eating venison, doctors treating hunters with dementia can consider a possible prion disease, and doctors treating CJD patients will know to ask whether they ate venison.
CDC spokesman Ermias Belay says that the CDC "will not be investigating the [Samii] cases because there is no evidence that the men ate CWD-infected meat". He notes that although "the likelihood of CWD jumping the species barrier to infect humans cannot be ruled out 100%" and that "[we] cannot be 100% sure that CWD does not exist in humans& the data seeking evidence of CWD transmission to humans have been very limited".
26 March 2003
Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically) CJD WATCH
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
***> 2001 FDA CJD TSE Prion Singeltary Submission
Sent: Monday, January 08,2001 3:03 PM
WOW, my submission held up on the www for 17 years, and was proven to be true, and now, it has been removed from the www, the same url does not work anymore and it was just working this year. nothing like the FDA et al cleaning up any evidence of truth with their mad cow debacle and sporadic cjd cover up contineus...so sad$$$
let's review the truth about sporadic cjd shall we;
***> U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD Watch.
[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?
[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]
[host Richard] could you repeat the question?
[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?
[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?
[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.
[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary
[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?
[not sure whom speaking] NO
[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?
[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]
[host Richard] could you repeat the question?
[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?
[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?
[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.
[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary
[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?
[not sure whom speaking] NO
2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S.
Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well
15 November 1999 British Medical Journal hvCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
Singeltary on CWD TSE Prion video
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 2019
***> Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a systematic review of global incidence, prevalence, infectivity, and incubation
WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019
Incomplete inactivation of atypical scrapie following recommended autoclave decontamination procedures USDA HERE'S YOUR SIGN!
REVIEW
***> In conclusion, sensory symptoms and loss of reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome can be explained by neuropathological changes in the spinal cord. We conclude that the sensory symptoms and loss of lower limb reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome is due to pathology in the caudal spinal cord. <***
***> The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.<***
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
***> All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals.<***
***> In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II) <***
Thursday, March 8, 2018
Familial human prion diseases associated with prion protein mutations Y226X and G131V are transmissible to transgenic mice expressing human prion protein
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
