Monday, March 10, 2014

Investigators study silent variant of mad cow disease Galveston Daily News March 4, 2014

Investigators study silent variant of mad cow disease Galveston Daily News

 
Medical Discovery News

 
Investigators study silent variant of mad cow disease

 
Posted: Tuesday, March 4, 2014 12:20 am

 
By NORBERT HERZOG and DAVID NIESEL

 
Ten years after bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly called mad cow disease, was diagnosed in cattle in Britain, the British government admitted it could be transferred to humans in a new form called variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD). Cases of BSE spread to cattle in other countries, and more people in different countries were being diagnosed with vCJD.

 
By 2004, the U.S. had passed various laws to eliminate BSE-infected cattle from the market. However, to this day, there are still sporadic reports of cows diagnosed with BSE both in the U.S. and abroad.

 
BSE and vCJD are neurological diseases that arise from prion plaques that form in the brain. Prions are simply misfolded proteins.

 
This can be caused by a genetic mutation, spontaneous misfolding or consuming infected beef.

 
These misfolded proteins can convert healthy or normal proteins into misfolded ones. Once they appear, abnormal prion proteins aggregate or clump together.

 
Investigators think these protein aggregates may lead to loss of brain cells and other brain damage. Areas of the brain’s gray matter are slowly displaced.

 
The brain develops holes or a spongy appearance, hence the name spongiform. There is no treatment or cure, and eventually the damage is severe enough to lead to death.

 
Initially, cattle acquired the prion proteins in feed supplements made from infected sheep brains and spinal cord tissues.

 
Once regulators understood the source, they passed laws banning the process of feeding dead animals to livestock.

 
Unlike meat contaminated with bacteria, cooking does not destroy prion proteins. In an effort to eliminate prions from the food supply, the U.S. Department of Agriculture imposed a rule that the brains and spinal cords of cattle must be removed before processing into edible meat.

 
There have been 175 people in Great Britain diagnosed with vCJD and an additional 49 people in 11 other countries.

 
A large study indicates that 1 in 20,000 people in Britain (30,000 total) carry the misfolded prion proteins and are at risk of developing vCJD.

 
These new results suggest that many people in Britain may be carrying the prions but are symptomless, at least for now.

 
This also could mean that these cases are silent carriers, who will not develop clinical vCJD. It remains a mystery that only time and additional studies will solve.

 
Since there is no blood test for vCJD, carriers could unwittingly pass on this disease to others when they give blood. Earlier research suggested that the incubation period for vCJD was about eight years, but now scientists think that there are at least three types of the misfolded prion proteins, with different incubation periods and different types of prion disease.

 
Blood tests need to be developed to protect against the inadvertent transmission of vCJD.

 
Better farm and food practices and laws also will help eliminate other sources of prion disease.

 
Scientists in a number of countries are exploring potential treatments for these disorders.

 
http://www.galvestondailynews.com/lifestyle/health/article_dee0df76-a33e-11e3-bc94-0017a43b2370.html

 

 
March 10, 2014

 

Greetings Galveston Daily News, Friends, and Neighbors,

 

FOR THE LIFE OF MY MOTHER, and many other mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, cousins, aunts, uncles, friends, I cannot understand why the media still ignores Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion aka mad cow type disease in the USA, and especially the USA. I am talking about the scientific links from animals to humans and sporadic CJD ??? why $$$ is it they are lazy, don’t want to investigate, don’t want to look into the SCIENTIFIC FACTS, POTENTIAL RISK FACTORS THERE FROM, nobody wants to get to the most up to date scientific facts vs scientific political facts $$$

 

it’s like it does not exist $$$

 

most hospitals are not doing anything in regards to TSE prion aka mad cow type safety protocol, for Gods sakes what’s wrong here, it’s 2014 !!!

 

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

 

Sent: Monday, March 10, 2014 5:29 PM

 

To: Heber Taylor Cc: norbert.herzon@galvnews.com ; david.niesel@galvnews.com ; letters@galvnews.com ; Leonard.Woolsey@galvnews.com

 

Subject: re- Medical Discovery News Investigators study silent variant of mad cow disease

 

Medical Discovery News Investigators study silent variant of mad cow disease

 

Posted: Tuesday, March 4, 2014 12:20 am

 


 

Hello Galveston Daily News et al !!!

 

THIS is not all that is bad news about the TSE prion disease.

 

the USA is ignoring sporadic CJD.

 

sporadic CJD has been linked to atypical BSE and atypical scrapie, and cwd is right behind, with scientist around the world concerned with CWD in cervids transmitting to humans.

 

ignore all this at our own perils.

 

the risk factor of iatrogenic TSE prion disease from all the TSE in different species in the USA is incredible i.e. friendly fire.

 

I lost my mother to the Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, hvCJD ‘confirmed’ in Galveston at UTMB and the Prion unit at Case Western Reserve University by Dr. Gambetti.

 

I have devoted over 15 years, ever day, to prove that what humans are dying from in the USA, is not simply a happenstance of bad luck. many say I have proven this.

 

on my mothers grave, you all don’t know the complete story, and I wish I didn’t.

 

I kindly submit the following for your files or to use as you wish. or not. ...kind regards, terry

 

BEFORE I proceed, a bit of history ;

 

1998

 

Galveston Daily News

 

Clippings on 27 April 1998 › Page 1

 

Singeltary Looking for answers

 


 


 


 

2001

 

Mad cow disease: Could it be here?

 

Man's stubborn crusade attracts experts' notice By Carol Christian | August 5, 2001

 


 

2001

 

FROM New York TIMES

 

Subject: Re: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA Posting of cut version...

 

Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2001 22:02:47 -0700 From: "Sandy Blakeslee" sblakeslee@mindspring.com

 

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: 1

 

Hi terry -- thanks for all your help. I know it made a difference with the FDA getting out that release.

 

----- Original Message -----

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder@wt.net

 

To: sblakeslee@mindspring.com

 

Sent: Thursday, January 11, 2001 2:06 PM

 

Subject: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA Posting of cut version...

 

> > hi sandy,

 

>From the New York Times NYTimes.com, January 11, 2001

 

Many Makers of Feed Fail to Heed Rules on Mad Cow Disease By SANDRA BLAKESLEE

 

U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 


 

 


 

 

NOW, I KINDLY SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING ;

 

 

Saturday, February 01, 2014

 

*** vCJD With Extremely Low Lymphoreticular Deposition of Prion Protein MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DETECTABLE

 


 

Monday, October 14, 2013

 

*** Researchers estimate one in 2,000 people in the UK carry variant CJD proteins ***

 


 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

 

*** Detection of Infectivity in Blood of Persons with Variant and Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease ***

 


 

Sunday, March 09, 2014

 

*** A Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) Lookback Study: Assessing the Risk of Blood Borne Transmission of Classic Forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

FDA TSEAC CIRCUS AND TRAVELING ROAD SHOW FOR THE TSE PRION DISEASES

 


 

Thursday, January 2, 2014

 

*** CWD TSE Prion in cervids to hTGmice, Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease MM1 genotype, and iatrogenic CJD ??? ***

 


 

Thursday, February 20, 2014

 

*** Unnecessary precautions BSE MAD COW DISEASE Dr. William James FSIS VS Dr. Linda Detwiler 2014

 


 

WHY WAS NOT THIS REPORTED BY THE GALVESTON DAILY NEWS AND THE SURROUNDING MEDIA IN TEXAS  ???

 

Thursday, March 6, 2014

 

*** TEXAS RECALL LIST MASSIVE FROM DEAD STOCK DOWNER CANCER COWS OFFAL from Class I Recall 002-2014 and 013-2014 Health Risk: High Jan 13, 2014 and Feb 8, 2014 shipped to Texas, Florida, and Illinois UPDATE FEBRUARY 14, 2014 ***

 


 

 

*** Because typical clinical signs of BSE cannot always be observed in nonambulatory disabled cattle, and because evidence has indicated these cattle are more likely to have BSE than apparently healthy cattle, FDA is designating material from nonambulatory disabled cattle as prohibited cattle materials.

 


 


 


 

 

FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS, PLEASE SEE THE RECALL LIST HERE ;

 

 

TEXAS RECALL LIST MASSIVE FROM DEAD STOCK DOWNER CANCER COWS

 

 
OFFAL from Class I Recall 002-2014 and 013-2014 Health Risk: High Jan 13, 2014 and Feb 8, 2014 shipped to Texas, Florida, and Illinois UPDATE FEBRUARY 14, 2014

 

howdy neighbors,

 

REMEMBER, dead stock downer cows are the most high risk cattle for BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease. I suppose the CANCER is just an added bonus $$$

 

TEXAS PART IN THIS DEAD STOCK CANCER DOWNER IS MASSIVE, and some how, I knew it would be. ...a great deal in the Galveston Bay area, some right in my neighborhood, Dallas, and just about all over Texas. good luck. ...TSS
 
 
 
Thursday, February 27, 2014
 
BEEF, CANCER, PRIONS, AND OTHER DANGEROUS AND DEADLY PATHOGENS, APPARENTLY, IT'S WHAT'S FOR DINNER
 
 
 
15 Amigo 100 N. 2nd Alvin TX-Texas
 
16 Lucky Stop 5001 Fairway Alvin TX-Texas
 
17 Power Mart 1700 South St Alvin TX-Texas
 
18 Shop Get 1517 W. Sealy Alvin TX-Texas
 
19 Shop N Go 1200 W. Sealy Alvin TX-Texas
 
20 Smart Stop 2022 South St. Alvin TX-Texas
 
21 Stantons Supermarket 219 N Taylor Alvin TX-Texas
 
22 Wee Mart 2802 Fm 2912 Alvin TX-Texas 9
 
5 Baytown Market 2900 Market Bay Town TX-Texas
 
96 Express 4300 Decker Bay Town TX-Texas
 
97 Power Fuel 721 Park Bay Town TX-Texas
 
Page 4 of 27 Retailer Name Street Address City State TEXAS
 
98 Shell 4612 W. Cedar Bayou Lunchberg Bay Town TX-Texas
 
99 Texaco 2107 W. Cedar Bayou Lynchberg Bay Town TX-Texas
 
100 Texaco 6114 Decker Bay Town TX-Texas
 
101 Valero 2 E. Fayle Bay Town TX-Texas
 
102 Bayside Grocers 1599 Fm 136 Bayside TX-Texas
 
103 Circle T 1301 N. Main Baytown TX-Texas
 
104 Jc Conoco 4612 Lynchburg - Cedar Ba Baytown TX-Texas
 
105 Sams Express 8305 Hwy 146 Baytown TX-Texas
 
106 Snack Time 2401 Massy Tompkins Baytown TX-Texas
 
107 Stop N Good 9219 N. Hwy 146 Baytown TX-Texas
 
108 Wb & B Groceries 15219 I-10 E Baytown TX-Texas
 
109 Country Supermarket 8210 Beauxart Garden Beaumont TX-Texas
 
110 Market Basket 3955 Phelan Beaumont TX-Texas
 
111 Market Basket 5960 Hwy 105 Beaumont TX-Texas
 
112 Market Basket 655 Lavaca St Beaumont TX-Texas
 
113 Mercado De Familia 1650 College Beaumont TX-Texas
 
114 Target 5850 Eastex Freeway Beaumont TX-Texas
 
115 Quick Stop 7525 Hwy 105 Beaumont TX-Texas
 
142 Bernard Grocery 4127 Fm 2611 Brazoria TX-Texas
 
143 Corner Stop 409 S. Brook Brazoria TX-Texas
 
144 Stewart's Food Store 102 Hwy 332 Brazoria TX-Texas
 
145
 
*** 253 American N Oriental 2100 Avenue J Dickinson TX-Texas
 
*** 254 Chevron 750 Fm 517 W. Dickinson TX-Texas
 
*** 255 Quick Pick 902 Fm 517 Dickinson TX-Texas
 
*** 256 Shell 151 Fm 646 W. Dickinson TX-Texas
 
*** 257 Ziegler's Foods 2308 Fm 517 Rd East Dickinson TX-Texas
 
407 Big Mama Supermarket 12355 Fondren Rd Houston TX-Texas
 
408 Bravo Ranch 2877 S. Richey Houston TX-Texas
 
409 Cherry Foodmart 2405 Kelly Street Houston TX-Texas
 
410 Chevron 10001 Fuqua Houston TX-Texas
 
411 Chevron 12222 Fm 529 Houston TX-Texas
 
412 Chevron 13051 Fm 529 Houston TX-Texas
 
Page 13 of 27 Retailer Name Street Address City State TEXAS
 
413 Chevron 14647 Wood Forest Houston TX-Texas
 
414 Chevron 3306 Navigation Houston TX-Texas
 
415 Chevron 9900 Galveston Houston TX-Texas
 
416 Circle S 9122 Winfern Houston TX-Texas
 
417 Cj Food 5175 Little York Houston TX-Texas
 
418 Coastal Mart 11611 Alief Clodine Houston TX-Texas
 
419 Conoco 10403 I10 East Houston TX-Texas
 
420 Conoco 11250 Fm 529 Houston TX-Texas
 
421 Conoco 14110 Telge Rd Houston TX-Texas
 
422 Conoco 17355 Fm 529 Houston TX-Texas
 
423 Conoco 3604 Oates Houston TX-Texas
 
424 Conoco 8360 Winfern Houston TX-Texas
 
425 Diamond Food 2331 Little York Houston TX-Texas
 
426 Dollar Town 9990 Kleckley Dr Houston TX-Texas
 
427 Express 7355 Alabonson Houston TX-Texas
 
428 Exxon 1003 Studemont Houston TX-Texas
 
429 Exxon 7010 N. Hwy 146 Houston TX-Texas
 
430 Ez Mart 2233 Fm 1960 Houston TX-Texas
 
431 Family Discount NEw 8805 Homestead Houston TX-Texas
 
432 Food Fair 1420 Fm 1960 W Houston TX-Texas
 
433 Food Fair 6470 W Little York Houston TX-Texas
 
434 Food Mart 5202 Canal St Houston TX-Texas
 
435 Food Way 10949 S. Sam Houston Park Houston TX-Texas
 
436 Food World 549 Greens Road Houston TX-Texas
 
437 Foodarama 10810 S. Post Oak Houston TX-Texas
 
438 Foodarama 11021 Fuqua Houston TX-Texas
 
439 Foodarama 11502 Wilcrest Houston TX-Texas
 
440 Foodarama 15915 S. Post Oak Houston TX-Texas
 
441 Foodarama 1805 Ella Blvd Houston TX-Texas
 
442 Foodarama 4425 W Fuqua Houston TX-Texas
 
443 Foodarama 4805 Old Galvestn Rd Houston TX-Texas
 
444 Foodarama 5665 Beechnut Houston TX-Texas
 
445 Foodarama 7320 Antoine Houston TX-Texas
 
446 Foodland 9001 Jensen Houston TX-Texas
 
447 Fuel Depot 2134 Bingle Houston TX-Texas
 
Page 14 of 27 Retailer Name Street Address City State TEXAS
 
448 Fuel Express 11402 N. Houston Rosslyn Houston TX-Texas
 
449 G Mart 10017 W. Montgomery Houston TX-Texas
 
450 Get N Go 7051 Monroe Houston TX-Texas
 
451 Gs Intl Embassy 6 7405 Cayuga St. Houston TX-Texas
 
452 Handi Stop 3543 Oak Forest Houston TX-Texas
 
453 Houston Baptist 7490 Beechnut Houston TX-Texas
 
454 King Point 10640 King Point Houston TX-Texas
 
455 Lees Mart 7901 Long Point Houston TX-Texas
 
456 Los Paisanos 4402 Sherwood Ln Houston TX-Texas
 
457 Lucky Food 2920 White Oak Houston TX-Texas
 
458 Lyons Super Market 3317 Lyons Houston TX-Texas
 
459 Metro 869 Dairy Ashford Houston TX-Texas
 
460 On The Way 6120 N, Fry Houston TX-Texas
 
461 Orbits Convenience Store 1501 Bay Area Blvd Houston TX-Texas
 
462 Phillips 66 15632 West Park Houston TX-Texas
 
463 Phillips 66 7028 Lawndale Houston TX-Texas
 
464 Pig & Save 7710 W. Little York Houston TX-Texas
 
465 Pinemont 7700 Pinemont Houston TX-Texas
 
466 Pop's Supermarket 6371 Windswept Lane Houston TX-Texas
 
467 Pyburns 12675 Fondren Rd Houston TX-Texas
 
468 Pyburns 13824 Almeda Houston TX-Texas
 
469 Quick Mart 252 E.Crosstimber Houston TX-Texas
 
470 Raceway 12411 Kuykendahl Houston TX-Texas
 
471 Rancho Grande 2598 A Fm 1960 E Houston TX-Texas
 
472 Sav A Step 13030 Wood Forest Houston TX-Texas
 
473 Sellers 1050 Federal Rd Houston TX-Texas
 
474 Sellers 10901 Market St Rd Houston TX-Texas
 
475 Sellers 1202 Uvalde Houston TX-Texas
 
476 Sellers 1523 Little York Houston TX-Texas
 
477 Sellers 3337 Telephone Houston TX-Texas
 
478 Sellers 402 Edgebrook Houston TX-Texas
 
479 Sellers 5900 Renwick Houston TX-Texas
 
480 Sellers 601 N. Cesar Chavez Houston TX-Texas
 
481 Sellers 8011 Elvera Houston TX-Texas
 
482 Sellers 8620 Stella Link Houston TX-Texas
 
Page 15 of 27 Retailer Name Street Address City State TEXAS
 
483 Sellers 9494 Hammerly Houston TX-Texas
 
484 Shell 11967 Aldine Westfield Houston TX-Texas
 
485 Shell 11997 Main Houston TX-Texas
 
486 Shell 1300 League Line Houston TX-Texas
 
487 Shell 1315 Blalock Houston TX-Texas
 
488 Shell 1827 Riley Fuzzell Houston TX-Texas
 
489 Shell 5602 Southwest Fwy Houston TX-Texas
 
490 Shell 8108 East Fwy Houston TX-Texas
 
491 Shell 9875 N . Houston Rosslyn Houston TX-Texas
 
492 Sing On Supermarket 3905 Cavalcade Houston TX-Texas
 
493 Sky Gas 15405 Tomball Houston TX-Texas
 
494 Sol Supermarket 7200 Lyons Houston TX-Texas
 
495 Speedex 211 Crosstimber Houston TX-Texas
 
496 Speedy Mart 1708 N. Wayside Houston TX-Texas
 
497 Step N Go 8602 Richmond Houston TX-Texas
 
498 Stop N Buy 7228 W. Gulf Bank Houston TX-Texas
 
499 Stop N Joy 10304 Harwin Houston TX-Texas
 
500 Sunmart 10910 Airline Houston TX-Texas
 
501 Sunny 10240 Bauman Houston TX-Texas
 
502 Sunrise 1301 Federal Houston TX-Texas
 
503 Super K 1326 Dairy Ashford Houston TX-Texas
 
504 Texaco 11602 N. Houston Rosslyn Houston TX-Texas
 
505 Texaco 9343 Clay Houston TX-Texas
 
506 Tip Top 15211 Wood Forest Houston TX-Texas
 
507 Ts All Season 620 Little York Houston TX-Texas
 
508 Twee's Food 3401 Holman St Houston TX-Texas
 
509 Valero 10201 Veterans Memorial Houston TX-Texas
 
510 Valero 9299 Richmond Houston TX-Texas
 
511 Watkins 10510 Cullen Houston TX-Texas
 
512 West Wind 13630 Richmond Houston TX-Texas
 
513 Zips 9922 North Freeway Houston TX-Texas
 
514 529 Market 13051 Fm 529 Road Houston TX-Texas
 
515 Citgo 14929 Tomball Parkway Houston TX-Texas
 
516 Jacks Grocery 5798 N Sam Houston Pkwy E Houston TX-Texas
 
517 Speedy Stop 2302 Northpark Drive Houston TX-Texas
 
Page 16 of 27 Retailer Name Street Address City State TEXAS
 
518 Speedy Stop 4502 Fm 1960 W Houston TX-Texas
 
519 El Ahorro 11132 Aldine Westfield Houston TX-Texas
 
520 El Ahorro 3107 Blalock Houston TX-Texas
 
521 Food City 5230 Aldine Mail Rd Houston TX-Texas
 
526 Exxon 11105 Fm 1960 Humble TX-Texas
 
527 Gas & More 301 St Humble TX-Texas
 
528 Super K 5103 Fm 1960 Humble TX-Texas
 
529 1960 Market 7807 Fm 1960 Bypass Rd W Humble TX-Texas
 
530 Wilson Mart 3103 Wilson Road Humble TX-Texas
 
*** 586 Corner Food 2402 W. Main League City TX-Texas
 
*** 804 Arlan's 4614 E Nasa Rd 1 Seabrook TX-Texas
 
*** 805 One Stop 4024 Nasa Pkwy Seabrook TX-Texas
 
*** 806 Red's Stop 4826 Todville Seabrook TX-Texas
 
*** 807 Super Save 1714 2nd Seabrook TX-Texas
 
*** 859 Amburn Food 8150 Fm 1764 W Texas City TX-Texas
 
*** 860 Citgo 5904 Texas Ave Texas City TX-Texas
 
*** 861 Food King 915 6th St N Texas City TX-Texas
 
*** 862 Food Rite 5320 Fm 1765 Texas City TX-Texas
 
*** 863 M & M Food 1830 25th Ave N. Texas City TX-Texas
 
*** 864 Mainland Express 8500 Fm 1764 W Texas City TX-Texas
 
*** 865 Shop In Drive 2717 25th Ave N Texas City TX-Texas
 
*** 866 Step In 1321 Texas Ave Texas City TX-Texas
 
*** 867 Tiger Express 1025 5 th Street Ave. North Texas City TX-Texas
 
Page 26 of 27 Retailer Name Street Address City State TEXAS
 
*** 868 Timewise 402 Hwy 146 Texas City TX-Texas
 
snip... see more of the stores in Texas and the USA and other countries that received these dead stock downer cancer cows, the most high risk cattle for BSE TSE prion disease aka mad cow disease and CANCER. ...
 
 
 
Thursday, March 6, 2014
 
*** TEXAS RECALL LIST MASSIVE FROM DEAD STOCK DOWNER CANCER COWS OFFAL from Class I Recall 002-2014 and 013-2014 Health Risk: High Jan 13, 2014 and Feb 8, 2014 shipped to Texas, Florida, and Illinois UPDATE FEBRUARY 14, 2014
 
 
 

*** WHAT about the sporadic CJD TSE proteins ?

 

*** WE now know that some cases of sporadic CJD are linked to atypical BSE and atypical Scrapie, so why are not MORE concerned about the sporadic CJD, and all it’s sub-types $$$

 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America updated report August 2013

 

*** Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease CJD cases rising North America with Canada seeing an extreme increase of 48% between 2008 and 2010 ***

 


 

Sunday, October 13, 2013

 

*** CJD TSE Prion Disease Cases in Texas by Year, 2003-2012

 


 

Friday, January 10, 2014

 

vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???

 


 

Monday, October 10, 2011

 

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

 

snip...

 

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far *** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

 

snip...

 


 


 

Thursday, August 12, 2010 Seven main threats for the future linked to prions First threat The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.

 

***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.

 

Second threat

 

snip...

 


 

*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier. Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.

 


 

Monday, March 10, 2014

 

Docket No. 00-108-10 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program and Interstate Movement of Farmed or Captive Deer, Elk, and Moose; Program Standards

 

Singeltary Submission

 


 

BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD-like prion strains in transgenic mice expressing human prion protein

 

Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (vCJD) has been recognized to date only in individuals homozygous for methionine at PRNP codon 129. Here we show that transgenic mice expressing human PrP methionine 129, inoculated with either bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or variant CJD prions, may develop the neuropathological and molecular phenotype of vCJD, consistent with these diseases being caused by the same prion strain. Surprisingly, however, BSE transmission to these transgenic mice, in addition to producing a vCJD-like phenotype, can also result in a distinct molecular phenotype that is indistinguishable from that of sporadic CJD with PrPSc type 2. These data suggest that more than one BSE-derived prion strain might infect humans; it is therefore possible that some patients with a phenotype consistent with sporadic CJD may have a disease arising from BSE exposure.

 


 

Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products; Final Rule Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 233 / Wednesday, December 4, 2013

 

TO ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES THAT IMPORTS FROM THE USA, BE WARNED, NEW MAD COW BSE REGULATIONS USDA, AND OIE, not worth the paper the regulations were wrote on, kind of like the mad cow feed ban of August 1997, nothing but ink on paper $$$

 

full text ;

 


 

Monday, December 02, 2013

 

*** A parliamentary inquiry has been launched today into the safety of blood, tissue and organ screening following fears that vCJD – the human form of ‘mad cow’ disease – may be being spread by medical procedures

 


 

IF you really want to know, what they are feeding cows and other livestock for human and animal consumption, please see my latest review of the OIA’s under the mad cow feed ban for 2013. please be aware, the mad cow feed ban of 1997, was nothing but ink on paper. the tonnage of banned mad cow feed that has gone into commerce is phenomenal, it’s in the 100s if not 1000s of tonnages. it’s flat out shocking...

 

 FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE

 

 OAI 2012-2013

 

OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions.

 

 ATL-DO 1035703 Newberry Feed & Farm Ctr, Inc. 2431 Vincent St. Newberry SC 29108-0714 OPR DR, FL, FR, TH HP 9/9/2013 OAI Y

 

DET-DO 1824979 Hubbard Feeds, Inc. 135 Main, P.O. Box 156 Shipshewana IN 46565-0156 OPR DR, FL, OF DP 8/29/2013 OAI Y

 

ATL-DO 3001460882 Talley Farms Feed Mill Inc 6309 Talley Rd Stanfield NC 28163-7617 OPR FL, TH NP 7/17/2013 OAI N

 

NYK-DO 3010260624 Sherry Sammons 612 Stoner Trail Rd Fonda NY 12068-5007 OPR FR, OF NP 7/16/2013 OAI Y

 

DEN-DO 3008575486 Rocky Ford Pet Foods 21693 Highway 50 East Rocky Ford CO 81067 OPR RE, TH HP 2/27/2013 OAI N

 

CHI-DO 3007091297 Rancho Cantera 2866 N Sunnyside Rd Kent IL 61044-9605 OPR FR, OF HP 11/26/2012 OAI Y

 

*** DEN-DO 1713202 Weld County Bi Products, Inc. 1138 N 11th Ave Greeley CO 80631-9501 OPR RE, TH HP 10/12/2012 OAI N

 

Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)

 


 

PLEASE NOTE, the VAI violations were so numerous, and unorganized in dates posted, as in numerical order, you will have to sift through them for yourselves. ...tss

 

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

 

*** Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods 6/1/12 significant deviations from requirements in FDA regulations that are intended to reduce the risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) within the United States

 


 

 Thursday, June 6, 2013

 

BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI ratings as at June 5, 2013

 

Greetings,

 

since our fine federal friends have decided not to give out any more reports on the USA breaches of the feed ban and surveillance etc. for the BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease in the USDA livestock, I thought I might attempt it. I swear, I just don’t understand the logic of the SSS policy, and that includes all of it. I assure you, it would be much easier, and probably better for the FDA and the USDA INC., if they would simply put some kind of report out for Pete’s sake, instead of me doing it after I get mad, because I am going to put it all out there. the truth.

 

PLEASE BE ADVISED, any breach of any of the above classifications OAI, VAI, RTS, CAN lead to breaches into the feed BSE TSE prion protocols, and CAN lead to the eventual suspect tainted feed reaching livestock. please, if any USDA official out there disputes this, please explain then how they could not. paperwork errors can eventually lead to breaches of the BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban reaching livestock, or contamination and exposure there from, as well.

 

I would sure like to see the full reports of just these ;

 

 4018 CHI-DO 3007091297 Rancho Cantera 2866 N Sunnyside Rd Kent IL 61044-9605 OPR FR, OF HP 11/26/2012 OAI Y

 

9367 3008575486 Rocky Ford Pet Foods 21693 Highway 50 East Rocky Ford CO 81067 OPR RE, TH HP 2/27/2013 OAI N

 

9446 DEN-DO 1713202 Weld County Bi Products, Inc. 1138 N 11th Ave Greeley CO 80631-9501 OPR RE, TH HP 10/12/2012 OAI N

 

9447 DEN-DO 3002857110 Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods 13553 County Road 19 Fort Morgan CO 80701-7506 OPR RE HP 12/7/2011 OAI N

 

 see full list of the fda mad cow bse feed follies, toward the bottom, after a short brief update on the mad cow bse follies, and our good friend Lester Crawford that was at the FDA.

 

ALSO, I would kindly like to comment on this FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)4 format, for reporting these breaches of BSE TSE prion protocols, from the extensive mad cow feed ban warning letters the fda use to put out for each violations. simply put, this excel format sucks, and the FDA et al intentionally made it this difficult to follow the usda fda mad cow follies. this is an intentional format to make it as difficult as possible to follow these breaches of the mad cow TSE prion safety feed protocols. to have absolutely no chronological or numerical order, and to format such violations in a way that they are almost impossible to find, says a lot about just how far the FDA and our fine federal friends will go through to hide these continued violations of the BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, and any breaches of protocols there from. once again, the wolf guarding the henhouse $$$

 

 NAI = NO ACTION INDICATED

 

OAI = OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED

 

VAI = VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED

 

RTS = REFERRED TO STATE

 

Inspections conducted by State and FDA investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection, based upon whether objectionable conditions were documented. Based on the conditions found, inspection results are recorded in one of three classifications:

 

OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions.

 

VAI (Voluntary Action Indicated) when inspectors find objectionable conditions or practices that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but warrant an advisory to inform the establishment that inspectors found conditions or practices that should be voluntarily corrected. VAI violations are typically technical violations of the 1997 BSE Feed Rule. These violations include minor recordkeeping lapses or conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.

 

NAI (No Action Indicated) when inspectors find no objectionable conditions or practices or, if they find objectionable conditions, those conditions are of a minor nature and do not justify further actions.

 


 

when sound science was bought off by junk science, in regards to the BSE TSE prion mad cow type disease, by the USDA, CFIA, WHO, OIE, et al. $$$

 

when the infamous, and fraudulently USDA, FSIS, APHIS, FDA, gold card was taken away that infamous day in December of 2003, all cards were off the table, it was time to change the science, and change they did. ...tss

 

snip. ...please see full text ;

 

Thursday, June 6, 2013

 

BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI ratings as at June 5, 2013

 


 

*** IN A NUT SHELL ***

 

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

 

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,

 


 

Thursday, May 30, 2013

 

*** World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) has upgraded the United States' risk classification for mad cow disease to "negligible" from "controlled", and risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease ***

 

U.S. gets top mad-cow rating from international group and risk further exposing the globe to the TSE prion mad cow type disease

 


 


 

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

 

*** APHIS USDA Administrator Message to Stakeholders: Agency Vision and Goals Eliminating ALL remaining BSE barriers to export market ***

 


 

Saturday, July 6, 2013

 

*** Small Ruminant Nor98 Prions Share Biochemical Features with Human Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker Disease and Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy ***

 

Research Article

 


 

Friday, July 19, 2013

 

PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED Revised as of April 1, 2013 50# Regular Chicken Feed was found to contain mammalian protein label does not contain the warning statement

 


 

snip...SEE FULL TEXT ;

 

 Sunday, December 15, 2013

 

*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE ***

 


 

2001

 

*** BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001 ***

 

Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 

Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 –0800

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder@wt.net

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

 

Greetings List Members,

 

I was lucky enough to sit in on this BSE conference call today and even managed to ask a question. that is when the trouble started.

 

I submitted a version of my notes to Sandra Blakeslee of the New York Times, whom seemed very upset, and rightly so.

 

"They tell me it is a closed meeting and they will release whatever information they deem fit. Rather infuriating."

 

and i would have been doing just fine, until i asked my question. i was surprised my time to ask a question so quick.

 

(understand, these are taken from my notes for now. the spelling of names and such could be off.)

 

[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD Watch.

 

[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

 

[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]

 

[host Richard] could you repeat the question?

 

[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

 

[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?

 

[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.

 

[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary

 

[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?

 

[not sure whom speaking] NO

 

from this point, i was still connected, got to listen and tape the whole conference. at one point someone came on, a woman, and ask again;

 

[unknown woman] what group are you with?

 

[TSS] CJD Watch and my Mom died from hvCJD we are trying to tract down CJD and other human TSE's world wide. i was invited to sit in on this from someone inside the USDA/APHIS and that is why i am here. do you intend on banning me from this conference now?

 

at this point the conference was turned back up, and i got to finish listening. They never answered or even addressed my one question, or even addressed the issue. BUT, i will try and give you a run-down for now, of the conference.

 

IF i were another Country, I would take heed to my notes, BUT PLEASE do not depend on them. ask for transcript from;

 

RBARNS@ORA.FDA.GOV 301-827-6906

 

he would be glad to give you one ;-)

 

Rockville Maryland, Richard Barns Host

 

BSE issues in the U.S., How they were labelling ruminant feed? Revising issues.

 

The conference opened up with the explaining of the U.K. BSE epidemic winding down with about 30 cases a week.

 

although new cases in other countries were now appearing.

 

Look at Germany whom said NO BSE and now have BSE.

 

BSE increasing across Europe.

 

Because of Temporary Ban on certain rendered product, heightened interest in U.S.

 

A recent statement in Washington Post, said the New Administration (old GW) has a list of issues. BSE is one of the issues.

 

BSE Risk is still low, minimal in U.S. with a greater interest in MBM not to enter U.S.

 

HOWEVER, if BSE were to enter the U.S. it would be economically disastrous to the render, feed, cattle, industries, and for human health.

 

(human health-they just threw that in cause i was listening. I will now jot down some figures in which they told you, 'no need to write them down'. just hope i have them correct. hmmm, maybe i hope i don't ???)

 

80% inspection of rendering

 

*Problem-Complete coverage of rendering HAS NOT occurred.

 

sizeable number of 1st time FAILED INITIAL INSPECTION, have not been reinspected (70% to 80%).

 

Compliance critical, Compliance poor in U.K. and other European Firms.

 

Gloria Dunason Major Assignment 1998 goal TOTAL compliance. This _did not_ occur. Mixed level of compliance, depending on firm.

 

Rendering FDA license and NON FDA license

 

system in place for home rendering & feed 76% in compliance 79% cross contamination 21% DID NOT have system 92% record keeping less than 60% total compliance

 

279 inspectors 185 handling prohibited materials

 

Renderer at top of pyramid, significant part of compliance. 84% compliance

 

failed to have caution statement render 72% compliance & cross contamination caution statement on feed, 'DO NOT FEED TO CATTLE'

 

56 FIRMS NEVER INSPECTED

 

1240 FDA license feed mills 846 inspected

 

"close to 400 feed mills have not been inspected"

 

80% compliance for feed.

 

10% don't have system.

 

NON-FDA licensed mills There is NO inventory on non licensed mills. approximately 6000 to 8000 Firms ??? 4,344 ever inspected. "FDA does not have a lot of experience with"

 

40% do NOT have caution statement 'DO NOT FEED'.

 

74% Commingling compliance

 

"This industry needs a lot of work and only half gotten to"

 

"700 Firms that were falitive, and need to be re-inspected, in addition to the 8,000 Firms."

 

Quote to do BSE inspection in 19 states by end of January or 30 days, and other states 60 days. to change feed status??? Contract check and ask questions and pass info.

 

At this time, we will take questions.

 

[I was about the third or fourth to ask question. then all B.S.eee broke loose, and i lost my train of thought for a few minutes. picked back up here]

 

someone asking about nutritional supplements and sourcing, did not get name. something about inspectors not knowing of BSE risk??? the conference person assuring that Steve Follum? and the TSE advisory Committee were handling that.

 

Some other Dr. Vet, whom were asking questions that did not know what to do???

 

[Dennis Wilson] California Food Agr. Imports, are they looking at imports?

 

[Conference person] they are looking at imports, FDA issued imports Bulletin.

 

[Linda Singeltary ??? this was a another phone in question, not related i don't think] Why do we have non-licensed facilities?

 

(conference person) other feed mills do not handle as potent drugs???

 

Dennis Blank, Ken Jackson licensed 400 non FDA 4400 inspected of a total of 6000 to 8000,

 

(they really don't know how many non licensed Firms in U.S. they guess 6000 to 8000??? TSS)

 

Linda Detwiler asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number, unless last resort. (i thought of calling them today, and reporting the whole damn U.S. cattle herd ;-) 'not'

 

Warren-Maryland Dept. Agr. Prudent to re-inspect after 3 years. concerned of Firms that have changed owners.

 

THE END

 

TSS

 


 

FROM New York TIMES

 

Subject: Re: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA Posting of cut version...

 

Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2001 22:02:47 -0700 From: "Sandy Blakeslee" sblakeslee@mindspring.com

 

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: 1

 

Hi terry -- thanks for all your help. I know it made a difference with the FDA getting out that release.

 

----- Original Message -----

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder@wt.net

 

To: sblakeslee@mindspring.com

 

Sent: Thursday, January 11, 2001 2:06 PM

 

Subject: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA Posting of cut version...

 

> > hi sandy,

 

>From the New York Times NYTimes.com, January 11, 2001

 

Many Makers of Feed Fail to Heed Rules on Mad Cow Disease By SANDRA BLAKESLEE

 

Large numbers of companies involved in manufacturing animal feed are not complying with regulations meant to prevent the emergence and spread of mad cow disease in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration said yesterday.

 

The widespread failure of companies to follow the regulations, adopted in August 1997, does not mean that the American food supply is unsafe, Dr. Stephen Sundlof, director of the Center for Veterinary Medicine at the F.D.A., said in an interview.

 

But much more needs to be done to ensure that mad cow disease does not arise in this country, Dr. Sundlof said.

 

The regulations state that feed manufacturers and companies that render slaughtered animals into useful products generally may not feed mammals to cud-chewing animals, or ruminants, which can carry mad cow disease.

 

All products that contain rendered cattle or sheep must have a label that says, "Do not feed to ruminants," Dr. Sundlof said. Manufacturers must also have a system to prevent ruminant products from being commingled with other rendered material like that from chicken, fish or pork. Finally, all companies must keep records of where their products originated and where they were sold.

 

Under the regulations, F.D.A. district offices and state veterinary offices were required to inspect all rendering plants and feed mills to make sure companies complied. But results issued yesterday demonstrate that more than three years later, different segments of the feed industry show varying levels of compliance.

 

Among 180 large companies that render cattle and another ruminant, sheep, nearly a quarter were not properly labeling their products and did not have a system to prevent commingling, the F.D.A. said. And among 347 F.D.A.-licensed feed mills that handle ruminant materials - these tend to be large operators that mix drugs into their products - 20 percent were not using labels with the required caution statement, and 25 percent did not have a system to prevent commingling.

 

Then there are some 6,000 to 8,000 feed mills so small they do not require F.D.A. licenses. They are nonetheless subject to the regulations, and of 1,593 small feed producers that handle ruminant material and have been inspected, 40 percent were not using approved labels and 25 percent had no system in place to prevent commingling.

 

On the other hand, fewer than 10 percent of companies, big and small, were failing to comply with the record-keeping regulations.

 

The American Feed Industry Association in Arlington, Va., did not return phone calls seeking comment.

 


 

Subject: USDA/APHIS response to BSE-L--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 

Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2001 14:04:21 –0500

 

From: "Gomez, Thomas M." tmg1@CDC.GOV

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

 

USDA/APHIS would like to provide clarification on the following point from Mr. Singeltary's 9 Jan posting regarding the 50 state conference call.

 

[Linda Detwiler asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number, unless last resort. (i thought of calling them today, and reporting the whole damn U.S. cattle herd ;-) 'not']

 

Dr. Detwiler was responding to an announcement made during the call to use the FDA emergency number if anyone wanted to report a cow with signs suspect for BSE. Mr. Singeltary is correct that Dr. Detwiler asked participants to use the FDA emergency number as a last resort to report cattle suspect for BSE. What Mr. Singeltary failed to do was provide the List with Dr. Detwiler's entire statement. Surveillance for BSE in the United States is a cooperative effort between states, producers, private veterinarians, veterinary hospitals and the USDA. The system has been in place for over 10 years. Each state has a system in place wherein cases are reported to either the State Veterinarian, the federal Veterinarian in Charge or through the veterinary diagnostic laboratory system. The states also have provisions with emergency numbers. Dr. Detwiler asked participants to use the systems currently in place to avoid the possibility of a BSE-suspect report falling through the cracks. Use of the FDA emergency number has not been established as a means to report diseased cattle of any nature.

 


 

Subject: Re: USDA/APHIS response to BSE-L--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan.9, 2001

 

Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2001 13:44:49 -0800 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder@wt.net

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de References: 1

 

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

 

Hello Mr. Thomas,

 

> What Mr. Singeltary failed to do was provide > the List with Dr. Detwiler's entire statement.

 

would you and the USDA/APHIS be so kind as to supply this list with a full text version of the conference call and or post on your web-site? if so when, and thank you. if not, why not?

 

> The system has been in place for over 10 years.

 

that seems to be a very long time for a system to be in place, and only test 10,700 cattle from some 1.5 BILLION head (including calf crop). Especially since French are testing some 20,000 weekly and the E.U. as a whole, are testing many many more than the U.S., with less cattle, same risk of BSE/TSEs.

 

Why does the U.S. insist on not doing massive testing with the tests which the E.U. are using? Why is this, please explain?

 

Please tell me why my question was not answered?

 

> U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you > give for serum or tissue donor herds?

 

It was a very simple question, a very important question, one that pertained to the topic of BSE/feed, and asked in a very diplomatic way. why was it not answered?

 

If all these years, we have been hearing that pharmaceutical grade bovines were raised for pharmaceuticals vaccines etc. But yet the USA cannot comply with feed regulations of the ruminant feed ban, PLUS cannot even comply with the proper labelling of the feed, cross contamination etc. Then how in the world can you Guarantee the feed fed to pharmaceutical grade bovine, were actually non ruminant feed?

 

Before i was ask to be 'disconnected', i did hear someone in the background say 'we can't'-- have him ask the question again.

 

could you please be so kind, as to answer these questions?

 

thank you, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA

 

P.S. if you will also notice, i did not post that emergency phone number and do not intend on passing it on to anyone. I was joking when i said i should call and report the whole damn U.S. Herd. So please pass that on to Dr. Detwiler, so she can rest easily.

 

BUT, they should be reported, some are infected with TSE. The U.S. is just acting as stupid as Germany and other Countries that insist they are free of BSE.

 

TSS

 

Subject: Report on the assessment of the Georgraphical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000 (not good)

 

Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2001 21:23:51 -0800 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder@wt.net

 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

 

Greetings List Members and ALL EU Countries,

 

Because of this report, and the recent findings of the 50-state BSE Conference call, I respectfully seriously suggest that these Countries and the SSC re-evaluate the U.S.A. G.B.R. to a risk factor of #3.

 

I attempted to post this to list in full text, but would not accept...

 

thank you, kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

 

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000

 

PART II

 

REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE RISK OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

- 29 -

 

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

 

The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely but cannot be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

 

Stability: Before 1990 the system was extremely unstable because feeding of MBM to cattle happened, rendering was inappropriate with regard to deactivation of the BSE-agent and SRM and fallen stock were rendered for feed. From 1990 to 1997 it improved to very unstable, thanks to efforts undertaken to trace imported animals and exclude them from the feed chain and intensive surveillance. In 1998 the system became neutrally stable after the RMBM-ban of 1997.

 

External challenges: A moderate external challenge occurred in the period before 1990 because of importation of live animals from BSE-affected countries, in particular from the UK and Ireland. It cannot be excluded that some BSE-infected animals have been imported by this route and did enter the US rendering and feed production system. The efforts undertaken since 1990 to trace back UK-imported cattle and to exclude them from the feed chain reduced the impact of the external challenge significantly.

 

Interaction of external challenges and stability: While extremely unstable, the US system was exposed to a moderate external challenge, mainly resulting from cattle imports from the UK. It can not be excluded that BSE-infectivity entered the country by this route and has been recycled to domestic cattle. The resulting domestic cases would have been processed while the system was still very unstable or unstable and would hence have initiated a number of second or third generation cases. However, the level of the possible domestic prevalence must be below the low detection level of the surveillance in place.

 

As long as there are no changes in stability or challenge the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent will remain at the current level.

 

JUSTIFICATION

 

1. DATA

 

The available information was suitable to carry out the GBR risk assessment.

 

- 30 -

 

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000

 

2. STABILITY

 

2.1 Overall appreciation of the ability to identify BSE-cases and to eliminate animals at risk of being infected before they are processed

 

· Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate) BSE cases was limited. · Since 1990 this ability is significantly improved, thanks to a good BSE-surveillance and culling system (contingency plan). · Today the surveillance should be able to detect clinical BSE-cases within the limits set by an essential passive surveillance system, i.e. some cases might remain undetected.

 

2.2 Overall appreciation of the ability to avoid recycling BSE-infectivity, should it enter processing

 

· Before 1997 the US rendering and feed producing system would not have been able to avoid recycling of the BSE agent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced the feed chain, it could probably have reached cattle. · After the introduction of the RMBM-to-ruminants-ban in August 1997 the ability of the system to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was somewhat increased. It is still rather low due to the rendering system of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) and the persisting potential for cross-contamination of cattle feed with other feeds and hence RMBM.

 

2.3 Overall assessment of the Stability

 

· Until 1990 the US BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable as RMBM was commonly fed to cattle, the rendering system was not able to reduce BSE-infectivity and SRM were rendered. This means that incoming BSE infectivity would have been most probably recycled to cattle and amplified and the disease propagated. · Between 1990 and 1995 improvements in the BSE surveillance and the efforts to trace back and remove imported cattle gradually improved the stability but the system remained very unstable. In 1998 the system became unstable because of an RMBM-ban introduced in 1997. After 1998 the ban was fully implemented and the system is regarded to be neutrally stable since 1998. The US system is therefore seen to neither be able to amplify nor to reduce circulating or incoming BSE-infectivity.

 

3. CHALLENGES

 

A moderate external challenge occurred in the period 1980-1989 because of importation of live animals from the UK. imports from other countries are regarded to have been negligible challenges. · As a consequence of this external challenge, infectivity could have entered the feed cycle and domestic animals could have been exposed to the agent. These domestic BSE-incubating animals might have again entered processing, leading to an internal challenge since 1991. · This internal challenge could have produced domestic cases of BSE, yet prevalence levels could have been below the detection limits of the surveillance system until now. (According to US calculations, the current surveillance

 

-31 -

 

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000

 

system could detect clinical incidence of 1-3 cases per year per million adult cattle, i.e. in absolute numbers 43-129 cases per year). Between 1990 und 1995, with the exclusion of the imported animals from Europe from the feed chain, the effect of the external challenges decreased.

 

4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS

 

4.1 Interaction of stability and challenqe

 

· In the late 80s, early 90s a moderate external challenges met an extremely unstable system. This would have amplified the incoming BSE-infectivity and propagated the disease. · With the exclusion of the imported animals from Europe from the feed chain between 1990 and 1995 the effect of the external challenge decreased. · Before 1998 an internal challenge, if it developed, would have met a still unstable system (inappropriate rendering, no SRM ban, RMBM ban only after 1997) and the BSE-infectivity could have been recycled and amplified. · After 1998 the neutrally stable system could still recycle the BSE-agent but due to the RMBM-ban of 1997 the BSE-infectivity circulating in the system would probably not be amplified.

 

4.2 Risk that BSE-infectivity enters processing

 

· A very low processing risk developed in the late 80s when the UK-imports were slaughtered or died. It increased until 1990 because of the higher risk to be infected with BSE of cattle imported from the UK in 1988/89, as these animals could have been processed prior to the back-tracing of the UK-imports in 1990. · From 1990 to 1995 a combination of surviving non-traced UK imports and some domestic (pre-)clinical cases could have arrived at processing resulting in an assumed constant low but non-negligible processing risk. · After 1995 any processing risk relates to assumed domestic cases arriving at processing. · The fact that no domestic cases have been shown-up in the BSE-surveillance is reassuring - it indicates that BSE is in fact not present in the country at levels above the detection limits of the country's surveillance system. This detection level has been calculated according to US-experts to be between 1 & 3 clinical cases per million adult cattle per year.

 

Note: The high turnover in parts of the dairy cattle population with a young age at slaughter makes it unlikely that fully developed clinical cases would occur (and could be detected) or enter processing. However, the theoretical infective load of the pre-clinical BSE-cases that under this scenario could be processed, can be assumed to remain relatively low.

 

4.3 Risk that BSE-infectivity is recycled and propagated

 

· During the period covered by this assessment (1980-1999) the US-system was not able to prevent propagation of BSE should it have entered, even if this ability was significantly improved with the MBM-ban of 1997. · However, since the likelihood that BSE-infectivity entered the system is regarded to be small but non-negligible, the risk that propagation of the disease took place is also small but not negligible.

 

- 32 -

 

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000

 

5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK

 

5.1 The current GBR

 

The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely but cannot be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

 

5.2 The expected development of the GBR

 

As long as there are no changes in stability or challenge the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent remains at the current level.

 

5.3 Recommendations for influencin.q the future GBR

 

· As long as the stability of the US system is not significantly enbanced above neutral levels it remains critically important to avoid any new external challenges. · All measures that would improve the stability of the system, in particular with regard to its ability to avoid recycling of the BSE-agent should it be present in the cattle population, would reduce, over time, the probability that cattle could be infected with the BSE-agent. Possible actions include: removal of SRMs and/or fallen stock from rendering, better rendering processes, improved compliance with the MBM-ban including control and reduction of cross-contamination. · Results from an improved intensive surveillance programme, targeting at risk sub-populations such as adult cattle in fallen stock or in emergency slaughter, could verify the current assessment.

 

snip...

 

end...tss

 

U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 


 


 

 FDA Singeltary submission 2001

 

Greetings again Dr. Freas and Committee Members, I wish to submit the following information to the Scientific Advisors and Consultants Staff 2001 Advisory Committee (short version). I understand the reason of having to shorten my submission, but only hope that you add it to a copy of the long version, for members to take and read at their pleasure, (if cost is problem, bill me, address below). So when they realize some time in the near future of the 'real' risks i speak of from human/animal TSEs and blood/surgical products. I cannot explain the 'real' risk of this in 5 or 10 minutes at some meeting, or on 2 or 3 pages, but will attempt here:

 

snip...see full text ;

 


 

-----Original Message-----

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:flounder@wt.net]

 

Sent: Tuesday, February 18, 2003 12:45 PM

 

To: Freas, William Cc: Langford, Sheila

 

Subject: Re: re-vCJD/blood and meeting of Feb. 20, 2003 Greetings FDA, Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Guidance Topic of Feb. 20 TSE Cmte. [Committee Meeting on February 20, 2003] FDA’s Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee will meet Feb. 20 to hear updates on the implementation of the agency’s variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease guidance and its effect on blood supply.

 

FULL SUBMISSION ;

 


 

Docket Management Docket: 02D-0073 - Guidance: Validation of Procedures for Processing of Human Tissues Intended for Transplantation Comment Number: EC -4 Accepted - Volume 1

 


 

Docket: 02D-0073 - Guidance: Validation of Procedures for Processing of Human Tissues Intended for Transplantation Greetings, please be advised; with the new findings from Collinge et al; that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD, i only ponder how many of the sporadic CJDs in the USA are tied to this alternate phenotype? these new findings are very serious, and should have a major impact on the way sporadic CJDs are now treated as opposed to the vCJD that was thought to be the only TSE tied to ingesting beef, in the medical/surgical arena. these new findings should have a major impact on the way sporadic CJD is ignored, and should now be moved to the forefront of research as with vCJD/nvCJD.

 

SNIP...FULL TEXT ;

 


 

U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

 


 


 

Aug. 5, 2001, 12:25AM

 

Mad cow disease: Could it be here?

 

Man's stubborn crusade attracts experts' notice

 

By CAROL CHRISTIAN Copyright 2001 Houston Chronicle

 

Like Paul Revere with e-mail, Terry Singeltary Sr. is on a mission to sound an alarm: Beware of mad cow disease.

 

As is true of many crusaders, however, his pleas often fall on deaf ears. Health officials here and abroad insist that bovine spongiform encephalopathy -- popularly known as mad cow disease, a fatal brain disorder that can make cows shake uncontrollably -- has been kept out of this country through surveillance of the cattle industry.

 

But since his mother's death in December 1997, the Galveston County man has been obsessed with possible connections between her deadly brain disorder, sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, and mad cow disease.

 

And after much persistence on his part, people are taking notice of this former machinist and high school dropout who jokes that he has a Ph.D. -- a Pool Hall Degree.

 

"They called me Chicken Little for four years," he said. "Now they're calling back, asking for more information."

 

For the past year he has been U.S. co-coordinator of an international monitoring group called CJD Watch. He regularly gets e-mail from scientists and journalists around the world.

 

Debora MacKenzie, a reporter for the British magazine New Scientist, described Singeltary, 47, as a "dogged unearther and tabulator of government documents." Singeltary monitors "every word written about CJD/BSE," said Anita Manning of USA Today, also by e-mail.

 

"He's passionate, opinionated and not always tactful, although I like him because he's such a character and he is so transparent," Manning said. "He is what he appears to be."

 

Science and environment writer Jonathan Leake of the Sunday Times in London said Singeltary has helped him track down families of people with CJD along with academic research papers.

 

"I strongly suspect he is right in thinking the USA has had BSE cases," Leake said by e-mail.

 

"The American government is making the same mistake as the British in putting the short-term commercial interests of its farmers before health considerations," he added.

 

"It should start formal and widespread testing of cattle plus compulsory autopsies for all human CJD victims at the state's expense. If there is BSE, then leaving it to spread will kill people -- and that would eventually destroy the industry, too."

 

Texas Department of Health epidemiologist Julie Rawlings said Singeltary's careful monitoring of the disease had proven useful.

 

"Terry has been helpful in providing contact information regarding suspect CJD cases so that the Health Department can initiate case investigations and learn more about CJD in Texas," she said.

 

Noting that the department cannot release records on individual patients, she added, "I think we learn more from him than he does from us."

 

Mad cow disease surfaced in England in 1986 and quickly became an epidemic. It since has been reported in 15 European countries, most recently Greece on July 2, and the Czech Republic on June 14. Two German-born cows tested positive for BSE in November.

 

Singeltary said he became convinced that BSE is here as he watched his mother, Barbara Poulter of Crystal Beach, dying of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease. The rare, fatal brain disease is sometimes accompanied by severe jerking.

 

"She would jerk so bad at times, it would take three of us to hold her down," Singeltary said. "They can call it whatever they want, but I know what I saw, and what she went through. `Sporadic' simply means they don't know."

 

Poulter, a retired telephone-company field worker, had a form of sporadic CJD -- Haidenhain variant -- that is even less common than the typical sporadic case. One of its first symptoms is loss of vision.

 

She started seeing brown spots in September 1997 and was virtually blind within two weeks. By the eighth week of the illness Poulter was bedridden, and in the 10th week she died. Before that she had been in good health.

 

In many countries and most U.S. states, physicians are not required to report CJD cases to health officials. Texas made the disease reportable in 1998. Through 2000, there were 17 probable or confirmed cases, according to the Texas Department of Health.

 

In mid-June, a case of sporadic CJD was confirmed through brain biopsy at Christus Spohn Hospital Shoreline in Corpus Christi, said Jane Bakos, hospital vice president. The patient has since died, the hospital reported.

 

CJD and mad cow disease leave their victims' brains full of holes like a sponge.

 

Although not contagious, the illnesses are thought to be transmissible through prions, or nearly indestructible abnormal proteins.

 

Because the prion protein is not killed by standard sterilization, sporadic CJD can be spread by contaminated surgical instruments.

 

In March 1996, the British government announced the discovery of a new variant of CJD, most likely explained by exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy.

 

Through June, 101 cases of new-variant CJD have been reported in the United Kingdom, three in France and one in Ireland. In contrast to sporadic CJD, the new variant usually affects younger patients and lasts longer.

 

No cases of new-variant CJD or BSE have been reported in the United States. No relationship has been shown between sporadic CJD and mad cow disease.

 

There is no indication that new-variant CJD can be spread through blood transfusions, but a U.S. Food and Drug Administration advisory committee voted in June to broaden the categories for excluding potential donors. The recommendations have not yet been approved by the FDA.

 

The American Red Cross has announced that on Sept. 17 it will begin rejecting potential blood donors who, since 1980, have spent at least three months in the United Kingdom or at least six months in any European country or combination of countries. Those who have received a blood transfusion in Britain since 1980 also will be rejected.

 

The primary collector of local blood donations is the Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center, which will follow the FDA's guidelines, said Bill Teague, president and chief executive officer.

 

Singeltary said it's naive to think that U.S. prevention efforts have kept mad cow and new-variant CJD out of the United States.

 

"They haven't found it," he said, "because they haven't looked."

 

For one thing, he said, too few cows are tested for the disease. In the first six months of this year, the European Union tested more than 3.2 million cows, David Byrne of the European Commission said in a speech last month.

 

By contrast, it took the U.S. Department of Agriculture nearly 10 years to analyze about 13,000 cow brains, according to the department's Web site.

 

With more than 68 million cattle slaughtered since 1990 in the United States, according to the USDA, checking about 13,000 falls far short, Singeltary said.

 

Though not a scholar, Singeltary has collected voluminous material on mad cow and CJD. Disabled from a neck injury, Singeltary never used a computer until 1998.

 

He now spends hours each day on the Internet while his wife, Bonnie Singeltary, runs a flower shop in their home in Bacliff, in north Galveston County.

 

His challenge to the CJD/BSE establishment is courageous and refreshing, said Dr. Lynette Dumble, former visiting professor of surgery at University of Texas Medical School at Houston and a former senior research fellow in the history and philosophy of science at the University of Melbourne in Australia.

 

"I certainly have no problem with Terry's ideas on BSE/CJD," said Dumble, who coordinates the Global Sisterhood Network, a computer service that posts media reports on developments affecting women. "His research skills are excellent, and he is abreast of each and every development in the field."

 

Among Singeltary's worries now, he said, are widespread violations of an August 1997 ban on feeding animal products to U.S. cattle. The FDA reported in January that hundreds of feed manufacturers were not complying with regulations designed to keep BSE out of this country.

 

(That same month, a Purina Mills feedlot near San Antonio told the FDA that a "very low level" of cow parts had been found in cattle feed. The company voluntarily removed 1,222 animals who had been fed the prohibited materials.)

 

He obtained copies of FDA letters to various feed mills that had been found in violation of the regulations and immediately sent them by e-mail to hundreds of people around the world.

 

Singeltary might not be so zealous in getting the word out if he weren't convinced that someone is covering up the truth.

 

"They used to say BSE would never transmit to humans," he said, "and it has. They lied about the feed ban being in place.

 

"I've lost faith in the whole process. I've discovered too many things."

 


 

Sporadic CJD type 1 and atypical/ Nor98 scrapie are characterized by fine (reticular) deposits,

 

see also ;

 

All of the Heidenhain variants were of the methionine/ methionine type 1 molecular subtype.

 


 

also, see relations from atypical h-type BSE and Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease here ;

 

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

 

GERMANY REPORTS ANOTHER CASE OF ATYPICAL BSE (H-TYPE)

 


 

 

MOM !

 

Tuesday, July 29, 2008

 

Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Case Report

 

snip...

 

Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease autopsy case report 'MOM'

 

DIVISION OF NEUROPATHOLOGY University of Texas Medical Branch 114 McCullough Bldg. Galveston, Texas 77555-0785

 

FAX COVER SHEET

 

DATE: 4-23-98

 

TO: Mr. Terry Singeltary @ -------

 

FROM: Gerald Campbell

 

FAX: (409) 772-5315 PHONE: (409) 772-2881

 

Number of Pages (including cover sheet):

 

Message:

 

*CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*

 

This document accompanying this transmission contains confidential information belonging to the sender that is legally privileged. This information is intended only for the use of the individual or entry names above. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying distribution, or the taking of any action in reliances on the contents of this telefaxed information is strictly prohibited. If you received this telefax in error, please notify us by telephone immediately to arrange for return of the original documents. -------------------------- Patient Account: 90000014-518 Med. Rec. No.: (0160)118511Q Patient Name: POULTER, BARBARA Age: 63 YRS DOB: 10/17/34 Sex: F Admitting Race: C

 

Attending Dr.: Date / Time Admitted : 12/14/97 1228 Copies to:

 

UTMB University of Texas Medical Branch Galveston, Texas 77555-0543 (409) 772-1238 Fax (409) 772-5683 Pathology Report

 

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS Autopsy' Office (409)772-2858

 

Autopsy NO.: AU-97-00435

 

AUTOPSY INFORMATION: Occupation: Unknown Birthplace: Unknown Residence: Crystal Beach Date/Time of Death: 12/14/97 13:30 Date/Time of Autopsy: 12/15/97 15:00 Pathologist/Resident: Pencil/Fernandez Service: Private Restriction: Brain only

 

FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS

 

I. Brain: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Heidenhain variant.

 

snip...see full text ;

 


 

P.5.21

 

*** Parallels between different forms of sheep scrapie and types of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD)

 

Wiebke M. Wemheuer1, Sylvie L. Benestad2, Arne Wrede1, Wilhelm E. Wemheuer3, Tatjana Pfander1, Bjørn Bratberg2, Bertram Brenig3,Walter J. Schulz-Schaeffer1 1University Medical Center Goettingen, Germany; 2Institute of Veterinary Medicine Oslo, Norway; 3Institute of Veterinary Medicine Goettingen, Germany

 

Background: Scrapie in sheep and goats is often regarded as the archetype of prion diseases. In 1998, a new form of scrapie - atypical/Nor98 scrapie - was described that differed from classical scrapie in terms of epidemiology, Western blot profile, the distribution of pathological prion protein (PrPSc) in the body and its stability against proteinase K. In a similar way, distinct disease types exist in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). They differ with regard to their clinical outcome, Western blot profile and PrPSc deposition pattern in the central nervous system (CNS).

 

Objectives: The comparison of PrPSc deposits in sheep scrapie and human sporadic CJD.

 

Methods: Tissues of the CNS of sheep with classical scrapie, sheep with atypical/Nor98 scrapie and 20 patients with sporadic CJD were examined using the sensitive Paraffin Embedded Tissue (PET) blot method. The results were compared with those obtained by immunohistochemistry. With the objective of gaining information on the protein conformation, the PrPSc of classical and atypical/Nor98 sheep scrapie and sporadic CJD was tested for its stability against denaturation with guanidine hydrochloride (GdnHCl) using a Membrane Adsorption Assay.

 

Results: The PrPSc of atypical/Nor98 scrapie cases and of CJD prion type 1 patients exhibits a mainly reticular/synaptic deposition pattern in the brain and is relatively sensitive to denaturation with GdnHCl. In contrast classical scrapie cases and CJD prion type 2 patients have a more complex PrPSc deposition pattern in common that consists of larger PrPSc aggregates and the PrPSc itself is comparatively stable against denaturation.

 

Discussion: The similarity between CJD types and scrapie types indicates that at least two comparable forms of the misfolded prion protein exist beyond species barriers and can elicit prion diseases. It seems therefore reasonable to classify classical and atypical/Nor98 scrapie - in analogy to the existing CJD types - as different scrapie types.

 


 

Monday, November 30, 2009

 

USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE

 


 

Monday, December 1, 2008

 

When Atypical Scrapie cross species barriers

 


 

why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

 

 snip...

 

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

 

snip...

 

R. BRADLEY

 


 

1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

 

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

 

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

 

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

 

snip...

 

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

 

PMID: 6997404

 


 

 Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

 

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

 

snip...

 

76/10.12/4.6

 


 

 Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.

 

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis). Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

 

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

 

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

 

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

 

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

 

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).

 


 


 

Re: vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S. 15 November 1999 Terry S Singeltary, NA

 

CWD is just a small piece of a very big puzzle. I have seen while deer hunting, deer, squirrels and birds, eating from cattle feed troughs where they feed cattle, the high protein cattle by products, at least up until Aug. 4, 1997. So why would it be so hard to believe that this is how they might become infected with a TSE. Or, even by potentially infected land. It's been well documented that it could be possible, from scrapie.

 

It was proven in Oprah Winfrey's trial, that Cactus Cattle feeders, sent neurologically ill cattle, some with encephalopathy stamped on the dead slips, were picked up and sent to the renders, along with sheep carcasses.

 


 

U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well...

 

2 January 2000 Terry S Singeltary

 

The exact same recipe for B.S.E. existed in the U.S. for years and years. In reading over the Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors-1, this is a 25 page report by the USDA:APHIS:VS. It could have been done in one page. The first page, fourth paragraph says it all;

 

"Similarities exist in the two countries usage of continuous rendering technology and the lack of usage of solvents, however, large differences still remain with other risk factors which greatly reduce the potential risk at the national level."

 

Then, the next 24 pages tries to down-play the high risks of B.S.E. in the U.S., with nothing more than the cattle to sheep ratio count, and the geographical locations of herds and flocks. That's all the evidence they can come up with, in the next 24 pages.

 

Something else I find odd, page 16;

 

"In the United Kingdom there is much concern for a specific continuous rendering technology which uses lower temperatures and accounts for 25 percent of total output. This technology was _originally_ designed and imported from the United States. However, the specific application in the production process is _believed_ to be different in the two countries."

 

A few more factors to consider, page 15;

 

"Figure 26 compares animal protein production for the two countries. The calculations are based on slaughter numbers, fallen stock estimates, and product yield coefficients. This approach is used due to variation of up to 80 percent from different reported sources. At 3.6 million tons, the United States produces 8 times more animal rendered product than the United Kingdom."

 

"The risk of introducing the BSE agent through sheep meat and bone meal is more acute in both relative and absolute terms in the United Kingdom (Figures 27 and 28). Note that sheep meat and bone meal accounts for 14 percent, or 61 thousand tons, in the United Kingdom versus 0.6 percent or 22 thousand tons in the United States. For sheep greater than 1 year, this is less than one-tenth of one percent of the United States supply."

 

"The potential risk of amplification of the BSE agent through cattle meat and bone meal is much greater in the United States where it accounts for 59 percent of total product or almost 5 times more than the total amount of rendered product in the United Kingdom."

 

Considering, it would only take _one_ scrapie infected sheep to contaminate the feed. Considering Scrapie has run rampant in the U.S. for years, as of Aug. 1999, 950 scrapie infected flocks. Also, Considering only one quarter spoonful of scrapie infected material is lethal to a cow. Considering all this, the sheep to cow ration is meaningless. As I said, it's 24 pages of B.S.e.

 

To be continued...

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA

 

Competing interests: None declared

 


 

Letters

 

JAMA. 2001;285(6):733-734. doi: 10.1001/jama.285.6.733

 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

 

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

 

Since this article does not have an abstract, we have provided the first 150 words of the full text.

 

KEYWORDS: creutzfeldt-jakob disease, diagnosis. To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

 

References 1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323.

 


 

Published March 26, 2003

 

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States

 

Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically)

 

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?

 

Published March 26, 2003

 


 

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure - Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

 

Session: International Scientific Exchange

 

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

 

T. Singeltary Bacliff, TX, USA

 

Background: An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

 

Methods: 12 years independent research of available data

 

Results: I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

 

Conclusion: I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

 


 

The Lancet Infectious Diseases, Volume 3, Issue 8, Page 463, August 2003 doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(03)00715-1Cite or Link Using DOI

 

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

 

Original

 

Xavier Bosch

 

“My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.” 49-year—old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous Creutzfeldt—Jakob ...

 


 


 

SEE FULL TEXT ;

 

-------- Original Message --------

 

Subject: Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE Volume 3, Number 8 01 August 2003

 

Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2003 17:35:30 –0500

 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

 

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

 

Volume 3, Number 8 01 August 2003

 

Previous

 

Next

 

Newsdesk

 

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

 

Xavier Bosch

 

My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.

 

49-year-old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). So he decided to gather hundreds of documents on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) and realised that if Britons could get variant CJD from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Americans might get a similar disorder from chronic wasting disease (CWD)the relative of mad cow disease seen among deer and elk in the USA. Although his feverish search did not lead him to the smoking gun linking CWD to a similar disease in North American people, it did uncover a largely disappointing situation.

 

Singeltary was greatly demoralised at the few attempts to monitor the occurrence of CJD and CWD in the USA. Only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal TSEs should be reportable nationwide and internationally, he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source.

 

Until recently, CWD was thought to be confined to the wild in a small region in Colorado. But since early 2002, it has been reported in other areas, including Wisconsin, South Dakota, and the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. Indeed, the occurrence of CWD in states that were not endemic previously increased concern about a widespread outbreak and possible transmission to people and cattle.

 

To date, experimental studies have proven that the CWD agent can be transmitted to cattle by intracerebral inoculation and that it can cross the mucous membranes of the digestive tract to initiate infection in lymphoid tissue before invasion of the central nervous system. Yet the plausibility of CWD spreading to people has remained elusive.

 

Part of the problem seems to stem from the US surveillance system. CJD is only reported in those areas known to be endemic foci of CWD. Moreover, US authorities have been criticised for not having performed enough prionic tests in farm deer and elk.

 

Although in November last year the US Food and Drug Administration issued a directive to state public-health and agriculture officials prohibiting material from CWD-positive animals from being used as an ingredient in feed for any animal species, epidemiological control and research in the USA has been quite different from the situation in the UK and Europe regarding BSE.

 

Getting data on TSEs in the USA from the government is like pulling teeth, Singeltary argues. You get it when they want you to have it, and only what they want you to have.

 

Norman Foster, director of the Cognitive Disorders Clinic at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI, USA), says that current surveillance of prion disease in people in the USA is inadequate to detect whether CWD is occurring in human beings; adding that, the cases that we know about are reassuring, because they do not suggest the appearance of a new variant of CJD in the USA or atypical features in patients that might be exposed to CWD. However, until we establish a system that identifies and analyses a high proportion of suspected prion disease cases we will not know for sure. The USA should develop a system modelled on that established in the UK, he points out.

 

Ali Samii, a neurologist at Seattle VA Medical Center who recently reported the cases of three hunterstwo of whom were friendswho died from pathologically confirmed CJD, says that at present there are insufficient data to claim transmission of CWD into humans; adding that [only] by asking [the questions of venison consumption and deer/elk hunting] in every case can we collect suspect cases and look into the plausibility of transmission further. Samii argues that by making both doctors and hunters more aware of the possibility of prions spreading through eating venison, doctors treating hunters with dementia can consider a possible prion disease, and doctors treating CJD patients will know to ask whether they ate venison.

 

CDC spokesman Ermias Belay says that the CDC will not be investigating the [Samii] cases because there is no evidence that the men ate CWD-infected meat. He notes that although the likelihood of CWD jumping the species barrier to infect humans cannot be ruled out 100% and that [we] cannot be 100% sure that CWD does not exist in humans& the data seeking evidence of CWD transmission to humans have been very limited.

 


 

LANCET SINGELTARY ET AL CWD TSE PRION NORTH AMERICA

 


 

Singeltary submission to PLOS ;

 

No competing interests declared.

 

see full text ;

 


 

Owens, Julie

 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]

 

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM

 

To: FSIS RegulationsComments

 

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98

 


 

FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY

 


 

Sunday, August 09, 2009

 

CJD...Straight talk with...James Ironside...and...Terry Singeltary... 2009

 


 

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

 

* BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 - 2009

 


 

 Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zf3lfz9NrT4

 


 


 

 full text with source references ;

 


 

 Wednesday, May 16, 2012

 

*** Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ?

 

Proposal ID: 29403

 


 

CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA

 


 


 

CJD VOICE

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

 

Thank You,

 

Respectfully,

 

I am sincerely,

 

layperson

 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

 

MOM DOD 12/14/97 confirm ‘hvCJD’ just made a promise to mom, NEVER FORGET! and never let them forget. ...

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