95,000,000.0 MILLION HEAD OF CATTLE USA FARMS, AS OF
JULY 1, 2014.
WASHINGTON, July 25, 2014 – As of July 1, there were
95.0 million head of cattle on U.S. farms, according to the Cattle report
published today by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's National Agricultural
Statistics Service (NASS). This is the lowest inventory for July 1 since the
series began in 1973. ...
MAD COW BSE TSE PRION TESTING THEREFROM
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE): Ongoing Surveillance Program
Current Monthly Test Results
APHIS reports ongoing surveillance test
totals monthly.
The BSE ongoing surveillance program
will sample approximately 40,000 animals each year. Under the program, USDA will
continue to collect samples from a variety of sites and from the cattle
populations where the disease is most likely to be detected, similar to the
enhanced surveillance program procedures.
| Month | Number of Tests |
|---|---|
| November 2014 | 2,401 |
| October 2014 | 1,386 |
Fiscal Year 2007-2014 Test
Results
OIE Surveillance Points: design
prevalence of 1 case per 100,000 U.S. adult cattle and 95% confidence; 300,000
OIE points over 7 years, or 42,857 OIE points on average per year are
required.
BSurvE Surveillance Points: design
prevalence of 1 case per 1,000,000 U.S. adult cattle and 95% confidence;
3,000,000 points over 7 years, or 428,571 BSurvE points on average per year are
required.
Samples Tested, OIE Points, and
BSurvE Points by Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year
|
Number of Valid Tests
|
OIE Points
|
BSurvE Points
|
|---|---|---|---|
FY 2014
|
41,291
|
678,622
|
1,642,452
|
FY 2013
|
43,173
|
1,048,554
|
2,505,042
|
FY 2012
|
42,202
|
1,066,637
|
2,523,447
|
FY 2011
|
40,482
|
997,360
|
2,344,436
|
FY 2010
|
44,301
|
948,593
|
2,233,643
|
FY 2009
|
44,217
|
1,036,849
|
2,442,400
|
FY 2008
|
43,145
|
1,121,624
|
2,677,665
|
FY 2007*
|
43,336
|
1,487,215
|
3,621,117
|
* FY2007 - first complete year of BSE Ongoing Surveillance | |||
BSE Ongoing
Surveillance Program Cumulative Totals
- Valid Tests From September 1, 2006 to November 25, 2014: 345,934
- OIE Points From September 1, 2006 to November 25, 2014: 8,443,289
- BSurvE Points From September 1, 2006 to November 25, 2014: 20,130,647
2006
OAI
2014
OAI (Official Action
Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or
practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the
establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI
classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to
ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material.
Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory
sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are
adequate to address the objectionable conditions.
OAI
1075 ATL-DO 3E+09 JP Green Milling Company, Inc. 496 East Depot St
Mocksville NC 27028-2419 OPR DR, NL, TH HP ######## OAI Y
1580 ATL-DO 1035703 ISE Newberry Inc. DBA Newberry Feed 2431 Vincent St.
Newberry SC 29108-0714 OPR DR, FL, NL, TH HP ######## OAI Y
5273
CIN-DO 3E+09 Michael A Hatcher 307 Holmes Bend Rd., PO Box 517 Columbia KY
42728-0517 OPR FR NP 9/4/2014 OAI Y
6966
DAL-DO 3.01E+09 Rusty Cattle Company 13893 Highway 133 Paul's Valley OK
73075-8595 OPR FR NP ######## OAI Y
9229
DAL-DO 3.01E+09 Stonegate Farms 770 CR 1038 Muleshoe TX 79347 OPR FR NP
######## OAI Y
13210
FLA-DO 1E+09 North Florida Holsteins, LLC. 2740 W County Road 232 Bell FL
32619-1350 OPR FR NP ######## OAI Y
21588
MIN-DO 2115215 All American Coop 113 4th St Southeast Stewartville MN 55976
OPR DR, FL, TH NP 9/9/2013 OAI Y
29189
NYK-DO 3.01E+09 James W. Michalek 1068 Clinton Street Rd Attica NY
14011-9711 OPR FR NP ######## OAI Y
29467
NYK-DO 3.01E+09 Papas Dairy LLC 322 Wheeler Rd North Bangor NY 12966-2931
OPR FR NP 8/8/2014 OAI Y
29595
NYK-DO 3.01E+09 Sherry Sammons 612 Stoner Trail Rd Fonda NY 12068-5007 OPR
FR, OF NP ######## OAI Y
VAI
PLEASE NOTE, THE VAI BREACHES IN THE MAD COW FEED BAN ARE SO NUMEROUS
(100s), I did not list them, you can search them out on the spread sheet url
below ;
infamous august 4, 1997 BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, part of usda
fda et al TRIPLE MAD COW FIREWALL, nothing but ink on paper. ...tss
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
OAI 2012-2013
OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant
objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are
warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation.
An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing
procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with
prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified
OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the
corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions.
ATL-DO 1035703 Newberry Feed & Farm Ctr, Inc. 2431 Vincent St.
Newberry SC 29108-0714 OPR DR, FL, FR, TH HP 9/9/2013 OAI Y
DET-DO 1824979 Hubbard Feeds, Inc. 135 Main, P.O. Box 156 Shipshewana IN
46565-0156 OPR DR, FL, OF DP 8/29/2013 OAI Y
ATL-DO 3001460882 Talley Farms Feed Mill Inc 6309 Talley Rd Stanfield NC
28163-7617 OPR FL, TH NP 7/17/2013 OAI N
NYK-DO 3010260624 Sherry Sammons 612 Stoner Trail Rd Fonda NY 12068-5007
OPR FR, OF NP 7/16/2013 OAI Y
DEN-DO 3008575486 Rocky Ford Pet Foods 21693 Highway 50 East Rocky Ford CO
81067 OPR RE, TH HP 2/27/2013 OAI N
CHI-DO 3007091297 Rancho Cantera 2866 N Sunnyside Rd Kent IL 61044-9605 OPR
FR, OF HP 11/26/2012 OAI Y
*** DEN-DO 1713202 Weld County Bi Products, Inc. 1138 N 11th Ave Greeley CO
80631-9501 OPR RE, TH HP 10/12/2012 OAI N
Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)
PLEASE NOTE, the VAI violations were so numerous, and unorganized in dates
posted, as in numerical order, you will have to sift through them for
yourselves. ...tss
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Tuesday, June 11, 2013
*** Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods 6/1/12 significant
deviations from requirements in FDA regulations that are intended to reduce the
risk of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) within the United States
Thursday, June 6, 2013
BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI
ratings as at June 5, 2013
Greetings,
since our fine federal friends have decided not to give out any more
reports on the USA breaches of the feed ban and surveillance etc. for the BSE
TSE prion mad cow type disease in the USDA livestock, I thought I might attempt
it. I swear, I just don’t understand the logic of the SSS policy, and that
includes all of it. I assure you, it would be much easier, and probably better
for the FDA and the USDA INC., if they would simply put some kind of report out
for Pete’s sake, instead of me doing it after I get mad, because I am going to
put it all out there. the truth.
PLEASE BE ADVISED, any breach of any of the above classifications OAI, VAI,
RTS, CAN lead to breaches into the feed BSE TSE prion protocols, and CAN lead to
the eventual suspect tainted feed reaching livestock. please, if any USDA
official out there disputes this, please explain then how they could not.
paperwork errors can eventually lead to breaches of the BSE TSE prion mad cow
feed ban reaching livestock, or contamination and exposure there from, as well.
I would sure like to see the full reports of just these ;
4018 CHI-DO 3007091297 Rancho Cantera 2866 N Sunnyside Rd Kent IL
61044-9605 OPR FR, OF HP 11/26/2012 OAI Y
9367 3008575486 Rocky Ford Pet Foods 21693 Highway 50 East Rocky Ford CO
81067 OPR RE, TH HP 2/27/2013 OAI N
9446 DEN-DO 1713202 Weld County Bi Products, Inc. 1138 N 11th Ave Greeley
CO 80631-9501 OPR RE, TH HP 10/12/2012 OAI N
9447 DEN-DO 3002857110 Weld County Bi-Products dba Fort Morgan Pet Foods
13553 County Road 19 Fort Morgan CO 80701-7506 OPR RE HP 12/7/2011 OAI N
see full list of the fda mad cow bse feed follies, toward the bottom,
after a short brief update on the mad cow bse follies, and our good friend
Lester Crawford that was at the FDA.
ALSO, I would kindly like to comment on this FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed
Inspections Firms Inventory (excel format)4 format, for reporting these breaches
of BSE TSE prion protocols, from the extensive mad cow feed ban warning letters
the fda use to put out for each violations. simply put, this excel format sucks,
and the FDA et al intentionally made it this difficult to follow the usda fda
mad cow follies. this is an intentional format to make it as difficult as
possible to follow these breaches of the mad cow TSE prion safety feed
protocols. to have absolutely no chronological or numerical order, and to format
such violations in a way that they are almost impossible to find, says a lot
about just how far the FDA and our fine federal friends will go through to hide
these continued violations of the BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, and any
breaches of protocols there from. once again, the wolf guarding the henhouse $$$
NAI = NO ACTION INDICATED
OAI = OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED
VAI = VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED
RTS = REFERRED TO STATE
Inspections conducted by State and FDA investigators are classified to
reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection, based upon whether
objectionable conditions were documented. Based on the conditions found,
inspection results are recorded in one of three classifications:
OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant
objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are
warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation.
An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing
procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with
prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified
OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the
corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions.
VAI (Voluntary Action Indicated) when inspectors find objectionable
conditions or practices that do not meet the threshold of regulatory
significance, but warrant an advisory to inform the establishment that
inspectors found conditions or practices that should be voluntarily corrected.
VAI violations are typically technical violations of the 1997 BSE Feed Rule.
These violations include minor recordkeeping lapses or conditions involving
non-ruminant feeds.
NAI (No Action Indicated) when inspectors find no objectionable conditions
or practices or, if they find objectionable conditions, those conditions are of
a minor nature and do not justify further actions.
when sound science was bought off by junk science, in regards to the BSE
TSE prion mad cow type disease, by the USDA, CFIA, WHO, OIE, et al. $$$
when the infamous, and fraudulently USDA, FSIS, APHIS, FDA, gold card was
taken away that infamous day in December of 2003, all cards were off the table,
it was time to change the science, and change they did. ...tss
snip. ...please see full text ;
Thursday, June 6, 2013
BSE TSE PRION USDA FDA MAD COW FEED COMPLIANCE REPORT and NAI, OAI, and VAI
ratings as at June 5, 2013
Saturday, August 30, 2014
Maine Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified
Risk Materials SRM TSE PRION aka mad cow type disease
Friday, December 19, 2014
Rancho Alleged Cancerous Eyeball Case Going To Trial
Thursday, November 28, 2013
Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch
Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows
seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our
children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high
risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they
did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a
recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked
the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse),
not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type
disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can
lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE
NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???
Saturday, September 21, 2013
Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry
Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT
DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH
RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ??? this recall was not for the welfare of the animals.
...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)
try this link ;
Sunday, November 13, 2011
*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer
livestock
Thursday, February 13, 2014
HSUS VS USDA ET AL BAN DOWNER CALVES FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION (*veal) and
potential BSE risk factor there from
Saturday, November 10, 2012
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk
Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK
MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
SRMs
Friday, August 8, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
Saturday, April 5, 2008
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS
KANSAS
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the
tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
Thursday, November 18, 2010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92
BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS
Dustin Douglass was indicted and charged with making a fraudulent
application to the VA, in an effort to obtain benefits from injuries Douglas
represented he suffered while deployed in Iraq. Based on his application, the VA
provided benefits totaling $22,148.53. Douglass claimed he suffered various
injuries and illnesses as a result of his service in combat. The investigation
revealed Douglass had, in fact, been deployed to Iraq, but had served as a
computer specialist, had never been in combat, and did not suffer the
service-related injuries and illnesses he claimed to have suffered. Douglass was
placed on supervised release for 3 years, and required to pay $22,148.53 in
restitution. Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports
to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska
cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska
ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle
including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow
Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections
of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about
feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for
laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to
the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation
by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE
inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his
reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he
submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year
term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in
restitution.
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1
include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for
specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over
SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in
future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are
completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs
February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602)
525-2681
CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD
COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of
Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail
fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel
Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease
relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without
that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at
risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their
continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm
Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government
funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004,
Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from
cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The
Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty
months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous
system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle.
Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per
obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle
Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow
disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the
sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm
Fresh Meats.
Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that
Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted
Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or
caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in
order to steal government moneys.
Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified
corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the
extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have
jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its
place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee
pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to
effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:
(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect,
obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not
subject to payment by the USDA;
(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests
to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not
subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;
(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s
testing laboratory that were false and misleading;
(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others
to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA
that were false and misleading;
(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify,
internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats
was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from
cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and
(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to
fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads
prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds
carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud
convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for
the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for
individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence,
Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide
appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those
guidelines in determining a sentence.
Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The
investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector
General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE
NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #
WE can only hope that this is a single incident. BUT i have my doubts. I
remember when the infamous TOKEN Purina Feed Mill in Texas was feeding up to 5.5
grams of potentially and probably tainted BANNED RUMINANT feed to cattle, and
the FDA was bragging at the time that the amount of potentially BANNED product
was so little and the cattle were so big ;
"It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in
origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no
evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The
potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the
feed were contaminated."
On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a
cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a
processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed. ... FDA's
investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into
"meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was
able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by
the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
WE now know all that was a lie. WE know that literally Thousands of TONS of
BANNED and most likely tainted product is still going out to commerce. WE know
now and we knew then that .005 to a gram was lethal. WE know that CWD infected
deer and elk, scrapie infected sheep, BSE and BASE infected cattle have all been
rendered and fed back to livestock (including cattle) for human and animal
consumption.
Paul Brown, known and respected TSE scientist, former TSE expert for the
CDC said he had ''absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago'',
and this was on March 15, 2006 ;
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of
other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National
Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an
expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question
was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one
year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that
initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven
months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005
suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul
Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System
... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle
Still Remain
Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds
Animal
Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bone
meal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried animal
blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals and other meal,
hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, and animal animals
digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals including deer and elk
Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste, dried poultry litter, and
undried processed animal waste products
snip...
Conclusions
Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the
past century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed
formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may
result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal
feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for
consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed
ingredients, including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics,
metals, and fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibioticresistant
bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxinlike compounds in animals and resulting
animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human
health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial infections
(antibioticresistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk of developing
chronic (often fatal) diseases such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide
range of potential human health impacts that could result from animal feeding
practices, there are little data collected at the federal or state level
concerning the amounts of specific ingredients that are intentionally included
in U.S. animal feed. In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is
conducted on complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on
retail meat products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked
to this information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to
conduct rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments that could identify
the extent to which specific human health risks are ultimately associated with
animal feeding practices. For example, as noted above, there are insufficient
data to determine whether other human foodborne bacterial illnesses besides
those caused by S. enterica serotype Agona are associated with animal feeding
practices. Likewise, there are insufficient data to determine the percentage of
antibiotic-resistant human bacterial infections that are attributed to the
nontherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has
been conducted to determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed,
which can lead to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al.
2004), contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these
research gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United
States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific
amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are
incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered
animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of robust
surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other etiologic
agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from farm to fork” to
human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and collaboration among
feed professionals, food-animal producers, and veterinary and public health
officials.
REFERENCES...snip...end
Sapkota et al. 668 VOLUME 115 | NUMBER 5 | May 2007 • Environmental Health
Perspectives
snip...see full text ;
Sunday, December 15, 2013
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
Thursday, July 24, 2014
Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of
infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05
Study of Atypical Bse
LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then
let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow. This new prionopathy in humans? the
genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_
mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new
prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of
symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and
the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the
g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that
they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that
family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic
make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in
Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans
there from ??? r i g h t $$$ ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama In this study, we
identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called
E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America.
This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with
a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed
case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We
hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in
"the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and
VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
her healthy calf also carried the mutation
(J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).
This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic
in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the
UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against
the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations
could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as
Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance
for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many
countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk
material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents
infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening
of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional
data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the
Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of
familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective
prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients
with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often
should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future
outbreaks.
Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary
Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen
A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier
Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009
Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98
FSIS, USDA, REPLY TO SINGELTARY
infamous august 4, 1997 BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, part of usda fda
et al TRIPLE MAD COW FIREWALL, 10 YEARS AFTER ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS:
VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT Bulk cattle feed made with recalled
Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed
delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Blood meal used to make cattle
feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat
and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did
not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL
Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal,
TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY
Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST
POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY
Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC
MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR,
V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML
W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007 CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only
shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified. RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Products manufactured from bulk
feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and
bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
SUMMARY REPORT CALIFORNIA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
CASE INVESTIGATION JULY 2012 CALIFORNIA
Summary Report BSE 2012
Executive Summary
Saturday, August 4, 2012
Final Feed Investigation Summary - California atypical L-type BSE Case -
July 2012
Saturday, August 4, 2012
Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE
Epidemiological Investigation
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Evidence for zoonotic potential of ovine scrapie prions
Scrapie from sheep could infect humans with 'mad cow disease', study finds
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion
aka Mad Cow Disease
USA, NORTH AMERICA, MBM (or any potential TSE prion disease) EXPORTS TO THE
WORLD (?) [protected by the BSE MRR policy] $$$
Monday, December 1, 2014
Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A Review
December 1, 2014
Friday, November 28, 2014 BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE AKA MAD COW
DISEASE PORTUGAL CONFIRMED http://bovineprp.blogspot.com/2014/11/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-bse.html
Sunday, October 5, 2014
France stops BSE testing for Mad Cow Disease
Friday, December 5, 2014
***SPECIAL ALERT The OIE recommends strengthening animal disease
surveillance worldwide
IN A NUT SHELL ;
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate
declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The
OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status
based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other
significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease North America
2014
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease have now been
discovered in a wide verity of species across North America. typical C-BSE,
atypical L-type BASE BSE, atypical H-type BSE, atypical H-G BSE, of the bovine,
typical and atypical Scrapie strains, in sheep and goats, with atypical Nor-98
Scrapie spreading coast to coast in about 5 years. Chronic Wasting Disease CWD
in cervid is slowly spreading without any stopping it in Canada and the USA and
now has mutated into many different strains. Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy
TME outbreaks. These Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease
have been silently mutating and spreading in different species in North America
for decades. The USDA, FDA, et al have assured us of a robust Triple BSE TSE
prion Firewall, of which we now know without a doubt, that it was nothing but
ink on paper. Since the 1997 mad cow feed ban in the USA, literally tons and
tons of banned mad cow feed has been put out into commerce, never to return, as
late as December of 2013, serious, serious breaches in the FDA mad cow feed ban
have been documented. The 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so flawed,
that one of the top TSE prion Scientist for the CDC, Dr. Paul Brown stated ;
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases
to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United
States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago"
because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested
positive.
see ; http://www.upi.com/Health_News/2006/03/15/Analysis-What-that-mad-cow-means/UPI-12841142465253/
The BSE surveillance and testing have also been proven to be flawed, and
the GAO and OIG have both raised serious question as to just how flawed it has
been (see GAO and OIG reports). North America has more documented TSE prion
disease, in different documented species (excluding the Zoo BSE animals in the
EU), then any other place on the Globe. This does not include the very
likelihood that TSE prion disease in the domestic feline and canine have been
exposed to high doses of the TSE prion disease vid pet food. To date, it’s still
legal to include deer from cwd zone into pet food or deer food. Specified Risk
Material i.e. SRM bans still being breach, as recently as just last month. nvCJD
or what they now call vCJD, another case documented in Texas last month, with
very little information being released to the public on about this case? with
still the same line of thought from federal officials, ‘it can’t happen here’,
so another vCJD blamed on travel of a foreign animal disease from another
country, while ignoring all the BSE TSE Prion risk factors we have here in the
USA and Canada, and the time that this victim and others, do spend in the USA,
and exposed to these risk factors, apparently do not count in any way with
regard to risk factor. a flawed process of risk assessment. sporadic CJD, along
with new TSE prion disease in humans, of which the young are dying, of which
long duration of illness from onset of symptoms to death have been documented,
only to have a new name added to the pot of prion disease i.e. sporadic GSS,
sporadic FFI, and or VPSPR. I only ponder how a familial type disease could be
sporadic with no genetic link to any family member? when the USA is the only
documented Country in the world to have documented two different cases of
atypical H-type BSE, with one case being called atypical H-G BSE with the G
meaning Genetic, with new science now showing that indeed atypical H-type BSE is
very possible transmitted to cattle via oral transmission (Prion2014). sporadic
CJD and VPSPR have been rising in Canada, USA, and the UK, with the same old
excuse, better surveillance. You can only use that excuse for so many years, for
so many decades, until one must conclude that CJD TSE prion cases are rising. a
48% incease in CJD in Canada is not just a blip or a reason of better
surveillance, it is a mathematical rise in numbers. More and more we are seeing
more humans exposed in various circumstance in the Hospital, Medical, Surgical
arenas to the TSE Prion disease, and at the same time in North America, more and
more humans are becoming exposed to the TSE prion disease via consumption of the
TSE prion via deer and elk, cattle, sheep and goats, and for those that are
exposed via or consumption, go on to further expose many others via the
iatrogenic modes of transmission of the TSE prion disease i.e. friendly fire. I
pondered this mode of transmission via the victims of sporadic FFI, sporadic
GSS, could this be a iatrogenic event from someone sub-clinical with sFFI or
sGSS ? what if?
Two decades have passed since Dr. Ironside first confirmed his first ten
nvCJD victims in 1995. Ten years later, 2005, we had Dr. Gambetti and his first
ten i.e. VPSPR in younger victims. now we know that indeed VPSPR is
transmissible. yet all these TSE prion disease and victims in the USA and Canada
are being pawned off as a spontaneous event, yet science has shown, the
spontaneous theory has never been proven in any natural case of TSE prion
disease, and scientist have warned, that they have now linked some sporadic CJD
cases to atypical BSE, to atypical Scrapie, and to CWD, yet we don’t here about
this in the public domain. We must make all human and animal TSE prion disease
reportable in every age group, in ever state and internationally, we must have a
serious re-evaluation and testing of the USA cattle herds, and we must ban
interstate movement of all cervids. Any voluntary effort to do any of this will
fail. Folks, we have let the industry run science far too long with regards to
the TSE prion disease. While the industry and their lobbyist continues to funnel
junk science to our decision policy makers, Rome burns. ...end
REFERENCES
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease North America
2014
2014
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice
overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE.
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may
result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent. Lending support to this hypothesis,
pathological and biochemical similarities have been observed between L-BSE and
an sCJD subtype (MV genotype at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE
infected non-human primate and another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15].
snip...
BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD-like prion
strains in transgenic mice expressing human prion protein
*** Surprisingly, however, BSE transmission to these transgenic mice, in
addition to producing a vCJD-like phenotype, can also result in a distinct
molecular phenotype that is indistinguishable from that of sporadic CJD with
PrPSc type 2.
These data suggest that more than one BSEderived prion strain might infect
humans;
***it is therefore possible that some patients with a phenotype consistent
with sporadic CJD may have a disease arising from BSE exposure.
snip...
These studies further strengthen the evidence that vCJD is caused by a
BSE-like prion strain.
Also, remarkably, the key neuropathological hallmark of vCJD, the presence
of abundant florid PrP plaques, can be recapitulated on BSE or vCJD transmission
to these mice.
***However, the most surprising aspect of the studies was the finding that
an alternate pattern of disease can be induced in 129MM Tg35 mice from primary
transmission of BSE, with a molecular phenotype indistinguishable from that of a
subtype of sporadic CJD. This finding has important potential implications as it
raises the possibility that some humans infected with BSE prions may develop a
clinical disease indistinguishable from classical CJD associated with type 2
PrPSc. This is, in our experience, the commonest molecular sub-type of sporadic
CJD. In this regard, it is of interest that the reported incidence of sporadic
CJD has risen in the UK since the 1970s (Cousens et al., 1997)...
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set
out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE
which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is
scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that
this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial
distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC)
signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and
H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and
spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains
of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type
mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because
they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type
BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian
hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or
a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE.
***In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for
atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time
for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific
information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose
the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by
the same protective measures.
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: re-BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 10:23:43 -0000
From: "Asante, Emmanuel A" e.asante@ic.ac.uk
To: "'flounder@wt.net'" flounder@wt.net
Dear Terry,
I have been asked by Professor Collinge to respond to your request. I am a
Senior Scientist in the MRC Prion Unit and the lead author on the paper. I have
attached a pdf copy of the paper for your attention.
Thank you for your interest in the paper.
In respect of your first question, the simple answer is, ***yes. As you
will find in the paper, we have managed to associate the alternate phenotype to
type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. It is too early to be able to claim
any further sub-classification in respect of Heidenhain variant CJD or Vicky
Rimmer's version. It will take further studies, which are on-going, to establish
if there are sub-types to our initial finding which we are now reporting. The
main point of the paper is that, as well as leading to the expected new variant
CJD phenotype, BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an
alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc.
I hope reading the paper will enlighten you more on the subject. If I can
be of any further assistance please to not hesitate to ask. Best wishes.
Emmanuel Asante
<>
____________________________________
Dr. Emmanuel A Asante MRC Prion Unit & Neurogenetics Dept. Imperial
College School of Medicine (St. Mary's) Norfolk Place, LONDON W2 1PG Tel: +44
(0)20 7594 3794 Fax: +44 (0)20 7706 3272 email: e.asante@ic.ac.uk (until
9/12/02) New e-mail: e.asante@prion.ucl.ac.uk (active from now)
____________________________________
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases
constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European
approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
Monday, October 10, 2011
EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story
snip...
EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or
molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on
Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical
BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far
*** but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far
classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded.
Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE
agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical
BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic
wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.
snip...
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
The pathological and molecular but not clinical phenotypes are maintained
after second passage of experimental atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy
in cattle
*** HUMAN MAD COW DISEASE nvCJD TEXAS CASE NOT LINKED TO EUROPEAN TRAVEL
CDC ***
Sunday, November 23, 2014
*** Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas
in June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European
the patient had resided in Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed
investigation did not support the patient's having had extended travel to
European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The
specific overseas country where this patient’s infection occurred is less clear
largely because the investigation did not definitely link him to a country where
other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.
Sunday, December 14, 2014
ALERT new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease nvCJD or vCJD, sporadic CJD
strains, TSE prion aka Mad Cow Disease United States of America Update December
14, 2014 Report
TSS
