MAD COW USDA TSE PRION COVER UP or JUST IGNORANCE, for the record AUGUST
2014
just for the record ;
1989
In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of
animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to
accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the
''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical
incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...
2001
NEWS RELEASE
Texas Animal Health Commission Box l2966 •Austin, Texas 78711 •(800)
550-8242• FAX (512) 719-0719 Linda Logan, DVM, PhD• Executive Director For info,
contact Carla Everett, information officer, at 1-800-550-8242, ext. 710, or
ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
For Immediate Release-- Feed Contamination Issue Resolved by FDA
Although many of you may have heard the latest regarding the resolution of
the cattle feed contamination situation in Texas, I wanted to ensure that you
received this statement issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
agency in charge of regulating feed components. The FDA has said the cattle
involved are to be rendered and the material will not enter ruminant or human
food channels. The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) will provided
assistance to the FDA as requested and needed. FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM
TEXAS FEED LOT Today (Tuesday, Jan. the Food and Drug Administration announced
the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of
containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's
1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants.
Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in
the feed fed to cattle. FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed,
at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce --
of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. It is
important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore
not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in
U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of
BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were
contaminated.
According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy
Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease
out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any
ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with
other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation
of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series
of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."
Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing
that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and
mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore,
meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any
cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are
unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance
process as usual. FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by
first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the
animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal
authorities. This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put
into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued
vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are
followed routinely. FDA will continue working with USDA as well as state and
local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws
and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.
---30--
> For Immediate Release-- Feed Contamination Issue Resolved by FDA
HMMM, TEXAS, 5.5 GRAMS TO A 600 POUND COW, no problem ??? really ??? let's
see ;
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradleys
surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram
triggered infection.
it is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradleys
surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram
triggered infection.
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral
Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3;
Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6;
Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique,
France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità , Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious
Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate
Center, Germany
Background: In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk
for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE
brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims: The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious
dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this,
to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the
disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods: Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering
amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration
study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005
mg).
Results: In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques
already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the
onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical
course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence
the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions: Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on
the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the
incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus
4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that
develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals. The work
referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“
supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route
using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.
WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in
TEXAS was enough to kill many many cows.
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm)
caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Deslys
Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human
primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a
BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months
after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the
basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary
estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance
that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum 100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01
mg Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%) Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%)
7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%) RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%)
15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection The comparison is made on the basis of
calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a
bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated
into mice and cattle.8
*Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the
time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy
of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic
ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected
orally with similar BSE brain inocula Published online January 27, 2005
snip...
2003
„U.S. Department of Agriculture documents uncovered by United Press
International provide new evidence the cow that tested positive for mad cow
disease in Washington last December was healthy and not a "downer," as the
agency has maintained.
The USDA has made such a claim since it announced the mad cow case on Dec.
23. Because the animal was a downer, officials said -- meaning it was unable to
stand -- its detection is an indication the agency's national surveillance
program for the disease is effective at detecting infected animals.
That position has come under fire recently, however. Last week, the House
Committee on Government Reform sent a letter to Agriculture Secretary Ann
Veneman, asking her to respond to the accounts of three eyewitnesses present at
Vern's Moses Lake Meats in Moses Lake, Wash., where the cow was slaughtered Dec.
9, and other documents it uncovered indicating the cow was not a downer.
UPI has uncovered additional documents that provide further support the cow
was walking at the time of inspection.
The documents indicate that a test for illegal antibiotics and a
temperature reading are required to be performed on all downer animals. However,
neither test was conducted, suggesting the animal was not a downer.
The adequacy of USDA's mad cow surveillance program hinges on resolving the
downer dispute. The agency's program tests only downer cattle and those showing
signs of central nervous system problems because these are the most likely to be
infected. However, European inspectors have found hundreds of infected cows that
did not display any symptoms.
If the Washington cow was not a downer, it raises the question of how many
other, seemingly healthy animals infected with mad cow went undetected and were
approved for human consumption. Humans can contract a fatal brain disorder,
known as variant Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease, from eating meat tainted with the
mad-cow pathogen.
According to documents detailing the inspection of the cow in Washington
the day it was slaughtered, there is no indication the USDA veterinary medical
officer who listed the animal as a downer conducted a required test for the
presence of illegal antibiotics.
This test, called either a STOP (slow test on premises) or FAST (fast
antimicrobial screening test), should be conducted on all downers, according to
a 2001 directive issued by the agency's Food Safety and Inspection Services that
was obtained by UPI.
The failure to conduct a STOP or FAST test indicates the veterinarian
either did not follow proper procedures or the animal was not a downer, former
USDA veterinarians told UPI. "That's neglect of duty" if the animal was indeed a
downer, said Lester Friedlander, who worked for the agency from 1985 to 1995.
"All downers have to have a STOP test done on them," he said.
The 2001 directive advises USDA veterinarians that the antibiotic tests are
warranted on all downers, defined as "any animal that was non-ambulatory," and
they should "retain the tested carcasses until the test results are
received."
The Washington animal, however, does not appear to have been tested and its
carcass was not retained
"They never did any lab work on it," Dave Louthan, the Vern's Moses
employee who killed the animal and was present when the veterinarian inspected
it, told UPI.
"The carcass was never retained," added Louthan, who has maintained the cow
was not a downer and testified to that effect before the Washington state
legislature earlier this month. The cow was slaughtered on Dec. 9, a Friday, at
about 2:30 p.m. The antibiotic tests can take anywhere from six to 24 hours to
obtain the results, meaning the veterinarian would have needed to return the
next day, Saturday, to interpret the tests and either pass or reject the carcass
for human consumption.
Louthan, who worked that Saturday, said neither the veterinarian nor the
meat inspector was present.
He said the carcass was loaded on a truck on Saturday morning and shipped
out Sunday night. By Monday afternoon, it had been turned into hamburger meat
and was on its way to the store, he said.
Tom D'Amura, a former USDA veterinarian who now works as an independent
support veterinarian for Sagebrush Veterinary Services in Arlington, Texas, said
he found it curious that a STOP test was not done.
The inspection sheet lists pelvic injuries for the cow, meaning it was at
least suspect, D'Amura told UPI. On top of that, it was a dairy cow, in which
antibiotic use is common, he said. "Alarm bells should have gone off with the
veterinarian; the cow would have been a prime candidate for a STOP test," he
said. "She should have been retained for STOP until the results returned no
matter the (mad cow) business."
Steven Cohen, a spokesman for USDA's FSIS, declined a request by UPI to
speak to the inspecting veterinarian, whom Louthan identified as Rodney
Thompson“.
„ An Eastside family who says they ate beef linked to the nation‘s only
known case of mad cow disease yesterday filed a class-action lawsuit against
QFC, claiming the grocery store chain negligently exposed them and others to
„highly hazardous“ meat and did not properly notify them that they had bought
it. Attorneys for Jill Crowson, a 52-year-old interior designer from Clyde Hill,
filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court on behalf of her family and
possibly hundreds of other customers who unwittingly bought and consumed beef
potentially exposed to mad cow disease. „I was pretty upset about it,“ Crowson
said. „I‘ve spent all of my kids‘ lives trying to be a responsible parent for
them to keep them safe. I felt badly that the food I served could be harmful to
their health.“ The lawsuit is believed to be the first stemming from this
country‘s only confirmed case of mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform
encephalopathy, which was detected in a slaughtered Holstein from a Yakima
Valley ranch on Dec. 23.
N either officials at Quality Food Centers‘ Bellevue headquarters, or
Kroger – the company‘s Ohio-based corporate parent – could be reached for
comment about the lawsuit yesterday. The suit contends the family bought and
later ate ground beef from their local QFC that was part of a batch processed at
Vern‘s Moses Lake Meats on Dec. 9 and included meat from the diseased Holstein.
The beef was later shipped to wholesalers and retailers in Washington, Oregon,
California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada. On Dec. 23 – after government scientists
confirmed the Holstein was infected with BSE – businesses began pulling
potentially affected beef from store shelves under a voluntary recall.
But the family‘s suit claims that, although QFC was aware of the recall on
Dec. 23, the store did not begin pulling the recalled beef from about 40 of its
stores that carried it until Dec. 24. The company also did not try to warn
customers about the recalled beef until Dec. 27 – and only then with small,
inconspicuous signs inside the stores, the suit claims. Steve Berman, the
family‘s attorney, said the company had „a duty to warn“ consumers who bought
the beef under terms of the Washington Product Liability Act. QFC could‘ve
easily notified customers by taking out TV, radio or newspaper ads, or by
tracking and notifying those who bought the beef through customers‘ QFC
Advantage Cards, Berman said. At Berman‘s downtown Seattle firm yesterday,
Crowson described how on Dec. 22 and Dec. 23 – the day of the recall – she
bought single packages of „9 percent leanest ground beef“ from her local QFC
store at Bellevue Village.
Crowson took the beef home, cooked it and made tacos one night and
spaghetti the next – serving the dinners to herself; her daughter, Laura, 22;
son, Nicholas, 19; and her niece, Claire De Winter, 23. Members of the family
also ate leftovers from those meals for the next several days, Crowson said.
„When the news about mad cow came out, I instantly became concerned,“ Crowson
said. „But the initial stories didn‘t mention anything about QFC, so I thought
we were OK.“ While shopping at the grocery store a few days later, Crowson said
she asked a store butcher whether QFC stores had sold any of the recalled beef.
The butcher assured her they had not, she said.
The family only learned QFC had sold any of the beef in question after
reading a news story Jan. 10 about a Mercer Island man who discovered his family
had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store, Crowson
said.Crowson later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking that
it track purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card – a store discount card issued
to customers. On Jan. 12, the company notified Crowson that the beef she bought
and served to her family was, in fact, part of the recalled batch, she said.
Scientists believe people who eat beef from infected cows can contract a fatal
form of the disease. The family is „now burdened with the possibility that they
presently carry (the disease) that may have an incubation period of up to 30
years,“ the lawsuit says. Lawyers for the family say they believe hundreds, if
not thousands, of QFC customers, and those of other stores, likely ate beef from
the recalled batch – the reason why Berman filed their legal claim as a
class-action lawsuit. A USDA official this week said that up to 17,000 pounds of
meat affected by the recall likely was eaten or thrown out by customers.
Berman added that an investigator from his firm learned that QFC buys beef
for its „9 percent leanest ground beef“ products in large tubs that can weigh
several hundred pounds, and then regrinds and packages the meat for sale.
Because QFC stores regrind the beef before selling it, Berman contends that
makes the store a manufacturer responsible under the Washington Product
Liability Act for not selling any unsafe product. Scientists believe people who
eat beef from cows infected with BSE can contract variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob, a
fatal brain-wasting disease that has been detected in about 150 people
worldwide. However, officials with the U.S. Agriculture Department have
repeatedly said the risk from eating muscle cuts from an infected cow – the
likely cut of meat processed and sold for hamburger in the recalled batch – is
extremely low. Although Crowson said she tries not to „obsess over it,“ she is
fearful that her family could one day become sick. „It‘s pretty scary,“ she
said.
Because no medical test is available to determine whether a living person
is infected with the disease, the couple‘s „stress and fear cannot be allayed,“
the lawsuit said. The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress
and medical monitoring costs. Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit
isn‘t about money. „The more I‘ve thought about this, the angrier I‘ve gotten,“
she said.
„ A key witness in the criminal investigation announced by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture Inspector General Wednesday likely will be the agency
veterinarian who inspected the cow infected with mad cow disease in Washington
last December. The veterinarian, Rodney Thompson, is the only witness the USDA
has who says the cow in Washington was a downer, meaning it was unable to stand
or walk. Three other witnesses who saw the cow the day it was slaughtered -- on
Dec. 9 at Vern‘s Moses Lake Meat Co. In Moses Lake, Wash. – have said the cow
was walking. So far, Thompson has not publicly divulged his side of the story
and it is uncertain whether under questioning he will maintain the cow was a
downer. USDA spokespeople have kept Thompson sequestered from the press and have
refused to provide information about him.
Dave Louthan, the Vern‘s Moses Lake employee who slaughtered the cow in
question, alleges Thompson changed his inspection sheet under duress from USDA
management to indicate the animal was a downer after it tested positive for mad
cow disease. The alteration was done, Louthan contends, to support the agency‘s
official position that their detection of the infected cow shows their
surveillance program – which is based primarily on testing downer animals – is
effective.
The USDA Office of Inspector General launched an investigation into the
matter in early February, and Inspector General Phyllis K. Fong told a House
appropriations subcommittee Wednesday the investigation was focused on „possible
alteration of official records.“ Thompson has not spoken publicly about the
issue, but USDA officers have distributed to reporters the Dec. 9 inspection
sheet he filled out. It indicates the cow was a downer, although Thompson‘s
signature on the sheet is blacked out. OIG spokesman Austin Chadwick told United
Press International the investigation was spurred by a Feb. 3 New York Times
article, in which Louthan said the cow was not a downer and alleged the
inspection sheet had been changed.
„The USDA made (Thompson) do it,“ Louthan told UPI, emphasizing Thompson
was „a good and honorable man“ who would never forge records on his own. If the
cow was not a downer, it would raise the larger issue of whether USDA‘s mad cow
surveillance program is based on faulty premises. Fong said her office had
launched a separate investigation that will involve „an audit to review various
aspects of USDA‘s response to the discovery of BSE, including the BSE response
and surveillance plans.“ The USDA‘s mad cow surveillance program has been in
question since the mad cow was first reported Dec. 23, 2003. The agency tests so
few animals – only about 20,000 out of the 35 million slaughtered each year –
some critics have said it is unlikely it could detect mad cow even if it was
prevalent in the U.S. herd. UPI reported in January that mad cow testing records
for the past two years, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, reveal
the agency had not tested any animals in Washington state for the first seven
months of 2003.
If the three eyewitnesses – Louthan, the driver of the trailer that
delivered the cow and the co-manager of Vern‘s – are correct and the cow was
walking, it raises the possibility that other seemingly healthy but infected
cows went undetected and were approved for human c onsumption. This is
theoretically possible because hundreds of cows in Europe have tested positive
but showed no apparent symptoms of the disease. Thompson‘s inspection sheet
shows he did not conduct two screening tests – body temperature and illegal
antibiotic residue – that, according to USDA regulations, are considered
mandatory for all downers, as previously reported by UPI. Former USDA
veterinarians – including Lester Friedlander, who acted as a chief inspector at
Taylor Packing in Wyalusing, Pa. – said this indicates the cow was either not a
downer or Thompson failed to follow proper protocol. The veterinarians added
they thought the latter possibility was unlikely because they never had
encountered a situation where they could not get a body temperature and
antibiotic residue test on a downer.
In addition, USDA regulations stipulate the cow carcass should have been
retained since a mad cow test was being conducted. However, the carcass was
processed and sent out to grocery stores more than a week before the positive
test results came back. Louthan said he knew Thompson well and often worked
„less than a foot away“ from him during his four-anda- half years at Vern‘s.
„He‘s a really good veterinarian. I really liked him,“ said Louthan, who was
laid off from Vern‘s shortly after telling reporters the cow in question was not
a downer – contrary to Secretary Veneman‘s statements at the time.
„If Doc Thompson made a mistake, he‘s the kind of person who would step up
and admit to it,“ he said. That is the reason the USDA has not allowed him to
talk to the press – because he would be honest and tell the truth – Louthan
contended. „If he‘s the same Rodney I‘ve always known, he‘s going to admit to it
and say ‚Yeah, I forged the paperwork,‘“ he said. Thompson did not respond to
e-mails sent by UPI two weeks ago, and attempts to reach him by phone last week
at Vern‘s were unsuccessful.
Although plant management said Thompson was on the job last Friday, a meat
inspector, who later was identified as Donald West, answered the phone line
reserved for USDA officials at the plant and told UPI that Thompson had left for
the day. West declined to identify himself or comment on the case and abruptly
ended the conversation. Louthan said West previously had told him Thompson was
given a promotion and bumped up three pay grades in an effort to keep him
silent. UPI has been unable to verify any of Louthan‘s allegations, in part
because the USDA has refused to give out any information on Thompson. In fact,
agency officials will not even verify if Thompson is still a USDA employee,
saying they cannot comment on an ongoing investigation.
Asked about the promotion and pay-raise allegations, USDA spokeswoman Alisa
Harrison said, „I haven‘t heard of that at all ...I‘m sure that‘s part of what
the (Inspector General) is taking a look at.“ Asked whether USDA officials
pressured Thompson to alter documents, Harrison replied: „I cannot fathom that
would happen ... I would assure you that‘s not something Secretary Veneman would
do.“ Harrison declined to comment on the actions that would be taken if the OIG
investigation found records had been forged. „I‘m not going to speculate or
answer any hypothetical questions,“ she said. „It‘s important to let the
investigation proceed.“
Thompson may soon have to give his account of the mad cow case whether USDA
officials want him to or not. The House Government Reform Committee has opened
its own investigation into the matter and requested in a Feb. 17 letter to
Veneman that she „make available for interviews with our staff the USDA
officials who are familiar with the operations at Vern‘s,“ which presumably
would include Thompson. Harrison said the agency would comply with the
committee‘s request and make Thompson available. „Je intend to fully cooperate
with information requests made by the committee,“ she said. A source close to
the committee‘s investigation who requested they not be identified, told UPI:
„There haven‘t been any new interviews to date, but the investigation is
definitely still ongoing and we‘re still interested in talking to people.“ The
source added that Thompson is „certainly an interesting part of the
investigation.“
„Our goal is to see trade resume as quickly as possible“, that is US
Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman´s main task, but if trade will resume as
quickly as the industry would like is uncertain. With the first BSE case found
in the US, a lot of digging is being done into the credibility of the American
feed safety system.
The fact that the first US-found BSE cow, according to DNA tests,
originates from Canada indeed helps to open up borders, but does not determine
that these borders actually will open up, said the international animal health
organization OIE. According to OIE there are more aspects that play a role in
re-aquiring BSE-free status. Top USDA officials and industry groups said that
foreign countries should lift US beef bans. US-politicians also hammer on the
BSE-case being Canadian and demand reopening of markets, but US chief veterinary
officer Ron DeHaven does not want to go that far. „It is a North-American case,
it was and it stays that way,“ he said.
In the meantime the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which has not
implemented any new safeguards since the BSE-discovery, faces growing pressure
to strengthen its ban on the use of cattle remains in certain animal feed. While
the Agriculture Department(USDA) quickly imposed a series of new food safety
rules, FDA officials still hesitated and said they needed time to install extra
precautions.
Three tier firewall
SNIP...
WE ALL KNOW HOW FLAWED THIS 3 TIER BSE MAD COW FIREWALL IS, PLEASE SEE
PROOF BELOW ON THE FEED, SURVEILLANCE, AND TESTING, AND JUST HOW FLAWED THEY ALL
ARE...TSS
FULL TEXT ;
[PDF]
www.usda.gov/oig/.../Testimony...
United States Department of Agriculture
This Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation concerned the identification ... facility in Moses Lake, Washington State, which tested positive for BSE two.
[PDF]
www.usda.gov/oig/.../50601-10-...
United States Department of Agriculture
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL. Washington, D.C. 20250. January 25, 2006. REPLY TO. ATTN OF: 50601-10-KC. TO: W. Ron DeHaven. Administrator.
[PDF]
www.usda.gov/oig/.../Testimony...
United States Department of Agriculture
Mar 15, 2004 - for my colleagues and staff at OIG, BSE-related work is a top priority and one of ... identification of a BSE-infected cow in Washington State in ...
Sunday, November 13, 2011 California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD,
and dead stock downer livestock
QFC sued over mad cow case Grocer negligently exposed them to beef, family
claims
Friday, March 5, 2004
2004
highly suspect stumbling and staggering mad cow reported, however, NO
TESTING DONE, ON ORDERS FROM AUSTIN $
May 4, 2004
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow
with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor
for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison)...
USDA regulations, any cow that exhibits signs of central nervous system
(CNS)
According to a 1997 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (NHIS)
Memorandum, brain samples all of such animals should be sent for BSE testing.2
The memorandum notes that "it is essential that brain specimens be collected
from adult cattle condemned for CNS signs as part of our national surveillance
of BSE."
The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week
staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a
request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an
APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant
to send the carcass for rendering.5
May 13,2004
Page 2
snip...
The cow slaughtered at the Lone Star Beef slaughterhouse last week
staggered and fell, and was condemned ante mortem by FSIS personnel.4 Despite a
request from APHIS personnel at the plant to conduct BSE testing, however, an
APHIS supervisor in Austin reportedly refused the test and instructed the plant
to send the carcass for rendering.5
This sequence of events is troubling, and it raises the question of whether
this is an isolated incident. In 1997, USDA noted a major gap between the number
of cattle condemned for CNS symptoms and the number of these cows actually
tested for mad cow disease. The Department found:
May 13, 2004
Failure To Test Staggering Cow May Reflect Wider Problems Rep. Waxman
raises concerns that the recent failure of USDA to test an impaired cow for BSE
may not be an isolated incident, citing the failure of USDA to monitor whether
cows condemned for central nervous system symptoms are actually tested for mad
cow disease. - Letter to USDA
July 13, 2004 IG Audit Finds Multiple Flaws in Mad Cow Surveillance Plan
Rep. Waxman raises questions about the effectiveness and credibility of USDA's
response to mad cow disease, citing an audit by the USDA Inspector General that
finds systemic deficiencies in the Department's surveillance plan and new
evidence that USDA misled the public in the wake of the detection of an infected
cow in Washington State. - Letter to USDA
IG Draft Audit
SUPPRESSED peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011]
FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE)
Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 INTRODUCTION The United
States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings
from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update,
October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the
FSIS website:
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to
FSIS.
Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns
Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S.
Singeltary.
This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on
the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points
in mind:
Owens, Julie From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006
Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;
Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002.
October 31, 2002 Review of the Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United States Conducted by the Harvard Center
for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public Health and Center for Computational
Epidemiology, College of Veterinary Medicine, Tuskegee University Final Report
Prepared for U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service
Office of Public Health and Science Prepared by RTI Health, Social, and
Economics Research Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 RTI Project Number
07182.024
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed
Thursday, April 09, 2009
Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule:
Proposed
Greetings FDA et al,
I kindly wish to comment on the following ;
[Docket No. FDA-2002-N-0031] (formerly Docket No. 2002N-0273) RIN
0910-AF46
[Federal Register: April 9, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 67)] [Proposed Rules]
[Page 16160-16161] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ap09-18]
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of
Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)
FULL TEXT OF GOA REPORT BELOW (takes a while to load)
2. Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other
Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts. GAO-02-183, January
25.
January 2002
MAD COW DISEASE Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory
Areas Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts
snip...
As you also requested, we considered, to the extent feasible, a study by
the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis and sponsored by USDA to examine the
potential for BSE in the United States.2 That study, issued in November 2001,
concluded that BSE is extremely unlikely to become established in the United
States and that, if introduced here, it would be eliminated within 20 years.3
The authors acknowledged that those conclusions, which were based on a
probabilistic simulation model developed for the study, could be influenced by a
number of model assumptions that could not be verified with confidence—including
assumptions about U.S. measures to prevent the introduction and spread of
BSE.
snip...
TSS COMMENTS;
IN OTHER WORDS, in was meaningless, just words on paper, rules and
regulations that were not complied with, much less enforced. as i so kindly
said, a farce. how many reports from peer reviewed experts do we need to say
that the USA BSE/TSE program is failing, has failed, and will fail in the
future, how many do we have to have before someone does something, and i don't
mean stand up there in front of God and the world and lie, i don't mean that, i
mean when is something going to be done...TSS
snip...
GAO Comments
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and Human
Services’ letter dated January 9, 2002.
1. Our report acknowledged FDA’s ongoing review but also notes that FDA has
not set a date to announce a decision on the exemptions. The report also
recognizes that recent research suggests the possibility of “silent” incubation
in species not previously thought susceptible to TSEs. This research argues
against waiting until BSE is found to strengthen measures shown to prevent the
spread of the disease. As FDA notes, other countries strengthened their feed
bans due to concerns about commingling prohibited and non-prohibited proteins.
Such commingling is a common area of noncompliance in the United States.
2. As FDA points out, its June 22, 2001, transmittal of compliance
information to the Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce “made
an effort to identify the fact that there were reporting problems, including
incomplete data, i.e., blanks.” However, we do not believe that this caveat
conveyed the extent to which the information could be inaccurate. In fact,
noncompliance could be much higher than FDA reported, because FDA treated all
firms with blanks on compliance questions as if they were in compliance. We
found that over 700 inspection records for firms that handled prohibited
proteins had blanks on compliance questions. In its response to the Chairman,
FDA did not disclose that some of those records contained inspector comments
stating that the firms were not in compliance. Nor did FDA disclose that, at the
time it responded to the Chairman, it was aware of the need for “significant
improvements in its data collection system for enforcing the feed ban.” As a
result, we believe the data were misleading.
3. We believe that the nature and severity of the problems we found in
FDA’s management, oversight, and enforcement of the feed ban point to
insufficient attention by FDA management. Moreover, the fact that FDA gave all
headquarters responsibility to one individual—as an addon to that individual’s
other duties—is further evidence of the relatively low priority FDA gave to its
regulatory responsibility.
4. Although FDA’s field inspectors and state inspectors carried out the
inspections, FDA headquarters tracked overall compliance with the feed ban and
brought together data on FDA field and state compliance inspections. In meetings
with FDA officials, we were repeatedly told Page 52 GAO-02-183 Mad Cow Disease
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services that a
single person had designed the program and the database to monitor inspections
and, until January 2001, made all enforcement decisions. While administrative
and other support may have been available for this person, the overall design
and direction of feed ban implementation rested with this individual. Moreover,
because FDA had no other information system, the database that individual
developed was FDA’s only mechanism to monitor the program and track feed ban
compliance.
5. Although FDA cites a number of high-level interagency policy and
technical initiatives aimed at ensuring that BSE-risk products do not enter the
United States, our recommendation is grounded in problems we found at the
operational level. First, the high error rates in importer-provided information
found by Customs are unacceptable. Second, the ever-increasing volume of
imported shipments strains inspection resources at both USDA and FDA. Third, we
observed or were told by federal field personnel about problems affecting USDA
and FDA staff responsible for reviewing import documentation and conducting
inspections of shipments. FDA staff told us that they need integrated
information technologies, dedicated inspection facilities, and additional staff
to effectively address their workload.
6. We do not agree that FDA has made extensive progress implementing our
recommendation, based on the fact that it periodically meets with states on
BSE-related issues and has increased the number of states under contracts to
conduct inspections. With regard to its progress in identifying the universe of
firms subject to the ban, our work shows that FDA’s efforts have not been
successful. In reports, FDA states that the number of on-farm feed mills, feed
blenders, and feed haulers is still unknown. FDA also asserts that the feed
industry has undergone extensive consolidation, but it has not reconciled the
number of firms inspected with industry or state estimates. Although FDA asserts
it has incorporated into state contracts a requirement to identify firms subject
to the ban, the contracts we reviewed did not include such provisions. Moreover,
as recently as May 2001, we found that FDA was adding to its database
information on inspections conducted in 1998 by states under contract.
7. FDA agrees on the need for a comprehensive strategy for BSE but points
out that it began an enforcement strategy in 1998. However, our review shows
that the strategy did not contain criteria and timeframes for specific
enforcement actions against firms that fail to comply with the feed ban, as our
recommendation envisions. FDA’s contention that Page 53 GAO-02-183 Mad Cow
Disease Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services
its initial approach was to educate firms does not explain its failure to take
action against firms found out of compliance on repeated inspections. Now that
the feed ban has been in effect for more than 4 years, FDA points out that
inspections have resulted in more than 200 recalls. However, those recalls
consist of actions taken by 22 firms, one of which accounted for about 150
recalls. By FDA’s own estimates, more than 300 firms are out of compliance.
8. Regardless of variations in state laws, FDA has instructed states to
provide specific information on the feed ban inspections they conduct. We
believe FDA should request these states to also include information on
enforcement actions taken as a result of those feed ban inspections.
9. While we agree that FDA has initiated efforts to increase the integrity
and usefulness of the BSE inspection data, it has not taken the steps necessary
to ensure that the inspection data are accurate and complete and recorded in a
timely manner. For example, neither the steps listed in FDA’s letter nor the
terms of the contracts we reviewed include periodic assessment of error rates or
controls to help ensure data entered are complete and accurate. Moreover, FDA’s
response does not address how the data on past BSE inspections will be merged
with the Field Accomplishment Compliance Tracking System. Many of the firms have
never before been subject to FDA oversight and would not have such control
numbers to effectively merge the old and new data. Also, FDA has not included
steps to capture timeliness of inspections, enforcement actions, and follow up,
especially for past inspections. Page 54 GAO-02-183 Mad Cow Disease
2005
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease
Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us
Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at
OIG, ...............
snip...
There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully
request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America
over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...
Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff,
Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx
Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST In
Reply to: Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford,
Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results posted by TSS on
June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:
Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days
later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary
for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow
found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected.
just pondering... TSS
*** HISTORY MAD COW IN TEXAS NOVEMBER 2004 ***
TIME FRAME FOR BSE CONFIRMATION SHOULD BE 48 HOUR TURNAROUND. THIS CASE WAS
COVERED UP FOR 7 MONTHS, ONLY CONFIRMED AFTER MY LETTER AND OTHERS TO OFFICIALS
ASKING FOR A RETEST, IN WHICH A CONFIRMATION WAS CONFIRMED MAD COW BSE.
...TSS
-------- Original Message --------
Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to
unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething,
but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you
confirm???
terry
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 –0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA
web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas. Carla At 09:44
AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting
unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you
comment on this either way please?>>
thank you,>
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: ...snip tss
our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's
announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by
NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when
we hear something. At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,
you wrote:
>why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?
>>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:
>November 22: Press Release title here
>>star image More BSE information
>>>>terry
>>Carla Everett wrote:
>>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...
>>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>
-------- Original Message --------
Director, Public Information Carla Everett ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 –0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to
unmask] us>
Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething,
but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you
confirm???
terry
==============================
USDA did not test possible mad cows
By Steve Mitchell
United Press International
Published 6/8/2004 9:30 PM
WASHINGTON, June 8 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture claims
ittested 500 cows with signs of a brain disorder for mad cow disease last year,
but agency documents obtained by United Press International show the agency
tested only half that number.
FULL 130 LASHINGS TO USDA BY OIG again
"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were
preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of
test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in
the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the
ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
TEXAS 2ND MAD COW THAT WAS COVERED UP, AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS, AND CALLS
FROM TSE PRION SCIENTIST AROUND THE GLOBE, THIS 2ND MAD COW IN TEXAS WAS
CONFIRMED
THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES POSITIVE TEST COVER UP
JOHANNS SECRET POSTIVE MAD COW TEST THAT WERE IGNORED
OIG AND THE HONORABLE FONG CONFIRMS TEXAS MAD AFTER AN ACT OF CONGRESS 7
MONTHS LATER
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE
BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i
confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i
contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal
was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of
67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated.
All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were
determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined
that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to
be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are
presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In
addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the
index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to
trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter
channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and
one calf was untraceable.
Executive Summary In June 2005,
an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November
2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the
immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western
blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin
for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis.
USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC),
established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities
according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel
removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd,
euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State
extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The
majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well
before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was
thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05.
The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not
present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person
who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and
could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a
search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not
result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received
one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order
on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05.
There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and
Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of
interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have
died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A
final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest
at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been
exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold
order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received
two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67
head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory,
the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth
cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive.
Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not
found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on
Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the
identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified
as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace
Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This
herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was
conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner
of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further
information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the
livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by
that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest.
Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd
had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the
history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted.
The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an
animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7
contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State,
including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough
place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in
2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of
interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded
herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to
locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was
subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may
have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The
hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
THE SECRET MAD COW POSITIVE TEST, THAT WAS COVERED UP
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February
2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The
owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified
BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to
USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those
cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the
owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem)
samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently
received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
2006
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow
issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed
critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
end...tss
2012
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?
SNIP...
What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare
disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”
The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown,
one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the
National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base
that statement.”
“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an
official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi
State.
In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the
origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said
The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a
spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.
SNIP...
HISTORY OF TEXAS AND ALABAMA MAD COWS ;
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
Saturday, August 4, 2012
*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012
(ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE)
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular
characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases
from Europe and Japan. *** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE
contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also
suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
Friday, December 14, 2012
DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced
into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
snip...
In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation
(21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin)
from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With
regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may
not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered
at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the
animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a
requirement by law.
Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:
1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD
eradication zones and
2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to
slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.
Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive
animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.
The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from
the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES.
It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin
processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.
Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible
risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk
protein is imported into GB.
There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data
on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these
products.
snip...
36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of
deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of
Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).
The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and
behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition,
signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a
fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an
altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids
experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB,
for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate
if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the
human food-chain via affected venison.
snip...
The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and
can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).
snip...
In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil
and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a
bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are
present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with
CWD prion.
snip...
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving
between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling
to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing,
footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible.
For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the
increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant
uncertainty associated with these estimates.
snip...
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher
probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer
given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists
and returning GB residents.
snip...
2013
Sunday, December 15, 2013
*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
REVIEW
The 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so flawed, that one of the
top TSE prion Scientist for the CDC, Dr. Paul Brown stated ;
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow
cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the
United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one
year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that
initially tested positive.
see ;
Saturday, August 16, 2008
Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13,
2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)
Tuesday, July 14, 2009 U.S.
Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE
Red Book
Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
Thursday, March 29, 2012
atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012
NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011San Antonio, Texas
Monday, June 02, 2014
Confirmed Human BSE aka mad cow Variant CJD vCJD or nvCJD Case in Texas
Monday, June 23, 2014
*** PRION 2014 CONFERENCE CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD
Tuesday, July 01, 2014
*** CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION DISEASE, GAME FARMS, AND
POTENTIAL RISK FACTORS THERE FROM ***
Thursday, July 03, 2014
*** How Chronic Wasting Disease is affecting deer population and what’s the
risk to humans and pets? ***
Saturday, August 02, 2014
*** Structural effects of PrP polymorphisms on intra- and inter-species
prion transmission
In contrast, the scrapie prions used in the deer transmission studies of
Greenlee and colleagues were isolated from a sheep encoding A136, ***raising the
possibility that deer may be susceptible to multiple scrapie strains.
snip...
Significance
The unpredictable recurrences of prion epidemics, their incurable
lethality, and the capacity of animal prions to infect humans, provide
significant motivation to ascertain the parameters governing disease
transmission. The unprecedented spread, and uncertain zoonotic potential of
chronic wasting disease (CWD), a contagious epidemic among deer, elk, and other
cervids, is of particular concern. Here we demonstrate that naturally occurring
primary structural differences in cervid PrPs differentially impact the
efficiency of intra- and interspecies prion transmission. Our results not only
deliver new information about the role of primary structural variation on prion
susceptibility, but also provide functional support to a mechanism in which
plasticity of a tertiary structural epitope governs prion protein conversion and
intra- and inter-species susceptibility to prions.-
snip...
Monday, July 28, 2014
Mitigating the Risk of Transmission and Environmental Contamination of
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 2013 Annual Report
*** The potential impact of prion diseases on human health was greatly
magnified by the recognition that interspecies transfer of BSE to humans by beef
ingestion resulted in vCJD. While changes in animal feed constituents and
slaughter practices appear to have curtailed vCJD, there is concern that CWD of
free-ranging deer and elk in the U.S. might also cross the species barrier.
Thus, consuming venison could be a source of human prion disease. Whether BSE
and CWD represent interspecies scrapie transfer or are newly arisen prion
diseases is unknown. Therefore, the possibility of transmission of prion disease
through other food animals cannot be ruled out. There is evidence that vCJD can
be transmitted through blood transfusion. There is likely a pool of unknown size
of asymptomatic individuals infected with vCJD, and there may be asymptomatic
individuals infected with the CWD equivalent. These circumstances represent a
potential threat to blood, blood products, and plasma supplies.
Wednesday, July 23, 2014
After the storm? UK blood safety and the risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease
Sunday, August 09, 2009
CJD...Straight talk with...James Ironside...and...Terry Singeltary... 2009
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
* BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 – 2009
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease North America
2014
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease have now been
discovered in a wide verity of species across North America. typical C-BSE,
atypical L-type BASE BSE, atypical H-type BSE, atypical H-G BSE, of the bovine,
typical and atypical Scrapie strains, in sheep and goats, with atypical Nor-98
Scrapie spreading coast to coast in about 5 years. Chronic Wasting Disease CWD
in cervid is slowly spreading without any stopping it in Canada and the USA and
now has mutated into many different strains. Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy
TME outbreaks. These Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease
have been silently mutating and spreading in different species in North America
for decades.
The USDA, FDA, et al have assured us of a robust Triple BSE TSE prion
Firewall, of which we now know without a doubt, that it was nothing but ink on
paper. Since the 1997 mad cow feed ban in the USA, literally tons and tons of
banned mad cow feed has been put out into commerce, never to return, as late as
December of 2013, serious, serious breaches in the FDA mad cow feed ban have
been documented. The 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so flawed, that
one of the top TSE prion Scientist for the CDC, Dr. Paul Brown stated ; Brown,
who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to
estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States,
said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because
of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested
positive.
see ;
The BSE surveillance and testing have also been proven to be flawed, and
the GAO and OIG have both raised serious question as to just how flawed it has
been (see GAO and OIG reports). North America has more documented TSE prion
disease, in different documented species (excluding the Zoo BSE animals in the
EU), then any other place on the Globe. This does not include the very
likelihood that TSE prion disease in the domestic feline and canine have been
exposed to high doses of the TSE prion disease vid pet food. To date, it’s still
legal to include deer from cwd zone into pet food or deer food. Specified Risk
Material i.e. SRM bans still being breach, as recently as just last month.
nvCJD or what they now call vCJD, another case documented in Texas last
month, with very little information being released to the public on about this
case? with still the same line of thought from federal officials, ‘it can’t
happen here’, so another vCJD blamed on travel of a foreign animal disease from
another country, while ignoring all the BSE TSE Prion risk factors we have here
in the USA and Canada, and the time that this victim and others, do spend in the
USA, and exposed to these risk factors, apparently do not count in any way with
regard to risk factor. a flawed process of risk assessment.
sporadic CJD, along with new TSE prion disease in humans, of which the
young are dying, of which long duration of illness from onset of symptoms to
death have been documented, only to have a new name added to the pot of prion
disease i.e. sporadic GSS, sporadic FFI, and or VPSPR. I only ponder how a
familial type disease could be sporadic with no genetic link to any family
member? when the USA is the only documented Country in the world to have
documented two different cases of atypical H-type BSE, with one case being
called atypical H-G BSE with the G meaning Genetic, with new science now showing
that indeed atypical H-type BSE is very possible transmitted to cattle via oral
transmission (Prion2014). sporadic CJD and VPSPR have been rising in Canada,
USA, and the UK, with the same old excuse, better surveillance. You can only use
that excuse for so many years, for so many decades, until one must conclude that
CJD TSE prion cases are rising. a 48% incease in CJD in Canada is not just a
blip or a reason of better surveillance, it is a mathematical rise in numbers.
More and more we are seeing more humans exposed in various circumstance in the
Hospital, Medical, Surgical arenas to the TSE Prion disease, and at the same
time in North America, more and more humans are becoming exposed to the TSE
prion disease via consumption of the TSE prion via deer and elk, cattle, sheep
and goats, and for those that are exposed via or consumption, go on to further
expose many others via the iatrogenic modes of transmission of the TSE prion
disease i.e. friendly fire. I pondered this mode of transmission via the victims
of sporadic FFI, sporadic GSS, could this be a iatrogenic event from someone
sub-clinical with sFFI or sGSS ? what if?
Two decades have passed since Dr. Ironside first confirmed his first ten
nvCJD victims in 1995. Ten years later, 2005, we had Dr. Gambetti and his first
ten i.e. VPSPR in younger victims. now we know that indeed VPSPR is
transmissible. yet all these TSE prion disease and victims in the USA and Canada
are being pawned off as a spontaneous event, yet science has shown, the
spontaneous theory has never been proven in any natural case of TSE prion
disease, and scientist have warned, that they have now linked some sporadic CJD
cases to atypical BSE, to atypical Scrapie, and to CWD, yet we don’t here about
this in the public domain. We must make all human and animal TSE prion disease
reportable in every age group, in ever state and internationally, we must have a
serious re-evaluation and testing of the USA cattle herds, and we must ban
interstate movement of all cervids. Any voluntary effort to do any of this will
fail. Folks, we have let the industry run science far too long with regards to
the TSE prion disease. While the industry and their lobbyist continues to funnel
junk science to our decision policy makers, Rome burns. ...end
REFERENCES
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease North America
2014
Tuesday, April 01, 2014
*** Questions linger in U.S. CJD cases 2005, and still do in 2014 ***
PLEASE REMEMBER ;
The Akron, Ohio-based CJD Foundation said the Center for Disease Control
revised that number in October of 2004 to about one in 9,000 CJD cases per year
in the population group age 55 and older.
HAVE YOU GOT YOUR CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ASKING REAL QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO
ROUTE AND SOURCE OF THE TSE AGENT THAT KILLED YOUR LOVED ONE ???
if not, why not...
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health
Crisis
full text with source references ;
just made a promise, never forget, and never let them forget...tss
Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Case Report
snip...
Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease autopsy case report
'MOM'
DIVISION OF NEUROPATHOLOGY University of Texas Medical Branch 114
McCullough Bldg. Galveston, Texas 77555-0785
FAX COVER SHEET
DATE: 4-23-98
TO: Mr. Terry Singeltary @ -------
FROM: Gerald Campbell
FAX: (409) 772-5315 PHONE: (409) 772-2881
Number of Pages (including cover sheet):
Message:
*CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*
This document accompanying this transmission contains confidential
information belonging to the sender that is legally privileged. This information
is intended only for the use of the individual or entry names above. If you are
not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying
distribution, or the taking of any action in reliances on the contents of this
telefaxed information is strictly prohibited. If you received this telefax in
error, please notify us by telephone immediately to arrange for return of the
original documents.
--------------------------
Patient Account: 90000014-518
Med. Rec. No.: (0160)118511Q
Patient Name: POULTER, BARBARA Age: 63 YRS DOB: 10/17/34 Sex: F Admitting
Race: C
Attending Dr.: Date / Time Admitted : 12/14/97 1228 Copies to:
UTMB University of Texas Medical Branch Galveston, Texas 77555-0543 (409)
772-1238 Fax (409) 772-5683 Pathology Report
FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS Autopsy' Office (409)772-2858
Autopsy NO.: AU-97-00435
AUTOPSY INFORMATION: Occupation: Unknown Birthplace: Unknown
Residence: Crystal Beach
Date/Time of Death: 12/14/97 13:30
Date/Time of Autopsy: 12/15/97 15:00
Pathologist/Resident: Pencil/Fernandez
Service: Private Restriction: Brain only
FINAL AUTOPSY DIAGNOSIS
I. Brain: Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, Heidenhain variant.
snip...see full text ;
TSS
layperson
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net
